Attached is a CIA document regarding Lee Harvey Oswald in Mexico,
declassified three decades after the fact. It's called "The Lopez
Report." It would make a great movie.
Her name was Silvia. She worked the visa desk. She looked for all the
world like Ronnie Spector, lead singer of the quintessential Sixties
gringo girl group, the Ronettes. Everybody knew she was a spy. Nobody
knew for whom. Everybody knew what she liked in bed, though. She liked
gringos, blonde gringos.
Silvia looked up from her desk one day. A handsome blonde gringo was
eyeing her assets.
"Is there anything I can, uh, do for you today senor, . . . senor . . .
?"
He smiled knowingly and extended his hand.
"Oswald," he said, "Lee Oswald."
Lopez_Report_(ascii)
LEE HARVEY OSWALD
THE CIA AND
MEXICO CITY
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Issues Addressed 1
B. Differences Between the Warren Commission
Investigation of Lee Harvey Oswald's
Activities in Mexico City and the House
Select Committee on Assassination's
Investigation. 3
C. Conclusions 5
D. Structure and Relevancy 10
II. Central Intelligence Agency Surveillance
Operations in Mexico City in September and October
1963
A. Photographic Surveillance Operations Aimed
at the Cuban Diplomatic Compound 12
1. Introduction 12
2. Physical Positioning of Surveillance
Bases and Targets 12
3. Objectives of Operation and Scope of
Coverage Provided 13
4. Disposition of Production from the
Operation 30
B. Photographic Surveillance Operations Aimed
at the Soviet Diplomatic Compound 31
1. Introduction 31
2. Physical Positioning of Surveillance
Bases and Targets 31
3. Objectives of Operation and Scope of
Coverage Provided 33
4. Procedure and Timing Involved in
Processing Production from the
Operation 45
5. Responsibility for the Operation 47
6. Coordination of Surveillance
Operations 52
a. [missing] 53
b. Analysis and Reporting of
Information Obtained 54
3. [redacted] 56
4. [13 chars] from Operation 58
a. Types 59
b. Handling Procedures 59
(1) Resuma 59
(2) [redacted] 60
(3) [redacted] 61
(a) [redacted] 61
(b) [redacted] 62
(c) [redacted] 64
(d) [redacted] 66
(e) Expedited Procedure 67
(f) [redacted] 70
(g) Format 71
c. Voice Comparisons 72
III. Information About Lee Harvey Oswald's stay in
Mexico that was Known by the CIA Mexico City
Station Prior to the Assassination of John Kennedy
and the Sources of that Information
A. Information that was Available 72
1. Information Available to the Mexico
City Station from [ ]
surveillance at the Soviet Consulate
and Millitary Attache's Office 73
a. September 27, 1963, Friday 73
b. September 28, 1963, Saturday 76
c. October 1, 1963, Tuesday 78
d. October 3, 1963, Thursday 79
2. Information Available to the Mexico
City CIA Station from CIA Headquarters 80
3. Information Available to the Mexico
City Station from [ ]
Surveillance Aimed at the Cuban
Diplomatic Compound 81
4. Information Available to the Mexico
City Station from Photographic
Surveillance of the Soviet and Cuban
Diplomatic Compounds 81
5. Possibility that Additional
Information from the [ ]
Surveillance on the Soviet Compound
was Available to the Mexico City
Station 82
6. Possibility that the CIA
Photosurveillance Obtained a
Photograph of Lee Harvey Oswald 90
a. Missing Materials 91
b. Likelihood that the
Photosurveillance Operation would
have Missed Oswald 91
c. Reports of the Existence of a
Photograph. 93
(1) Phillip Agee Allegation. 93
(2) [ ]
Allegation 95
(3) Joseph Burkholder Smith
Allegation 99
(4) Joseph Piccolo, Jr.
Allegation. 102
(5) Statements of [ ] 105
d. HSCA Investigation of the
Possibility that the Mexico City
Photosurveillance Operation
Produced a Photograph of Lee
Harvey Oswald 107
(1) Introduction 107
(2) Investigation of the
Allegations 108
B. Information Connected to Lee Harvey Oswald
by the Mexico City Station Prior to the
Assassination. 115
1. Introduction 115
2. Information Available from the Soviet
[ ] that was
Connected with or involved Lee Harvey
Oswald. 116
3. When were the [ ]
Conversations Linked to Lee Harvey
Oswald. 120
4. The Photograph of the Mexico Mystery
Man. 122
IV. Reconstruction of the CIA Mexico City Station and
Headquarters Actions Prior to the Assassination of
President John F. Kennedy.
A. Introduction--CIA Interest in and Liaison
with FBI Regarding American Citizens in
Contact with Soviet Bloc Embassies in
Mexico City. 123
V. Mexico City Station Reporting of Information
Concerning Oswald After the Assassination
A. Reporting of information concerning the
photograph of the Mexico Mystery Man 178
B. Reporting of information concerning Lee
Harvey Oswald from the [ ]
aimed at the Soviet Embassy 180
C. Silvia Duran 184A
VI. Information not available at the time of the
Warren Commission investigation
A. Silvia Tirado (nee Duran) 191
1. House Select Committee on
Assassinations 6/6/78 Interview of
Silvia Tirado 191
2. CIA information not available at the
time of the Warren Commission
investigation 194
a. [ ] allegation 194
b. The possibility that Silvia Duran
was an agent for either American,
Mexican or Cuban intelligence 197
(l) Was Silvia Duran an agent,
asset or source for Mexican
or American intelligence? 197
(2) Was Silvia Duran a Cuban
intelligence agent? 202
B. The Cubans 203
1. Eusebio Azcue Lopez 205
2. Alfredo Mirabal Diaz 206
C. Elena Garro de Paz 206
1. Elena's story as reported October 5,
1964 206
2. October 12,1964 CIA Memo for the
Record 208
3. November 24, 1964 CIA Informant Report 209
4. November 24,1964 Elena Garro meeting
with Mexico City Legal Attache
officers; 210
5. Charles Thomas' first meeting with
Elena Garro where Lee Harvey Oswald is
discussed 212
6. Charles Thomas's Meeting with Elena
Garro on December 25, 1965 216
7. December 27 1965 Legal Attache Memo
to the United States Ambassador re
Elena Garro 221
8. CIA Investigation of Elena's
Allegation that She Created a
disturbance at the Cuban Embassy on
November 23, 1963. 223
9. Legal Attache 2/23/66 memo to the
United States Ambassador Regarding
Elena Garro's Allegations 224
10. Legal Attache Memo to Winston Scott re
Elena's Allegation that She had Stayed
at the Hotel Vermont from the Day
After the Assassination Until November
30, 1963 225
11. Charles Thomas' September 30, 1969
Letter to State Department and Legal
Attache's Response 226
l2. House Select Committee on
Assassination's Investigation of Elena
Garro's Allegations 228
D. Oscar Contreras Lartigue 235
VII. Analysis of Lee Harvey Oswald's Activities in
Mexico City
A. Introduction 240
B. Did Lee Harvey Oswald or an Impostor
Contact the Cuban and Soviet Consulates in
Mexico 242
C. What were Lee Harvey Oswald's Activities in
Mexico City? 250
D. Was Lee Harvey Oswald alone while he
traveled to Mexico? 259
Appendix 1
HSCA Procedural write-up: Cuba Trip 1 261
Appendix 2
HSCA Procedural Write-up: Mexico Trip 1 265
Appendix 3
HSCA Procedural Write-up: Mexico Trip 2 273
Appendix 4
HSCA Procedural Write-up: Cuba Trip 2 287
Appendix 5
Biography: Elena Garro de Paz 297
APPENDIX SIX
GLOSSARY OF TERMS USED IN REPORT. 301
APPENDIX SEVEN
LISTING OF CIA DOCUMENTS CITED. 305
-1-
I. INTRODUCTION;
A. Issues Addressed
The House Select Committee on Assassinations'
investigation into Lee Harvey Oswald's activities in Mexico
City has been directed at answering the following questions:
1) Did Lee Harvey Oswald visit the Soviet and Cuban
Consulates or Embassies in Mexico City?
2) In addition to the visits which may have been made
to the Embassies, what were Lee Harvey Oswald's
activities while he was in Mexico City?
3) Was Lee Harvey Oswald alone in Mexico City? If
not, who were his associates and what were their
activities?
4) Did the Central Intelligence Agency maintain any
surveillance operation(s) aimed at the Cuban and
Soviet diplomatic missions in Mexico City? If so,
what kind?
5) What information, if any, about Oswald's stay in
Mexico was known by the CIA Mexico City Station
prior to the assassination and what was the source
of that information?
-2-
6) Was the information, if any, in the possession of
the CIA Mexico City Station reported to the CIA
Headquarters accurately and expeditiously prior to
the assassination?
7) Was the information in the possession of the CIA
Mexico City Station reported to the CIA
Headquarters accurately and expeditiously after
the assassination?
