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Citation: Journal of Economic Issues Sep 1998, v32, n3, p759(13)
Author: Olson, Paulette
Title: Ending corporate welfare as we know it: an institutional
analysis of the dual structure of welfare. by Paulette
Olson and Dell Champlin
------------------------------------------------------------------------
COPYRIGHT 1998 Journal of Economic Issues-Association for Evolutionary
Economics
In 1996, after years of debate and the accumulation of a vast literature on
poverty, economic dependency, and family structure, the U.S. government voted
to "end welfare as we know it." The federal government officially withdrew the
entitlement to cash assistance and imposed strict time limits on Temporary
Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), the replacement for Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) [Burtless 1997]. Federal regulations require all
recipients to work within two years and limit all forms of assistance to 60
months. States are free to impose shorter time limits and more stringent work
requirements as they see fit. While government assistance for individuals at
both the federal and state levels is clearly in retreat, government assistance
for the business sector appears to enjoy broad public support. Under a wide
array of programs, the federal government assists business in the form of
direct services, cash grants, subsidized credit, as well as through various
tax credits and deductions. Plainly, the call to Wend welfare as we know it"
did not apply to all recipients of government aid.
Corporate welfare is estimated to cost the federal government between $170 and
$200 billion each year [Collins 1996]. This figure far exceeds the amounts
ever budgeted for individual welfare programs. The Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) program cost the federal government $11 billion in
1989. Even Medicaid, which benefits primarily the elderly, was budgeted at $30
billion. This is about half the amount lost to the federal government through
tax credits and deductions given to corporations [Huff and Johnson 1993]. The
irony of fiercely debating programs designed to provide basic food, shelter,
and medical care for indigent individuals while dispersing billions to wealthy
corporations has been remarked upon by a number of analysts. In 1983, Mimi
Abramowitz pointed out that in the "narrow and compartmentalized view of the
welfare state," only the poor receive aid [Huff and Johnson 1993, 442].
Corporations receive "economic incentives."
Recently, corporate welfare has come under attack not only by those who object
to the inequity of providing "assistance to the wealthy" while withdrawing
"assistance to the needy," but also by those who object to government
assistance in all forms [Bandow 1996]. Despite the political coalition
supporting an end to corporate welfare, such efforts are unlikely to succeed
as long as they are based on appeals to "equity" or to "economic efficiency."
Attitudes toward welfare are deeply rooted in cultural myth, not in
benefit/cost analysis. That is, individual welfare is perceived as an
undeserved "hand out" that constitutes a drain on the public treasury. In
contrast, corporate welfare serves the public interest by promoting economic
growth [Gray 1996].
The purpose of this paper is to examine the dual structure of welfare. The
first section reviews the dual structure of welfare policy in the United
States. In the second part of the paper, welfare is analyzed in terms of the
controlling cultural myths. Underlying the dual structure of welfare policy is
a cultural dualism identified by many feminists in which activities associated
with the "economy" attain a higher degree of status and legitimacy than
activities associated with the "family" [Fraser 1989, 149-151; Jennings and
Waller 1990, 627-629]. Within the framework of this dualism, assistance to
corporations has a higher degree of status and legitimacy than assistance to
individuals. So powerful is this dualism that it has undermined the powerful
myth of laissez faire in which government assistance to business is viewed not
only as illegitimate, but as counter-productive. Hierarchical dualisms endow
one side of the dualism with higher status and legitimacy. In the case of
welfare, the higher status and greater perceived value to society accorded to
corporate welfare recipients have led to a greater sense of entitlement to
public resources. This sense of entitlement reinforces and is reinforced by
the racial, class, and gender dimensions of the welfare dualism. In the
conclusion, we discuss the wider implications of the dual structure of
welfare. The main point of the paper is to illustrate that corporate welfare
not only wastes billions of dollars in tax revenues, but reinforces the
growing bifurcation of our society into the privileged and non-privileged.
