-Caveat Lector-
an excerpt from:
BETRAYAL - Our Occupation of Germany
Arthur D. Rahn
Former Chief Editor of Intelligence
Office of the Director of Information Control
Office of Military Government, Germany
Book & Knowledge
Warsaw, Poland
pps. 237 (no date) out-of-print
-----
---" NOT until I sat down to write this book and reflected on my experience
and organized my notes did I realize that what had seemed to me and my
friends in Germany to be a chaos of corruption and incompetence had actually
been a planned development following a very definite pattern. In fact, it has
become increasingly clear that the pattern of events in Germany from 1944 to
mid-1947 mirrored in sharp perspective what was happening at home in America.
Developments in Germany, too, have paralleled our actions in the United
Nations and our relations with the Soviet Union, Greece, Spain, China,
Britain, Israel — with the entire world."---
Om
K
-----
CHAPTER THIRTEEN
1947, Culmination
The Occupation Yields Rotten Fruit
"We can gain no lasting peace if we approach it with suspicion and mistrust "
or with fear. We can gain it only if we proceed with the understanding and
the confidence and the courage which flow from conviction."
--From Fourth Inaugural Address, January 20, 1945.
FOR two years our Military Government authorities and our State and War
Department officials lauded their "accomplishments" in Germany. They assured
the American people they had been applying our original directives with true
American spirit and efficiency. They had been doing the best job in
denazification, they had been the only ones introducing real democratic
practices and a true democratic way of life, the only ones carrying out the
provisions of the Potsdam Declaration.
But by the summer of 1947 the ballyhoo and the selfrighteous mouthings of
these politicians and military leaders who actually had never fully accepted
the Roosevelt policy were unmistakeably exposed.
The transformation of the occupation was completed from an occupation devoted
to accomplishing the stated aims of the war and for eliminating for ever the
German war potential to an occupation concerned with the establishment of
American assistance necessary for the reconstruction of this industrial area,
and his speech won us many new friends and strengthened our ties with our old
German allies. Immediately, German stocks on the Frankfurt exchange rose an
average of 10 per cent, with bank stocks going up as much as 30 per cent. A
few days later, on September 9th, Edwin Hartrich reported to the New York
Herald Tribune that:
"...German businessmen and industrialists interpret the Byrnes speech to mean
that America will virtually underwrite the recovery of at least the western
zones of occupation. At the same time they believe that America and Britain
have definitely decided to build up western Germany as a balance against the
Russian Zone."
This was the new policy, clearly expressed.
In January 1947, on New Year's Day, the marriage between the British and
American Zones was consummated. The Ruhr was the dowry. Although General Clay
assured the world that this was merely a marriage of economic convenance that
would not result in the political unification of the two zones, it was
apparent that the establishment of over-all bizonal economic unity would
inevitably lead to political unity. Alongside the Four Power Allied Control
Council in Berlin, we had now established our own Two Power Economic
Administration to make decisions without consulting the other occupation
powers.
It was only a few weeks, however, before it became apparent that the marriage
was not an entirely happy one. Our "conservative" German authorities were
incapable of handling the critical economic problems of the bizonal area and
the further delay and avoidance of necessary social and economic reforms
accompanying the cure-all marriage was aggravating the hardships and hastening
the inevitable economic collapse. In the British Zone food rations fell as
low as 800 calories in February and March. Hundreds of factories in the
American Zone, on the other hand, were forced either to shut down or to run
on short shifts because of the lack of coal from the Ruhr. The British Zone
officials demanded larger quotas of food from the American Zone; our German
administrators refused to deliver food until they received coal.
>From the very beginning of the occupation, we had sponsored federalist
tendencies and now the centralized economic administration foundered because
of the provincial jealousies and selfishness in our Zone. By March three
months after the establishment of Bizonia, Baumgartner, the Bavarian Minister
of Agriculture and a protegee of Cardinal Faulhaber, openly announced that he
would not cooperate in the bizonic economic plans.
