-Caveat Lector- From http://www.centraleurope.com/features.php3?id=90795 > September 8, 1999 > > On Czechs, the Great Myth-Makers > By Tomas Pecina > > Few nations have created so many myths about themselves as the Czechs. > As with other national mythologies, Czech myths mostly concern the > history and self-perception of the ethnic group. > > The most famous myth of the last century even took on literary form. > There was much rejoicing among Czechs when, almost simultaneously, two > seemingly medieval manuscripts were discovered in two different Bohemian > towns, which not only emulated, but in some respects surpassed the > famous German saga, the Nibelungenlied. However, their fame was > short-lived. They were masterworks of sorts indeed, but not of an > ancient minstrel; as it turned out, they were a sophisticated fake, > concocted by two contemporary writers and linguists, Vaclav Hanka and > Josef Linda. > > I remember clearly the day back in the 80s when my high-school teacher > of Czech language and literature explained this - understandably > extremely sensitive - topic to his students. Puzzling? Humiliating? Not > at all! Thanks to the excellent counterfeit, explicated the teacher > while gesticulating expressively, Czech arts, sciences and politics > underwent rapid development, and Czechs became more self-conscious and > emancipated in relation to their German adversaries. It was a fraud, but > a fraud for a good cause and, therefore, a fully excusable one. > > With the declaration of Czechoslovakia in 1918, what was previously the > nation's mythology became state ideology. The leader of the secessionist > movement and the first president of the country, Tomas G. Masaryk, was > perceived by many as the ultimate idol, a god-like figure. Also the > Czechoslovak legions fighting the Bolsheviks in Siberia soon became > idolized and deified. Czechs, who had not won a single war for the > previous five hundred years, started viewing themselves as a nation of > invincible, Herculean warriors. > > World War II and its aftermath, the forcible expulsion of a > three-million community of Sudeten Germans from the country, was covered > by a whole new layer of protective mythology. Books and movies from that > time, overflowing with nationalistic pathos, have retained their > popularity among Czechs to this day. > > Protection and preservation of the nation's integrity were also the > objectives of numerous post-war myths. > > One of them described Czechs as a better, "cultural" nation, an island > of higher culture among Byzantine barbarians. Not a single nation was > spared from Czech contempt, except, in part, Slovaks, who were depicted > as rather primitive, though not so hopelessly backward as, say, Poles or > Hungarians, or as shallow and dumb as Germans. > > Another myth, one that survived the fall of Communism in 1989, is that > of the exceptional qualities of Czech workers and technicians, compared > to their foreign counterparts. The illusion of "zlate ceske ruce" > (literally, "golden Czech hands") had its heyday in 1960s; everything > seemed easy in the revolutionary Spring of 1968. With one notable > exception of Antonin J Liehm, all Czechoslovak journalists of that time > failed to perceive the difficulties lying ahead. Prague's economic > experts were unanimous in their optimistic forecasts: give us five or > ten years of democratic development, and Czechoslovakia will surely > catch up with Austria, perhaps even with Germany. The invasion and > normalization that followed made an abrupt end to any hope for the > democratization of the country, so the myth of the Czech worker as a man > of superior manual skills and ingenuity could live on. > > The early 90s were a period of sobering up and deep disillusionment. The > old myths offered no protection anymore. Not only were manual skills and > craftsmanship regarded as inadequate and rather obsolete in the upcoming > information age, but the actual gap between Czechoslovakia and Western > Europe turned out to be much larger than both sides had ever thought. > Czechoslovakia's Western neighbors were very successful, but Czechs, as > well as Slovaks, were not allowed to partake in that success. They found > the door to the European integration shut, and their country a woeful > backyard of the continent for as long as two or three generations to > come. > > New myths coping with this predicament are still in the making. One of > them is told by those who returned home from the West. According to > their interpretation, Czechs are at least as capable as any Westerners. > The problem is that they are too humble. Ask an American if he can do > this or that, and he'll, no doubt, reply: Yes, of course! Czechs, on the > other hand, are always honest, and this is why they are never given > their fair share of opportunities. > > This is true, though not the whole truth: most Czechs, due to their > deficient, discipline-and-drill oriented system of education, lack > assertiveness, communication skills (including, but not limited to, the > command of foreign languages) and the ability to find and analyze > information. Due