-Caveat Lector- >Day of Deceit : The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor >by Robert B. Stinnett >NY: Simon & Schuster: The Free Press, 2000 (pub. 1999 Nov.) > >Reviews > >>From Kirkus Reviews > >An explosive, well-written look at the events leading up to the Japanese >raid on Pearl harbor, including FDRs provocation of the attack, by a >WWII veteran and longtime journalist. Though rumors have long circulated >about American prior knowledge of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, >Stinnett has gone far beyond his models in substantiating the state of >American intelligence, diplomacy, and readiness in the year preceding >December 7, 1941. Though Stinnett easily makes his case that the Unites >States knew an attack was coming and did not prepare for it, even more >shocking is his discovery that the North Pacific area, where an attack >was believed likely to originate, was declared a ``vacant sea'' just >weeks prior to the attack and any patrols were forbidden in this area. >The real heart of the book is the argument that the attack on Pearl >Harbor was deliberately instigated by the Roosevelt Administration as a >way of quickly bringing a unified America into the war. Stinnett begins >his case by quoting a policy memo written by Lt. Cdr. Arthur McCullum >listing eight actions designed to incite a military action by Japan, >including such actions as the blocking of the sale of oil to the >Japanese, maintaining a heavy US naval presence in the Pacific, and >supporting Chiang Kai-shek in China. After showing how this plan was >carried out, he then goes on to show how this effort systematically led >up to Pearl Harbor. Although too little is made of the context in which >Roosevelt apparently made the decision to allow the attack to go >unchecked (it is only in the closing sections that this issue is even >discussed), Stinnett has left no stone unturned in this account, which >should rewrite the historical record of WWII. -- Copyright �1999, Kirkus >Associates, LP. All rights reserved. > >Book Description > >Pearl Harbor was not an accident, a mere failure of American >intelligence, or a brilliant Japanese military coup. It was the result >of a carefully orchestrated design, initiated at the highest levels of >our government. According to a key memorandum eight steps were taken to >make sure we would enter the war by this means. Pearl Harbor was the >only way, leading officials felt, to galvanize the reluctant American >public into action. > >This great question of Pearl Harbor--what did we know and when did we >know it?--has been argued for years. At first, a panel created by FDR >concluded that we had no advance warning and should blame only the local >commanders for lack of preparedness. More recently, historians such as >John Toland and Edward Beach have concluded that some intelligence was >intercepted. Finally, just months ago, the Senate voted to exonerate >Hawaii commanders Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short, after the >Pentagon officially declared that blame should be "broadly shared." But >no investigator has ever been able to prove that fore-knowledge of the >attack existed at the highest levels. > >Until now. After decades of Freedom of Information Act requests, Robert >B. Stinnett has gathered the long-hidden evidence that shatters every >shibboleth of Pearl Harbor. It shows that not only was the attack >expected, it was deliberately provoked through an eight-step program >devised by the Navy. Whereas previous investigators have claimed that >our government did not crack Japan's military codes before December 7, >1941, Stinnett offers cable after cable of decryptions. He proves that a >Japanese spy on the island transmitted information--including a map of >bombing targets--beginning on August 21, and that government >intelligence knew all about it. He reveals that Admiral Kimmel was >prevented from conducting a routine training exercise at the eleventh >hour that would have uncovered the location of the oncoming Japanese >fleet. And contrary to previous claims, he shows that the Japanese fleet >did not maintain radio silence as it approached Hawaii. Its many coded >cables were intercepted and decoded by American cryptographers in >Stations on Hawaii and in Seattle. > >The evidence is overwhelming. At the highest levels--on FDR's >desk--America had ample warning of the pending attack. At those same >levels, it was understood that the isolationist American public would >not support a declaration of war unless we were attacked first. The >result was a plan to anger Japan, to keep the loyal officers responsible >for Pearl Harbor in the dark, and thus to drag America into the greatest >war of her existence. Yet even having found what he calls the "terrible >truth," Stinnett is still inclined to forgive. "I sympathize with the >agonizing dilemma faced by President Roosevelt," he writes. "He was >forced to find circuitous means to persuade an isolationist America to >join in a fight for freedom....It is easier to take a critical view of >this policy a half century removed than to understand fully what went on >in Roosevelt's mind in the year prior to Pearl Harbor." > >Day of Deceit is the definitive final chapter on America's