-Caveat Lector- ------- Forwarded Message Follows ------- Date sent: Mon, 07 Jun 1999 15:02:58 -0600 To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] From: Progressive Response <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Subject: European Security, Indonesia ---------------------------------------------------------------------- ---- ----- The Progressive Response 7 June 1999 Vol. 3, No. 20 Editor: Tom Barry ---------------------------------------------------------------------- ---- ----- The Progressive Response (PR) is a weekly service of Foreign Policy in Focus (FPIF), a joint project of the Interhemispheric Resource Center and the Institute for Policy Studies. We encourage responses to the opinions expressed in PR. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- ---- ----- Table of Contents I. Updates and Out-Takes *** NATO & EUROPEAN REGIONAL SECURITY *** *** FISSURES IN THE BEDROCK *** By Jonathan P.G. Bach *** INDONESIA: POLITICS AND HUMAN RIGHTS *** By John Gershman, II. Comments *** SHOULD NOT BE PROUD OF MILITARY SUCCESS *** *** DEEPLY UPSET ABOUT TURKEY *** -------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----- I. Updates and Out-Takes *** NATO & EUROPEAN REGIONAL SECURITY *** (Ed. Note: The initiation of serious negotiations between NATO and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is good news, as are attempts to have the UN Security Council sign off on the proposed settlement and stationing of peacekeeping forces in Kosovo. Another hopeful sign is the decision of the European Union (EU) to take the necessary steps to form a common foreign and security policy. The EU will incorporate the functions of the dormant Western European Union (WEU), holding out the possibility that in the near future the European nations may be able to address regional security issues without the involvement and leadership of the United States and without involving NATO. As the EU's military capacity takes shape, there is the danger that, like NATO, the EU may decide to wield its collective military power outside the bounds of the United Nations. Parallel to the initiatives to strengthen the EU's capacity to act independently of Washington, it is imperative that the world's nations also act to strengthen the UN so as to make it a more credible and effective guarantor of international peace. The following analysis of security aspects of U.S.-West European relations is excerpted from a forthcoming FPIF essay, "The Transatlantic Partnership in the Shadow of Globalization," by Jonathan P. G. Bach <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>. The author is a Post-Doctoral Fellow at the Saltzman Center for the Center of Constitutional Democracy.) FISSURES IN THE BEDROCK By Jonathan P.G. Bach Not all is quiet on the military front either. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is regarded as the bedrock of U.S.-European relations. A primary reason for its perseverance after the demise of its raison d'�tre, the Warsaw Pact, is that NATO's rationale extended beyond deterring the Soviet Union. NATO institutionalized U.S. military relations with Europe in a way that interwar internationalists could only dream of. The original impulse rested most immediately, of course, on the Soviet Union as a threat. But there was also a perception that a lack of American military commitment to Europe per se was threatening, allowing instability and its consequences, whether fascist or communist. Decades later, NATO capitalized on this perception by recasting itself as a political/military organization whose existence was justified by this original concern. NATO was billed as tantamount to U.S. commitment, and hence stability, in Europe. The decision to retool NATO for a post-cold war role essentially meant abandoning alternative European security constellations such as: Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), a wide-ranging, informal consultative body that includes both the U.S. and Russia; an approach drawing on nonoffensive defense; or a collective security model. As NATO increasingly became the only game in town, those critical of the alliance hoped it was truly capable of metamorphosing from a collective defense system into some form of collective security for Europe. The principal concern among critical voices was that Washington would seek to develop NATO as a U.S.-led police force to enhance its interests around the world. This prompted the out-of-area debate about whether NATO forces could be used outside its members' territory for reasons other than self-defense, a question answered by NATO's de facto military action first in Bosnia and then in Kosovo. Although European member states support "upgrading" NATO, they are not as sanguine about continued U.S. dominance within the organization. France, historically suspicious of Washington's perception of European defense, postponed reintegrating its forces with the NATO military command, insisting that a French admiral should command the Southern Fleet. Washington's hypocritical position--refusing to subordinate U.S. troops to any other command, while expecting and insisting that other troops defer to U.S. commanders--is becoming more of an issue. In this context, recent U.S. proposals to give NATO a more explicit role in the maintenance of global stability--including combating nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons--were met with a decidedly cool reaction in Europe. Combined with NATO enlargement and military action in Yugoslavia, Washington's attitude has fueled critics' and skeptics' worst fears of NATO evolving from a defensive