8) Was the information developed by the CIA in
Mexico City communicated to the Warren Commission
in an accurate and expeditious manner?
9) Did the CIA photo-surveillance of the Cuban and
Soviet diplomatic compounds in Mexico City, if
such photo-surveillance existed, obtain a
photograph of Lee Harvey Oswald? If so, what
became of the photograph?
-3-
B. Differences Between the Warren Commission
Investigation of Lee Harvey Oswald's Activities in
Mexico City and the House Select Committee on
Assassination's Investigation.;
The approach taken by this Committee's investigation
differs from that of the Warren Commission primarily in
terms of scope. The Warren Commission and the investigative
agencies at its disposal went to great lengths to establish
Oswald's travel to and from Mexico, but devoted minimal
effort to evaluating Oswald's contacts with the Cuban and
Soviet Consulates. It is the conclusion of this Committee
that the Warren Commission correctly established that Oswald
had traveled to Mexico City. Hence, this Committee has
chosen not to reinvestigate Oswald's travel to and from
Mexico City. Instead, the Committee's approach has been to
focus narrowly on Oswald's contacts with the Soviet and
Cuban diplomatic missions in Mexico City and on evidence
that was not available to the Warren
-4-
Commission that could possibly shed light on Oswald's
activities in Mexico City outside of the Soviet and Cuban
installations.
The Warren Report limited its discussion of Oswald's
contacts with the Soviet and Cuban diplomatic missions to
information obtained from Sylvia Duran and the Cuban
Government.(1)
At one point in the Report the Commissions referred to
other information:
By far the most important confirmation of Senora
Duran's testimony, however, has been supplied by
confidential sources of extremely high reliability
available to the United States in Mexico. The
information from these sources establishes that her
testimony was truthful and accurate in all material
respects. The identities of these sources cannot be
disclosed without destroying their future usefulness
to the United States.(2)
The Warren Commission did not print anything in the
twenty-six volumes of evidence to support its statement that
Silvia Duran's testimony was confirmed by "confidential
sources of extremely high reliability."
-5-
In an attempt to answer the questions posed by Lee
Harvey Oswald's visit to Mexico City in September and
October of 1963, the House Select Committee on
Assassinations has pursued the following investigative
procedure:
1) Conducted extensive interviews, depositions and
executive session hearings involving Central
Intelligence Agency personnel;
2) Interviewed Cuban citizens who could have
knowledge of Oswald's sojourn in Mexico;
3) Interviewed Mexican citizens who could have
knowledge of Oswald's activities and associations
while he was in Mexico;
4) Conducted an extensive review of the files of the
Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau
of Investigation that pertain to Oswald and Mexico
City.
C. Conclusions
1) Someone who identified himself as Lee Harvey
Oswald called the Soviet Consulate on 1 October
1963. This
-6-
individual indicated that he had visited the
Soviet Consulate at least once. Other evidence
from the CIA [ ] and witness testimony
indicates that the individual visited the Soviet
and Cuban Consulates on five or six different
occasions. While the majority of the evidence
tends to indicate that this individual was indeed
Lee Harvey Oswald, the possibility that someone
else used Lee Harvey Oswald's name during this
time in contacts with the Soviet and Cuban
Consulates cannot be absolutely dismissed.
2) This Committee has not been able to determine Lee
Harvey Oswald's activities outside of the Cuban
and Soviet Embassies with certainty. There is a
report, which has not been confirmed, indicating
that during his stay in Mexico Oswald attended a
"twist party" at the home of Ruben Duran Navarro,
the brother-in-law of
-7-
Silvia Duran. There is also unconfirmed evidence
which, if true, would indicate that Oswald spent
one night and parts of two days with a group of
pro-Castro students from the University of Mexico.
3) There is a report that Oswald may have been in the
company of a tall, thin, blond-headed man while in
Mexico. This point has not been confirmed. If
true, it is possible that this same individual
may, on occasion have used Oswald's name in
dealing with the Cuban and Soviet Consulates. The
man's name, if there was such a man, is not known.
4) On the dates that Oswald was in Mexico, the CIA
had photographic surveillance operations which
covered entrances to the Soviet Embassy and the
Cuban Embassy and Consulate. [
] in the
Soviet Consulate and Military Attache's Office and
Cuban diplomatic compounds. The
-8-
[ t ] Cuban Consulate was not
subject to that surveillance.
5) The CIA's Mexico City Station definitely knew of
Oswald's contacts with both the Soviet and Cuban
diplomatic compounds and of his desire to obtain
an intransit visa for travel to Russia via Cuba.
The source of this information was the [
] surveillance on the Soviet Consulate and Soviet
Military Attache's Office.
6) All information in the possession of the CIA
Mexico City Station was not reported to CIA
Headquarters in an accurate and expeditious manner
prior to the assassination.
7) With the exception of a few, possibly benign,
irregularities, and considering the possibility
that not all of the information available to the
Station has been provided to this Committee, the
information in the possession of the CIA Mexico
Station was reported in an
-9-
accurate and expeditious manner after the
assassination to headquarters.
8) With the exception of those areas that involved
sensitive sources and methods, such as the
information pertaining to the [ ]
photographic surveillance of the Soviet and Cuban
diplomatic compounds, information developed by the
CIA in Mexico was generally relayed to the Warren
Commission in an accurate and expeditious manner.
9) It is the conclusion of this Committee that the
CIA's photo-surveillance operations in Mexico City
probably obtained a photograph of Lee Harvey
Oswald entering either or both the Soviet and
Cuban Consulates. The CIA denies that such a
photograph exists. Hence, the disposition of this
photograph is unknown.
-9A-
10) [
] several calls of a man using
the name "Lee Oswald." These tapes were retained
for a routine two week period and were most likely
erased shortly after 16 October 1963. These tapes
were probably? [hand written not in ] existence
at the time of the assassination.
11) The Committee is aware of the allegations that
Silvia Tirado de Duran may have been an
intelligence agent for either the Cubans, Mexicans
or Americans. Ms. Duran was probably never
employed by Cuban intelligence. While there is no
direct evidence on the question other than Ms.
Duran's denial, the Committee believes that the
circumstantial evidence that tends to indicate
that Ms. Duran had a relationship of some type
with either Mexican or American intelligence is of
such a nature that the possibility can not be
dismissed.
-10-
D. Structure and Relevancy;
The following report detailing the results of this
Committee's investigative efforts regarding Mexico City is
divided into general areas:
l) CIA surveillance operations in Mexico City during
September and October of l963,
2) Information about Lee Harvey Oswald's stay in
Mexico City that was known prior to the
assassination;
3) Reconstruction of the CIA Mexico City Station and
Headquarters activity regarding Oswald prior to
the assassination;
4) Mexico City reporting of information after the
assassination;
5) Witnesses from the Cuban Consulate;
6) Investigation of related information that was not
available to the Warren Commission; and
7) Reconstruction of Oswald's activities in Mexico
City.
-11-
The reader should be advised at the outset that the
first section following is technical in nature and may not
appear directly relevant at first blush. But the report is
cumulative in nature. The specific, detailed analyses of the
standard operating procedures in the first section are
necessary to, and form a partial basis for, the
reconstruction of the Mexico City Station's handling of the
Oswald case. There are many gaps left by the documentary and
testimonial evidence concerning the manner in which the
CIA's Mexico City Station and Headquarters reacted to
Oswald's presence in Mexico City. A knowledge of the ways in
which the Mexico City Station operated and the procedures
involved in those surveillance operations which detected
Oswald is valuable in filling the gaps of the specific case
which is the subject of this report.