The Dual Structure of Welfare Policy
The myth of the dual structure of welfare has guided public policy at both the
federal and state levels for years. This myth has led to a proliferation of
programs designed to provide assistance both to individuals and to
corporations. The term "welfare," however, is used only to describe assistance
to individuals. Indeed, describing both aid to individuals and aid to
corporations as "welfare" sounds inappropriate because of the underlying
dualism. Welfare is a term of opprobrium that suggests a number of undesirable
characteristics that are associated not only with the policy, but with the
recipients as well. These traits are not, however, associated with
corporations. If corporations do not belong in the category of "welfare
recipients," then the assistance corporations receive from the government must
not be welfare. The maintenance of this contrived distinction is the key to
the dual structure of welfare policy.
Many of the undesirable characteristics associated with welfare and welfare
recipients stem from the redistributive nature of the program. Ever since its
inception, welfare has provoked a high level of public controversy, because it
is viewed as an unwarranted redistribution of income. For instance, Charles
Murray's 1984 book Losing Ground asserted that welfare programs are flawed
because they provide a disincentive to work. Murray's conclusion is
influential because it reinforces the belief that welfare recipients could
work but just choose not to. In this framework, welfare is simply a
redistribution of income from those who work to those who do not, from those
who pay taxes to those who do not, or from the useful and industrious to the
useless and idle. Corporations, however, are not labeled with these same
attributes. Corporations work, pay taxes, and perform useful services to
society. In sum, corporate recipients of government assistance are not viewed
in the same negative way as individual welfare recipients because government
assistance to business is not viewed as redistributive. And if it is not
redistributive, then it must not be "welfare."
Government assistance to corporations avoids the label of "redistributive" in
two basic ways. First, the key justification for corporate welfare is that it
will benefit society. So influential is the dual structure of welfare that
merely asserting that a policy will provide jobs or other economic benefits is
enough. Actual delivery of these benefits to the community is neither a
"condition" nor a cause of withdrawal of the government program. Payments to
corporations recycle into the economy because they increase the amounts
businesses can spend. Since all spending by business is "investment,"
corporate welfare is simply a form of investment that increases the overall
circular flow of income throughout the economy. On the other hand, individual
welfare payments do not recycle as part of the circular flow. The dual
structure of welfare puts spending by welfare recipients into a different
category which is separate and distinct from the household sector. Hence money
spent on the poor apparently serves no discernible economic purpose.
The second way that corporate welfare avoids the redistributive stigma is
through its "invisibility." For instance, one of the major benefits
corporations receive is a reduction in taxes. This type of corporate welfare
is less visible and is not seen as a redistribution of income because no funds
are actually transferred. A tax credit or a tax deduction that results in a
lower tax liability has the same impact on government revenues as a government
transfer payment, but the perception by the public is often very different.
For example, the majority of Americans receive a housing subsidy from the U.S.
government in the form of mortgage interest deductions. In the case of
residents of low-income housing, this subsidy consists of reduced rent or a
housing voucher. Even though the size of the benefit is usually much greater
in the case of the mortgage interest deduction, few homeowners would consider
this benefit "welfare." In order to be "welfare," there must be a
redistributive aspect to it that is much easier to see as in the case of a
cash or in-kind government transfer.
Likewise, corporations receive many forms of government assistance that are
"invisible." Corporations have access to subsidized government credit in the
form of loan guarantees, below market interest rates, and tax-exempt
development bonds. Private business interests are allowed the exclusive use of
public resources such as water, acreage, and minerals at rates well below
market. State and local governments build and maintain infrastructure such as
roads, bridges, harbors, water, and sewer systems in order to attract new
business and then exempt these businesses from the taxes that support this
infrastructure. Government regulations requiring the use of certain products
amount to an outright subsidy to selected industries. Corporate welfare in the
form of tax deductions, credits, exemptions, loan guarantees, and government
regulations are "invisible" because they do not show up as an item in the
federal budget. In contrast, programs for individuals such as Medicaid, School
Lunches, and Head Start require direct expenditures and transfer payments.