"I am absolutely opposed," he said, "to the export of additional food into
other states of the American Zone or into the British Zone... It was simply
decided (by the German bizonal food agency) that Bavaria would have to
furnish so-and-so many thousand tons of fat within such-and-such time. I
refused, of course. The result was that these gentlemen got behind General
Muller (Brig. Gen. Muller, the Military Governor of Bavaria) who ordered me
to supply the fat. My answer was: 'You can, of course, put me in jail, but I
will not obey this order of yours ....‘"
The Bavarians refused to deliver their full quota not only to the British
Zone but to the other provinces in our Zone as well. At Easter, in Hesse, one
egg per person was doled out to the population. In Bavaria, at the same time,
adults received seven, children, nine and adolescents, 14 eggs apiece. No
wonder that General Clay complained angrily in mid-April that cooperation
among the German officials was "less than at any time in the past two years."
Although, as Col. Hugh B. Hester, Chief of the Food and Agriculture Division
of our MG, stated at the end of March "German selfishness and failure to
provide effective leadership... (are) the primary causes of an inadequate
food program," our officials were unable to find any solution to the problem
other than the importation of thousands of tons of food monthly from the
States, paid for by American taxpayers. American taxpayers have had to make
up for the losses in the blackmarket also, inasmuch as the German
administrators have either been incapable of eliminating the corrupt
profiteering or unwilling to do so. A report from Hesse in March revealed
that there was almost as much illegal slaughtering and selling of meat as
legal. And the April 14th issue of the provincial semi-monthly MG report
announced that "the blackmarket is by far one of the chief problems in
Bavaria."
With coal the situation was equally as discouraging. In January, Dr. Mueller,
the head of the Bizonal Economics Administration reported that one and a half
million tons of coal had disappeared in delivery during 1946 and about 5
million additional tons had spoiled waiting for shipment. He explained that
German authorities could do nothing to prevent the loss of about 150,000 tons
of coal that simply vanished each month. Five months of Bizonal
administration did little to remedy this situation. In the monthly British
report for May appeared this laconic admission of failure: "No improvement
has occurred in the coal situation."
As a result of the continuing crisis in food and coal, our MG officers were
unable to develop the industrial exports of the western zones to pay for the
importations of food. Here, too, the situation was seriously aggravated by
the recalcitrance of our German administrators. * In May, the head of MG's
Export-Import Division in Hesse, Leo Mandell, complained of the low
production in the provincial chemical industry, particularly at the large
completely undamaged I. G. Farben plant in Hoechst (near Frankfurt), He
suspected that the production was being hoarded and warned that drastic
punishments would result from any such attempts at sabotage.[* Kurt Blaum
(Cf. Chapter III, Crew Cuts and White Collars), the former Oberbuergermeister
of Frankfurt, ex-Wehrmacht major, expediter of armaments production, Nazi
theoretician, "conservative" pseudodemocrat and favorite of our MG men, was
appointed head of the Provincial Board for Property Control in Hesse
(administrator of expropriated Nazi and militarist holdings) in April. We
have seen the results of his talents in the administration of Frankfurt.
Could we expect his kind to inspire the workers to increase production? It is
men like him who are running German business and industry in Bizonia.]
Despite the failure of the German administrators to cope with the food and
coal problems and to carry through our denazification program, General Clay
announced on May 1st, that the Germans would henceforth bear primary
responsibility for their own affairs, MG would not interfere with the German
administrations and no prior MG approval would be necessary for actions of
the German legislatures. This move was in keeping with the policy of
withdrawing MG supervision and reducing MG personnel that had commenced back
in the fall of 1945, when we withdrew our supervision from the rural areas
before holding the first elections. Since we had already so drastically
decreased the size of our MG staff, however, General Clay's announcement of
the transfer of authority to the Germans was merely a recognition of a fait
accompli. On May 20th, Delbert Clark reported to the New York Times that as a
result of the cuts in MG personnel "assigned functions cannot be performed
with the thoroughness necessary to assure success of the occupation
mission... with the possible exception of the economics division..."
