-Caveat Lector-

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Today's Lesson from The Books in My Life

by Colin Wilson


It was about the time that I was thirteen or fourteen that I began to
catch glimpses of an answer to the problem of nihilism that had reduced
me to such a state of despair and exhaustion.

In a secondhand bookshop, I found the Everyman edition of Goethe's Faust
. Even the awful translation could not disguise the tremendous vitality
of the poetry . . .

But when I came to Faust's opening speech, in his "high vaulted narrow
Gothic chamber," I realized with a shock that the young Goethe had
experienced my own glimpse of meaninglessness.

I have studied, alas, philosophy,
And jurisprudence, and medicine, too,
And worst of all, theology,
With ardent labor through and through.
As here I stick, as wise, poor fool
As when my steps first turned to school.
Master they style me, nay doctor, forsooth
And nigh ten years, o'er rough and smooth,
And up and down, and acrook and across,
I lead my pupils by the nose,
And know that in truth we can know--aught!

"Das wir nichts wissen konnen"--that we can know nothing: the words made
my heart sink. Yet there was also immense comfort in knowing that
someone else had recognized the futility of human knowledge.

There followed a passage that I soon learned by heart:

Would thou, full orbed moon, didst shine
Thy last upon this pain of mine.
Thou whom from this my desk so oft
I watched at midnight climb aloft.
O'er books and papers thou didst send
Thy radiance, melancholy friend.
Ah, could I, on some mountain height,
Float onward, steeped in thy dear light,
Round mountain caves with spirits hover,
Or float the moonlit meadows over,
>From fumes of learning purse my soul,
Bathe in thy dew, and so be whole.

Like Faust, I also felt that I had dehydrated my soul with logic and
reason. But whenever I read this passage, I experienced a cooling
sensation, like plunging a blistered finger into cold water, and a sense
of relaxation and serenity. In fact, Goethe does not use the word
"float," but "gehn," which might easily be translated "walk." But this
image of floating peacefully over moonlit meadows always brought a
tremor of sheer joy.
=====

Spy vs. Spy

Nuclear Disarmament Chief Was Stasi Secret Agent

The commies just keep on coming.

A UNIVERSITY professor who was on the national council of the Campaign
for Nuclear Disarmament was a communist agent, The Telegraph reveals
today.
Vic Allen, a retired professor of economics at Leeds University, passed
confidential information about CND to East German intelligence officers
and manipulated the peace movement into taking a Soviet-friendly line.

According to secret files compiled by the Stasi, the East German secret
police, Mr Allen provided information on CND leaders and activists for
several years during the Eighties and visited the East German Embassy in
London. In 1985, he unsuccessfully attempted to succeed Joan Ruddock as
the chairman of CND, which then had 400,000 members.

The Telegraph has learnt that MI5 had a file on Mr Allen, 77, but it is
not known if the security service was fully aware of his activities. He
has admitted being an informer but denies betraying his country, acting
illegally or receiving payments. He said: "I feel no regrets."

Security experts said Mr Allen, who lives in Keighley, West Yorks, would
have been regarded as an "agent of influence" by the Stasi. He is the
fourth Communist asset to be unmasked within the past nine days -
causing embarrassment to the security services and the Government.

Robin Pearson, a lecturer at Hull University, was named as a Stasi spy
on Friday. The Home Office said yesterday that although he was
interviewed by MI5 in 1994, it was decided not to prosecute him as there
was no "usable evidence".

Yesterday, Ann Widdecombe, the shadow home secretary, demanded that the
Government disclose details of all alleged communist spies. She said:
"What I want Jack Straw to do is to stop what is now happening, which is
that we are only finding out about these things through press
revelations."

CND, formed in 1958, said it was "appalling and disgusting" that Mr
Allen fed information on its members to the East Germans. A spokesman
said: "It is deeply concerning that anybody should be passing on
information on our members. We were used to being targeted by MI5 and
the Ministry of Defence, but now we find that former Soviet states were
after information on us."

Mr Allen, who packed CND meetings with Soviet sympathisers, aimed to
promote Moscow's unilateral cause within the organisation, urging that
Britain alone disarm its nuclear weapons. Rival factions wanted the
Kremlin to disarm too.