alliance into a semiautonomous regional actor drawing new partitions in a Europe still unhealed from cold war rifts. Both European hawks and doves take issue with the U.S. role in NATO. Critics fear that Washington will use NATO as a military extension of its own global activities, subordinating Europe's interests and dragging the alliance into unwanted wars. Even supporters of more aggressive military engagements within Europe criticize Europe's military dependence on the U.S., citing the lack of a European capacity for air transport of troops, strategic reconnaissance, and military technologies such as laser-guided bombs. Thus even among more traditionally inclined officials there is growing sentiment for a more autonomous voice in European military affairs, even if this means working outside of NATO. Here is where divisions within NATO between the U.S. and the EU could become crucial. The oft-maligned Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union, while still a pale version of its economic and social counterparts, remains a pivotal feature of continued European integration. European foreign ministers have now replaced the moribund West European Union, until now the military coordination arm of the EU, with a common defense policy that would allow independent military action. The new entity consists of an EU military committee headed by a new High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Javier Solana, NATO Secretary General since 1995, will assume the new position in December 1999. The EU will now develop its own satellites, intelligence sources and military staff and would have the option to lead operations with or without NATO assets. At the same time, the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, which sets forth the most complete guidelines to date on a Common Foreign and Security Policy, allows an "opt-out" option for EU member states who, for reasons of neutrality or history, feel they cannot participate in a military mission. This procedure is known in Euro-lingo as "constructive abstention," reflecting a desire to dilute the need for unanimity required by the Maastricht Treaty, the 1990 landmark agreement on European political integration. European gestures toward new defense institutions first achieved a new level of significance during NATO's fiftieth anniversary celebration in April 1999, which wore a beleaguered look of gnawing self-doubt illuminated by the failure of air strikes to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo. The war over Kosovo injected an air of near panic about the future of the alliance: "If we do not achieve our goals in Kosovo," warned U.S. Senator Joseph Biden, Jr., ominously in the midst of NATO's fiftieth anniversary, "NATO is finished as an alliance." The Europeans are generally more sanguine about NATO's future, regarding U.S. supremacy--rather than the alliance itself--as being at stake, but the Kosovo crisis clearly highlights the contradictory impulses of NATO's attempt to redefine itself. The war over Kosovo began as a call to maintain NATO's solidarity in the face of seemingly shameful inaction. It became the most serious test yet of NATO's unity in the face of unclear political aims and ineffective military force, which precipitated the very humanitarian catastrophe it was supposed to prevent. As loops of argumentation for and against military action in Kosovo devolved into infinite regress, two consequences resonate: NATO can no longer shroud itself in the mantle of pan-European security where Russia is concerned, and Russian concerns are European concerns. For all the soothing rhetoric in selling NATO enlargement to the Russians, Russia has now gained the ammunition it needs to credibly present NATO as an aggressor and NATO enlargement as a threat. For U.S.-European relations, this reality harbors long-term consequences. At first glance, Washington could exploit the image of a bellicose, if impoverished, Russia to strengthen the alliance. But given the European desire to jettison the U.S. foreign policy umbrella, if not the Pentagon's security umbrella, Washington will not find a replay of the hegemonic aspects of the cold war possible. For Western Europe, and especially Germany, good relations with Russia are of paramount importance, and official support for a renewed enemy image is likely to be luke-warm at best. Beyond the problems unleashed by excluding Russia from meaningful participation in the original decision to use NATO forces in Kosovo, the Balkan war opened rifts both between NATO allies and within them. Greece and Italy grudgingly accept the air war, more out of fear of reproach than any enthusiasm. Hungary became a front-line state two weeks after joining NATO, tempering its show of support after its hard-won NATO acceptance with its concern over the war. Perhaps the most serious threat to NATO's coherence came from the effect of the war on Germany, where the historic Social Democratic/Green Party coalition government struggles with the once seamless, now contradictory, sentiments of "never again war" and "never again Auschwitz." Having failed miserably in preventing the violent implosion of former Yugoslavia, Europe now uneasily participates in the U.S.