to the government's telecommunications policies, the > Internet is still a luxury only the better-off can afford. Young people > are allowed to travel abroad, but except for university students, they > cannot work in the West in other than the least qualified jobs, often as > au-pairs or seasonal agricultural workers. > > The Czech government is well aware of all these problems, but it is > doing nothing about them. It is currently busy with other things, such > as imposing tighter controls over the press with its new press law, or > preparing a new bill on an electoral law which would make it even more > difficult for new people and new parties to enter Czech politics, making > a political career a life-long job about as secure as that of a plumber. > > As long as this situation prevails, new myths excusing and ameliorating > Czech failures will be born. The worst - though not unlikely - scenario > is that frustrated Czechs will give their vote to the Communists, and > due to the ensuing international isolation, the window of opportunity, > opened for the nation temporarily by the events of 1989, will > permanently close. Then, once again, Czechs will be left with nothing > but themselves and their myths. > > Reprinted with permission from Central Europe Review. > © 1999 European Internet Network Inc. All rights reserved. From http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/en/1999/08/?c=02spin > Big guns for hire > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > From Argentina to Estonia, Israel to Britain, Western-style political > consultancy is a growth industry dominated by a few US superstars. As election > campaigns lose political content, political parties are withering and the impact > of money and marketing is increasing. These developments are linked to the > ideology of the "middle way" which unites "modern" politicians of left and right > in unquestioning acceptance of the rules of the global market economy. Even > though it could stem the rising tide of civic apathy, the subject of social > inequality is becoming a no-go area. by SERGE HALIMI > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > > > > Sidney Blumenthal's itinerary may seem a little tortuous. Early in his > journalistic career he analysed the emergence of political consultants as a "new > power within the American political system". Politicians were ephemeral, he > warned, but consultants were permanent. They were encouraging dealignment and > the demise of parties - and hyping up petty, symbolic squabbles that could > easily be used to manipulate the depoliticised masses - in order to increase the > number of floating voters who could be influenced by political marketing. He was > scathing about the notion of "government by opinion", denouncing the grip of the > opinion polls on politics and the "permanent campaign" in which elected > representatives were engulfed (1). That was twenty years ago. > > When he received us at the White House, it was clear that Blumenthal had > changed. He had become a man to be reckoned with: an advisor to the president of > the United States, a friend of Tony Blair and an exponent of Blair and Clinton's > "third way". The Washington Post headline announcing the president's acquittal > by the Senate hung in a frame on the wall of his little office not far from a > shot of Clinton and Blair both beaming. With his official gobbledegook and > peddling of the official line, the presidential advisor had become a full-time > practitioner of what he had denounced 20 years earlier. > > In the meantime the system whose workings he had exposed has taken over the > planet. The four main "consultants" in Clinton's two presidential campaigns - > the 1992 threesome (James Carville, George Stephanopoulos and Stanley Greenberg) > and the 1996 solo act (Dick Morris), as well Arthur Finkelstein, advisor to > several Republican parliamentarians - have globalised their operations. They > have served as strategists for the leaders of Brazil, Honduras, Greece, Ecuador, > Panama, South Africa, the United Kingdom and Germany. This year alone, both main > parties in Israel (Labour and Likud) and Argentina (Peronists and Radicals) > employed US consultants who were almost totally ignorant of the terrain and knew > no Hebrew or Spanish. Apparently, Blumenthal no longer sees anything wrong with > this: "Professional techniques can be used for any purpose in different places > under different circumstances ... Techniques can be used on behalf of any > agenda, any candidate." > > But will any candidate really do? In their memoirs Morris and Stephanopoulos > describe, with touching and highly lucrative sincerity (2), how they sought out > the political clients most likely to provide them with a "ticket to the top". In > 1992 Stephanopoulos had hoped to advise a left-wing Democrat opposed to the > death penalty, Reagan's policy in Central America and the Gulf war. In Clinton, > he chose to serve a Southern governor who had supported the Gulf war and the > "contras" in Nicaragua and, to scrape up a few more votes at a crucial point in > his campaign, had refused to commute