___________________________________________ What's going on in your world? Find Out. Visit Stratfor's Global Intelligence Center http://www.stratfor.com/world/default.htm ___________________________________________ OTHER FEATURES ON STRATFOR.COM NATO Remains at Core of Russian Foreign and Domestic Power Struggles http://www.stratfor.com/CIS/commentary/c9907192020.htm Sharif Seeks International Rewards for Withdrawing Troops from Kashmir http://www.stratfor.com/asia/commentary/c9907191750.htm Barak Tries to Redefine the Peace Process in Washington http://www.stratfor.com/SERVICES/GIU/071999.ASP __________________________________ STRATFOR.COM Global Intelligence Update July 20, 1999 Turkey Accused of Attacking Iranian Targets Summary: Iranian media has reported that a number of Iranians were killed when Turkish planes bombed suspected Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK) positions inside of Iran. Turkey has denied carrying out the strikes. Iranian media has also suggested that Turkey may have been behind provoking the recent student unrest in Iran. Iran and Turkey routinely trade diplomatic barbs, and this could be a groundless spat. After all, Turkey has enough domestic and international concerns to deal with without increasing tension with Iran. But given ongoing international realignments, Ankara may not be entirely averse to ratcheting up tension with Iran at this time. Analysis: On July 18, Iranian television broadcast a statement by the Iranian foreign ministry condemning a Turkish air raid on border outposts in the mainly Kurdish inhabited Piranshahr area in Iran's Western Azerbaijan province. The report claimed that positions of A Brigade of the Third Martyr's Division were hit during the raid, with one Revolutionary Guard soldier reportedly killed and two wounded. The governor of Western Azerbaijan province also claimed that five civilians were killed and ten were wounded. The next day, July 19, the Iranian Army command issued a statement emphasizing that it has the right of "proper response" to these provocations. It also said that Iran holds Turkey responsible for the "further development of events." Turkish Defense Minister Sabahattin Cakmakoglu denied the Iranian charges, saying that he had no information on the claims, and added only that his office was still collecting information on the matter. On July 19 Turkish NTV Television, quoting sources at the foreign ministry, said that the Iranian claims were simply not true. Diplomatic rows between Tehran and Ankara are nothing new. Turkey has repeatedly accused Iran of sheltering PKK rebels. Iran has denied these accusations and claims that there are no PKK bases on its territory. Iran has previously condemned Turkish intervention in Iraq, though it has also refrained at times from condemning such intervention depending on the surrounding circumstances. Iran has spoken out against Turkey's military cooperation with Israel. Tension increased between the two countries last week over student unrest in Tehran. Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit said that the students were justified to protest against an oppressive regime. Iran protested Ecevit's comments and charged that the unrest was caused by foreign interference. The Tehran Times went so far as to suggest that Turkey may have provoked the riots. Still, despite their regular diplomatic sniping, Iran and Turkey have avoided serious confrontation, and both have good reason not to exacerbate this situation. Turkey does not need to provide Iran with a justification for supporting the Kurds, just as it is mopping up the remnants of the PKK. And Iran is attempting to cope with internal unrest and a power struggle between moderates and conservatives, and does not need an international crisis at this time. However, assuming for the moment that the Iranian allegations are true, there is one justification for Turkey risking -- even fomenting -- a temporary crisis with Iran. Last week, Greek, Armenian, and Iranian officials met in Ankara to discuss expanding economic cooperation. That would have been relatively mundane, had not the Iranian and Greek defense ministers announced prior to the meeting that the three countries intended to sign a military cooperation pact. If one looks at a map, it is obvious that any such alignment would be meant to contain no other country but Turkey. While there were no reports that a pact was signed, and Armenian and Greek officials denied the potential for such a pact, the public statement of intent said enough to Ankara. Armenia and Syria are currently re-equipping their militaries with some of the latest Russian technology, and Greece is facilitating the sale of Russian arms to Greek Cypriots. Greece has maintained constant pressure on Turkey over airspace violations as well. Turkey nearly went to war with Syria a few months ago over Syrian support for the PKK, and relations between the two countries have shown little sign of improvement. The Turkish Army continues to make occasional forays into northern Iraq, and Baghdad has been less complacent about Ankara arming the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) -- Turkey's Kurdish allies in Iraq. As potential threats to Turkey increase, support from its allies appears fade. Since the Kosovo crisis marked Turkey as a reliable NATO member and the Greeks as a thorn in the organization's side, Turkey has had to worry about NATO trying to improve relations with Greece at its expense. As it is, Turkey's peacekeeping troops were kept few in number and their arrival in Kosovo was delayed, though considering Turkey's relations with Albania and the threat they pose to Greece, concern over Turkey's deployment is understandable. Turkey also has to worry about the accelerated strategic positioning underway between Russia and the West in the Caucasus and Central Asia in the wake of the Kosovo crisis. Russia's relations with the West have become far more confrontational -- a sleeping bear awakened -- and the U.S. is rushing to solidify relations to Russia's south. This is apparently occurring in part at Turkey's expense, as the U.S. is easing its support for the expensive proposed Baku-Ceyhan pipeline to the Turkish coast in favor of a quicker, cheaper expansion of the Baku-Supsa route to Georgia and a new route from the Bulgarian coast through the Balkans. Turkey's military cooperation with Israel seems less secure with the election of new Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak. Barak is pressing for a comprehensive peace settlement involving Syria, Lebanon, and the Palestinians -- a plan which could strengthen Syria and decrease Israel's commitment to Turkey. Additionally, Barak is certain to continue pursuing long-running Israeli back channel talks with Iran to contain Iraq. And while Iranian President Mohammad Khatami is unlikely to sign a formal peace treaty with the "Zionists," he could facilitate a substantial decrease in tension, reducing Israel's need for involvement in eastern Turkey. Ankara is looking at a regional situation in which its foes are becoming stronger and more belligerent and its friends are being distracted from their commitments to Turkey. If there are grounds to Iran's allegations, this may explain the Turkish attack. Taking a page from Pakistan's foray across the Kashmir Line of Control, Ankara could have risked an air raid, then denied it, in hopes of sparking a little tension and winning greater attention from the U.S. and the West. A little instability can go a long way. Iran will have to reconsider Turkish-Israeli links. Syria will reconsider its position and its negotiations with Israel in light of Iranian-Turkish tension. The U.S. will have to pay more attention to Turkish adventures against the Kurds. Of course Pakistan's venture backfired. And if Turkey is playing the same gambit, it risks souring ties with both Israel and the U.S. while adding Iran to its list of foes. __________________________________________________ SUBSCRIBE to FREE, DAILY GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE UPDATES (GIU) http://www.stratfor.com/services/giu/subscribe.asp or send your name, organization, position, mailing address, phone number, and e-mail address to [EMAIL PROTECTED] UNSUBSCRIBE FROM THE GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE UPDATES (GIU) http://www.stratfor.com/services/giu/subscribe.asp ___________________________________________________ STRATFOR.COM 504 Lavaca, Suite 1100 Austin, TX 78701 Phone: 512-583-5000 Fax: 512-583-5025 Internet: http://www.stratfor.com/ Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] ___________________________________________________ (c) 1999, Stratfor, Inc.