In an interview with BBC2's The Spying Game to be broadcast next month,
Mr Allen admits that he provided information to East Germany. He said:
"It was perfectly legitimate that I should do that as the faction I
belonged to was the pro-Soviet faction, the pro-GDR faction . . . I have
no shame. I feel no regrets about that at all. My only regret is that we
didn't succeed and in the end we lost our influence in CND."

A senior adviser to the Home Secretary said Mr Straw would not agree to
Miss Widdecombe's demand to issue a list of names of those suspected of
treachery. He said: "Hundreds of people have been investigated over the
years and it would bring their identities into the public domain. We
don't know who the press is going to name."

London Telegraph, Sept. 19, 1999


International Bureaucracy

IMF Under Fire for Failed Policies

You mean . . . again?

THE patients span the globe from Vietnam to Venezuela. The doctors face
each other across 19th Street in Washington and dispense their medicine
together. Their remedies, dubbed the Washington consensus, include tight
fiscal and monetary policies, freer trade and capital flows, and
privatisation. For much of the 1990s, these were accepted as the best
ways to make the transition from poverty to prosperity and from
communism to capitalism. The consensus�s sponsors, the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, stood unchallenged as the
world�s top economic doctors.
No longer. After a series of financial crises from South Korea to
Brazil, and an economic meltdown in Russia, the consensus has broken
down. Many traditional prescriptions have been discredited and the
doctors are at loggerheads with each other. Joseph Stiglitz, chief
economist of the World Bank, who was vocal in his criticisms of IMF
 economic advice in Asia last year, is now equally vocally lambasting
the Fund�s record in transition economies. Although he is not officially
speaking for the World Bank, it is widely believed that the Bank�s boss,
James Wolfensohn, shares his views.

Partly, the fracas is the inevitable result of apparent failure. But it
also has a more subtle cause. In recent years the Fund and the Bank have
been hijacked by their major shareholders for overtly political ends.
Whether in Mexico in 1994, Asia in 1997 or Russia throughout the 1990s,
the institutions have become a more explicit tool of western, and
particularly American, foreign policy. Only this week the two bodies
were using their economic muscle to pressure the Indonesian government
into accepting an international peacekeeping force in East Timor. Such
politicisation, many feel, threatens their credibility in handing out
disinterested policy advice.

The focus of a lot of criticism is the IMF�s record in Russia. Almost a
decade after reforms began, the place is a mess. Around 60m people,
almost half the population, live below the poverty line. Income
inequality has risen; life expectancy has plummeted. Corruption is
massive and endemic.

Mr Stiglitz says much of this dismal performance stems from the
intellectual inadequacies of the previous approach. There was, he
argues, too much emphasis on macroeconomic stabilisation at the expense
of institution-building. Privatisation was pushed too far too fast, and,
without the right regulatory framework, was bound to fail. Western
advisers wrongly thought that privatisation would create a demand for
protection of property rights. Instead, new owners stripped the assets
and transferred the money abroad, helped by a misguided liberalisation
of capital flows. The result was a country riddled with cronyism and
corruption.

It would have been better, argues Mr Stiglitz, to have proceeded more
slowly�building a regulatory framework before privatisation, and
concentrating on strengthening the rule of law and on creating effective
institutions, such as courts. He likens the misguided zeal with which
Russian reformers and their western advisers set about changing a
society overnight to that of the Jacobins and, yes, the Bolsheviks. It
is as if many western advisers thought the Bolsheviks had the wrong
textbooks but not the wrong approach, he writes.

These comments have caused a furore. Anders Aslund, of the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, an early adviser to the Russian
government, says mildly, �Stiglitz is a striking embarrassment to
himself and the World Bank. Without knowing anything, he mouths any
stupidity that comes to his head.� Officials at the Fund and the
Treasury are more circumspect in public, but there is little doubt that
they too are furious.

Mr Stiglitz is plain wrong, these critics claim, to argue that nobody
emphasised the importance of building institutions. The World Bank
itself sent dozens of teams to help with legal reform, training judges
and so forth. But the process is complicated and slow. Reformers did not
have the luxury of waiting until it was complete.