(Rehabilitation of industry had assumed first importance in Germany.)
Scarcely a week after the announcement of the new "democratic responsibility"
of the German officials, General Clay was talking about instituting a new
"Get Tough" policy with Germans, using the army to collect food and to fight
the blackmarket.
A month later, we reversed our "democratic" policy, announcing the formation
of a German Economics Council for the British and American Zones to be
composed of 53 members nominated by the legislatures of the individual states
in the two zones and exercising complete authority in the economic
administration of the area. With this all-powerful council, there was no
pretence of democracy. Its term of office was indefinite and it was not
responsible to the electorate. Only the joint MG administrations could veto
its decisions. Hardly had the "independent" council begun to operate, when on
June 22nd, the British announced that British troops would be used to combat
the blackmarket in Lower Saxony. Neither our "democratic" nor our
"undemocratic" administrative organs were capable of handling the major
problems of Bizonia.
As we have seen, 'the unification of the two western zones brought dubious
economic advantages. Politically, the move was disastrous. The British had
made no pretence of attempting any large-scale, consequent denazification. To
adapt our policy to theirs, we actually had to surrender our entire program —
or what remained of it after it had been mangled by the "conservatives". On
January 14th, two weeks after the formation of our bizonal economic unity,
Delbert Clark cabled the following statement about American Zone
denazification to the New York Times:
"General Clay has said that he considers the success of bizonal economic
unification the most important task before the Military Government. If this
can be interpreted as literally as have been the instructions not to
interfere in the local German governments, it is not likely there will be a
strong drive to weed out undesirables or to scrutinize too closely the
political fitness of individuals under consideration for important posts."
In every large bizonal economics office, there is a large percentage of Nazis
and Nazi sympathizers. We accepted the British appointments and were
diffident about our own denazification regulations with high officials. In
the Food Administration, under Dr. Hans Schlange-Schoeningen, the director,
163 of the 169 highest officials were former Party members. In January, 1947
the trade unions complained that 60 of the 65 highest officials in the
bizonal Post and Communications Administration were former Nazis. In March,
the workers in the Waterways Administration in the American Zone refused to
accept the authority of the bizonal board because 95% of the officials were
ex-Party members.
In 1946 our difficulty had frequently been that the German "conservatives"
were refusing to dismiss fromer Party members. In 1947 the Germans sometimes
had difficulty with ,is in the same respect. In June the Bizonal (Allied)
civil service panel overruled the decision adopted by the German bizonal
communications board to ban the employment of former Nazis — the decision was
too radical for the British and the American officials. Dr. Fritz Busch,
rejected by the Germans in April as a director general of the bizonal
railroads, was able to retain his position because the U. S.-British appeal
board simply filed his case away. The railway unions complained that 70 per
cent of the top railroad supervisors are former Party members, appointed and
retained by directors like Busch.
Emboldened by the reinstatement of thousands of exonerated Nazis to high
positions and by the withdrawal of MG supervision, the German politicians
brazenly sought to force us to bargain for their support against the
Russians. In April, Dr. Schumacher, the head of the western zones Social
Democrats, ignoring the responsibility of the Germans themselves for the
blackmarket and failure to collect the full food quotas, warned:
"If it (Anglo-American assistance) continues in the previous unsatisfactory
tempo or difficulties develop, the Anglo-Saxon powers will lose a round in
the battle they began in Moscow."
If we wanted German support in our struggle against the Soviet Union, we had
better pay the price!