Thus, they are discussed as part of the annual budget approval process.
Moreover, the precise cost to the government can be easily determined. In
contrast, corporate welfare that is indirect or hidden is much more difficult
to estimate accurately.
The Intellectual Foundation of the Welfare Dualism
As the foregoing discussion suggests, the dual structure of welfare policy in
the United States is rooted in a set of hierarchical dualisms that we label
"the welfare dualism" (see Table 1). In this dualism, government assistance to
corporations is treated as an economic incentive. An economic incentive
metaphorically implies the encouragement of socially beneficial outcomes such
as greater investment, more jobs, and higher incomes. That is, our tax dollars
are well spent on corporate welfare because corporations are the primary
source of domestic prosperity and competitive success in the global
marketplace. In contrast, government assistance to individuals is associated
with handouts and economic disincentives, which ultimately lead to
joblessness, poverty, and other socially detrimental outcomes. Indeed,
feeding, clothing, housing, and educating the nation's poor is considered
unproductive and a waste of the nation's limited resources.
The bifurcation between corporate and individual welfare is deeply rooted in
the Western intellectual tradition. Since the Enlightenment, Western thought
has been governed by a set of Cartesian-inspired dualisms: mind vs. body,
reason vs. emotion, culture vs. nature, fact vs. value, objective vs.
subjective, and so on [Harding 1986, 123-125]. These binary oppositions
socially construct the way we understand reality in three basic ways. First,
each pairing represents mutually exclusive categories. Something can be either
this or that, but it cannot be both. For instance, the opposite of "fact" is
"value." The opposite of "logic" is "intuition," and so on. Second, each term
depends on the other for its meaning. For instance, subjective is understood
as "not objective." Emotional is understood as "not rational." Third, these
pairings assert not just epistemological differences, but hierarchical
orderings. In Western societies, for instance, reason, objectivity, and
science are understood as superior to and more highly valued than emotion,
subjectivity, and non-scientific pursuits. Indeed, we have learned to value
only one side of the dualism.
The Primacy of the Market
Embedded in the welfare dualism is the intellectual bifurcation of economic
reality and the social elevation of market relations over other forms of human
interaction. In pecuniary culture, market relationships set the standard for
what counts as valuable "economic" activity. The corporation - the
quintessential pecuniary institution - is thereby rendered separate and
superior to all non-market-oriented institutions such as households, unions,
government agencies, and educational systems. As the cultural symbol of the
"economy," corporations set the standard by which "other" institutions are
judged inferior, deficient, and not-the-economy. Only corporations are
understood as productive, efficient, and contributing to economic growth and
prosperity. In contrast, households are unproductive. Unions and government
agencies are inefficient bureaucracies constraining economic growth. Expertise
is understood to reside in the corporate suites of America, not in the halls
of academia or government agencies. Note the growing representation of
university professors as "unproductive" and government workers as "amateurs"
and "losers." This is a political rhetoric that resonates with an American
public who have been taught to value only one side of the dualism (see Table
2).
This claim to superiority has the further advantage of sheltering corporations
from public view. By defining unions, consumers groups, environmentalists,
welfare activists, and other non-corporate entities as "special interest
groups," the corporation is able to perform a disappearing act. Recall the
NAFTA debate in which unions were characterized by the media as having a
"special interest" because they lobbied hard against its passage. Likewise,
environmentalists have been charged with having an unfair "special interest"
in the jobs versus the environment debate in the Pacific Northwest. Even the
homeless, who are unable to purchase their "special interest," are defined as
such. On the other hand, corporate executives who do, in fact, buy their
congressmen have somehow escaped the label of "special interest."(1) Indeed,
corporate interest is understood as natural or self-evident in the context of
pecuniary culture. Corporate interest reflects society's interest. In this
way, the corporation becomes invisible. This invisibility stems from the
dualistic understanding that the "economy" is separate and distinct from the
political realm of public discourse defined as "not-the-economy" [Jennings
1992] (see Table 3).