II. Central Intelligence Agency Surveillance Operations in
Mexico City in September and October 1963
-12-
A. Photographic Surveillance Operations Aimed at the
Cuban Diplomatic Compound;
1. Introduction
The Mexico City Station of the Central Intelligence
Agency maintained photographic surveillance on the Cuban
diplomatic compound during September and October of l963.(3)
The purpose of this operation was to get identifiable
photographs of all individuals who visited the Cuban
diplomatic compound.(4)
2. Physical Positioning of Surveillance Bases and
Targets
The Cuban diplomatic compound covered one city block in
Mexico City between Tacubaya, Francisco Marquez and Zamora
Streets. The entrance to the Cuban Embassy was located on
the corner of Tacubaya and Francisco Marques.(5) Next to
this entrance on Francisco Marquez Street was another
entrance for automobiles.(6) The entrance to the Cuban
Consulate,
-13-
which was in a separate building from the Embassy, as
located on the corner of Francisco Marquez and Zamora.(7)
The CIA surveillance post was located at [
] (8) An agent photographed visitors to the Embassy from one
window in the third floor apartment at [
] (9) A pulse camera covered the entrance to the Consulate
from a second window in the same third floor apartment.(10)
3. Objectives of Operation and Scope of Coverage
Provided
One CIA officer, who claimed to have had a marginal
role in this surveillance operation, remembers that they had
trouble covering both the Cuban Embassy entrance and the
Consulate entrance.(11) "The Cuban Embassy coverage had more
sophisticated equipment using a pulse camera which
frequently developed mechanical difficulties."(12) Two former
CIA employees who were in Mexico City in l963 remembered
that there. were two cameras covering the Cuban diplomatic
compound.(13) Ms. Goodpasture, a case officer in the
-14-
Mexico City Station, testified that she could not remember
the locations of the two cameras.(14) David A. Phillips,
Chief of the Cuban Section in the Mexico City Station,
testified that the Consulate entrance was covered along with
the Embassy entrance.(15) Mr. Phillips was not absolutely
sure of his recollection, but thought that it was possible
that the Embassy entrance had been covered by a manned
photographic base and the Consulate entrance was covered by
a pulse camera.(16)
The CIA staff technician who serviced the cameras and
trained the agents at the CIA photographic base that covered
the Cuban compound was interviewed by the House Select
Committee on Assassinations. The technician stated that he
had set up the cameras in the photographic base at the
inception of an operation in the early 1960's designed to
provide photographic surveillance of the Cuban compound. For
a short time after the inception of the operation, the
technician had been responsible for maintaining liaison
between the agents inside the base and the Station. After
the agent's training was completed,
-15-
the technician turned the liaison responsibilities over to a
case officer.(17) He could not remember with certainty the
identity of that case officer, but thought that it may have
been [ ] (18) The technician remembered that the
operation had originally covered the Cuban Embassy entrance
with a manually operated Exacta or Leica camera. He said
that this camera had been set up on a tripod and was
equipped with a Bal-Scope.(19) Later, according to the
technician, a pulse camera was installed in this base
[written ibid. p 3] The pulse camera was set up to cover
the Consulate entrance, while the agents continued covering
the Embassy entrance with the manual camera.[written ibid.]
The technician could not remember with certainty when the
pulse camera was installed in the base. The technician told
the House Select Committee on Assassinations that the exact
time of installation could be checked by reviewing the
project files maintained at CIA Headquarters.(20)
The technician remembered quite a few details about
how the pulse camera had been set up and how it worked. He
remembered that the shutter was triggered by a device
attached to a spotting scope.(21) The
-16-
triggering device was activated by changes in light
intensity The spotting scope was trained on a very narrow
area of the door latch of the Cuban Consulate entrance. The
camera itself covered a much broader field than the spotting
scope. The camera was set up so-as to make sure that a
person triggering the camera by passing between the spotting
scope and its target, the door latch, would be photographed
from the waist up.(22)
The technician stated that the agent in the
photographic basehouse serviced his own cameras, and
developed the film and made contact prints in the
basehouse.(23) The agent covering the Embassy entrance kept a
log corresponding to the photographs taken.(24)
The project files for this operation bear out the
technician's recollections. An examination of these files by
the House Select Committee on Assassinations revealed
several of the technician's monthly reports. An examination
of the chronological file of dispatches passing between CIA
Headquarters and the Mexico City Station turned up one
additional monthly report that was not located in the
project file. A third relevant
-17-
dispatch was made available to the Committee on 20 November
1978. The report in the dispatch chronology covers the
period of 1 September to 30 September 1963.(25) The dispatch
reports that on 23 September 1963 the agent who ran the
Cuban photographic basehouse called the technician into the
basehouse to discuss the layout of the Cuban Consulate.(26)
The entrance to the Cuban Consulate had been closed in 1961
due to harassment and stink bombings.(27) A few days prior to
the 23rd, the Consulate had once again opened its door to
the public. Prior to this reopening of the Consulate door,
the photography agent had limited his coverage to the main
Embassy gate.(28) He used an Exacta camera with a Bal-Scope
with a 30-power eyepiece. The dispatch reported, however,
from the position he had to cover the main gate, he could
not cover the newly reopened Consulate entrance.(29) The base
agent told the technician that at that time, approximately
seventy percent of all the visitors to the Cuban compound
were using the Embassy entrance and the remainder used the
Consulate entrance.(30)
-18-
The technician discussed this problem with the case officer
for the project [ ] (31) [ ] asked the
technician to add additional photographic coverage to the
basehouse so as to cover the Consulate door.(32) On 26
September the technician tested equipment for use in the
basehouse.(33) The dispatch goes on to say:
On the morning of 27 September, [ ] installed
the VLS-2 Trigger Device at the [ ] basehouse
and used the 500 mm lens issued with this system,
one 400 mm Telyt, one reflex housing to be used with
the Telyt adapted to fit the Robot Star camera, one
Robot Star Camera, one solenoid release for mounting
and triggering the Robot Star camera, one Kodak K-
100 adapted for single or burst type exposure, one
solenoid release to be used with the K-100...one 152
mm f/4 Cine Ektar Lens, and two additional
tripods.(34)
The photography agent was instructed to test each
camera for four days. The report says that the results of
these test days will be forwarded to the Technical Services
Division at Headquarters as soon as they become
available.(35)
On 7 November 1963 the Mexico City Station filed a
report on the functioning of the pulse camera.(36) This
dispatch is referenced to
-19-
HMMA-22307, paragraph 5, c.(37) It says that the VLS-2
triggering device had been performing well with little false
triggering. The 500 mm lens was replaced with a 6-inch lens
so as to obtain wider coverage of the Consulate door.(38)
During the first two weeks that the pulse camera was in
operation, the VLS-2 triggered the camera anytime that
anyone entered or left the Consulate door. This dual
photography used an excessive amount of film, so the base
agent adjusted the VLS-2 so that it only photographed people
leaving the Cuban compound by the Consulate door.(39) The
base agent used "the K-100 camera with a 152 mm lens for
one day turning in 10 fee (sic) of 16 mm film."(40) Samples
of the photos taken "on that day" with the camera are
enclosed with the dispatch.(41) The Robot Star camera that
was placed in the base on September 27 broke down after four
days of operation and was replaced with a second Robot Star
camera.(42) This Robot Star broke down after five days of
operation. At the time of this dispatch in
November, a Robot Star camera was in operation.(43) Samples
of this camera's photographs
-20-
were also sent with this dispatch.(44) Hence, between
September 27, 1963 and November 7, 1963, at least three, and
possibly four, cameras were used in the photo base with the
VLS-2 automatic triggering device. On the 27th, the photo-
technician installed two cameras, K-100 and the first Robot
Star, with the VLS-2 triggering device.(45) The K-100 was
used for one day.(46) The first Robot Star worked for four
days; a second Robot Star worked for five days.(47) On
11/7/63 a Robot Star was in operation at the base.(48) It is
not clear whether the Robot Star which was working at the
time of the November dispatch was a third camera or one of
the earlier ones which could have been repaired. In any
event, the Station asked that a new camera be sent to
replace the Robot Star.(49)
On June 1964 the CIA Mexico City Station sent a cable
to Headquarters alerting them that they were sending up the
negatives from the pulse camera coverage of the Cuban
Embassy.(50) All available negatives and five packages of
undeveloped film were sent to Headquarters by transmittal
manifest #252572.(51)
-21-
The cable apologizes for the delay in sending the negatives
caused by "consolidation and dating."(52) The cable suggests
that Headquarters retain possession of the negatives and
informs Headquarters that the negatives will be forwarded to
them on a regular basis.(53)
A transmittal manifest is "unaccountable."(54) That
means that the document and the material it transmits is not
made part of the record and is, therefore, unretrievable.(55)
The CIA made the photo-technician's monthly report for
December available to the Committee on 16 November 1978.(56)
On the morning of 17 December 1963, a 35 mm Sequence camera
was installed in the base house and the VLS-2 trigger
device.(57) The installation of this Sequence camera was
probably in response to the request for a replacement camera
in HMMA-22433.
On 22 June 1965 the CIA Mexico City Station sent a
dispatch to Headquarters to familiarize them with the
details of the pulse camera operation.(58)
-22-
This dispatch is intended to familiarize
headquarters with the details of the Pulse Camera
operation in Mexico City, which was mounted in
December 1963 and is targeted against the (Cuban)
Embassy and Consulate.(59)
The dispatch goes on to report that a technician from
Headquarters brought a pulse camera to Mexico City mid-
December 1963, installed and tested it, and instructed the
technician resident in Mexico City and the base agent in the
use and maintenance of the camera.(60)
On the basis of HMMA-22307, HMMA-22433 and MEXI 9940,
the Committee believes that it is probable that the pulse
camera was in operation on the days that Lee Harvey Oswald
visited the Cuban Consulate. This Committee requested the
photographs produced by the pulse camera by the project's
cryptonym on 22 June 1978. The CIA informed a House Select
Committee on Assassinations researcher on 7/20/78 that the
cryptonym did not refer to a photographic project.(61) A more
specific request for the photographs was made on 21 July
1978.(62)
On 13 October 1978 the Committee, as a result of a
review of materials taken by James Angleton from Win Scott's
safe at the time of his death,(63) addressed another letter
to the CIA on this matter.(64) This letter
-23-
said, in part:
First, while admittedly there are
contraindications in the Agency's written records.
these records nevertheless suggest that an impulse
camera was in operation when Oswald visited the
Cuban Embassy. Such a camera would have
automatically been triggered to photograph any
person entering the Embassy. In addition, it has
been determined by this Committee that Oswald
entered and exited from the Cuban and Soviet
compounds on at least five separate occasions,
resulting in a total of ten opportunities during
which Oswald could have been photographed by CIA
surveillance cameras. The existence of an Agency
photograph of Oswald has been further corroborated
by CIA personnel both in Mexico City and at Agency
headquarters who claim to have seen this material.