German officials seeking political capital among the nationalistic
electorate, consistently blamed the occupation for all the suffering and
corruption in Bizonia. In June, Dr. Josef Baumgartner, the Bavarian Minister
of Agriculture, an ardent nationalist and Faulhaber man, and Dr. Wilhelm
Hoegner, the Social Democratic Deputy Premier and an old MG favorite and
"middle-of-the-road" politician, both threatened to resign if Bavaria were
forced to deliver the food quotas set by MG. * [* In mid-May a UP
correspondent toured the Bavarian countryside with a German profiteer and
watched him collect 260 pounds of food within two hours in exchange for
cigarettes and some used clothing. This food he sold the same day at a
fabulous profit in a German city. The two important German politicians were
making political capital out of their opposition to the occupation
authorities.]
A wave of nationalism and of opposition to the occupation powers engulfed
Bizonia. Attacks against the anti-Nazi "collaborators" became sharp and open.
In April after the Nazi inspired attack on the Welfare office of the Nazi
Persecuted in Nuremberg, the editor of the Christian Democratic magazine Freih
eit (Freedom) accused the Germans who condemned this terrorist provocation of
trying to "curry favor with the occupation powers." A month later the city
council of Kassel attacked the two local papers in a resolution as "servants
of the American authorities." Germans could no longer cooperate with the
Americans without "betraying" the Fatherland!
The grumbling and sneers of the "conservatives" against the anti-Nazis in
1946 developed into open physical attacks in 1947. In Ansbach, the Union of
the Victims of Fascism had to petition the Bavarian provincial authorities
for protection against the amnestied Nazis who were belligerently attempting
to regain their jobs and homes from the Kzler who had replaced them. In
January, a former SS man invaded the Munich apartment of a Jewish Kzler. With
the aid of two policemen accompanied by police dogs and two housing
officials, he sought to intimidate the Jew into returning the furniture that
had been requisitioned for the Jew's use. They threw two children out of
their beds, struck the man's wife, kicked him down the steps and set the dogs
at him.
High public officials, including the Bavarian Ministers of Agriculture and
Economics, began to harangue against the Jews in public speeches. In March,
an attitude study in the American Zone revealed that 60 per cent of the
German population was strongly anti-Semitic. In May, placards were posted in
the Munich railway station bearing caricatures of Jews, praise of Hitler and
an announcement of the founding of a new anti-Semitic political party.
The Church, never absent from the worst nationalist developments, joined the
attacks on the anti-Nazi "collaborators." The chairman of the Central Council
for Distribution of Foreign Gift Packages in the American Zone, also the head
of the Evangelical charities in Germany, announced that he would not
distribute packages among the victims of fascism. That, he insisted, would be
an act of reparations and would not be poli
tically neutral, favoring, as it would, the anti-Nazis over the Nazis. Yet at
Christmas (1946) the Evangelical Church distributed packages in the
internment camp at Ludwigsburg to the SS men and war criminals imprisoned
there.
The occupation, too, became a target for German "conservative" assault. In
Bremen, anti-occupation pamphlets had wide distribution. In the British Zone,
the German Rightist Party, according to a May 17th dispatch to the New York
Times, circulated leaflets containing such slogans as these:
"No compromise but war."
"Bitter fighting until the decision."
"This period of national humiliation."
"The duty to clean the shield of the German soldiers' honor before our own
and foreign countries."
In this atmosphere of anti-occupation and anti-Nazi agitation, the danger to
our troops increased many times over what it was back in 1945 at the time of
the great Army breakdown.* It was no wonder that Col. Julius Klein, a special
assistant to Secretary of War Patterson, should warn in a report printed in
the June 5th issue of the Congressional Record that "American troops are
exposed to carefully planned and subtle nationalistic German propaganda" or
that Senator Brewster (Republican, Maine) should express concern that "our
politically * inexperienced" occupation troops might be exposed to the "virus
of Nazism." After two years of American "democratization," the German
fraeuleins were even more dangerous than they were back in 1945! [* Cf. in
addition, the development of the Nazi underground and the terrorist bombing
attacks which followed in rapid succession in the beginning of 1947 in
Chapter XI, The Youth — In The Atmosphere of Despair.]