-led effort. After so much inaction, the European allies are in a weak position to criticize the NATO intervention, especially when President Clinton has made it the centerpiece of his foreign policy. Major changes in NATO are likely to arise in the aftermath of the war in Kosovo. European politicians are preparing the public for higher military expenditures, viewing a modernized military as enabling more options. "We Europeans," states the otherwise pro-American British Prime Minister Tony Blair, "should not expect the United States to play a role in every disorder in our back yard." For the U.S. this does not mean the end of NATO but rather the politically palatable possibility that NATO could henceforth undertake missions using U.S. military equipment but not U.S. troops. NATO is still too important to the new Europe's sense of self and too central to America's role as the purveyor of global security to be discarded rather than modified. Thus, to satisfy both European desires for more autonomy and U.S. desires for less troop risk, the future NATO may look increasingly to ad hoc operations (premised on the idea of "Combined Joint Task Forces") collaborating with Europe's nascent independent military capacity. Washington could then assemble "coalitions of the willing"--those European allies inclined to participate--rather than seeking unanimity within NATO. Should this become the trend, the criticism that selective military action serves geopolitical rather than humanitarian reasons stands to gain more credibility. -------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----- *** INDONESIA: POLITICS AND HUMAN RIGHTS *** (Ed. Note: This update on the political and human rights situation in Indonesia, where voters went to polls for the parliamentary election, comes from John Gershman of the Institute for Development Research. A previous FPIF policy brief, "Indonesia After Suharto," by Abigail Abrash of the Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center for Human Rights is available at http://www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org/briefs/vol3/v3n34ind.html) *** Indonesia: Politics and Human Rights *** By John Gershman, Progress has been uneven on human rights and sustainable development issues in post-Suharto Indonesia. Since B.J. Habibie replaced Suharto in May 1998, the government has released several dozen prisoners, dropped charges against some detainees whose trials were pending, and "rehabilitated" others who had served sentences under the Suharto regime. Along with some greater freedom of the press and the formation of new political parties, these are positive signs. Three major issues will shape the future prospects for democracy in Indonesia: the June 7, 1999, parliamentary elections and its election of the president later in the year, investigations of corruption under Suharto, and the future role for the military in politics. The latter remains the most contentious of all, and the Indonesian military shows no sign of reshaping its dwifungsi (dual function) of both serving the government and being a part of it. The military will retain 38 seats in the new 500 seat national parliament and will occupy 10% of the seats in district and provincial level assemblies. The military's 7.5% of seats in the parliament may enable them to play a key role in shaping the outcome of a probable coalition government. There are serious ongoing violations of human rights, including the continued imprisonment of some Suharto-era political prisoners, repression of pro-democracy activists and workers, and military and paramilitary violence against independence activists in East Timor and Irian Jaya and autonomy movements in the province of Aceh. The U.S. should raise concerns over ongoing violations and provide resources that address the social costs of the crisis. As a major supporter of the military during the thirty years of the New Order, the United States has an obligation to use contacts to pressure the military to reduce its active role in politics. Other major roadblocks to democratization remain, particularly regarding East Timor and the provinces of Irian Jaya and Aceh, as well as other growing pressures for the renegotiation of relations between Jakarta and the Outer Islands. The Habibie Administration tried to accommodate demands for autonomy with a decentralization law that would provide something short of independence for East Timor and undermine large-scale autonomy or secession demands by increasing some local control over government expenditures. In April 1999, Indonesia and Portugal negotiated an agreement under UN auspices for a referendum to be held in August 1999. But a truly free referendum cannot be held while paramilitary groups attack independence supporters with the support of the Indonesian military. Civilian militias have been operating in East Timor with the formal and visible support of local authorities and in some cases are led by civilian or military officials. The military has provided the militias with arms, transportation, medical support and political protection. The U.S. needs to push the Indonesian government and military to allow free access by international humanitarian organizations, human rights organizations and the press, to disarm paramilitary groups, and to reduce its troop presence in East Timor. The U.S. should ban all arms transfers and military assistance until this is done. Similar steps in Irian Jaya and Aceh should also be taken and negotiations opened with the leadership of opposition groups. Even with political democratization and the defeat of Golkar (the current ruling party), human rights issues regarding East Timor, Irian Jaya, and Aceh will continue to exist, as some of the most popular opposition parties oppose independence for East Timor. (John Gershman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> is the author of the FPIF policy brief on the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum and of the forthcoming FPIF Special