Finally, on October 6, 1978, a manuscript
written by the late Win Scott, former Chief of
Station of the CIA's Mexico City Station, was
reviewed by a staff member of this Committee. While
the criticism can be offered that Scott's manuscript
has not yet been established as a true record,
relevant portions of this manuscript do suggest that
the contents are accurate and that photographs of
Oswald were in fact obtained by the CIA's Mexico
City surveillance operations. At page 273 of the
manuscript, Scott wrote:
These visits and conversations are not
hearsay; for persons watching these embassies
photographed Oswald as he entered and left each
one; and clocked the time he spent on each
visit. The conversations are also known to have
taken place, including the one in which he told
the Soviet to whom he was talking that he
should have heard, received a message, from the
Soviet Embassy in Washington, indicating
-24-
obviously that a Soviet Embassy official in
Washington had offered to help Oswald.
Scott's comments are a source of deep concern to
this Committee, for they suggest your Agency's
possible withholding of photographic materials
highly relevant to this investigation.
Therefore, the Committee reiterates its request
of May 2, including but not limited to any and all
photographs in the CIA's possession of Lee Harvey
Oswald resulting from CIA surveillance operations
directed against the Soviet and Cuban Embassies and
Consulates in Mexico City. In addition, the
Committee requests a detailed explanation regarding
the withholding of any and all photographs in the
CIA's possession of Oswald resulting from CIA
surveillance operations directed against the Soviet
and Cuban Embassies and Consulates in Mexico
City.(65)
The CIA responded to this letter on 25 October 1978.(66)
The CIA informed the Committee that it was their belief that
the pulse camera was not in operation during September of
1963.(67)
First, there was no pulse camera...opposite the
entrance to the Cuban Consulate until December
1963...In fact, there had been no photographic
coverage of the Consulate entrance prior to the
visit of Lee Harvey Oswald to Mexico City...The
Consulate entrance had been closed for some time,
and after it was reopened the 27th of September was
scheduled as the day for installation of
photographic equipment for its coverage. Difficulty
was experienced in the installation and the
technicians had to machine a part for
-25-
the equipment... The technicians probably [illegible
hand written comment] had to make the part in
question. On that date, or at some date not long
afterwards, there was test photography of the
entrance... Various difficulties were experienced
with the equipment, which seems eventually to have
been resolved by installation of the pulse camera in
December 1963. There is no question about the
sequence set forth above.(68)
HMMA-22307 definitely reports the installation of the
two cameras and a VLS-2 trigger device on 27 September
1963.(69) But the cameras did not function smoothly.(70) HMMA-
22433 reported that the K-100 camera broke down after one
day's operation.(71) It was replaced with the first Robot
Star. which had also been installed on September 27. The
first Robot Star broke down four days after its
installation.(72) A second Robot Star broke down after five
days of operation.(73) A Robot Star was working on 7 November
1963, when HMMA-22433 requested that Headquarters send a
replacement camera to Mexico.(74) In all likelihood, that
request was filled with the installation of the Sequence
camera on 17 December 1963 detailed in HMMA-22726.(75) Under
this interpretation of the documents, the operation would
have gone into continuous
-26-
operation in mid-December 1963 as claimed by the CIA. But
the first pulse camera was set up on Friday September 27,
1963. The documents do not specify the days that the
original cameras functioned. HMMA-22307 says:
(The base agent) was requested to test the Robot
Star Camera for four days and the K-100 for another
four days.(76)
HMMA-22433 says:
(The base agent) used the K-100 with a 152 mm lens
for one day, turning in 10 fee (sic) of 16 mm
film...The Robot Star and the Telyt 400 mm lens are
now being used with the VLS-2 on this project...The
Robot Star camera which was given to (the base
agent) with the VLS-2 broke down after four days of
photographing. (The technician) replaced this with
another Robot. Five days later the second camera
failed to advance properly.(77)
This Committee believes that it is reasonable to assume
that the base agent started using the equipment immediately
after it was installed.(78) Hence, the one day that the K-100
was used would have been either the 27th (the day it was
installed), the 28th (a Saturday) or the 30th (the following
Monday). It is also reasonable to assume that the Robot Star
was put into action the day of, or the day following, the
breakdown of the K-100. This camera worked for four
-27-
[PAGE 27 MISSING}
(79)(80)(81)(82)(83)
-28-
Phillips.(84) During September, October and November of 1963,
the Cuban Consulate was open to the public from 10:00 a.m.
to 2:00 p.m.; the Embassy was open to the public from 9:00
a.m. to 5:00 p.m.(85)
A blind memo, dated 11/27/64, entitled "Memo passed to
Mr. Papich of FBI with info on photo coverage of Embassies
and info on Kostikov," implies that the coverage on the
Cuban Embassy was of a continuous nature during daylight
hours. This memo also implies that there was a coverage of
the Cuban Consulate.(86) The technician who serviced this
operation in Mexico City remembers that he tried to get full
daylight coverage of the compound but that it was very
difficult.(87) He said that the manual coverage was usually
good but that human error had to be taken into account when
considering the manual coverage. He pointed out that it was
hard for a person to maintain constant attention in such a
sedentary job and, hence, some visitors would get by the
manual operation.(88) The technician also remembered that he
had set up the pulse camera to provide constant daylight
coverage.(89) By 1965 the pulse camera was
-29-
only working for six hours a day.(90) The House Select
Committee on Assassinations has not been able to determine
the scope of the pulse camera coverage during September and
October 1963 by examination of the production because that
production, if it exists, has not been made available for
review.(91)
The CIA has made the photographic production and logs
from the manual coverage of the Embassy entrance available
for House Select Committee on Assassinations review.(92) All
production from the manual camera coverage of the Cuban
Embassy for months of September, October and November was
examined.(93) footnote skipped94 This examination revealed
that the coverage. of the Embassy was fairly consistent
between the hours of 9:00 a.m. and 2:00 p.m. on weekdays.(95)
There was coverage, with a few exceptions, on every
weekday.(96) There was no coverage on weekends.(97) During the
three-month period examined by the House Select Committee on
Assassinations only four weekdays were not covered by the
photographic surveillance operation aimed at the Cuban
Embassy.(98) There was no evidence in the files of serious
technical difficulties or camera
-30-
problems in the manual operation during these three
months.(99)
4. Disposition of Production from the Operation
The photographs from the manual camera were maintained
in a chronological file at the CIA station in Mexico
City.(100) The photographs were routinely shown to [
] for identification purposes.(101) After this agent left [
t. ] in 1965, the photographs were sent to
the JM/WAVE Station in Miami, Florida for review by Cuban
defectors such as AMMUG/1.(102)
The disposition of the pulse camera photographs in
general, beyond the fact that as of 1965, and possibly
earlier, the production was routinely sent to Headquarters,
is unknown.(103) The CIA denies that the pulse camera was
functioning during the time Oswald was in Mexico.(104) If the
Committee's belief that the pulse camera was functioning on
the days that Oswald visited the Cuban Consulate is correct,
then the ultimate disposition of the photographs produced on
those days remains a mystery.
-31-
B. Photographic Surveillance Operations Aimed at the
Soviet Diplomatic Compound;
1. Introduction
The Mexico City CIA Station maintained photographic
surveillance on the Soviet diplomatic compound in Mexico
City in 1963. Three photographic sites, or bases, were used
in this operation.(105) The primary objective of the operation
was to photograph people who visited the Soviet Embassy.(106)
The operation, generally, covered the main gate of the
Soviet compound between 900 and 1800 (or dark) on weekdays
and from 900 to 1400 on Saturdays.(107)
2. Physical Positioning of Surveillance Bases and
Targets(108)
[insert GIF here for page 32]
-33-
There were three bases which provided photographic
surveillance of the Soviet diplomatic compound in 1963.(109)
One of the bases [
] (110) The other two bases, of
primary concern to this Committee,[
] (111) The primary base,[ ]
was [
] the secondary, or "back-up,"
[ ] base [
] (112)
3. Objectives of Operation and Scope of Coverage
Provided
The purpose of this operation has also been described
as being to obtain photographs of Soviet officials and their
families; all foreigners (non-Latins) who visited the
Embassy; and cars with foreign license plates.(113) One of the
main purposes of the photographic bases that covered the
Embassy gate was to obtain a photograph of every
"foreigner," or non-Latin, in contact with the Soviet
Embassy.(114)
-34-
This was done in an attempt to identify possible Soviet
espionage agents.