For international cooperation and the establishment of a lasting peace, the
early months of 1947 in Germany were very discouraging. The Economic Council
established in June was entrusted with such extensive powers that there was
in fact a political as well as an economic unification of the two Anglo-Saxon
zones. The removal of all the bizonal administration offices, German and
Allied, to Frankfurt in effect meant the establishment of a capital for
western Germany. European nations which experienced German Kultur during the
Nazi occupation had reason to fear that we were reconstructing western
Germany into a rump state to act as a buffer against the Soviet Union.
There was good reason for the suspicion, too, that our MG officials were more
concerned with the interests of certain American bankers and industrialists
than with the accomplishment of our original aims and directives. Our
emphasis on industrial rehabilitation, to the detriment of denazification and
democratization, our insistence on Anglo-American control of the Ruhr and the
appointment of bankers, directors of industrial enterprises and big
businessmen to the all-powerful Economics Division of MG pointed to an
American imperialist policy in Germany. * [* One of Major General (formerly
Brig. Gen.) William H. Draper's chief assistants in the Economics Division
was Rufus J. Wysor, the president of Republic Steel at the time of the
massacre during the Little Steel strike. Republic Steel is controlled by the
international banker Victor Emanuel, who has close connections with the
Schroeder banking interests, the German branch of which, under Baron Kurt von
Schroeder, is heavily involved in the Ruhr industrial enterprises. In keeping
with the attempt to merge occupation with business also were the appointments
of Col. Harry L. Berno, former president of the W. H. Davey Steel Corp., as
chief of the industry branch of the Economics Division, and Bertrand Clarke,
former vice president of the United States Trust Co. of Kansas City and later
president of the Industrial Rayon Corp. as the industrial advisor for the
Joint Export-Import Agency of the United States and British Zones. While
these men are being sent over to Germany, other MG officials in charge of
denazification and reeducation are being returned to the States — those tasks
are not so important!
Indicative of the influence of our business interests in occupation policies
was the following statement cabled from Bremen to the New York Times by
Edward Morrow on January 29th:
"Pointing out that his plant would come under the broad definition (for
socialization in the city-state), the local manager of one large American
interest asserted that there was not enough money in the- whole state to pay
American investors for his plant, should sociali-zation be adopted... Since
there are large United States business interests in this port, more than one
concern in the United States was pressing to have this section come under
United States control." (It did come under American control.)
Officials in the Economics Division warned the German administrations in our
Zone against even projecting a possible nationalization of I. G. Farben. It
was likely that the Merck Chemical Works in Darmstadt and the Opel Works in
Ruesselsheim were not included in the nationalizations accomplished by the
Hessian provincial government because of American pressure. That these plants
are guilty of maltreatment of foreign workers, of large financial support to
the Nazis and considerable contributions to and profiteering from Hitler's
war of plunder and ,oppression was evidently not to be considered when
American profits are at stake]
In keeping with our plans for rehabilitating German industry in alliance with
the British and the German industrialists and bankers, we served notice in
January, 1947 that the production levels established at Potsdam would no
longer apply in Bizonia. In June, when Secretary of Commerce W. Averill
Harriman visited Germany, General Clay publicly announced that the purpose of
his visit was "to see to what extent he can revive German trade with the
United States and to what extent the United States can restore the German
economy."
Officials of the British Economics Division urged the resumption of the
production of vanadium and aluminium in Bizonia. The processing of these
metals had been forbidden under the Potsdam Agreement because of their value
as war materials. In further violation of the Potsdam Agreement we permitted
German industrialists seeking to avoid nationalization, trade union control
or dismantlement for reparations, to transfer their plants from the Russian
Zone to the west (March 29th dispatch to the New York Times).
Neither we nor the British fulfilled our reparations quotas. On May 31st
Edward Morrow reported to the New York Times that there was a danger of a
breakdown of the reparations program because of the widespread sabotage in
the British Zone. Machinery disappears, inventories are faked, irreplaceable
parts are removed. Every method possible is employed to prevent the shipment
of reparations. The British, presumably, are helpless before this
"disobedience!" In the American Zone, the situation was simpler. As the
anti-Soviet leader of the Social Democrats and British favorite, Kurt
Schumacher, declared:
"It is a fact that America has stopped the dismantling of industry in
Germany..."
