-Caveat Lector-
Re secret agencies' use of journalists:
See also Covert Action magazine. They did most of an issue on "The CIA
and the Media" dated Spring-Summer 1983. Includes some interesting stuff
on ownership of the media, the plot to kill the pope, democracy as a cover
story, and some disinformationists who are still around and functioning
today. I would suspect power elements would be using hypnotised
journalists as well, but that is just a personal comment. It is issue 19,
and back copies are available from CAQ, 1500 Massachusetts Ave. NW, #732,
Washington, DC 20005 at US$8 - or credit card order at fax (USA)
202-331-9751, or e-mail them at [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Lyn
AC Szul Jr ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) wrote:
>I vaguely recall a site that talks more about this same topic, but can't
>place the URL. Anyone?
>
> ---- Original Message -----
>From: Para [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
>Sent: Tuesday, August 31, 1999 1:40 AM
>To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>Subject: MI6 & the Media
>
>
> MI6 & the Media
>- SUPER SLEUTHS -
>
>The allegation that Sunday Telegraph editor
>Dominic Lawson is an MI6 spy has raised the
>spectre of links between the media
>and intelligence services.
>
>A former agent, who cannot be named,
>provides a compelling insight.
>
>========================================
>"M16 has an entire highly secret department
>dedicated to manipulating media opinion"
>========================================
>
>Journalism and spying have a long and intertwined history.
>Graham Greene and Somerset Maugham are just two of the
>better-known journalists who have crossed the blurred line into
>the intelligence world. Both professions have a great deal in
>common, benefit each other and compete with each other.
>
>Inevitably there always has been, and always will be, close
>contact between the two sides.
>
>Until the recent allegation in the House of Commons by the
>Labour M.P. Brian Sedgemore, that Dominic Lawson, editor
>of the Sunday Telegraph, is a paid agent of MI6, the extent
>of the co-operation between M16 and elements of the British
>media has been a keenly guarded secret, kept quiet even
>within MI6 itself.
>
>Lawson denies the allegation, but there is nothing particularly
>wrong with journalists mixing in the intelligence world and using
>spies as sources, as long as the information from such sources is
>treated with the same scepticism and impartiality as information
>from any other source.
>
>However, clearly there is everything wrong with a journalist or
>worse an editor, acting as an agent of a state intelligence service,
>particularly one as politically unaccountable as MI6.
>
>Most Western governments recognise the dangers of such
>collaboration and have strict rules and guidelines governing the
>degree of contact between their intelligence services and their media.
>
>Even the CIA, which wields more power in its country's policies
>than most other Western intelligence services, is prohibited from
>cultivating contacts in the American media.
>
>But no such strictures apply to MI6. Indeed, MI6 has an entire
>department, known as "Information Operations", or "I/Ops" for
>short, dedicated to manipulating media opinion. The existence
>and operations of I/Ops are kept secret even within MI6 itself,
>such is its obvious sensitivity.
>
>Normally, it is only when officers reach a relatively senior level
>and are posted overseas that they are briefed into its activities
>and key assets.
>
>The scope and objectives of information operations performed
>by the intelligence services are varied and often highly imaginative.
>The bread-and-butter work is in massaging public opinion into
>accepting controversial foreign policy decisions. The plethora of
>media stories about Saddam Hussein's chemical and biological
>weapons capability was no accident - the ante was upped so that
>there would be less of a public outcry when the bombs started to
>fall. Sometimes the objective may be to influence events in another
>country or organisation in a direction favourable to Britain.
>
>For example, MI6 made a determined (but unsuccessful) effort to
>plant discrediting stories in the American press about Boutros
>Boutros Ghali, whom they regarded as dangerously Francophile,
>in the run up to the 1992 elections for UN secretary-general.
>
>Often, the intelligence Services may use information operations
>simply to defend themselves against criticism or public hostility.
>They worry about their public image, not only because they need
>political support to justify their existence and budgets, but also
>because it affects staff morale. They therefore expend considerable
>energy behind the scenes to ridicule their critics and publish their
>successes.