the death sentence on a mentally ill > prisoner. Stephanopoulos' desire "to inhabit the smallest ring of the inner > circle" (3) was stronger than his scruples. > > 'Opportunism, mother of consensus' > > And if any candidate will do, all candidates have to speak more or less the same > language. Three years ago the journalist EJ Dionne pointed out that "two sides > can play at stealing the opposition's best lines ... Given how fast the parties > are moving toward each other, you might well think that Dick Morris is plotting > strategy for both parties. Opportunism is the mother of consensus" (4). From > 1994-96 nobody had as much influence as Morris on the current US president. But > Morris was a Republican. And, while organising Clinton's re-election campaign, > he stayed in contact with his opponent, Bob Dole (5). > > "Maybe it was time for the party to sacrifice ideological purity for electoral > potential," Stephanopoulos observed. It is because this comment has become an > almost universally accepted aphorism -- particularly appreciated by so-called > leftwing parties - that American techniques and consultants travel the world. > Still, the relation between cause and effect is not always what one imagines. A > US consultant does not simply show up in another country and transform its > political practice. He shows up in countries where politics has already moved > towards the American model. > > It is not entirely correct to refer to the system as a model, however, given its > propensity to appropriate other ideas. Morris's strategy in 1996 (that > subsequently served both Blair and Schröder) was to encourage Clinton to take > over his opponents' most popular policies, such as law and order and welfare > cuts, in order to provoke a Republican lurch to the right that would alienate > moderate voters (6). > > It was in France that Morris got the idea for this approach, which he called the > "third way": "The strategy Clinton and I had mapped out in late 1994 was based > on the model of Mitterrand's defeat of Chirac in 1988 (7). I had briefly worked > with some of Chirac's people early in the 1980s ... The way Mitterrand handled > Chirac's majority was superb. He ignored those who proposed he fight Chirac for > every foot of ground. Instead, he let Chirac pass his programme and privatise > most of the French business that had been nationalised [after 1981]. 'He > fast-forwarded Chirac's agenda', I said, 'passing enough of it to relieve the > frustrations that led to Chirac's victory. He helped Chirac succeed, thereby > rendering irrelevant the issues that had made Chirac's victory possible.' > 'Chirac lost in 1988,' the president recalled" (8). Morris summed up this third > way in a metaphor: "Let the wave wash over the shore so that its energy is > spent." > > While the employment of American consultants is partly due to the emergence of > new communication techniques requiring recourse to the best practitioners, it is > mainly a reflection of fundamental political developments which the Wall Street > Journal analyses with almost touching delight: "The close of the cold war and > corresponding expansion of democracy and free-market economics have triggered a > widespread move toward the political centre like the one dominating American > politics. As a result, election campaigns outside the US increasingly resemble > those in America in both substance and style. Just as open trade and > free-flowing capital have fostered one vast world economy, so are the politics > of disparate cultures yielding to what Bill Clinton calls 'the inexorable logic > of globalisation'" (9). > > Sergio Bendixen, an American consultant of Peruvian origin who alternates > between local campaigns in the US and presidential campaigns in Latin America, > is well placed to confirm the Wall Street Journal's analysis. In his view, > "politics is being restricted to a very narrow lane" and the main social and > political issues are the same from one country to the next. "In America," he > quips, "we have become experts at making campaigns out of narrow points." > Blumenthal reacts angrily to such wisecracks: "I completely reject the idea that > President Clinton has taken over Republican ideas. He has looked at new > realities, redefined the ideas and created an entirely new political equation." > But is this not the same thing as accepting that the task of the "left" is to > plough over the ground left fallow by the right? > > So where is the "entirely new equation"? New or not, it appears to be gaining > universal acceptance, even if some conservative parties continue to peddle their > traditional stock-in-trade. In El Salvador, presidential candidate Francisco > Flores was concerned to modernise the image of his party, the National > Republican Alliance (Arena), which was dogged by its close association with the > far right and the death squads. He hired Phil Noble, a Democrat consultant from > North Carolina who had already worked in Australia, Malta, Sweden and Ukraine. > "The moment I convinced Phil to come work with us," he recalls, "I knew we had a > chance of winning." > > But faced with a client whom Noble was preparing for the "new realities of the > global economy", the Salvadorian left (the FMLN) also hired an American > consultant. The two parties, who had fought a civil war only a few years > earlier, were now competing for the same political space. In the words of the > Wall Street Journal, "What followed was the sort of campaign that American > voters would find easy to understand. FMLN nominee Facundo Guardado, once a > guerrilla comandante, moderated his image with a promise not to reverse > free-market reforms by overturning the recent privatisation of state-owned > industries. 