greatest >secret and our worst military disaster. > >Chapter One: The Biggest Story of My Life > >Washington >December 8, 1941 >About 1:00 A.M. > >Edward R. Murrow couldn't sleep. His wife, Janet, watched him pace in >their hotel room. He was chain-smoking. Murrow, the CBS radio newsman, >had just returned from a midnight meeting with President Franklin D. >Roosevelt in the White House. Japan's carrier and submarine raid on >Pearl Harbor had taken place twelve hours earlier, and the full impact >of the military disaster was slowly sinking in for FDR and the American >people. > >During their twenty-five-minute discussion in the second-floor Oval >Study, the President provided Murrow with something -- we will never >know exactly what -- that any reporter would kill for. That night he >told his wife, "It's the biggest story of my life, but I don't know if >it's my duty to tell it or forget it." Long after the war ended, Murrow >was asked about this meeting by author-journalist John Gunther. After a >long pause, Murrow replied: "That story would send Casey Murrow through >college, and if you think I'm going to give it to you, you're out of >your mind." > >Earlier in the week, the Murrows had accepted a personal dinner >invitation from the Roosevelts. First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt personally >prepared, cooked, and served supper for two dozen guests. Her specialty >was scrambled eggs and sausage, cooked in an electric chafing dish that >sat atop a long buffet table in the family dining room. It was the >invariable menu. Since the regular White House staff was given Sunday >off, she did the cooking while the President mixed the cocktails. > >After he heard the first news flashes about the Pearl Harbor raid, >Murrow checked with the White House to see if the supper was still on. >Told that it was, he and Janet then walked across Lafayette Park, >crossed Pennsylvania Avenue, and entered the mansion through the North >Portico. After the Murrows were ushered into the dining room, Mrs. >Roosevelt explained that the President was meeting with congressional >leaders and military officers and could not join them for supper. > >Outside on Pennsylvania Avenue a small crowd had gathered. The White >House was ablaze with light. No one inside the mansion thought to pull >the window shades or institute blackouts on the first day of war -- that >would came later. An Associated Press photographer took a picture from >Lafayette Park. It shows a window in the family dining room with a >silhouette of a tall figure -- probably the First Lady -- presiding over >her scrambled eggs. > >During the dinner, White House chief usher Howell Crim asked Murrow to >remain for an informal meeting with FDR. After Janet Murrow returned to >their hotel, her husband went to the second floor and waited outside >Roosevelt's Oval Study -- not to be confused with the Oval Office -- in >the West Wing of the White House. Soon Murrow was joined by William >"Wild Bill" Donovan, Roosevelt's Coordinator of Information and later >founder of the wartime Office of Strategic Services, the forerunner of >the CIA. > >Donovan had not been present at dinner but had been summoned by the >President from New York, where he had been watching a football game at >the Polo Grounds. Football fans heard an unusual announcement over the >public address system about 2:30 that afternoon: "Colonel William >Donovan, come to the box office at once. There is an important phone >message." The message was from James Roosevelt, the President's son and >a member of Donovan's staff; he told Donovan about the Japanese attack. > >Throughout the evening of December 7, Roosevelt conferred with >congressional and military leaders. He decided his first wartime move >would come the next morning, December 8, when he would ask Congress to >declare that a state of war existed between Japan and the United States. >He prepared a rough draft of what later became his "Day of Infamy" >speech. Then he invited Murrow and Donovan into the study for a midnight >snack of sandwiches and cold beer. Chief Usher Crim noted that the three >men spent twenty-five minutes together in the study before Roosevelt >retired to his adjoining bedroom. Crim's arrival and departure notations >in the Usher Book comprise the only official record; there were no >official minutes of the meeting. > >Only Donovan has hinted at what went on: the conversation was mostly >about public reaction to the attack. He sensed that this was FDR's >overriding concern. In 1953, while he served as ambassador to Thailand, >Donovan disclosed the details of the meeting to his executive assistant, >William J. vanden Heuvel, who summarized the recollections in his diary. >The President asked Murrow and Donovan whether they thought the attack >was a clear case of a first Japanese move that would unite Americans >behind a declaration of war against the Axis powers. Both guests thought >it would indeed have that effect. > >Donovan believed that Roosevelt welcomed the attack and that it was less >of a surprise to him than it was to others in the White House. FDR >claimed he sent an advance warning to Pearl Harbor that an attack by >Japan was imminent. "They caught our ships like lame ducks! Lame