The political debate over welfare has followed the same epistemological and
rhetorical path. When corporate welfare is discussed, it enters the discourse
as an "economic" concern, on a level above the non-scientific discourse of
politics. Public assistance to poor families is reduced to a political matter.
Moreover, to further legitimate the higher "economic" status of corporations
over "non-economic" families, the welfare dualism takes a gender-specific
form. That is, if the quintessential pecuniary institution is the corporation,
then the quintessential non-pecuniary institution is the family. Indeed, the
social construction of the family as "not-the-economy" is powerfully raced,
classed, and gendered [Jennings and Champlin 1994]. As representative of the
masculine, monetized marketplace, corporations are socially elevated above the
female domain of the family, where women's unpaid work is not valued and
defined as unproductive. Embedded in this dualistic construction is the
hierarchical understanding of masculine roles of corporate autonomy and
control and the female roles of dependency, passivity, and non-economic. Poor
families are constructed as female, non-white, and members of the underclass.
Whereas the cultural symbol of welfare recipients is the black, welfare
mother, the cultural symbol of the corporation is the white, male CEO.
Families are poor because their female heads prefer leisure over labor and are
only interested in producing babies. In contrast, the corporation is rich
because corporate leaders are highly motivated, productive, and focused on
producing the highest quality product at the lowest possible price. That is,
corporations exist to serve society. In contrast, poor women are portrayed as
drains on society. They are associated with drug addiction, child abuse, and
other deviant behaviors defined by the "culture of poverty." Corporate leaders
avoid these labels. Corporate crime is described as "white" collar crime and
treated as such. Alcoholism, drug addiction, and other socially unacceptable
behaviors among America's corporate leaders are not subjects of academic
scholarship, media focus, political rhetoric, or public concern. Like
corporate welfare, they remain invisible (see Table 4).
As indicated above, the supremacy of corporate activity over familial activity
can be traced to the primacy of pecuniary relations over non-pecuniary
relations. However, the epistemic authority of corporations also requires a
particular definition of the economy that corporations supposedly represent,
namely, a "laissez-faire" economy. In this bifurcation of economic reality,
the "economy" is understood as superior and in opposition to the "state" (see
Table 5).
The controlling myth of this dualism is the principle of laissez faire. In our
culture, the market is assumed to be the natural condition of humankind. It is
self-regulating, self-correcting, and all-solving. Private, monetary
relationships based on egoism naturally lead to socially beneficial outcomes.
Any attempt by the state to improve on these outcomes will have a contrary
effect. The state can only "interfere" with the market and obstruct the
attainment of optimum outcomes. The primary role of the state is protection of
private property rights, thereby guaranteeing the smooth operation of the
"free enterprise" system. In this way, the market mechanism conceptually
subjugates the political sphere. Indeed, the market substitutes for democracy
because it gives people what they want. Corporations, which supposedly speak
for the market, are understood to speak for "the people."
Within this dualistic framework, however, corporate welfare poses a dilemma.
How can corporations share the virtues of the "laissez-faire" economy yet
simultaneously accept public assistance from the state? To reconcile this
dilemma, it is necessary to introduce a familiar set of hierarchical dualisms
used in economic courses today (see Table 6).
In this dualism, economic reality is partitioned into "perfectly competitive"
and "imperfect" markets. In the abstract world of "the market," firms are
small and subject to the impersonal forces of supply and demand. Competitive
pressures guarantee efficient outcomes and consumer sovereignty because firms
are forced to compete on the basis of costs rather than price. The competitive
firm represents the world of entrepreneurs, risk takers, and technological
innovators. Firms are progressive and dynamic, and they invest only in
productive activities, generating real economic growth. They employ millions
of workers who have the ability to consume the goods and services they
produce. Indeed, the profit-making decisions of firms lead to a higher
standard of living for everyone as reflected in the upward trend of the gross
domestic product.
