-Caveat Lector-
The Nation ran this story in May. Why is the mainstream press acting so
amazed that the militias are now behaving as they are? Why are they so
reluctant to state that these acts of terrror are planned and abetted by the
Indonesian military and the hapless Indonesian regime? Could it be the fact
that the U.S. backed, trained, and financed the Indonesian military? That
the U.S. tacitly recognized Indonesia's right to invade and annex East
Timor? That it was, in fact, the U.S. that helped create Indonesia's brutal
police state in 1965, going so far as to provide the Suharto regime with the
names of 30,000 "suspects," most of whom were later disappeared? Once again
American "truth, justice, and the American way" is unleashed upon an
innocent populous. And once again the American people are deceived and
distracted by their own press.
Lucio
May 31, 1999
License to Kill in Timor
http://www.thenation.com/issue/990531/0531nairn.shtml
Following the ouster of Indonesia's President Suharto last year, the new
government agreed to give the people of East Timor--which was illegally
seized by Indonesia a quarter-century ago--the chance to vote for
independence. But as veteran journalist Allan Nairn reports, the powerful
Indonesian military and its militias in Timor are engaged in a ruthless
effort to intimidate the Timorese population. --The Editors
Jakarta
According to the number-two commander of East Timor's notorious newly formed
militias, the Indonesian armed forces (TNI-ABRI) have made a secret "accord"
with the militias, authorizing them to assassinate members of local
independence groups.
Herminio da Costa, chief of staff of the thirteen Timorese militias, says
the accord has been in effect since late January. He says it authorizes his
men to "attack homes, interrogate and kill members of the CNRT [the National
Council of Timorese Resistance, the nonpartisan, pro-independence umbrella
group] and Fretilin [a left-leaning pro-independence party]," as long as the
militias refrain from common crimes like "car theft and stealing food."
Speaking in a series of phone interviews from militia headquarters in
occupied Dili, da Costa described how his men had executed unarmed "enemies
of the people" but said that these killings had been carried out with prior
clearance from TNI-ABRI.
Da Costa said he was disclosing the existence of the accord for the first
time publicly in order to illustrate his claim that the militias are, in
fact, independent. Reacting testily to questions about Jakarta's role in
launching the militias, da Costa denied that he and his men were operating
with impunity. "We can be arrested at any time like any ordinary Timorese,"
he said. When asked exactly what he meant by that, da Costa said that the
Timor police and army command, with formal approval from Jakarta, had worked
out with his men a series of ground rules for mayhem in occupied Timor that,
in effect, grant the militias an official--but conditional--license to kill.
Da Costa spoke warmly of the Indonesian army now occupying East Timor, an
army that has caused the deaths of one-third of the original population. The
army guarantees his local business holdings (he claims the militias are
self-financing), and he has long served it openly as an informant and
collaborator. He praised General Wiranto--now the TNI-ABRI national
commander and Indonesia's Defense Minister, who once served in Timor--as a
"very good friend"; he said the same of Gen. Zacky Makarim, who now oversees
Timor policy. But he complained that since the independence vote for Timor
was announced in January (the vote is now set for August 8, under a UN
agreement), the army has been under pressure to provide protection for its
longtime enemies. Da Costa says the accord was in part a solution to this
political problem and in part a means of addressing the fact that
"unauthorized violence" by the militias was at times causing headaches for
the army and its subunit, the police.
Da Costa portrays the militias as an autonomous player in this deal. He
says, contrary to much evidence, that the army gives them only "moral
support." Even if that were true, it would not change the nature of the
accord: In January the army and the militias worked out a division of labor.