>
>The results of these tactics can be seen in the ferocious attacks in
>certain newspapers on those who publicly criticise the intelligence
>services, such as former M15 officer David Shayler. It is no
>coincidence that the same newspapers carry an abundance of "scoop"
>stories on intelligence-related matters.
>
>So how exactly do intelligence services manipulate the media to their
>own ends? Three main tactics are used to get what the intelligence
>services want us to believe into the press or on to our TV screens.
>
>The first and most straightforward is simply to give off-the-record
>briefings to trusted journalists. We see the results of these briefings
>regularly in our media, referred to obliquely as "intelligence sources".
>Such sourcing is so omnipresent in the British press that we tend to
>accept the veracity of the information without challenge.
>However, the intelligence services cannot afford to lose the trust of
>their media contacts, or the public at large, so a basic rule is never,
>or at least rarely, spread false information using this method. This rule
>is only broken if the stakes are particularly high or the chances of the
>story being disproven are negligible.
>
>The second tactic used by the intelligence services to persuade the
>media to run a story is slightly more subtle - the "double source".
> This tactic, more difficult to manage and set up, is used particularly
>to spread disinformation and misleading stories. A tantalising titbit is
>first fed to a journalist by an intelligence officer in the normal way
>but with the caveat that it is a "rumour", or "not reliably sourced".
>That way if the information is subsequently exposed to be untrue,
>the trust between the intelligence officer and his media contact is
>not prejudiced. But the intelligence officer goes home after the
>meeting smug in the knowledge that any reputable journalist will
>seek corroboration for the story.
>It is not uncommon for the media and intelligence services to
>share the same sources and so frequently a journalist will seek
>corroboration from a source already under the control of the
>intelligence services.
>
>Whereas the media use their sources only passively ie, to extract
>information, the intelligence services will persuade that same
>source, or agent in their terms, to act proactively. They will
>persuade the agent to give the journalist a misleading story that
>will corroborate the "rumour" planted a few days earlier.
>
>With the story now apparently independently confirmed, even
>the most sceptical and impartial journalist will accept the line
>first put to him by the intelligence officer and so the story will
>end up in the media. This technique, and more complicated
>variations on it, are regularly used by MI5 and MI6 to plant
>stories.
>
>The BBC's Panorama programme has regularly been a victim
>of such operations.
>
>Arguably, there is nothing much wrong with the intelligence
>services manipulating the media in this way It is a tactic used,
>in one variation or another, by any public relations company
>or spin doctor.
>
>But it is the third tactic that clearly crosses into dangerous
>moral territory.
>The recruitment of Dominic Lawson - if true - is a spectacular
>example of this.
>Alas, it is probably not the only one.
>
>The intelligence services are always on the lookout to recruit
>people with influence in the media. This way a story can be
>proactively directed by the intelligence officer, rather than
>diluted by the judgement of the journalist.
>The agent can then be used to influence the views of his
>colleagues or even double-source other journalists.
>
>How do the intelligence services go about recruiting such
>assets?
>
>Virtually every journalist working in the field of politics,
>defence or international affairs will at some stage in their
>careers meet, either socially or professionally, a member
>of the intelligence services. They may not necessarily know
>they have done so, because the officer will be working
>undercover. M16 officers have been known to work in
>British embassies overseas as embassy press officer because
>the job gives them access to so many journalists.
>
>At the first meeting, perhaps at a social function, the intelligence
>officer will make an assessment of the target journalist's access
>to useful information, his psychological make-up, his political
>leanings, his influence and potential usefulness. Then the
>journalist will be traced on the internal computer system
> (to check that he or she does not already have a personal file)
>and a record of that meeting will be written up.
>
>>From that moment he or she will have a personal file, which
>will be added to every time his or her path crosses that of the
>intelligence service.
>Virtually every journalist working in areas of professional
>interest to the intelligence service will have a file.
>
>Most targets will be rapidly dismissed as unrecruitable. They will
>be either too principled, regarded as ideologically unsound,
>unreliable, or indiscreet. But if they are judged to be recruitable,
>then the intelligence officer will arrange a series of meetings, all
>the while sticking to the cover under which contact was first made.