On the other side of the dualism, firms are less homogeneous. They are
associated with a variety of market structures - monopolistic competitors,
oligopolists, and monopolists. These "imperfect" markets are more complicated
and do not assure efficient outcomes or consumer sovereignty - the benefits of
a laissez-faire economy. In our abstract world, they are of little theoretical
importance because they do not represent the "market." They are anomalies,
exceptions, or deviations from the norm of laissez hire. Thus, by definition,
"imperfect markets" are insignificant for understanding the "laissez-faire"
economy.
Thus, the contradiction between laissez faire and corporate welfare is
resolved. The "imperfect" side of the dualism fades, and economic reality is
reduced to only one side of the dualism. Corporations, as quintessential
representatives of economic reality, are socially constructed as
"competitive." The fact that corporations are imperfect competitors, rather
than perfect competitors, is overlooked because the distinction between
perfect and imperfect competition is important only in the classroom.
It is now possible to merge the welfare dualism with the set of laissez-faire
dualisms (see Table 7). By privileging one side of the dualism over the other,
all markets share the virtues of the laissez-faire economy. In this way, the
supremacy of the market is retained. In this intellectual sleight of hand, the
virtues of the market become the virtues of the corporation. But is this still
laissez faire? The answer is technically no, since government intervention in
the economy is now permitted. However, the underlying ideology of laissez
faire remains intact. For the most part, government expenditures and transfers
are still regarded as unnecessary and harmful, and government itself is still
viewed as an inefficient bureaucracy. Indeed, government programs are exempt
from this negative portrayal only if they are associated with the "market."
Thus, any government policy that is "pro-market" is acceptable, while any
government policy viewed as "anti-market" is unacceptable. Moreover, since
corporations are now equivalent to the "market" economy, any policy that is
"pro-business" is, by definition, pro-market. For example, governmental
regulations to safeguard the environment or protect workers and consumers are
"anti-business" and are acceptable only if they pass a benefit/cost test. In
fact, the importance of designing policies to promote business has transformed
some environmental regulation into a form of corporate welfare. The federal
government gave more money to corporations for pollution control in 1989 than
it spent on secondary and elementary education put together [Huff and Johnson
1993, 315]. On the other hand, a reduction in the capital gains tax is
considered desirable as a spur to economic growth and requires no benefit/cost
analysis. And although the vast majority of academic economists believe the
effect of a capital gains tax reduction on investment will be minimal [Fuller,
Alston, and Vaughan 1995], this belief is less important than the
characterization of this move as "pro-business."
Implications and Conclusions
The implications of welfare dualism extend well beyond the distinction between
"anti-market government regulation" and "pro-market government incentives."
The most important inference of the dualism is that all government assistance
to individuals is constructed as harmful - not only to business, but to the
individual recipients themselves. The cultural myth that bifurcates economic
reality between corporations and the family informs welfare policy. Poor women
are socially constructed as idle and unproductive and are therefore the source
of poverty. Therefore, only behavior modification in the form of "workfare" or
forced labor will rid the economy of poverty. Indeed, to make the poor work
harder, government assistance must be either more difficult to obtain,
personally degrading, or totally eliminated. In contrast, to make the rich
work harder, corporate welfare must be easily accessible, personally
gratifying, and unlimited. The poor need discipline, while the rich require
rewards [Buckley 1996].
The second implication is that government assistance to corporations is given
priority over other forms of public spending. Government expenditures on
individuals or non-market institutions are unnecessary and harmful, while
government assistance to corporations is beneficial. The absurdity of this
ideological construction can be seen in the resulting policy choices. The
federal government cannot afford to underwrite school lunches for indigent
children or the vaccination of infants, according to some politicians, but we
can afford to underwrite overseas advertising of McDonald's hamburgers, Gallo
wine, Campbell's soup, and Pillsbury bakery products [Bandow 1996, 10; M.
Moore 1996, 45]. At the state level, the choices are even more stark because
of the size of economic development expenditures in state and local budgets.
Education is the primary responsibility of most local governments, yet school
budgets must be squeezed to make way for "economic incentives." Jim Benn,
executive director of the Federation for Industrial Retention and Renewal,
believes the tradeoffs are clear.