Report, "Still the Pacific Century? U.S. Policy in the Asia-Pacific.") Sources for More Information on Indonesia and East Timor: Amnesty International Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Committee to Protect Journalists Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Website: http://www.cpj.org East Timor Action Network Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Environmental Defense Fund Website: http://www.edf.org Human Rights Watch/Asia Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Website: http://www.hrw.org Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] International NGO Forum on Indonesian Development (INFID) Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] INFID-Jakarta Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center for Human Rights Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Indonesia Daily News Online http://www.uni-stuttgart.de/indonesia/news/ Jendela Indonesia: Indonesian periodicals http://www.iit.edu/~indonesia/jendela/ KITLV Library: Daily Report of Current Events in Indonesia gopher://oasis.leidenuniv.nl/11/.kitlv/.daily-report -------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----- II. Comments *** SHOULD NOT BE PROUD OF MILITARY SUCCESS *** I think that one should never throw out the baby with the water! If one is trying to save souls: save even more by doing no harm first. Today the civilized world has incredible amounts of humane, effective and legal resources to deal with bad guys. The question is: who is heading the good cause and what is the hidden agenda? As we mature morally, we learn the number one rule in life: nothing is more precious than happiness and peaceful life. If we don't respect others' lives, we can't expect others to respect ours. I don't think that any supporter of the NATO campaign would offer to sacrifice the life of a loved one! Would you sacrifice your spouse, parents or friends? Would Clinton sacrifice his daughter or himself? Would a Kosovar Albanian willingly die for you--especially when his or her death would not save you? It is always easy and cheap for leaders to let other people pay for their questionable glory! We do not save lives by bombing innocent people! We only add numbers to the toll! And before we sacrifice innocent people, maybe we should first ask them if they really wanted to volunteer to die without actually helping one single Kosovar Albanian! We can, and have to help other people! We need to stop monstrous regimes! But NATO and Clinton are not morally mature enough to realize the hypocrisy and wickedness of the military solutions! When you are a hammer everything looks like a nail! When you are a military leader you will try to convince yourself and the world that bombing is the remedy for violations of human rights! But how about the human rights of those who perish or get crippled innocently and needlessly in this Balkan war? Clinton and Milosevic are inhumane persons, along with everybody actively participating in the terrorizing and murdering of human beings in the name of humanity (or nationalism, or military pride) anywhere in the world. These powerful people will probably weasel out of legal punishment most of the time, but they will always have their consciences to torture them for the heartless crimes they committed against humanity with the mindless, blood thirsty support of morally immature people. These monsters are the champions of the inhumane world order. Humans are just not to be trusted with power, because they will always abuse it! All unwise leaders had bad role models! Wise leaders realize the single most important lesson from the past: war and violence will only lead to war and violence. We should not be proud of any heartless military success, because it is nothing, but getting away with murder and terrorism! Clinton, Milosevic and all their followers are immature children, playing with destructive toys and they will be the wrong role models for the next generation! They demand attention by bullying peaceful (and not so peaceful) people! Gabor Kovacs, MD <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> -------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----- *** DEEPLY UPSET ABOUT TURKEY *** I just finished reading your "Turkey: Arms and Human Rights" article (via the Washington Kurdish Institute e-mail news) and wanted to congratulate you on an excellent, informative, convincing article. Having been various times to Turkey, and having also seen Turkish tanks in Iraqi Kurdistan (and currently helping support a family whose father was killed by Turkish bombings in '97 while I was there) I am deeply upset about the massive U.S. (& other) arms sales to such a violent country. Thank you for your informed article, and I hope it will be widely read, hopefully also by those able to influence U.S. policies. (Name withheld out of concerns for personal security) -------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----- -------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----- The Progressive Response aims to provide timely analysis and opinion about U.S. foreign policy issues. The content does not necessarily reflect the institutional positions of either the Interhemispheric Resource Center or the Institute for Policy Studies. We're working to make the Progressive Response informative and useful, so let us know how we're doing, via email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] Please put "Progressive Response" in the subject line. Please feel free to cross-post The Progressive Response elsewhere. 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