>Sometimes a second officer will be introduced to get a second
>opinion. MI5 and Special Branch records will be called up and
>reviewed and the opinions of friends and colleagues will be gleaned.
>
>Once a detailed profile of the target is built up - and this may
>take several years - a decision is taken to attempt a conscious
>recruitment. This decision is not taken lightly The consequences
>of a recruitment attempt being rebuffed are far more serious in
>the case of a journalist than any other target, simply because he
>has the means to turn the tables and publicise the attempt.
>Careful consideration is given to what motivation the journalist
>may have to work for the intelligence service.
>
>The final clearance to attempt a recruitment of a junior journalist
>would be given in-house by a relatively senior officer.
>Only if there were a risk of political embarrassment to the
>government would a submission be put to the Foreign Secretary
>to seek permission for the attempt.
>
>Certainly there is no way that MI6 would ever contemplate
>seeking permission to recruit a serving newspaper editor - it
>would certainly never be signed off by any Foreign Secretary.
>
>However, if an editor had been recruited early in his career,
>before his rise through the ranks, M16 would not be obliged
>to inform the Foreign Secretary of the new situation.
>
>Assuming the target accepts, the usual operational practice is
>to give the new "agent" an immediate assignment. That way,
>it makes it harder for the agent subsequently to back down,
>and it also gives the officer a chance to assess the ability and
>commitment of his new charge.
>
>The sort of tasks given to the recruited journalist will depend
>upon his job, his position and his seniority.
>
>A junior journalist would probably be used mostly for
>double-sourcing, or spreading disinformation. As he became
>more trusted, and rose up the journalistic career path, he
>would have more influence and prestige so the tasks given to
>him would change.
>
>More often, he would be asked to lead a breaking story and
>be given more sensitive scoops.
>
>If the intelligence service were lucky enough to have one of
>their agents promoted to an editorship, the possibilities would
>be endless. An editor clearly holds considerable influence over
>his newspaper's readership, and this is a most powerful advantage
>to the intelligence service. But editors also have considerable
>influence in Fleet Street and indeed in the wider media.
>
>An editor can be persuaded to wine and dine other influential
>editors, pushing a particular angle on a story, in a way that MI6
>cannot do directly themselves. For example, senior M16 officers
>rarely dare invite other newspaper editors to a private lunch -
>and it would be unlikely that an editor would accept.
>But presented with a lunch invitation from a rival colleague,
>most newspaper editors are far too intrigued at the motive to
>decline, giving MI6's man the opportunity to develop a
>favourable story
>
>Editors also have the opportunity to offer cover to MI6
>agents travelling overseas under cover as journalists. Under
>the guise of a journalist, an MI6 officer would have access
>to individuals and areas of conflict that would be closed to
>diplomats or government officials. Although the officer will
>generally try to stick to freelance cover, it is useful to have
>the backing of a commissioning editor who can be relied
>upon to provide a reference should someone become suspicious.
>
>The extent of the collaboration, unwitting or otherwise,
>between our media and the intelligence services will probably
>never be fully uncovered, but there is clearly danger in the murk.
>
>It would perhaps be more acceptable if our intelligence
>services were fully accountable to our democratic systems
>so that at least elected politicians, rather than MI6 officers
>themselves, were setting the objectives and parameters of
>information operations.
>
>But proper accountability of the intelligence services still
>seems some way off.
>
>Until that date, we can only hope that the recent negative
>publicity around the Lawson allegations will persuade journalists
>who are intertwined with the intelligence services quietly
>to extricate themselves.
>
>=================== end =================
>
>
>MUST SEE ALSO:
>
>CIA: THE USE OF JOURNALISTS
>pages at Mario's Cyberspace Station
>The most comprehensive source
>related to the use of journalists by
>the intelligence agencies
>
>http://mprofaca.cro.net/ciapress.html
>
>-------
>Caution: It's your right to remain silent after reading this message;
>Anything you answer might be used against you on Internet.
>"Yes, the world is a sick place, and Mario Profaca is its webmaster"
>(The New York Times)
>http://mprofaca.cro.net/mainmenu.html
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