-Caveat Lector-

 FCC MANDATES NEW TELEPHONE SURVEILLANCE FEATURES

On Friday, August 27, the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) ordered
the nation's telephone companies to modify their switching
equipment to
provide more information to government agencies conducting
electronic
surveillance.  The Commission largely rejected privacy
concerns and aligned
with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which had sought
the enhanced
monitoring capabilities under the 1994 Communications
Assistance for Law
Enforcement Act (CALEA).

The decision was the latest step in a long-running struggle
over the
surveillance potential of communications technology. CALEA
was enacted in
1994 after the FBI complained to Congress that new digital
technology and
other advanced services would soon make it impossible to
carry out wiretaps
and other electronic surveillance.  The FBI originally
sought direct
control over phone system design.  Congress refused to grant
the Bureau
that kind of power, but adopted CALEA with the intent of
balancing law
enforcement, privacy and industry interests.  Congress made
it clear that
CALEA was intended to preserve but not enhance government
monitoring
capabilities.  The Act left design decisions to the
telephone  industry,
subject to FCC review.

However, soon after CALEA was enacted, the FBI began
insisting on very
specific surveillance features, including some never before
available to
the government.  After industry worked with law enforcement
agencies to
draft technical standards to put CALEA into effect, the FBI
claimed the
industry plans did not go far enough and petitioned the FCC
to order
additional, specific surveillance features.  CDT claimed
that the industry
plan failed to protect privacy and opposed the FBI's
add-ons.
_________________________________________________________________

(2) TURNING CELL PHONES INTO TRACKING DEVICES; OTHER
FEATURES

The most immediately disturbing element of the FCC's ruling
was its
requirement that cellular and other wireless phone companies
provide the
capability to identify where their customers are at the
beginning and end
of every call, effectively turning wireless phones into
tracking devices.
In 1994, FBI Director Louis Freeh testified twice before
Congress that
CALEA did not cover this kind of location information.
While many cellular
systems already have some ability to locate callers, CDT
argued to the FCC
that this should not be a mandatory element of system
design.  CDT was
concerned that, as the technology evolves, the FBI is likely
to seek more
and more precise location information.  The FCC ignored the
legislative
history and rejected CDT's concerns

In addition, for both wireline and wireless systems, the FCC
ruled that
six other specific surveillance features sought by the FBI
were required by
CALEA. One of the six requires carriers to ensure that the
government will
be able to continue listening to those on a conference call
after the
criminal suspect has dropped off the call. Another add-on
guarantees the
government access to credit card numbers and bank account
data generated
when a user punches numbers on a telephone. Other add-ons
ensure government
access to the detailed signaling information generated in
connection with
calls, information that law enforcement would obtain under a
legal standard
lower than the one required to conduct a wiretap. CDT and
the telephone
industry had argued that none of these items was required by
CALEA.

Carriers are currently required to comply with most aspects
of CALEA,
including the location mandate, by June 30, 2000.  The other
features
required by the FCC last week must be available to the
government by
September 30, 2001.

_________________________________________________________________

(3) PACKET SWITCHING - CALEA'S SLEEPER ISSUE

One CALEA issue of immense importance has received little
press attention:
how to conduct electronic surveillance in packet
environments.  Packet
technology, until recently used mainly on the Internet,
breaks
communication into many small packets, each consisting of
some addressing
information and some content.  For efficiency's sake, the
packets may be
transported by various routes, and are reassembled at their
intended
destination to create a coherent communication.  Packet
technology is
becoming increasingly important for voice communications,
posing the risk
that the government will obtain access to the content
portion of packets
when it has only satisfied the lower legal standard for
intercepting the
call routing or addressing information.

CDT argued that CALEA imposes on carriers an affirmative
obligation to
design their equipment, to the extent  technically
reasonable, to withhold
content from the government when the government has not met
the legal
standard to intercept it.  Industry responded that carriers
should be
allowed to disclose everything to law enforcement, including
content, and
rely on the government not to read (or listen to) what it is
has no
authority to intercept.

The FCC declined to require carriers to protect the privacy
of packet
communications that the government is not authorized to
intercept.
Instead, the FCC requested the industry to report on what
steps can be
taken to protect the privacy of packet communications.  Last
Fall, the
Commission asked the same question and industry said that
protecting
privacy was too hard.  This leaves it to CDT to prove to the
industry that
the technology can be designed to protect privacy.

______________________________________________________________

(4)  CDT EXAMINES APPEAL

CDT had believed that CALEA was a balanced statute.  We had
accepted the
FBI Director's assurances that the statute would not be used
as a mandate
for cell phone tracking, and we had believed that the FCC
would resist any
FBI efforts to dictate surveillance enhancements. Yet on all
the issues
that mattered, the Commission ruled against privacy and in
favor of
expanded law enforcement surveillance.   The ability of the
FBI to turn
CALEA on its head does not generate confidence in government
claims to be
seeking balanced solutions on other issues such as
encryption.

CDT is deciding whether to appeal the decision of the FCC to
the federal
Court of Appeals in the District of Columbia.

As of August 31, the full text of the FCC's order has not
been released.
The only official description of the FCC's action comes in
the form of FCC
press releases, which are available at
http://www.cdt.org/digi_tele/fccpress0899.shtml

For background on CALEA, go to
http://www.cdt.org/digi_tele/.

_______________________________________________________________________

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