Most reform veterans also reject Mr Stiglitz�s policy prescriptions. Few
accept that collapsing post-communist governments could have prevented
the looting of assets. In a recent paper*, John Nellis, a privatisation
expert at the Bank, argues that, globally, privatisation has been a
success. Governments that botched it were equally likely to botch the
management of state-owned firms. He points to Ukraine, which is in even
worse straits than Russia, as evidence that the Stiglitz strategy of
going more slowly would not have worked. The evidence from Eastern
Europe is that the speed of �shock therapy� has delivered better results
than gradual reform.

Third, nobody denies that reform in Russia and elsewhere has had to
contend with political constraints. There were clear risks in rapid
privatisation. And there were unsavoury aspects to Russia�s reforms,
particularly the 1995 policy of handing over shares in lucrative state
jewels to the financial oligarchs in return for short-term loans. But
the political environment�the chance of a return to communism, a
collapse into fascism or even the disintegration of a nuclear
power�justified some risk-taking. The record of the Bretton Woods
institutions should be considered against this background.

These arguments are not wholly convincing, however, not least because
the Fund did offer mistaken policy advice to some transition economies.
Among the most successful countries have been those which, although
strongly reformist, ignored the IMF on important questions. Estonia, for
instance, successfully reintroduced its pre-war currency, the kroon, in
place of the rouble in 1992, when the IMF was still calling for a single
currency from Tallinn to Tashkent.

And regardless of political constraints, the IMF, an overbearing
organisation with a well-thumbed book of macroeconomic-policy nostrums,
may have been unsuited as an institution to handle the murky, stricken
economies of Eastern Europe in the first place. �Would you have wanted
the IMF running the Marshall Plan in Western Europe after the war?�,
asked Yegor Gaidar, Russia�s first radical reforming prime minister, at
a recent conference in Stockholm.

Still, the political and strategic arguments help to explain why
economic considerations often became secondary. That was why the Fund
tolerated the loans-for-shares scheme; why it relaxed lending criteria
before the Russian election in 1996; and why the Fund blew nearly $5
billion trying to prop up the rouble up in July 1998.

Political and strategic considerations have also played a role in the
IMF�s recent reactions to financial crises elsewhere in the developing
world. Starting with the massive bailout for Mexico in 1994, via the
enormous support packages for Thailand, South Korea and Indonesia and
ending with its failed attempt to prop up Brazil�s currency, the real,
in 1998, the Fund�s programmes have reflected its strategic as well as
economic priorities�and those of its major shareholders.

There have been economic miscalculations too. Most people now agree, for
instance, that defending fixed exchange rates for too long is a mistake.
It is broadly accepted that private creditors should share the burden of
unwinding economic crises; and that big public bailouts may create moral
hazard, increasing the risk of future crises. This week, a task-force
sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations published a report that
urged countries to avoid fixed exchange rates and to discourage
short-term capital inflows, and called on the IMF to return to its old
policy of smaller bailouts.

But if the political role the two institutions are being asked to play
is part of the problem, that needs to be addressed too. Another recent
study* argues that, just as independent central banks have proved better
at fighting inflation, so a more independent IMF might be more effective
at promoting international financial stability.

Such reforms, the authors say, would insulate the IMF from short-term
political pressures, making its advice more credible and more effective.
Pretending to be economic handmaidens while in fact being political
social workers is a recipe for failure. On the other hand, the converse
might also be awkward: officials would no longer be able to blame
political constraints when their economic medicine doesn�t work.

The Economist, Sept. 18-24 1999


Japanese Policy

Head of Central Bank and Finance Minister Meet in Hotel Room

Did they have sex?

Picture the scene. A darkened room, minders huddled by the
trouser-press, two men talking in hushed tones - perhaps over a drink
from the minibar. It is neutral ground. But it is not a rendezvous
between Moscow mobsters. The location is Tokyo.

As the yen soared close to �103 against the dollar this week, Kiichi
Miyazawa, the Japanese finance minister, and Masaru Hayami, governor of
the Bank of Japan, called a meeting. In a hotel room. Neither wanted to
go to the other's office. It must have been an interesting chat.


Fiscal pump-priming has done what Japanese consumer demand could not: a
recovery is under way. The economy expanded 1.1 per cent in the year to
June. The stock market is up 25 per cent this year. Foreign investors
have piled in. And the yen has risen.