'The future in El Salvador is not about the left or the right,' > Guardado said in one of his TV ads: 'it's about solutions.' But Flores wasn't > going to let his rival grab the centre uncontested. He shunned divisive rhetoric > and dubbed his cause the 'new alliance' ... Flores sought to reassure those left > behind in El Salvador's recent economic expansion that he wouldn't forget their > plight. 'If free markets are a vehicle for progress', Flores says in a > interview, 'one of the jobs of the government is to try to see that no-one gets > left behind'" (10). It was Flores who won last March's election. > > The presence of consultants from the US in Latin America is nothing new. In 1978 > David Garth, one of the most prestigious, was being courted simultaneously by > all three Venezuelan presidential candidates. Having opted for the Christian > Democrat, Luis Herrera, Garth was pitted against President Carlos Andrés Pérez, > a Social Democrat who five years earlier had used another famous American > consultant, Joe Napolitan. Does all this further the cause of democracy around > the world? Napolitan, for one, did not always have a golden touch. Pérez was > eventually impeached for misappropriating public funds. The Philippines' > Ferdinando Marcos, another of Napolitan's foreign clients, scarcely left an > unblemished record as leader. In Africa, the French consultant Jacques Séguéla, > chiefly known for his campaigns on behalf of François Mitterrand, has assisted > such illustrious democrats as Omar Bongo (Gabon) and Gnassingbé Eyadema (Togo), > whom an Amnesty International report has just accused of torture tantamount to > crimes against humanity. > > Superstar status > > American consultants now have a much higher profile. In 1974 Napolitan, > recruited through the intermediary of the French centrist, Jean-Jacques > Servan-Schreiber, conducted Valéry Giscard d'Estaing's campaign for the French > presidency in the greatest of secrecy. Already suspected of being pro-American, > the future French president feared disclosure of the role of his American mentor > would harm his prospects and made sure the press was kept in the dark about his > meetings with Napolitan. He confided to us: "You know about French > sensitivities. The idea of an American adviser would not have got down very well > at the time. Of course, now things have changed." But 20 years on, Carl Bildt, > Sweden's conservative prime minister, was still taunting his challenger, Ingvar > Carlsson, by brandishing photos of Phil Noble, who had served as guru to the > social democratic candidate. > > Carlsson won all the same. And in Israel, too, things have changed. David Garth > had acted as consultant to Menachem Begin in 1981 almost incognito, whereas the > names Finkelstein (who masterminded Binyamin Netanyahu's campaigns in 1996 and > 1999) and Carville (Ehud Barak's strategist) are household words. Finkelstein > would prefer to remain in the background. "The actors need to be on stage," he > says, "not the director." But such modesty is now the exception. As soon as > Barak's victory was announced, his three American consultants (Carville, > Greenberg and Shrum) gave two press conferences carefully designed to spread the > message about their know-how. And five months before Netanyahu's defeat, the > Jerusalem Post noted that Carville's "superstar status brought out a mob of > reporters." > > In Argentina, Eduardo Duhalde and Fernando de la Rua, the two main candidates > for the presidency, will have to pedal fast if they are not to be overshadowed > by their consultants, Carville (yes, him again!) and Morris. The Argentinian > clash next October is an opportunity for the successive strategists of Clinton's > two presidential campaigns to settle accounts. They can't stand each other. In > 1994 after the triumph of the American right (which won a majority in both the > House of Representatives and the Senate), Clinton switched to Morris's > conservative, "Mitterrandist" strategy. As Morris now charitably recalls, > "Coelho's advice in 1994, echoed by former Clinton consultants James Carville > and Stan Greenberg, was to 'go negative' and attack Republicans by linking them > to the Reagan years. It sure worked, didn't it? After the Democratic debacle, > Clinton immediately dumped Coelho, Carville and Greenberg and never trusted > their political judgement again" (11). > > Morris is now hated at the White House. After advising Clinton to lie to the > American people about his relationship with Monica Lewinsky, he