This is an issue whose time has come because too many giveaways are gnawing
away at the tax base of our communities. Teachers and firemen are being laid
off, and homeowners and small businesses are getting stuck with even more of
the burden [Greenwald 1996, 44].
Finally, corporations appear to "need" incentives. They even need incentives
to provide jobs for people on welfare. Indeed, the Clinton administration
supports a private sector initiative aimed at finding jobs for welfare
recipients. Not surprisingly, the initiative is headed by one of corporate
America's finest - Monsanto Corporation's chairman, Robert Shapiro [Sawyer
1996]. Following this initiative, state after state has rushed to pass bills
offering tax incentives and subsidies to corporations that hire welfare
recipients. In response, a whole new growth industry has been created. As one
headline put it: "Giant companies entering race to run state welfare programs"
[Berstein 1996]. That is, in order to save money on individual welfare, we
have to spend more money on corporate welfare.
What we have created is a "culture of dependency." Corporations can no longer
be expected to provide jobs, to invest, or to produce without government
assistance. We have created an "endless cycle of dependency" - a "way of life"
for a whole group of people. Thus, we suggest that any attempt to get
corporations "off the dole" will have to be no less dramatic than the way we
ended AFDC.(2)
Table 1. The Welfare Dualism
Corporate Welfare
Incentives Benefits Society Greater Investment Creates Jobs Generates Income
Source of Growth
Individual Welfare
Handouts Drains Society Redistribution Disincentive to Work Tax Burden Source
of Poverty
Table 2. The Primacy of Markets/Corporations
Corporate Welfare
The Economy Corporations Productive Efficient Generates Prosperity
Non-bureaucratic Experts Management Businessmen CEOs
Individual Welfare
Not The Economy Other Institutions Unproductive Inefficient Constrains
Economic Growth Bureaucratic Neophytes Union Leadership University Professors
Government Administrators
Table 3. Dualisms of Political Discourse
Economic
The Economy Corporations Society's Interest
Political
Not the Economy Non-Corporate Entities Special Interest
Table 4. The Gender/Race-Specific Form of the Welfare Dualism
Corporate Welfare
Corporations Masculine/Market Autonomy Active Participants White/Male CEOs
Produce Goods/Services Mainstream Motivated/Productive Serve Society
White-Collar Crime Normal
Individual Welfare
Poor Families Feminine/Non-economic Dependency Passivity Non-white Mothers
Produce Babies Underclass Lack Work Ethic Welfare Abuser Deviant Behavior
Pathological
Table 5. The Laissez-Faire Dualism
Economy
Entrepreneurship All-solving Democratic
State
Bureaucracy Obstructionist Authoritarian
Table 6. The Ideal Economy
Perfectly Competitive
Price Takers Efficient Atomistic Individuals Consumer Sovereignty Equal Power
Invisible Hand Theoretical
Imperfect Markets
Price Makers Inefficient Powerful Groups Producer Sovereignty Unequal Power
Visible Fist Empirical
Table 7. The Welfare/Laissez-Faire Dualism
Economy
Corporations Incentives Benefits Society Greater Investment Creates Jobs
Generates Income Source of Growth Entrepreneurship All-Solving Efficient
Productive
State
Non-Market Institutions Handouts Drains Society Redistribution Disincentives
to Work Tax Burden Source of Poverty Bureaucracy Obstructionist Inefficient
Unproductive
Notes
1. See for instance Editors [1996, 20-25], which documents the specific
amounts.
2. Some have suggested revoking corporate charters, for instance the program
on Corporations, Law and Democracy (POCLAD).
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56, no. 6 (November-December 1996): 611-13.
Paulette Olson and Dell Champlin are Associate Professor of Economics, Wright
State University, and Associate Professor of Economics, Eastern Illinois
University, respectively. This paper was presented at the annual meeting of
the Association for Institutional Thought, Albuquerque, New Mexico, 1997.
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