Those who placed their faith in a recovery play, and in current account
fundamentals, have made a killing. The yen was at �120 three months ago,
and at �135 this time last year: �103 is the highest level since early
1996.


A weaker dollar/stronger yen is exactly what the Japanese government
does not want. The finance ministry is desperately worried that an
overvalued yen could choke-off the fragile recovery. As the yen soared
this week, the stock market sold off.


It is not all a story of yen strength. This week's US current account
figures prompted a dollar slide. The deficit was a record high of $81bn
in the second quarter, an 18 per cent increase on a deficit of $69bn in
the first three months of the year. Consumers are spending like there is
no tomorrow. Their savings rate is negative. There is no sign of the
spending spree slowing. Retail sales rose 1.2 per cent in August, up
10.6 per cent year-on-year.


The US Federal Reserve, which raised interest rates by a cautious
quarter point in July, and again in August, is going to have to keep
raising rates if domestic demand continues to outpace the economy's
growth rate. Despite the prospect of higher interest rates, worries
about the gaping US current account deficit seems to be what is moving
the market.


Money supply


Back to the hotel room. Worried about a too-strong yen, the Japanese
finance minister can tell the central bank to intervene in the foreign
exchange market. But the BoJ is jealous of its control over the money
supply. Throughout the year, when it has been told to intervene the BoJ
has followed instructions, creating yen to buy dollars. It has then
immediately taken the extra yen back through the money market, with no
net change in the money supply. Economic theory says that "sterilised"
intervention should have no effect. Japan has provided the evidence.


Joint intervention


On his way out of the hotel, Mr Hayami made clear that he had not budged
an inch. With the BoJ refusing to play ball, the government has set its
sight on joint intervention with the US, and on next weekend's meeting
of G7 finance ministers and central bankers in Washington.


On Friday, rumours of a deal in the making brought the yen back below
106 (a significant fall, but still too high for Japan's comfort). Past
experience suggests that the US may do a little to help - perhaps Europe
too. But not very much.


Investors may feel a sense of d�j� vu. The yen has been repeatedly
overvalued over the last 20 years. Investors have experienced a great
deal of volatility.


Japan has a structural trade surplus, and a structural excess of
domestic savings over investment. The goods have to go somewhere (a lot
of them go to the US). The money generated has to go somewhere too. The
exchange rate does not just move in response to the trade account and
interest rate differentials. It is also driven by capital flows. The
trade surplus sucks in dollars. Japanese investors either buy assets
abroad or the exchange rate rises sharply - as has been happening.


At the moment, US assets look overvalued to Japanese investors, and the
current account deficit makes the dollar look vulnerable. Some investors
are biding their time, keeping their money at home. If everyone waits
for a dollar fall/yen rise, it can be self-fulfilling.


A short, sharp bout of joint intervention with the US might break the
bandwagon effect. But the strong yen is largely a Japanese problem for
the moment. A really big dollar slide, or a Japanese collapse, would
change attitudes in Washington. But the US does not have much in the way
of foreign reserves to play with.


This means that the BoJ may well be forced to swallow its pride, and
increase the money supply, to stop the yen strangling growth. From a
policy perspective, this is the right thing to do. Combined with an
inflation target, to cap inflationary expectations as well as counter
deflationary ones, that would also be good for Japanese equities.

The Financial Times, September 18, 1999


Digital Society

New Laws of Economics?

The increasing returns to hot air.

TWO sorts of claim are made about the �new economy�. The first says that
technology is spurring growth so dramatically that old assumptions about
productivity, inflation, profits and so on no longer hold. This is a
bold position, but it poses no great challenge to orthodox theory:
old-fashioned �neoclassical� economics can comprehend it very well. The
second claim is different. It says that orthodox economics itself needs
to be revised wholesale to take account of the way the new economy
actually works.
The �new theorists�, let us call them, say that technology-driven market
failures are now pervasive. The chief culprit is increasing returns. In
a world where unit costs fall without limit as output rises, monopoly
thrives: a bigger firm can always undercut a smaller one. Industries
based on knowledge, the argument goes, are especially prone to
increasing returns, and hence to monopoly. Think of software. The costs
are largely fixed and upfront; once they have been incurred, production
can be expanded without limit at very little cost.