called for the > president's resignation when the lie was exposed. At the same time, Carville > launched a campaign for Starr's dismissal. However, this mutual hostility smacks > of a self-serving publicity campaign. When the public loses interest in the > candidates, the press turns its attention to the consultants. Now everybody > knows that while Carville was busy planning George Bush's defeat in the 1992 > election, his wife, Mary Matalin, was Bush's deputy campaign manager. The couple > wrote up their account of this conjugal clash in a very lucrative book (12). And > while Matalin was running her own radio show, and letting it be known that she > would have voted for Netanyahu, her husband was getting $100,000 a year for > flashing a pair of Reebok trainers on his multiple television appearances. > > When US spin doctors were hired by the two main candidates in the Argentinian > election, an article appeared in the major Buenos Aires daily paper Clarin > asking what they had to offer the process of democracy in Argentina. The answer > from William Perry, a Latin America affairs specialist in Washington, was > "absolutely nothing". In his view, both of them were ignorant of the terrain and > had been brought in only so the candidates could boast of having US consultants. > Talking about Napolitan's part in his election in 1974, Giscard d'Estaing > commented: "He didn't know the situation. He said some very interesting things > but they were not of any practical use." > > Sampling the voters > > Carville's interest in Argentinian politics dates from January last year when > the former US ambassador in Buenos Aires introduced him to Duhalde (a name > Carville still has trouble pronouncing). His passion for Israel is not much > older. But his explanation is interesting: "No one is going to say 'Write me a > 500-word essay on the causes, strategies and long-range results of the 1967 and > 1973 wars.' That's not what's important. I mean, it's important but it's not > important to my role. They're not looking to me for advice on Israel. They're > looking to me for advice on communications, on organisation, on how to set > things up, on how to respond" (13). > > Morris visits Argentina once a month. "He gives us the opinion of a person who > doesn't live in Argentina but who is an expert in communication," a Radical > Party spokesman explained. The Peronists agree that "it helps to have the views > of a foreign observer." When globalisation becomes Americanisation, the American > viewpoint is everyone's concern. > > Duhalde, the Peronist candidate, is handicapped by too close an association with > President Carlos Menem who is now very unpopular. De la Rua, the Radical Party > candidate, is thought to be too soft and lacking in charisma. So Carville and > Morris's campaign scripts almost write themselves. Duhalde now misses no > opportunity to criticise the powers-that-be (of which he was part for almost 10 > years). De la Rua's TV ads are very effective. He stares directly at the camera > and pulls no punches: "So they call me boring. Well, let's see what being > amusing means." There follows a shot of Menem bursting out laughing at the wheel > of his Ferrari. When Carville first saw the ad on a TV screen at the airport, he > asked for a translation. "That's Dick Morris's work," he concluded (14). > > A telling scene from The War Room, Chris Hegedus's famous documentary about the > 1992 US presidential election, shows Carville moved almost to tears as he takes > leave of his winning team of young volunteers: "We changed the way campaigns are > run. There used to be a hierarchy. Everybody was compartmentalised. You showed > you could be trusted. I was 33 before I ever went to Washington and New York. I > was 42 before I won my first campaign. And I am happy for you all." Youth, > aggressiveness and the rejection of hierarchy have long been the parameters of > American political communication. Pat Caddell was 25 when he became President > Carter's future strategist. Lee Atwater masterminded Bush's victorious campaign > at the age of 33. And Stephanopoulos was only 30 when he became Clinton's > campaign manager. But each election peddles the notion that "Nothing will ever > be the same again". It became the slogan of the new spin doctors. > > In 1928 Edward Bernays, Freud's nephew and the father of American advertising, > lamented that "politics had failed to keep up with business methods in the mass > distribution of ideas and products." Today US politics is dominated by business > methods, as political parties have virtually ceased to exist, campaigns have > become personalised and, because of the cost of advertising, money plays an ever > greater role. Once the distinction between voter and consumer - and between > democracy and the market - has been obliterated (which is an explicit part of > the doctrine of some theoreticians of pluralism), a good election strategy is to > try and split a fragile opposing coalition. The stress must be on topics that > can serve to detach a sufficient number of supporters (or customers). The less > politicised the electorate, the less