___________________________________________ Visit Stratfor's NEW Middle East & Africa Intelligence Center http://www.stratfor.com/meaf/default.htm ___________________________________________ ALSO ON STRATFOR.COM One China, Two States: Taiwan's Evaluation of Geopolitics and Clinton http://www.stratfor.com/asia/commentary/c9907190220.htm Are Russian Security Forces Again Acting Without Presidential Approval? http://www.stratfor.com/CIS/commentary/c9907171655.htm __________________________________ STRATFOR's Global Intelligence Update Weekly Analysis July 19, 1999 Barak Tries to Redefine the Peace Process in Washington Summary: The Middle East peace process has obsessed and collapsed over the Palestinian question for decades. Ehud Barak wants to redefine the issue; instead of focusing on the Palestinian question, he wants to focus on a peace treaty with Syria. He has good reason to believe that Syria is ready for a peace settlement. The problem, in our eyes, is not Syria but Turkey. Israel and Turkey are allied against Syria. The United States is highly dependent on Turkey for its regional strategy and is not eager to see the boat rocked. The U.S. must be convinced that accords with Syria can be the foundation for Syria's general integration into America's regional system and not the preface for a geopolitical upheaval. On the whole, from the American point of view, sticking with the Palestinians is the safer course. Analysis: Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak has taken office and arrived in Washington for meetings with President Bill Clinton and his national security staff. The Clinton administration, as always, is eager to restart the peace negotiations between Israel and the Arabs. Given the rhetoric of the campaign and the early actions of Ehud Barak, the administration has reason to believe that there is now some real possibility of a peace accord with Syria if not the Palestinians. This shift to a focus on Syria by Barak must be examined carefully, because it has broad geopolitical implications. To begin with, it is important to understand that, rhetoric aside, there has been a general Arab-Israeli peace in place for nearly a quarter of a century. The last general war occurred in 1973. That war set the stage for a general peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. Israel and Jordan have been in close alignment for many years. With two of the three frontline states neutralized, the only military threat to Israel came from Syria and Syria alone did not constitute a credible threat. Neither the Lebanese situation nor the Palestinian situation constituted a life- threatening situation for Israel. From a purely military standpoint, they were fairly trivial and manageable problems. At the same time, they drained military resources and had a dramatic effect on morale, both military and civilian. Most important, unlike the direct military threats faced in the past, neither the Lebanese nor Palestinian issues could be settled with a definitive, military solution. This was a reality difficult for Israel's political culture to absorb, and Israel kept searching for a military solution where there was none. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 was emblematic of the problem. The direct occupation of Lebanon protected northern Israel from the occasional rocket attack. The cost was a prolonged occupation by Israeli forces, exposure to casualties, substantial financial expense all without solving the problem. Indeed, Israeli exertions were consistently out of proportion to the problems. Because neither issue was life threatening, Israeli interest in solving the problems was driven as much by domestic political consideration as by strategic analysis. As a result, the peace process in Israel was always hostage to the national mood. That mood was always deeply divided and changeable. This meant that the peace process was highly manipulable, not only by political figures, but also by elements that wanted to see the peace process fail. Terrorist actions on both sides could rapidly redefine the dynamics of negotiations. Every peace talk was hostage to the next terrorist act. Barak is extremely sensitive to this reality. His own government can be easily fragmented. Barak has therefore chosen to shift his focus from the Palestinian question or even the Lebanese question. Instead, he has chosen to focus his attention on an agreement with Syria. Barak has, we think, grasped something critical about Israel's position. Israel cannot create a stable situation in Lebanon or even among the Palestinians without first reaching an agreement with Damascus. Israel will not be able to withdraw from Lebanon until there is an entity prepared to control Hezbollah and other anti-Israeli groups operating in the south. By itself, the Lebanese Army is incapable of bringing the south under control. Syria can bring order to the south, but Israel cannot permit Syrian troops or even Syrian-controlled Lebanese troops into the south without a firm and comprehensive settlement with Syria. Moreover, such an understanding will serve to further isolate Palestinian radicals like Hamas, hurting their morale and decreasing their effectiveness. For Barak, the key is in Syria. This would be a major shift for the U.S. The Americans have been obsessed with the Palestinian question for decades, certainly since the Camp David Accords mandated some sort of peace process involving the Palestinians. Moreover, Washington is deeply suspicious of Syria. This is not only a matter of concern over Syrian support for terrorism, but also that Syria intersects two issues of fundamental interest to the U.S. There is deep tension between Syria and Turkey. Turkey is a key American ally. Any settlement with Israel that opens the door for Syrian adventures in Turkey is unacceptable. There is also the matter of Iraq. Hafez al Assad and Saddam Hussein are mortal enemies. That does not mean that they can't work together this is the Middle East, after all. The U.S. is clearly beginning to increase the pressure on Iraq again, as forces used in Kosovo are freed up. The U.S., concerned that Russian arms availability increases Syrian unpredictability, are concerned about releasing Israeli pressure on Syria. Therefore, Barak's job this weekend has to been to persuade Clinton and Albright that a settlement with Syria is the precursor to a comprehensive settlement with the Palestinians and will not destabilize the region. To begin with, Barak had to explain why he expects Assad to be open to a settlement now, when he has flirted with them in the past but always avoided signing one. There are three reasons, we think, why Assad is open to a settlement. 