My understanding of that was that it was to be used
to identify those people who might be working for
the Soviets as espionage agents who were U.S.
citizens who went down there driving a car with a
U.S. license plate on it, or people we did not know
but could identify. The same procedure was also used
for trying to identify people other than U.S.
citizens.(115)
It is reported that the Mexican nationals who manned
the photographic bases and actually took the photographs had
an "uncanny ability" to pick out foreigners.(116)
The House Select Committee on Assassinations next
attempted to determine the scope of the photographic
coverage on the main gate of the Soviet Embassy. At a
minimum, the Embassy was probably covered by the
photographic operations during office hours. "The
instructions were to cover the entire work day (office
hours)..."(117) "Instructions were to cover office hours,
photograph each new Soviet and family, all foreigners and
foreign license plates."(118) The normal work hours of the
Soviet Embassy during September and October of 1963 were
from 9:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.(119)
-35-
There are some indications that the photographic
coverage was more extensive than just office hours. Even
though the Embassy was not open past 6:00 p.m., visitors
could still gain entrance by ringing the gate bell. "Russian
speakers can get in any time."(120) [Hand written two] One CIA
officer who was in Mexico City remembers "that the photo
surveillance was constant except for instances where it
would be down for security reasons or equipment
malfunction."(121) A blind memorandum, dated 11/27/63,
entitled "Memo passed to Mr. Papich of FBI with info on
photo coverage of embassies and info on Kostikov," says, in
part,
We have photographic coverage during daylight hours
on the USSR, Cuban [ ]
Embassies. Their consulates are located in the
embassies and therefore the coverage of the
embassies would include coverage of the consulates.
The photographic coverage is of a continuous nature
during daylight hours. However, weather conditions
and other factors affecting any photographic efforts
require that the coverage not be considered as total
or complete.(122)
Ann Goodpasture was questioned about the scope of the
photographic coverage on the Soviet compound. She said:
I cannot give you the exact times (of coverage). I
can guess, and my guess is that they were
-36-
open most of the time when the Consulate was opened
for business hours. But the person who would have
that information, the only person who would know, is
the case officer who was handling the project at
that time.(123)
Ms. Goodpasture explained the discrepancy between the
time of coverage as stated in her notes and testimony and
that in the 11/27/63 memorandum by saying that the
memorandum referred to the coverage instituted after the
assassination of John Kennedy.(124) An examination of the
photographic production from the base shows that the
coverage from that base prior to the assassination was
fairly uneven.(125) The log sheets for this operation show
that, if anything, coverage decreased after the
assassination.(126)
The House Select Committee on Assassinations reviewed
production and log materials from one base [ ], which
covered the gate of the Soviet diplomatic compound.(127) The
[ ],base was referred to as the "primary" base
because it began operation before the [ ] base
opened.(128)
-37-
[ ] was planned as an alternate base to [
].
It had a slanted view of the front gate of the Soviet
Embassy.(129)
The following chart lists the production from the
[ ] base which was made available to the House Select
Committee on Assassinations.(130)
Date Hours of cover- Time of 1st Time of last Number
of Photo- age stated photgraph photograph
graphs
taken
Aug. 31 800-1400 956 1220 8 (Saturday)
Sept. 1 800-2000 1009 1321 6 (Sunday)
2 830-1900 935 1556 19
3 830-1800 1131 1334 18
4 830-1800 1001 1715 43
5 1200-1900 1238 1510 12
6 830-1800 926 1702 39
7 ***************NO COVERAGE******************************
8 ***************NO COVERAGE******************************
9 900-1900 1159 1640 3
10 830-1800 855 1119 17
11 900-1900 1132 1550 14
12 900-1900 1015 1233 7
13 ***************NO COVERAGE******************************
14 1000-1400 1047 1344 10 (Saturday)
15 ***************NO COVERAGE******************************
16 ***************NO COVERAGE******************************
17 900-1900 1133 1549 19
18 ***************NO COVERAGE******************************
19 900-1900 1105 1654 13
20 ***************NO COVERAGE******************************
21 ***************NO COVERAGE******************************
22 ***************NO COVERAGE******************************
23 900-1900 1137 1300 7
24 ***************NO COVERAGE******************************
25 900-1900 1040 1137 6
26 ***************NO COVERAGE******************************
27 900-1900 1018 1146 16
-38-
28 ***************NO COVERAGE******************************
29 ***************NO COVERAGE******************************
30 ***************NO COVERAGE******************************
Oct. 1 900-1900 1251 1251 2
2 900-1900 1139 1259 14
3 900-1900 1200 1222 5
4 900-1900 1103 1251 21
5 ***************NO COVERAGE******************************
6 ***************NO COVERAGE******************************
7 900-1900 1158 1235 6
8 900-1900 1219 1232 5
9 900-1900 1108 1210 4
10 900-1900 1031 1719 18
11 900-1900 1522 1733 9
12 1000-1400 1002 1015 2 (Saturday)
13 ***************NO COVERAGE******************************
14 800-1900 831 944 12
15 ***************NO COVERAGE******************************
16 ***************NO COVERAGE******************************
17 900-1900 1624 1649 7
18 1200-1900 1404 1437 2
19 ***************NO COVERAGE******************************
20 ***************NO COVERAGE******************************
21 ***************NO COVERAGE******************************
22 1200-1900 1305 1307 3
23 1200-1900 N.A.+ N.A. 8
24 1200-1900 N.A. N.A. 22
25 1200-1900 N.A. N.A. 21
26 1000-1600 N.A. N.A. 14 (Saturday)
+Not Available
-39-
Given the somewhat uneven nature of the coverage by
[ ] (131) the House Select Committee on Assassinations
asked whether the two bases were run in conjunction so as to
provide more comprehensive coverage. [ ] the
project's case officer, did not remember that this was the
case. He did remember that both bases operated at the same
time so as to get the most complete coverage possible.(132)
[ ] was not sure whether there was routine
coverage of the Soviet Embassy on weekends.(133) He said that
it was possible that there was routine coverage on Saturday
mornings.(134)
An examination of the project file maintained by the
CIA on the photographic coverage of the Soviet Embassy does
not bear out [ ] assertion that the two bases
duplicated efforts. In fact, the project file confirmed
that the bases complemented each other rather than
duplicated efforts. This was the case in l960 when a
project review stated:
-40-
[ ] This base compiles daily logs indicating
all arrivals, departures and, where possible,
identities of every person visiting or working at
the [ ] target... [ ] photographic
coverage is still concentrated on [ ]
installation.. [ ] photographs are also
concentrated on visitors to the target, as opposed
to employees. It should be noted that [ ]
operates for photographic coverage during the hours
from daylight to l400 hours each day of the week
except Sunday. the [ ] base maintains
photographic coverage from l400 hours to darkness
each day except Sunday.(135)
[ ] the project review said:
l. To collect operational information pertaining to
[ ] personnel and physical facilities through
use of photographic base houses. Three photographic
bases, [ , ] contribute to this
objective. To avoid repetition, the Station is
omitting the usual description of the functions of
these three bases and how they contribute to the
above objective. There has been no change in the
coverage as described in the [4 chars] Request for
Project Renewal.(136)
Similar statements are included in the project reviews for
[ ] (137) At one point a move was made at
Headquarters to close the [ ] base:
-41-
FI/OPS recommends strongly that the photo coverage
be reviewed from the standpoint of value and
usefulness with a view to determining whether the
[ ] activity could not be safely eliminated
and the additional photographic coverage conducted
on a more selective basis, without materially
affecting overall usefulness.(138)
The Mexico City Station took exception to this
recommendation:
While HMMA 14093 correctly referred to
[ ] as "photographic basehouses," the
Station would like to emphasize that photographic
coverage is only one of their functions. [ ] is
used as a radio dispatch base for automobile
surveillance teams in addition to physical
surveillance of persons entering the front gate.
Their photography is negligible compared to their
other duties. The [ ] base performs the best
photography of persons visiting the front gate,
perhaps because the vantage point for taking the
pictures is [
] which partially blocks
[ ] photographs. [ ] also does individual
reports on [ ] personnel entering and leaving
main gate...(139)
In l964 the Mexico City Station restated the operating
procedures of the two bases in a dispatch referenced to the
above paragraph from HMMA-l4793:
-42-
The Station feels that it would be helpful to
summarize at this time information previously
reported to Headquarters (see paragraph 3, reference
B) concerning the photo basehouses under this
project and thereby give Headquarters an updated
frame of reference in which to view the roles of the
various basehouses.
The [ ] and [ ] basehouses provide
coverage of front of the [ ] installation.