emphasis should be placed on genuine > political differences. > > The "focus group" technique is used to ascertain the precise reactions and > motives of a sample group of voters, generally paid for their participation, who > are required to respond instantly to phrases and pictures of a candidate by > pressing buttons on a device linked to a computer. The results are posted on > screen in real time, enabling the experts to judge what works and what doesn't. > One of the first tests of this kind, conducted by Greenberg in Michigan in 1985, > showed the Democrats that the major setbacks they suffered in the presidential > elections of 1980 and 1984 in some of their traditional strongholds (Midwest > working-class districts) had been largely due to the feeling of working-class > whites that their party had moved away from them and was concerned exclusively > with blacks, the poor, feminists and homosexuals (15). The Democrats' discourse > was "re-centred" accordingly. > > Three years later, another of these political electrocardiograms showed Bush's > campaign managers his most promising line of attack on Michael Dukakis. The > Democratic candidate was opposed to the death penalty, and the state of which he > was governor had (on one single occasion) granted day release to a (black) > prisoner, who had taken the opportunity to rape a (white) woman. Perhaps not the > most important issue in a US presidential election? Never mind. That affair, > regurgitated ad nauseum, charted the course of the 1988 campaign and won the > election for Bush (16). Here Mary Matalin echoes Edward Bernays: "The principle > is the same for political campaigns or companies: everyone says the same thing > over and over." > > The "war room" approach is designed to prevent a campaign from straying "off > message" by centralising all the information and reactions that might be picked > up by the media. The term was coined by Hillary Clinton, but it was Carville who > developed the concept in 1992. Drawing conclusions from Dukakis' inability to > counter Bush's attacks on law-and-order, he set up a single strategic centre for > response and counter-attack. "The purpose of the 'war room' wasn't just to > respond to Republican attacks. It was to respond to them fast, even before they > were broadcast or published, when the lead of the story was still rolling around > in the reporter's mind." > > "Its purpose," Stephanopoulos adds, "was to make us appear relentless, to > intimidate ... The 'war room' never closed. Day and night, teams of young > volunteers worked in shifts, tracking every Bush move on their computers. On the > roof, a satellite dish pulled in broadcasts, including the occasional intercept > of a still-unaired Republican commercial on its way to a local affiliate ... We > managed to write and release an annotated response to Bush's acceptance speech > even before the president reached the podium" (17). > > In Israel, Barak's team were encouraged to use the "war room" as the basis for > their campaign. Like that of Dukakis in 1988, Labour leader Shimon Peres' 1996 > campaign had been a disaster. He had been unable to counter the wave of > television ads designed by Finkelstein which showed pictures of bombed-out > buses, over the wailing of police sirens, followed by the slogan: "No security. > No peace. No reason to vote Peres". > > In 1999 everything changed on the Labour side. Tony Blair advised Barak to hire > Greenberg, who immediately brought in his old crony Carville. The war-room > strategy hit the Middle East: the message, and nothing but the message; instant > response to attacks; constant harping on the opponent's weaknesses. In the case > of Netanyahu, the opinion polls were clear: he was guilty of leading the country > up a blind alley. Carville had his topic and his key word: "Netanyahu is stuck. > He is stuck on the economy, stuck on the peace process ... stuck in the Lebanon > mud" (18). > > Systematic reliance on opinion polls is not peculiar to the US. In France, the > communist leader Robert Hue refers to them constantly. But the range of > decisions they dictate to American politicians has become highly disturbing. > While Louis Harris (whose poll, begun in 1963, is one of the longest running > opinion surveys) had served as a consultant to John Kennedy, it was pollster Pat > Caddell who developed the closest relationship with a president in office, Jimmy > Carter. Drawing conclusions from the demise of parties and their role in > homogenising public opinion, he sought to break the electorate down into smaller > and smaller segments and measure each subgroup's reactions to the president's > "permanent campaign". He was able to tell you, for example, whether Carter was > considered efficient by 30-year-old white mothers with university degrees. Such > detailed knowledge was to be used to disintegrate the opposition and assemble a > block of voters for Carter. It was a difficult but necessary task. Without this > strategy, the series of decisions taken by Carter, each individually popular, > could create numerous disgruntled minorities that might eventually combine to > form