Although we heard much of our disagreements with the Soviets and the French
on the question of reparations, decartellization, German boundaries and the
control of the Ruhr, between us and the British there has hardly been the
harmony to be expected with newly-weds. After six months of bizonal economic
unity the New York Times was still carrying reports of Anglo-British
disagreement. Fearing the greater economic power and industrial. might of the
Americans, the British have favored some form of nationalization of German
industry to prevent American businessmen from obtaining complete control of
the Ruhr enterprises. Our Economics Division officials replied with a plan
for a five year moratorium against any modification in the form of ownership
of German industry.
Having forced the British to share in the exploitation of the Ruhr and having
excluded the other European powers from the area, our officials began to
deprive the British, too, of any considerable role in the exploitation of
this industrial heart of Germany. Averill Harriman's criticism in July of the
British "mismanagement" of the Ruhr and his advice that the Ruhr and not
Britain would be the chief beneficiary of the Marshall Plan pointed to
further aggravation of the existing Anglo-American "disagreements."
Concerned with safeguarding and multiplying the profits of the massive
American corporations with investments and business agreements in Germany,
our banker-industrialist statesmen not only antagonized many of our wartime
allies and many of the German anti-Nazis, but they also betrayed the war
objectives and the best interests of the American people. In 1947, our
occupation of Germany was hardly concerned any longer with the
democratization and denazification of Germany or with the strengthening of
international cooperation for the establishment of lasting peace. Not the
American people, certainly not the American soldiers who fought the Nazis,
were being represented by the policymakers in Washington and our MG officials
at the Berlin headquarters.
Revival Under Our Feet
In. April, angry workers overturned British MG automobiles in Duesseldorf and
Braunschweig and hurled stones through the windows of MG buildings. A general
strike of the Ruhr miners was followed by strikes in individual factories
throughout Bizonia. In the British Zone, city councils halted their activity,
and after the elections in mid-April, political parties refused to accept
positions of responsibility in the provincial and municipal administrations,
fearing the wrath of the people. In the American Zone, the Communist Party
issued a series of resolutions calling for the institution of emergency
measures to alleviate the critical food and fuel shortages. By May, the
demonstrations had grown to vast proportions in the British Zone and would
have spread through the American Zone if our officials had not threatened
strikers and demon. strators with severe punishments. At a meeting of 1,000
trade union delegates representing two million workers in the Ruhr, a
resolution was passed demanding immediate action to improve the food supply
and declaring in anger:
"We cannot escape the impression that the spirit of the past still has too
strong an influence on the economy and the administration."
There was nothing in common between these expressions of popular
dissatisfaction and the bombing attacks of the Nazi fanatics and the
disillusioned, misguided ex-Hitler Youth and ex-soldiers. Officially backed
by the trade unions in most cases, these demonstrations were neither
nationalistic nor reactionary in purpose. The demands were for thorough
denazification, for social reforms, greater democratization and for an end to
blackmarket profiteering.
. Half-starved on rations which fell as low as 790 calories (as in Cologne)
in the winter 1946-1947, frightened at the anemia and rickets sapping the
strength of their children and at the growing menace of consumption, the
workers waited while our officials sharply criticized the German politicians
for failing to ensure the food supply. They listened when the German
politicians retorted by blaming the occupation authorities for the crisis.
But nothing positive was accomplished. The stubborn, sabotaging, incompetent
reactionaries remained in office and the unconstructive vituperation
continued.