_Although on the surface it may appear that these
two basehouses provide duplicate take, this is not
the case._ It has been the Station's experience in
running the[ ] [ ] operation that a
0900 to evening workday, which would be required of
a single basehouse in order to cover the [ ]
target effectively, is just too long for any pair of
agents to remain effective. This is especially true
when it is considered that these basehouse operators
are essentially unsupervised during their workday.
It would also be impossible for a single base-house
to provide the kind of coverage this station needs
on the target installation, especially during the
peak hours of activity, namely late morning and
early afternoon. For these reasons, the [ ]
basehouse generally operates from 0900 to 1400 or
1500 weekdays. [ ] operates from 1200 to 1800
or dark (as the daily situation dictates) on
weekdays, and _0900 to 1400 on Saturdays._ (These
hours are subject to change to fit Station needs.)
Special coverage for Sunday is arranged on a need
basis; however, past experience has shown regular
coverage of Saturday afternoons and Sundays is not
rewarding. This schedule provides for both
basehouses to be in action
-43-
during the peak activity hours of the [ ]
target. Although even this arrangement is no
completely airtight, anything less than this would
present unacceptable gaps in the coverage It must
also be considered that without two basehouses
covering the front of the target installation, any
illness, personal problem or vacation for operators
of one basehouse would terminate Station coverage
[...] It is the Station's opinion that as long as
the[ ] installation is a prime target of the
station, it will be necessary to maintain the
present three basehouses. To eliminate any one of
the three would create a gap in the Station's
coverage that would not be compatible with the
emphasis placed on this target[...] (140)
But the information in the preceding chart does not
correlate with the statement of the coverage in HMMA-23343.
The above chart, on pages 37-38, refers to the coverage of
the Soviet compound by the base that the review of HMMA-
23343 reveals covered the compound from 1200 to 1800 or
dark. The chart shows that while 1200 to 1800 coverage is
sometimes the case, the base's coverage of the Embassy, at
least during the months of September and October, on days
when the base operated at all, was not always in that time
period. This is the base that the dispatch also states
covered Saturday morning. Out of the nine Saturdays covered
by the above chart, this base
-44-
was in operation on only four of those days. This Committee
has not been able to establish or disprove the possible
inference that [ ] covered those days when there was
no coverage from [ ] because the production and logs
from the [ ] base were not made available for review.
That material was requested but has not been made
available.(141) An explanation of why this material is missing
was requested on 7/25/78.(142) The CIA's explanation stated
that the photographs and logs "may have been destroyed in a
purge of Mexico City Station files and that the folders for
the destroyed material were reused to forward more recent
photographic material to Headquarters for retention."(143) The
folders which once contained the production were located at
the National Archives'
[ ] Records Center but, according to the CIA's
explanation, the folders contained production material from
[ ] (144) Because the CIA has not provided the photographic
production and logs from the [ ] for examination, no
precise determination detailing the effectiveness of the
coverage of the Soviet compound can be made.
-45-
Regardless of the scope and effectiveness of the two
bases, a question that may never be resolved due to the
conflicting evidence and missing production. the
surveillance was considered adequate:
Q: [...] How thorough was the coverage?
A: They covered the categories that we asked them
for on a routine basis, which was to identify any
people who appeared to be non-Latin and any
Soviets.
Q: I understand that was the purpose. Given that
purpose, how thorough was the coverage?
A: I think it was accurate.
Q: Was Win Scott satisfied with the performance of
the photo operation at the Soviet Embassy?
A: To the best of my knowledge he was.(145)
4. Procedure and Timing Involved in Processing
Production from the Operation
The CIA photographic bases were manned by at least one
agent who took photographs and kept a log sheet of people
entering and leaving the Embassy and of the photographs that
he took.(146) The film remained in the camera until the whole
role was exposed, which often took two or three days.(147)
-46-
After the assassination of John Kennedy, this procedure was
changed and the film was cleared from the camera on a daily
basis.(148)
The CIA contract agent outside of the United States
Embassy who was in charge of the photographic bases was
[ s] (149) [ ] picked up the film, prior to the
assassination, from the photo bases three times a week.(150)
[ ] then took the film to his brother-in-law, who
worked at night, to develop it. The brother-in-law also
printed the film into eight-by-ten contact prints.(151) After
the film was developed and printed,
[ ] turned over the negatives and contact prints to
[ ] (152)
Ms. Ann Goodpasture picked up the photo production if
[ ] was not available.(153) [ ] or Ms.
Goodpasture, would then bring the photographic production
back to the Mexico City Station in the American Embassy.(154)
[ ] did not remember with certainty to whom he turned
over the material, but believed it was either Ms.
Goodpasture or [ ] (155)
-47-
5. Responsibility for the Operation;
There is some controversy as to who had overall
responsibility for this project. Ms. Goodpasture testified
that the responsibility was [ s] (156)
[ ] according to Ms. Goodpasture, made all the
decisions and had all the responsibility involved in the
operation.(157) [ ] was the most junior
Operations Officer in the Mexico City Station in 1963, and
claims that his role in the operation was largely limited to
legwork.(158) Ms. Goodpasture testified that her role in the
operation was limited to acting as an alternate Case
Officer, internal routing of the production, and review of
the photographs to insure the maintenance of technical
quality in the operation.(159) Ann Goodpasture's annual
Fitness Report for the period 1 January 1963 to 31 December
1963 specifies her duties in regard to this operation. The
fitness report says,
Working with [ ] (regular contact and case
officer), supervises work of three photo bases
operating against Soviet Embassy; processes take;
identifies Soviets and intelligence function.
Alternate contact with
-48-
Staff Agent.(160)
Ms. Goodpasture denied that she had any supervisory role in
relation to this operation.(161) The House Select Committee on
Assassinations redeposed Ms. Goodpasture in November 1978
and asked her about this apparent inconsistency between her
Fitness Report and her testimony:
Q: Now, having read your Fitness Report for 1963, are
there any portions of your prior testimony that
you wish to modify?
A: No. not really. Now, this [ ]
project, this is a case of where I cannot seem to
make it clear how our functions were. Now, the
case officer had responsibility for the operation
of the project. He decided how much to pay the
agents, what hours they worked, where the meetings
were held. He hired them; he fired them and he
knew the identities; he met with all of them.
He brought in the photographs, the product. He
dumped it on my desk and he was finished with it.
I took the product film and prints and the contact
file and distributed those.
I could levy any requirements of him or other
people in the Station which as he remembered it it
might have been for supervision, but when he was
out of town I met with one agent with his so-
called cut-out...(162)
Q: This (Fitness Report) is not accurate?
-49-
A: It is not precise the way the work was
divided...(163)
Q: Now, I don't understand why, if you knew this
description was inaccurate, you let this document
go to Headquarters?
A: I think it was made on the basis of trying to get
a promotion for me.(164)
[ ] who was Deputy Chief of Station in Mexico
City in 1963, testified that Ann Goodpasture was "a Special
Assistant" to the Chief of Station and that "her main
responsibilities were to handle the surveillance
operations."(165) [ ] stated that this included both
the photographic and [ e.] (166) Mr.
White remembered that [ ] "did help Annie with some
of the pickup (of production)" but that his main
responsibilities were with another operation. (167) [
] also testified that:
(Ann Goodpasture) carried with her a lot of
invisible authority that devolved upon her because
of her operational relationship the Chief of
Station, who had absolute confidence in her. She had
a marvelous memory. She was meticulous in detail. I
think he had every reason to put that kind of trust
in her.
-50-
She reported directly to him. While she may
not have been invested with any command authority by
virtue of her position at the Station, certainly she
was a kind of unofficial deputy for the purposes of
the operations that she was involved in.(168)
Ms. Goodpasture was asked about [ ] statements
as well as similar statements by other people associated
with the CIA's Mexican operations.(169)
Ms. Goodpasture: Well, I made more of those
statements as those people saw it in their
relationship with Mr. Scott's projects. They are
true the way they saw it but I had no responsibility
outside the projects that we worked on, but the
[ ] projects and the [ ]
project touched every operation in the Mexico
station. I just didn't think I was important as
other people seemed to imply that I was.(170)
Ms. Goodpasture also testified that her relationship
with Mr. Scott could be termed special in that she was
responsible for the day-to-day handling of the [ ]
operation of which Mr. Scott was the case-officer.(171)
[ ] recollection that he turned the
photographic production over to [ ] or Ms.
Goodpasture was confirmed by Ms. Goodpasture.(172) Ms.
Goodpasture also testified that the primary responsibility
for the photographs after they were in
-51-
the Station was that of [ ] (173) Goodpasture
testified that she was responsible for routing the
photographs and that the complete production went to the
[ ] before it was filed.(174) Copies of the important
photographs were given to the [ s] for them to retain
for routine use in the course of their work.(175)
The [ ] recollection of their role in this
operation is very different from that of Ms. Goodpasture.