a majority. But it did not stop Carter losing in 1980. > > Fifteen years later, in an attempt to resolve a conflict with Stephanopoulos, > Morris apparently offered the following arrangement: "My team is like the > Politburo. We work together, everyone has a say, and when we disagree, we submit > the decision to the ultimate master of the Western world - the polls." In fact, > the ultimate master of the Western world was consulted by President Clinton on > the most important and most trivial of matters. Armed with his poll figures, > Morris, who admits that "foreign affairs is not my speciality", gave advice on > the invasion of Haiti (he would have preferred Cuba), on Iran, on aid to Russia > and on the war in Bosnia (where he recommended mass bombing of Serbia). "You > print the menu of things you want," he told the president. "Then I'll advise > which dish to have for dinner tonight." > > A good menu has a place for every dish. In the spring of 1995, Morris conducted > a massive opinion poll designed to identify floating voters. It showed they were > neither hunters (a Dole-voter activity) nor MTV viewers (all firm Clinton > supporters). Instead, they liked baseball, hiking, camping and high-tech > equipment. Morris drew the obvious conclusion. The US president had to spend his > summer vacation hiking in the mountains and sleeping in a tent, and the press > would be informed of the high-tech gear their illustrious hiker was using. > Clinton grudgingly complied, though it did not improve his ratings. > > Focus groups and opinion polls are used to adjust political communication to > voters' expectations. In 1996 Clinton personally supervised the concoction of > each of his campaign commercials. The Democratic Party spent $85m on them (some > of which went on paying Morris's fees.) Unfortunately for American consultants, > foreign legislation is often much more restrictive in this respect than that of > the US. Israel allows campaign commercials only in the three weeks preceding the > election. France prohibits all advertising during the last three months of the > campaign. > > So there are limits on the universal use of techniques imported from the US. In > some poor countries, the communications network is not adequate for instant > telephone polls. In others, the legal ceiling on election expenses prevents a > wave of advertising. And everywhere, the effectiveness of the symbol > manipulators depends on the existence of a huge apathetic, apolitical middle > class. > > Well-worn scripts > > Nor is the whole business noted for innovation. US consultants abroad cannot > resist the temptation to recycle the well-worn scripts of their most famous > American successes. Finkelstein's strategy in the 1996 Israeli election was a > replay of Bush's campaign against Dukakis. Three years later he tried it again. > But Barak was no Peres pushover, and Carville fought back with the methods he > had devised in 1992 for the Clinton campaign. > > Sometimes, these replays involve straight plagiarism. In 1996 the British daily > The Independent revealed that a speech made by Blair four months before the > Labour victory had been calqued on one made by Clinton four months before the > Democrat victory (19). It cuts both ways. In 1988 Joseph Biden, a contender for > the Democratic presidential nomination, read out an emotional speech referring > to his childhood and family that had previously been delivered by Neil Kinnock, > then leader of the British Labour Party. > > Despite all this, the influence of the media men is spreading. In El Salvador, > Flores took Noble's advice and gave up the mass meetings that are a traditional > part of Latin American election campaigns. He replaced them by Reagan-style > "events" orchestrated for television, and advertising clips produced by a firm > whose main clients are McDonald's and American Airlines. Thousands of miles > away, David Bar-Illan, then Netanyahu's media manager, admitted missing "the > hour-long speeches in stuffy meeting halls and the long harangues in public > places that were now being replaced by political clips." With an admirable lack > of ulterior motive, French media consultant Jacques Séguéla has suggested that > most of the election funds devoted to "meetings organised solely for the sake of > two minutes' airtime on the television news" would be better spent on clips > (20). > > In 1996, summarising the outcome of the elections in Israel and Russia (where > one of Morris's former partners had advised Boris Yeltsin on his campaign), > Clinton is said to have noted that "the candidates who used American-style > polling and media won" (21). The consequences of such techniques and the type of > political debate that has made them so effective are extremely worrying. US > elections have become a sordid exercise in manipulation. The abstention rate is > one of the highest in the world. In 1996 the turn-out for the simultaneous > election of the president, vice-president, the whole House of Representatives, a > third of the Senate and most of the mayors and governors was less than 50%. Some > American consultants have admitted they