Here is an overview. For the entire document (28 pages ) in .pdf go to
http://www.gulfwarvets.com/mac.htm
THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS
AND
CONFLICT SHORT OF WAR
Steven Metz
and
James O. Kievit
July 25, 1994
The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not
necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of
the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
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FOREWORD
For many experts on U.S. national security, the combination of emerging
technology and innovative ideas seen in the Gulf War seem to herald a
genuine revolution in military affairs. The victory of coalition forces
demonstrated the technology and seemed to suggest that the revolution in
military affairs can solve many of the strategic problems faced by the
United States in the post-Cold War security environment.
In this study, the authors concede that the revolution in military affairs
holds great promise for conventional, combined-arms warfare, but conclude
that its potential value in conflict short of war, whether terrorism,
insurgency, or violence associated with narcotrafficking, is not so
clear-cut. Given this, national leaders and strategists should proceed
cautiously and only after a full exploration of the ethical, political, and
social implications of their decisions. To illustrate this, the authors
develop a hypothetical future scenario--a "history" of U.S. efforts in
conflict short of war during the first decade of the 21st century.
It is too early to offer concrete policy prescriptions for adapting many
aspects of the revolution in military affairs to conflict short of war, but
the authors do suggest an array of questions that should be debated. In
order to decide whether to apply new technology and emerging concepts or
how to employ them, the United States must first reach consensus on
ultimate objectives and acceptable costs. The Strategic Studies Institute
is pleased to offer this study as a first step in this process.
JOHN W. MOUNTCASTLE
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
Many American strategic thinkers believe that we are in the beginning
stages of a historical revolution in military affairs (RMA). This will not
only change the nature of warfare, but also alter the global geopolitical
balance.
To date, most attention has fallen on the opportunities provided by the RMA
rather than its risks, costs, and unintended consequences. In the arena of
conflict short of war, these risks, costs, and unintended consequences may
outweigh the potential benefits.
The Strategic Context.
The Cold War notion of conflict short of war is obsolete. Politically and
militarily, the Third World of the future will be full of danger. The
future will most likely be dominated by peace enforcement in failed states,
new forms of insurgency and terrorism, and "gray area phenomena." Many if
not most Third World states will fragment into smaller units.
Ungovernability and instability will be the norm with power dispersed among
warlords, primal militias, and well-organized politico-criminal
organizations. U.S. policy in the Third World is likely to be more
selective and the U.S. homeland may no longer provide sanctuary. Renewed
external support will restore the lagging proficiency of insurgents and
terrorists.
The Application of Emerging Technology.
Emerging technology will have less impact on conflict short of war than on
conventional, combined-arms warfare. It will, however, have some role. In
noncombatant evacuation operations, new technology can assist with
identification and notification of evacuees. Sensor technology, robotics,
nonlethal weapons, and intelligence meshes will be used in combatting
terrorism, countering narcotrafficking, and peace operations. These
technologies, along with simulator training and unmanned aerial vehicles,
will also be useful in insurgency and counterinsurgency.
Constraints and Countermeasures.
There are a number of constraints on applying the RMA to conflict short of
war. These include the lack of a powerful institutional advocate for this
process, a shortage of money for the development of technology specifically
for conflict short of war, and the possibility that new technology may run
counter to American values.
Enemies may also develop countermeasures to RMA innovations. Rather than
attempt to match the technological prowess of U.S. forces, future enemies
will probably seek asymmetrical countermeasures designed to strike at U.S.
public support for engagement in conflict short of war, at the will of our
friends and allies, or, in some cases, at deployed U.S. forces.
Making Revolution.
Rather than simply graft emerging technology to existing strategy,
doctrine, organization, force structure, objectives, concepts, attitudes,
and norms, the United States could pursue a full revolution in the way we
approach conflict short of war. This is rife with hidden dangers and
unintended consequences. A hypothetical future scenario illustrates some of
these.
Conclusions and Recommendations.
In the near future, change will occur in the American approach to conflict
short of war. To understand and control ongoing change, research, analysis,
and debate is needed on a number of topics:
* A comprehensive general theory of military revolutions set within the
context of broader notion of global politics and security;
* The strategy and policy foundation of military revolutions;
* The ethical dimension of RMA;
* The impact of the RMA on the structure of the U.S. national security
organization;
* The impact of RMA on leader development within the military;
* The cultivation of appropriate expertise within the Army; and,
* Technology designed specifically for conflict short of war, especially
psychological, biological, and defensive technology.
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To view the complete study in an Adobe Acrobat format, click
HERE.
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