The workers knew that we had entrusted the unreliable "conservative" German
officials with almost unlimited authority, withdrawing our own personnel so
that we could not satisfactorily supervise the German administrations even if
we were to decide to reimpose strict controls. From their politicians and
even from many of their trade union leaders, the workers could expect nothing
but speeches and promises.* As a result the workers turned to direct action,
strikes and public demonstrations.[* That was why the Social Democratic trade
union leaders in our Zone advised MG in May that they would not be able to
control their followers or prevent the rapid spread of "bolshevism" if
definite action to solve the crisis were not directly forthcoming.]
Rejecting the pusillanimity and indecision of many of our MG men, the
workers, frequently led by the Communists, who are particularly strong among
the left-wing workers in the industrial British Zone, demanded the
resignation of the "conservative" administrators and their replacement by
more aggressive, democratic German leaders, who would be responsive to the
will and needs of the majority and less concerned with the privileges and
profitmaking of the tiny minority.
The VE day resentment against and fear of the Nazis and the Nazi-sympathizers
was reborn. Frightened by the Freikorps activity of the reactionaries, the
workers were being shaken out of the apathy and confusion that followed the
stifling of the Antifas and the destruction of the anti-Nazi unity of 1945.
Although -the British and the Americans were also among the chief targets of
the developing Nazi underground, the trade unionists, the Communists and the
left-wing Social Democrats could no longer count on the Allied MG officials
for support in the struggle against the resurgence of reaction. The
anti-Nazis had to fight back alone. Their answer to the nationalist offensive
was dramatic. In Stuttgart after the bombing of local denazification courts
in the fall of 1946, some 75,000 workers marched in protest. In Nuremberg,
after the bombing of the denazification court in February, 1947, the trade
unions called a general strike and staged a huge demonstration. Additional
supporting strikes were held in Coburg, Bamberg, Bayreuth and Hof. Showing
clear understanding of the real instigators of the terrorist attacks, the
workers in the great NAM plant at Nuremberg (Nuremberg-Augsburg Machine Works)
held a six-hour strike to force the dismissal of four Nazis who occupied
leading administrative positions in the factory.
United in their fight against hunger, unemployment and the nationalist
resurgence, the workers renewed their demands for the unity of the workers'
parties with new persistence and became more vocal in pressing for the
nationalization of various basic industries. In May applications for the
authorization of the Socialist Unity Party were entered in the three
provinces of the American Zone and throughout the British Zone. In Hesse,
among the 30 signers of the petition were fourteen former Social Democratic
functionaries. In Wuerttemberg-Baden, Hans Venedey, the former Social
Democratic Minister of Interior in Hesse, was one of the chief sponsors of
the application.
As long as the British and American MG officials delayed the establishment of
a unified workers' party in Bizonia by refusing to grant a license for the
party, the Communist Party continued to increase its strength among the worker
s demanding an end to procrastination and idle verbal recriminations. In
April, the Communists polled ten per cent of the vote in the British Zone
elections and led in industrial towns like Remscheid and Solingen.
Since our banker-industrialist MG men and State Department officials reject
the objectives of the war, hamper the aggressive anti-Nazi forces in Germany,
sabotage Big Power cooperation and devote almost all their efforts to
rebuilding German industry; the trade unionists, Communists, left-wing Social
Democrats and the Kzler (who are fighting with new vigor in their Union of
the Victims of Nazism), are the chief forces in Bizonia maintaining the
struggle for the accomplishIment of the provisions of the Postdam
Declaration. They alone fight for thorough denazification, extirpation of the
German war menace, dynamic democratization, German national unity and lasting
peace through international agreement.
We Americans are fortunate that in the chaos of our Zone, there exists a
large body of Germans who will not succumb to the demogogic appeals of the
German nationalists and Nazis. If we should succeed in returning to the
Roosevelt foreign policy of international cooperation for the elimination of
war and fascism, we will be able to turn to them for assistance in
accomplishing the objective for which we fought.
pps. 213-230
-----
Aloha, He'Ping,
Om, Shalom, Salaam.
Em Hotep, Peace Be,
Omnia Bona Bonis,
All My Relations.
Adieu, Adios, Aloha.
Amen.
Roads End
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