[ ] testified that Ann Goodpasture held the
photographic production very tightly.(176) Her recollection
was confirmed by her husband.(177) The [ ] stated that
they did not routinely review or see all of the production
from the Soviet Embassy photographic surveillance
operation.(178) They claim they only saw the photographs that
Ms. Goodpasture thought were important enough to bring to
their attention.(179) According to the [ ] access to
this file was tightly controlled by Ms. Goodpasture.(180)
-52-
6. Coordination of Surveillance Operations
The Mexico City Station employed an operating
procedure whereby the functioning of [
] could be
coordinated.
[
] he would alert [
] who would then alert [
] could then alert.[
] who would then notify [
The reporting to Headquarters of information generated
by [ ] surveillance operation
[ ] was also coordinated.(181)
The Station was able to go back to the photographic
chronological file to check for photographs of
people [
] It was a matter of routine to check
the photographic production when
-53-
[page 53 missing]
a. [missing]
[ (182) (183) (184) (185) (186) (187) (188)
footnotes missing]
-54-
[ ] (189) Even though Mr. Scott was
the nominal case officer, the "routine case officer
functions" were performed by[ ] (190) An
American [ ] was stationed [
] to protect the
Station's interests there.(191) [ ]
duties in this operation ranged from meeting with [
] inside the base for the purposes
of daily supervision of the operation to handling the
collection and distribution. [ ] (192)
[ ] worked in this capacity until 1968.(193)
[
(194) (195) ]
b. Analysis and Reporting of Information Obtained
was responsible for the
analysis, processing. and daily review of [
] (196) [ ] were reviewed on a
daily basis by [ ]
-55-
bring conversations of interest or importance to [
] was also responsible for reporting the
information developed from the reports were usually written
by himself or [ ] These reports were
usually in the form of cables or dispatches to CIA
Headquarters (197)
[footnotes (198) (199) somewhere in this paragraph]
[
footnote (200)]
David A. Phillips, a CIA officer who was stationed in
Mexico City in 1963, testified that information [ ]
would be reported if the information was important, if it
was useful to another Agency component, or if it was
something that should "go in the record."(201) Mr. Phillips
said that only a small amount of the information
[ ] developed would be formally reported to CIA
Headquarters and that the information that was reported was
generally something more important than [1 line].(202)
-56-
It should be noted, though, that an examination of the
project files shows that [
] were routinely
reported to Headquarters for name traces and dissemination
to the intelligence community.(203)
3. [redacted]
This Committee has made an attempt to determine
[
]
The monthly operational report of this project for the
month of September [
(204) (205) maybe]
The report notes that [
] The monthly report for October says that
-57-
there has not been any change [hand-written "relevant"]
[ ],since September.(206)
A review of the [
] revealed that the CIA [
] from the two-month period of interest [
207] It is noted that the [
] was not listed in the monthly reports.(208) A
review of the [ ] revealed that the [
] in the monthly reports [
]
The House Select Committee on Assassinations has found
some indications in testimony given before this Committee
and CIA documents that [
] This Committee
has not been able to determine with certainty whether
[
]
-58-
[
]
One CIA employee who was involved [
] in Mexico City remembered that [
] It is
possible that the employee, Mr. Phillips, who was stationed
in Mexico City from, 1961 to 1966, was incorrect, after a
fifteen-year hiatus, [ ]
As the above notes, an examination of the project files
fails to support Mr. Phillips' memory, although those files
do show that [
]
4. [ ] from Operation
[
]
-59-
[
footnotes (209) (210) (211) (212) (213) (214)
(215) (216) (217) (218) (219) somewhere
]
a. Types
[
]
b. Handling Procedures
(1) Resuma
A summary [ ] deemed of
sufficient interest by the [ ] was
prepared [ ]. These summaries
were called "resuma."(220) The resuma were given to
-60-
[
(221) (222)]
Win Scott marked these resuma for action by his case
officers before routing them through the Station.(223) This
Committee has requested copies of these resuma from the CIA
but they have not been made available for review.(224)
The resuma covered
[
] After the resuma were prepared,
[
]
The resuma were maintained in a chronological file
(2) [redacted]
[
footnotes (225) (226) (227) (228) (229)
]
-61-
[
] (230) [
(231)] would be turned over
to [ ] at the same time as the resuma(232)
[
(233)] which was
situated on the floor above the room in which
[ ] (234) [
] (235) [ ]
were not turned over to [ ] unless
she requested [ ] (236)
(3) [redacted]
(a) [redacted]
were removed daily [
] (237)
-62-
[
] (238)
[
] (239)
[
] (240)
(b) [redacted]
There is some question about how long,[
] There are
indications that [
] (241) [
] could not state with certainty
what the practice regarding [
] was. He said that he did not
[
] (242) He stated that he assumed that [
] (243) [
] (244) It is possible
-63-
that [
] (245) [ ] remembers that [
] spent a lot of time in the Station [
] (246)
[
]
This Committee has not found any evidence that would
contradict the above-quoted statement in regard to
[ (247)]
There was a procedure whereby [
] (248) The interested officer could make a
note [ ] or he could notify [
] orally or by note, that he wanted
[ ] (249) There were no written rules or
regulations governing this procedure.(250)
-64-
(c) [redacted] ;
There are some indications that [
] The Tab F Draft says: [
] (251) [.
] notes say: [
] (252)
But, in her testimony before the House Select Committee on
Assassinations in executive session on 4/13/78, Ms. [
] (253)
It is clear that [.5 line]
-65-
[ ] has testified that he was also responsible
for [
] This testimony is
confirmed by the testimony of [
] could
not clearly remember whether or not any of his [
] He remembered that [
] It
is doubtful that the [
]
In light of this [ ] recollection and
[ ] recollection, it is probable that all the
[
footnotes (254) (255) (256) (257) (258) (259) (260) (261)
somewhere on
this page]
-66-
[
(d) [redacted] ;
[
] received [
] (262) [
] that were denoted [
] as being [ ] (263)
[
(264)] testified
that he would then immediately [
(265)]
[ ] said that the volume of work he
had to do at any given time fluctuated [
] (266)
"Sometimes there was so little work [
] that I was just hanging
around doing nothing."(267)
-67-
[
] In her testimony before this Committee, [ ]
stated it generally took [
(268)]
(e) Expedited Procedure
[
269)] There was a procedure whereby [
] could be expedited if there was a
special interest [
(270)] it was possible for him to
bring this quickly to the Station's attention.(271) Although [
] was not the [ ] contact in
September or October of 1963, he did serve as such at one
time.(272) When he was interviewed by the House Select
Committee on Assassinations [ ] was asked
whether there was a process whereby
-68-
[ ] (273) He explained
that there would not have been such a process for [
(274)] did say that there was
such a procedure for [ ] (275)
[
(276)] would decide whether or not it warranted special
attention.(277) If he deemed that it was important enough, he
would mark [
] (278) recollection was confirmed by an examination of
the project files for this operation. One of the monthly
project reports explains this procedure and its purpose:
[
]
-69-
Headquarters (is) not well informed on the way the
Mexico Station exploits operational leads from (this
operation).
[ ] has instructions
to alert this Station immediately if [
] Emergency
meetings are arranged in double talk...
[ ] meets ] within fifteen minutes at a
pre-arranged downtown location and [
Headquarters is
notified by cable of the action taken. Only in rare
cases is information [
] without prior Headquarters
approval(279)
[
(280)] (281) It should be noted that the monthly report
says that [
] to the case officer responsible [
] (282)
-70-
[ (283)] testified that he
had nothing to do with [ ]
to or from the [ ] except in rare instances when no
one else was available to do the job.(284)
[ ] testified that [
] their regular contact.(285)
(f) [redacted]
[
(286) (287) (288) (289)] eventually went into a
chronological file.(290) [
] and filed in appropriate subject or [ ]
personality files.(291) The resuma were also maintained
-71-
in a chronological file.(292) [
] was routinely sent to Headquarters [
crossed out by hand: on a we(ekly basis?).5 line] (293)
(g) Format
The format [
] was much the same as those of [
] (294) [
] (295) [
] bear the notation [
(296)] (297) [ ] indicated that this notation
meant that the [
] means, for instance,
[
] So there was no question of doing it twice.(298)
-72-
c. Voice Comparisons;
[
(299) (300) (301)]
III. Information About Lee Harvey Oswald's stay in Mexico
that was Known by the CIA Mexico City Station Prior to
the Assassination of John Kennedy and the Sources of
that Information
A. Information that was Available
In 1963 the Central Intelligence Agency's Mexico City
Station surveilled both the Cuban and Soviet diplomatic
compounds electronically and
-73-
photographically.(302)
[
(303)]
The Station received twice, or three times, a week the
photographic coverage of the Embassies and Consulates.(304)
1. Information Available to the Mexico City
Station from [ ] Surveillance Aimed at
the Soviet Consulate and Military Attache's
Office.;
[
] the CIA Mexico City Station learned of the following
conversations that were subsequently linked by Station
personnel to Lee Harvey Oswald:
a. September 27, 1963, Friday
(1) At or about 10:30 a.m. an unidentified
man called the Soviet Military Attache looking for a visa to
Odessa. He was referred to the Consulate. The man then asked
for and was given directions to the Consulate office. The
directions
-74-
were not noted by the transcriber. The entire conversation
was transcribed in Spanish.(305)
(2) At 10:37 a.m. a man called the Soviet
Consulate and asked for the Consul. He was told that the
Consul was not in. The man outside stressed that it was
necessary for him to get a visa to Odessa. He was told to
call back at 11:30. This conversation was also transcribed
in Spanish.(306)
(3) At 1:25 an unidentified man called the
Soviet Consulate and asked for the Consul, The man was told
that the Consul was not in. The man outside asked, "when
tomorrow?" The Soviet official told him that on Mondays and
Fridays the Consul was in between four and five. This
conversation was also in the Spanish transcriptions.(307)
(4) At approximately 4:05 p.m., Silvia Duran
called the Soviet Embassy. She told the person at the
Embassy that an American citizen seeking a visa was at the
Cuban Consulate. Silvia explained that the American citizen
wanted to know the name
-75-
of the official he had dealt with at the Soviet Embassy.