"Now the ABRI was 'protecting' the Fretilin," da Costa explained, "and we
were the ones who were assaulting Fretilin and CNRT homes." He argued
strenuously that this license came at a price. The law was laid down to
them, da Costa said: no stealing, no mugging, no rackets. In the event of
such actions, "we can be arrested and disarmed." He added, "But if we kill
CNRT or Fretilin members, no, there is no problem." Consistent with da
Costa's claims, none of the militiamen have been arrested for political
murders (one foreign diplomat estimates a toll of 100 victims in the past
month)--though it is also the case that they have openly continued their
common-crime spree. Da Costa says that the accord was worked out in Dili
with the police chief, Col. Timbul Silaen, and the army command staff and
that Timor's army chief, Col. Tono Suratman, "gave permission to do assaults
on houses but not without his authorization and knowledge." The same applies
to interrogations of independence supporters. Col. Suratman did not respond
to messages left at his home asking for comment. Col. Silaen could not be
reached.
Shortly before the first high-profile militia massacre, in Liquisa on April
6, da Costa was sworn in as militia chief of staff in a public ceremony by
Gen. Adam Damiri, the TNI-ABRI commander for the region that includes East
Timor. Following Liquisa, on April 17, after open threats to "invade" Dili
and "wipe out" and "clean up" all vestiges of independence support, the
militias staged a public ceremony, overseen by the occupation governor and
attended by General Makarim and at least three other senior officers, in
front of the Dili government palace. There followed an open militia rampage
through the deserted streets of Dili--with police and army standing aside,
cheering and giving high-fives--that left the houses of key independence
leaders sacked and burned, an estimated twenty dead and several dozen
missing.
When I asked da Costa about Liquisa, Dili and militia executions generally,
he said that all these killings fell under the terms of the January accord.
"We don't have authorization to kill every day," he explained, "only when we
are assaulted"--though the assaults apparently need not be physical. He
claimed that the Liquisa killings arose from physical attacks on militia
members by pro-independence youth instigated by the CNRT and Fretilin. (The
militias do not attempt to engage the armed Falintil guerrillas, the
resistance force that has fought in the mountains ever since Indonesia
invaded in 1975 and that has, according to US officials, been in a "stand
down" posture in recent months.) But da Costa does not dispute the fact that
his forces assaulted the Liquisa church and rectory, a horrific attack that
left blood and pieces of scalp on the walls, and dozens hacked to death.
Da Costa's point is that the Liquisa victims had it coming politically.
Yayasan Hak, the Timorese human rights and legal group, says the victims
were refugees. It has published the names of fifty-seven dead, many of them
women and children; some survivors say many more died. Da Costa claims that
local "people asked us to kill them [the victims]. For us it wasn't a
disaster. For the people of Liquisa it was a liberation." He adds that in
Liquisa the militias asked the TNI-ABRI for backup--and got it from the
BRIMOB, a unit specializing in crowd control. As BRIMOB lobbed in tear gas
and fired gunshots, the militia machete-men waded in.
Da Costa says, "We assaulted the church and the rectory as Fretilin command
posts. Those who died were not simple people. They were activists, CNRT
members.... If we kill them, they say they died as people. But no, they died
as Fretilin."
Manuelito Carrascalao, the 16-year-old son of Manuel Carrascalao, a CNRT
political leader, died in the Dili rampage when militias attacked his
father's house, murdering him and more than a dozen of the refugees
sheltering there. Survivors were taken away and have reportedly been put in
a concentration camp. For da Costa, Manuelito's death was consistent with
the militias' mission. Manuel Carrascalao, he said, is "an enemy of the
people." When the militias arrived, they found that Manuel was not home (he
had left moments before to seek help from Colonel Suratman, who had brushed
him off). The execution of Manuelito was "punishment for his father's
activism," according to da Costa. "If he hadn't been the son of Manuel, he
wouldn't have died."
As this was written, reports came in of another Dili rampage, with at least
three reported deaths. No arrests have been made.
On May 5 Indonesia signed a UN deal in which the government pledged to stay
neutral in the Timor vote and to enforce the law impartially. But speaking
on May 11, da Costa said that as far as the militias knew, their accord with
TNI-ABRI "remains in force." The license to kill still holds.
Allan Nairn
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