Increasing returns in the form of �network effects� can affect
consumption as well as production. A common feature of the new
technologies, it is argued, is that their value to any user increases in
proportion to the number of users. The result is that, once a product is
established in the market, demand for similar products will collapse:
consumers get �locked in�. And if they get locked in to a bad product,
you have another market failure to compound the first one. The classic
example of the �bad standard�, or of �path dependence� as this syndrome
is called, is the QWERTY keyboard: the layout makes no sense, it is
claimed, but by an accident of history it has established itself and
there is no getting rid of it.

Our Economics focus of April 3rd discussed �The Fable of the Keys�, a
paper by Stan Liebowitz and Stephen Margolis, which showed that the
QWERTY story was wrong, because the standard layout is not in fact
demonstrably worse than the alternatives. This cast doubt on the whole
new-theory movement. Now the authors have brought out a book, �Winners,
Losers and Microsoft� (published by the Independent Institute). It
includes the keyboard paper but moves on from that, by way of a close
look at the software industry, to a broader and deeper attack on the
would-be heretics. By a long way, it is the best single thing to read on
this tangle of issues. The book reviews the new theory carefully and in
language accessible to the general reader, and then subjects it to a
detailed empirical examination. At the end, very little of the
fashionable critique of neoclassical economics is left standing.

To begin with, the authors question the theoretical appeal of the
path-dependence paradigm. Network effects are real, and it follows that
lock-in is a possibility. But note that lock-in is inefficient (that is,
it is a kind of market failure) only if the inferior product survives
despite the fact that the benefits of switching would exceed the costs.
If the inferior product survives because the costs of switching are
high, that is as it should be: in that case it would be inefficient to
switch. (Recall that the point of the bogus QWERTY story was that the
benefits of switching would be great and the costs low: the market
failure consisted in the difficulty of making a co-ordinated jump to the
new layout.) Taking switching costs into account immediately narrows the
extent of plausible market failures.

The new theory needs to be qualified in another way, too. Where lock-in
is a factor, it is wrong to suppose that consumers and producers will
blunder on as if it were not. On both sides of the transaction, there is
an incentive to find ways round the problem. On the demand side, groups
of consumers can get together and co-ordinate their choices. On the
supply side, producers can start by selling their superior new product
at a loss: if it really is superior, the market will adopt it and move
across. Or they can spend heavily on advertising. Or they can help
newcomers to switch by promising compatibility, as when cable-television
companies offer to convert old televisions to the new system. With these
and other strategies, it becomes an empirical question whether
inefficient lock-in is as common as is often supposed; it is certainly
not self-evident.

Turning to the actual evidence, the authors find no such cases at all.
Again and again they show that good products win. The standard lock-in
stories are examined and, like QWERTY before them, debunked.

Betamax was not beaten by an �inferior� VHS video format: at the time,
reviewers were divided over which system offered better quality, and VHS
 offered the unambiguous advantage of longer playing-time. The triumph
of DOS over the Macintosh operating system is equally explicable. Macs
cost more, and Apple had developed a reputation for changing operating
systems so as to make earlier software redundant; until Windows 2000,
Microsoft�s successive operating systems were consistently
backwards-compatible (a feature that explains many of the problems that
some Windows users complain of, but which is prized by many others). The
book gives example after example of software that came and went, at one
time dominating the market but then giving way to a better newcomer:
throughout, reviewers� ratings of the products explain market-share.

Unsurprisingly, in view of all this, the authors take Microsoft�s side
in the firm�s battle with the Justice Department. Their view of that
endlessly complicated issue, set out in an appendix, is not so much a
resounding acquittal as �case not proven��but they would say this should
suffice. Be that as it may, the case they make against the
path-dependence paradigm as a way to see the world could hardly be
stronger: it is a big idea that simply fails to stand up.

The Economist, Sept. 18-24, 1999
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Aloha, He'Ping,
Om, Shalom, Salaam.
Em Hotep, Peace Be,
Omnia Bona Bonis,
All My Relations.
Adieu, Adios, Aloha.
Amen.
Roads End
Kris

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