1: Assad is a member of the generation of Arab leaders who came to power in the late 1960s and early 1970s. They took their bearing from Gamel Abdul Nasser. They were military men, committed to modernization using the army as the prime vehicle. They had overthrown both the British- created monarchies and the religious authorities linked to them. They believed in the Arab nation, socialism and modernism. They spawned a generation of Arab radicalism that is now passing into history. Hamas and Hezbollah are not modernist, not socialist and not Arabist. They are Islamic to the core, and Assad sees them as a threat to his regime and his life. His cooperation with the Iranians was never heartfelt. It was only pragmatic. Assad has fought Muslim fundamentalists inside Syria and crushed them. He fears Hezbollah and Hamas even as he uses them. He is 69 and has heart disease. He would like to secure his political heritage before he goes. In one of history's ironies, a deal with Israel would help Assad do this. 2: The intensifying Israeli-Turkish alliance has unnerved him tremendously. The Syrians despise both the Turks, who oppressed them for centuries, and the Israelis. Assad also hates the Iraqis. That leaves Assad only the Mediterranean to be friendly with. Earlier this year, Turkish forces were actually threatening Syria militarily for their support of Kurdish separatists. Assad knows that Syria is now the isolated country, not Israel. Assad also understands that Syria's dispute with Israel is less profound and personal than his dispute with Turkey or Iraq. Indeed, they have interests in common. Syria must break the anti-Syrian front posed by Turkey and Israel. He has more room to maneuver with Israel. 3: Assad badly wants an agreement with Israel over Lebanon. Syria has always claimed that Lebanon was part of Syria. Even if that claim is never enforced, Syria in general and Assad personally have intimate ties and fundamental interests inside Lebanon. A stable, prosperous Lebanon is essential for Syrian development. The same forces that threaten Israel inevitably fragment and destabilize Lebanon. This has little to do with religion. When Syria first intervened in Lebanon in the 1970s, it was in support of the Christians and in opposition to the PLO. Israel and Syria have a shared interest in a stable Lebanon. Indeed, they have been cooperating in various ways for years. Israel no longer has the stomach for patrolling southern Lebanon. Syria holds the keys and it is in Syria's interest, at this time, to use them. If an agreement with Syria were reached, then all of Israel's borders would be secured by treaties for the first time in history. Now, treaties are only paper. But the military threat from Syria would be not much greater with a treaty than without. Much is made of the Golan Heights, but rarely by Israeli military professionals. If Syria wanted to bombard Israeli settlements, they could do so right now, without retaking the Heights. Moreover, fighting a holding action with its back to an escarpment is not something the Israeli Defense Forces want to try again. Israeli forces west of the Jordan river would have a field day picking off Syrian armor descending the Golan escarpment. They wouldn't have to be on the Golan to seal them off. The real threat would come from Syrian forces passing through Lebanon and hitting Israel along its northern frontier. That, however, has been a threat since the founding of Israel. It hasn't happened because the logistical problems involved and the opportunities for counterattack are too great. More important, Syria has never and will never attack Israel alone. It is not large enough or strong enough. It will attack only in concert with Egypt. The threat of Lebanon or Golan is meaningful only in the context of a fundamental reversal of the geopolitics of the region. Were that to happen, these issues would pale into triviality anyway. An agreement would include an Israeli withdrawal from the Golan, retention of key facilities on Mount Hermon, a joint agreement on Israel security interests in Lebanon to be guaranteed by Beirut, and a Syrian guarantee of support for Beirut in these efforts. The net result would be the liquidation of Hezbollah in southern Lebanon and the complete isolation of the Palestinians in the Arab world. This would not end anti-Israeli terrorism; there will always be Palestinians prepared to strike at Israel. However, it would weaken their access to weapons, intelligence and political support. It would also strengthen the hands of Palestinians within the Palestine National Authority that want to move on with developing the Palestinian state. Indeed, statehood would turn from a major issue into an administrative abstraction. In the long run, what does it matter what Palestine is called, so long as it is isolated and surrounded by suspicious former enemies like Israel and the Hashemite Jordanians? Barak is therefore proposing to redefine the driving issues in the region. It is not clear that the Americans will be particularly happy with this choice. American eyes are increasingly on areas where a strong and secure Turkey could be essential. An agreement with Israel strengthens Syria and inevitably threatens Turkey. Negotiations with the Palestinians, win or lose, do not effect the geopolitics in the region. Negotiations with Syria can and do. Thus and this is the interesting part here one of the keys to this strategy rests in Ankara. in order to head off Turkish pressure on Washington, Israel must convince the Turks that an agreement with Syria will not threaten them. Thus, Barak has initiated a powerful strategic move, but like all things in the Middle East, the unintended consequences are substantial. Syria will have to make some promises to the Turks and that will be hard to do. Barak's initiative will force Washington to think through some of the strategic principles that have governed U.S. policy in the region. The U.S. has deepened its relationship with Turkey during and since the Kosovo war. The U.S. is depending on Turkey to influence events in the Caucasus. The U.S. is increasing pressure on Iraq once again. The situation in Iran appears somewhat unstable. There are fundamental strategic questions on the table in the region, and Barak has just dumped another one on the Administration's desk. Barak's Syrian initiative cannot be treated in isolation, precisely because this time, an opening to Syria might well work. The question now is whether the United States wants it to work and if so, how should it be made to work? ___________________________________________________ SUBSCRIBE to FREE, DAILY GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE UPDATES (GIU) http://www.stratfor.com/services/giu/subscribe.asp or send your name, organization, position, mailing address, phone number, and e-mail address to [EMAIL PROTECTED] UNSUBSCRIBE FROM THE GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE UPDATES (GIU) http://www.stratfor.com/services/giu/subscribe.asp ___________________________________________________ STRATFOR.COM 504 Lavaca, Suite 1100 Austin, TX 78701 Phone: 512-583-5000 Fax: 512-583-5025 Internet: http://www.stratfor.com/ Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] ___________________________________________________ (c) 1999, Stratfor, Inc.