ducks, >Bill. We told them, at Pearl Harbor and everywhere else, to have the >lookouts manned. But they still took us by surprise." > >Still not convinced that America's isolationist sentiments would change >after this attack, FDR then read to the two men from a message he had >received from a British Foreign Office official, T. North Whitehead: >"The dictator powers have presented us with a united America." Roosevelt >wondered whether Whitehead's assessment was correct. Again he asked, >would America now support a declaration of war? Donovan and Murrow again >replied in the affirmative. > >Whitehead was an influential member of the Foreign Office and an advisor >to Prime Minister Winston Churchill on matters affecting America's aid >to the British in 1940 and 1941. He evaluated American public opinion >and "read" FDR's mind for the Prime Minister. In written comments to >Churchill in the fall of 1940, Whitehead had warned of continued United >States isolationism, but predicted it could be overcome: "America is not >in the bag. However, the President is engaged in carefully calculated >steps to give us full assistance." > >Several years later Murrow made a brief, circumspect broadcast that in >part addressed the question of what the President had known before the >Japanese hit Pearl Harbor. According to Murrow's biographer Ann Sperber, >"The broadcast itself was a response to an article by John Chamberlain >in LIFE magazine charging Roosevelt with foreknowledge of the attack. >Murrow did not believe it and said so on the air, making it clear that >he had only his instinct to go on." > >In the end, Murrow's big story remained unwritten and unbroadcast. >Sperber believed that the meeting concerned damage reports. Whatever it >was, it weighed heavily on Murrow's mind. "But he couldn't forget it >either, blaming himself at times thereafter for not going with the >story, never determining to his satisfaction where his duties lay that >night or what had been in the subtle mind of FDR," Sperber wrote. Murrow >took the story to his grave. He died April 7, 1965, two days past his >fifty-seventh birthday. > >Had FDR revealed something that night about his foreknowledge? Damage >reports emerged immediately in local Hawaii papers, though the full >details of the American losses were not released to the nation's news >media until December 16, 1941, by Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox. He >confirmed the initial report by the Honolulu Star-Bulletin. Secretary >Knox named the seven warships sunk: USS Arizona, USS Utah, USS Oklahoma, >USS Cassin, USS Downes, USS Shaw, and USS Oglala. He said the human toll >on Oahu was 2897 Americans killed, 879 wounded, and 26 missing. There >was severe damage to the Army's aircraft and hangars on Oahu. Knox said >the Japanese planes came from aircraft carriers and had the "most >tremendously detailed" information of the naval layout at Pearl Harbor. >He listed Japan's losses at forty-one planes shot down, and disclosed >the American capture of a Japanese two-man midget submarine that had >gone aground on an Oahu beach and the sinking of four other Japanese >midget subs. > >Once the nation's news media reported the attack details on December 16, >1941, there was no "big story" left to report on the main events at >Pearl Harbor. None -- except speculation about Roosevelt's >foreknowledge. Certain words and phrases cited by Donovan hinted at what >he and Murrow were told by FDR. William vanden Heuvel's diary, according >to author Anthony Cave Brown, is tantalizing: "The President's surprise >was not as great as that of other men around him. Nor was the attack >unwelcome. It had ended the past months of uncertainty caused by FDR's >decision that Japan must be seen to make the first overt move." > >Any conclusion about the Murrow meeting must remain speculative, because >the participants refused to tell the story. However, there are many more >direct pieces of evidence from the days and weeks leading up to December >7 that put the question of FDR's foreknowledge definitively to rest. >Previous accounts have claimed that the United States had not cracked >Japanese military codes prior to the attack. We now know this is wrong. >Previous accounts have insisted that the Japanese fleet maintained >strict radio silence. This, too, is wrong. The truth is clear: FDR knew. > >The real question is even more intriguing: did he deliberately provoke >the attack? Were there earlier covert moves by the United States? >According to a secret strategy memo, dated October 7, 1940, and adopted >by the President, there were. > DECLARATION & DISCLAIMER ========== CTRL is a discussion and informational exchange list. Proselyzting propagandic screeds are not allowed. Substance�not soapboxing! These are sordid matters and 'conspiracy theory', with its many half-truths, misdirections and outright frauds is used politically by different groups with major and minor effects spread throughout the spectrum of time and thought. That being said, CTRL gives no endorsement to the validity of posts, and always suggests to readers; be wary of what you read. CTRL gives no credeence to Holocaust denial and nazi's need not apply. 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