go abroad because US politics has become > too mediocre and predictable. Should we really be preparing the ground for them > by reducing our political life to debates contrived by two almost identical > coalitions? > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > > (1) Sidney Blumenthal, The Permanent Campaign, Simon and Schuster, New York, > 1980. > > (2) Morris is said to have received an advance of $ 2.5m from his publisher, and > Stephanopoulos $3m. > > (3) George Stephanopoulos, All Too Human : A Political Education, Little Brown, > New York, 1999, pp. 67 and 80. > > (4) The Washington Post, 15 August 1996. > > (5) See his explanation in Dick Morris, Behind the Oval Office, Winning the > Presidency in the Nineties, Random House, New York, 1997. > > (6) See "Les simulacres de la politique américaine" and "Elections américaines : > des jeux sans enjeu", Le Monde diplomatique, February and November 1996 > > (7) From 1986-88 Mitterrand had to "cohabit" with Chirac as his prime minister > after the right won the 1986 parliamentary election. > > (8) Dick Morris, op. cit., pp. 37 and 269. The wrong dates given by the author > (and the publisher), who seem to think the first period of cohabitation between > François Mitterrand and Jacques Chirac was from 1985-87, have been corrected. > > (9) John Harwood, "A Lot Like Home : Campaign Strategists Give Foreign Elections > That American Cachet", The Wall Street Journal, 24 March 1999. > > (10) Ibid. > > (11) The Washington Times, 19 May 1999. This is not entirely true: Greenberg was > involved in writing Clinton's state-of-the-union speech last January. > > (12) All's Fair: Love, War, and Running for President, Simon & Schuster, New > York, 1994. > > (13) See Adam Nagourney, "Sound Bites Over Jerusalem", The New York Times > Magazine, 25 April 1999. > > (14) See Ana Baron, "Secretos de una campaña carnal", Clarin, Buenos Aires, 16 > May 1999. > > (15) See Thomas and Mary Edsall, Chain Reaction, Norton, New York, 1991. > > (16) See "Dans les bas-fonds de la campagne électorale américaine", Le Monde > diplomatique, December 1988. > > (17) George Stephanopoulos, op. cit., pp. 86-91. > > (18) See Adam Nagourney, op. cit. > > (19) See John Lichfield, "Great speech, even second time round", The > Independent, 3 October 1996. > > (20) Jacques Séguéla, "Pas de pub, pas de vote", Le Monde, 18 June 1999. > > (21) Dick Morris, op. cit., p. 261. > > > > > Translated by Barry Smerin > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > > ALL RIGHTS RESERVED © 1999 Le Monde diplomatique A<>E<>R ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The only real voyage of discovery consists not in seeking new landscapes but in having new eyes. -Marcel Proust + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + "Believe nothing, no matter where you read it, or who said it, no matter if I have said it, unless it agrees with your own reason and your common sense." --Buddha + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + A merely fallen enemy may rise again, but the reconciled one is truly vanquished. -Johann Christoph Schiller, German Writer (1759-1805) + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + It is preoccupation with possessions, more than anything else, that prevents us from living freely and nobly. -Bertrand Russell + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + "Everyone has the right...to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers." Universal Declaration of Human Rights + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + "Always do sober what you said you'd do drunk. That will teach you to keep your mouth shut." --- Ernest Hemingway + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Forwarded as information only; no endorsement to be presumed + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. section 107, this material is distributed without charge or profit to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving this type of information for non-profit research and educational purposes only. DECLARATION & DISCLAIMER ========== CTRL is a discussion and informational exchange list. Proselyzting propagandic screeds are not allowed. Substance—not soapboxing! These are sordid matters and 'conspiracy theory', with its many half-truths, misdirections and outright frauds is used politically by different groups with major and minor effects spread throughout the spectrum of time and thought. That being said, CTRL gives no endorsement to the validity of posts, and always suggests to readers; be wary of what you read. CTRL gives no credeence to Holocaust denial and nazi's need not apply. Let us please be civil and as always, Caveat Lector. ======================================================================== Archives Available at: http://home.ease.lsoft.com/archives/CTRL.html http:[EMAIL PROTECTED]/ ======================================================================== To subscribe to Conspiracy Theory Research List[CTRL] send email: SUBSCRIBE CTRL [to:] [EMAIL PROTECTED] To UNsubscribe to Conspiracy Theory Research List[CTRL] send email: SIGNOFF CTRL [to:] [EMAIL PROTECTED] Om