Silvia had sent the American to the Soviet Embassy, stating
that his acquiring a Cuban visa was contingent on his
previously acquiring a Soviet visa. Silvia explained to the
Soviet official that the American had stated that he was
assured that there would be no problem. At that point, the
Soviet official put another official on the phone, causing
Silvia to repeat the story. The official then asked Silvia
to leave her name and number so he could call later. This
conversation was also in Spanish.(308)
(5) At 4:26 p.m., an unidentified Soviet
official called Silvia Duran inquiring whether the American
citizen had been to the Cuban consulate office. Silvia
responded affirmatively, stating the American was at the
office at that time, The Soviet official told Silvia that
when the American visited the Soviet Consulate office he had
displayed papers from the Soviet Consulate in Washington. He
also had a letter stating that he was a member of an
organization that favored Cuba. The American wanted to go to
the U.S.S.R. with his Russian wife and remain there a
-76-
long time. The Soviet official had not received an answer
from Washington to the American's problem. The problem
traditionally took four to five months to resolve because
Washington had to secure authorization from the U.S.S.R. The
Soviet official added that the American's wife could get a
visa in Washington very quickly and she could have it sent
anywhere, but he felt that the American would not get a visa
soon. Silvia said that the Cuban government could not give
the American a visa because he had neither friends in Cuba
nor authorization for a visa from the U.S.S.R. The Soviet
official added that the Soviets could not give the American
a letter of recommendation because they did not know him.
This conversation was also in the Spanish transcripts.(309)
b. September 28, 1963, Saturday
At 11:51 a.m. Silvia Duran called the Soviet
Consulate. She said that there was an American citizen at
the Cuban Consulate who had previously visited the Soviet
Consulate. The Soviet asked Silvia to wait a minute. Upon
his return to the
-77-
telephone, Silvia put the American on the line. At first the
American spoke in Russian and the Soviet spoke English. The
conversation then proceeded in English until the Russian
discontinued it and put another Soviet on the line. The
Soviet spoke in English, but the American, speaking in
broken Russian, asked him to speak Russian. The conversation
resumed in Russian at that point. It also became incoherent
and is thus quoted in its entirety:
Russian: What else do you want?
American: I was just now at your Embassy and they
took my address.
Russian: I know that.
American: /speaks terrible, hardly recognizable
Russian/ I did not know it then. I went
to the Cuban Embassy to ask them for my
address, because they have it.
Russian: Why don't you come again and leave your
address with us; it is not far from the
Cuban Embassy.
American: Well, I'll be there right away.(310)
-78-
c. October 1, 1963, Tuesday;
(1) At 10:31 a.m. an unidentified man called
the Soviet Military Attache and, in broken Russian, said
that he had visited the Consulate the previous Saturday and
had spoken to the Consul he man wanted to know if the
Soviets had received an answer from Washington. At that
point, the Soviet official gave the man the Consulate phone
number and asked him to call there. This conversation is in
the English transcripts, indicating the man spoke in either
Russian or English.(311)
(2) At 10:45 a.m.(312) a man who, according to
the translator's comment, had phoned a day or so before and
had spoken in broken Russian, called the Consulate and spoke
to an employee named Obyedkov. The man calling introduced
himself as "Lee Oswald" and stated that he visited the
Soviet Consulate the previous Saturday. He told Obyedkov
that he spoke with the Consul on that day. Oswald added that
the Consul had stated that they would send a telegram to
Washington and he wanted to know if they
-79-
had received an answer. Oswald also said that he did not
remember the name of the Consul with whom he had spoken.
Obyedkov asked if it had been Kostikov and described him as
"dark." The man outside replied affirmatively and repeated
that his name was Oswald. Obyedkov asked Oswald to hold on a
minute while he inquired. When Obyedkov resumed the
conversation, he stated that the Soviet Consul had not yet
received an answer but the request had been sent. Obyedkov
then hung up the telephone as Oswald began another sentence
with the words "and what." This conversation is in the
English transcripts.(313)
d. October 3, 1963, Thursday
An unidentified man called the Soviet
Military Attache and spoke in broken Spanish and then in
English. When the man inquired about a visa to Russia, he
was given the Consulate phone number. The man then inquired
if they issued visas at the Consulate. The Soviet stated
that he was not certain but that the caller should call the
Consul nonetheless.(314)
-80-
2. Information Available to the Mexico City CIA
Station from CIA Headquarters;
On October 11, 1963, three days after the Mexico City
Station made the initial report to Headquarters of Oswald's
contact with the Soviet Embassy, the Mexico City Station
received some information about Lee Oswald from CIA
Headquarters. Headquarters informed Mexico that the Lee
Oswald who visited the Soviet Embassy may be identical to
Lee Henry (sic) Oswald.(315) Mexico City received this cable
on 11 October 1963.(316) This cable described Oswald as:
born 18 Oct. 1939, New Orleans, Louisiana, former
radar operator in United States Marines who defected
to USSR in Oct. 1959. Oswald is five feet ten
inches, one hundred sixty five pounds, light brown
wavy hair, blue eyes.(317)
The cable reported Oswald's defection in 1959; his
desire to return to the United States in 1962; his
employment in Minsk; his marriage to a Russian citizen; the
return of his passport; and the State Department's issuance
of visas for Oswald and his family.(318)
-81-
3. Information Available to the Mexico City
Station from [ ] Surveillance Aimed at
the Cuban Diplomatic Compound;
[
(319)]
4. Information Available to the Mexico City
Station from Photographic Surveillance of the
Soviet and Cuban Diplomatic Compounds;
An examination of the production from these operations
failed to reveal a photograph of Oswald.(320) This Committee
has not been able to rule out the possibility that a
photograph of Oswald was obtained in Mexico City by these
operations since the material made available for review was
incomplete.(321) The possibility that such a photograph was
obtained is discussed in Section III.A.6. below. The
photograph that was mistakenly linked to Oswald by the
Mexico City Station is discussed in Sections III.B.4
-82-
5. Possibility that Additional Information from
the [ ] Surveillance on the Soviet
Compound was Available to the Mexico City
Station;
[ ] assisted her husband [ ] in
the transcription of tapes from the Russian Embassy.(322)
[ ] testified before this Committee on 12
April 1978.(323) She was shown the transcripts from the
conversations [ ] on 10/1/63
at 10:31 a.m. and 10:45 a.m.; 9/28/63 at 11:51; and
10/3/63.(324) She recognized these transcripts as being her
husband's work.(325) She testified that she could identify his
work by the style of his writing or typing and the use of
slash marks.(326)
In addition to these transcripts, [ ]
testified that she remembered one more conversation that
involved Lee Oswald.
-83-
According to my recollection, I myself, have made a
transcript, an English transcript, of Lee Oswald
talking to the Russian Consulate or whoever he was
at that time, asking for financial aid.
Now, that particular transcript does not appear here
and whatever happened to it, I do not know, but it
was a lengthy transcript and I personally did that
transcript. It was a lengthy conversation between
him and someone at the Russian Embassy.(327)
[ ] testified that the transcript that
she remembered was approximately [handwritten 1 1/2 to] two
pages long.(328) She testified that the caller identified
himself as Lee Oswald.(329) She was certain that the 10/1/63,
10:45 a.m. conversation was not the one that she recalled.
[handwritten No] This would not be the
conversation that I would be recalling for the
simple reason that this is my husband's work and at
that time probably the name didn't mean much of
anything. But this particular piece of work that I
am talking about is something that came in and it
was marked as urgent.(330)
In the call that [ ] recalled, Oswald
spoke only English.(331) [ ] testified that
the 10/1/63, 10:45 conversation could not be the call she
remembered because the transcript indicates that Oswald
spoke in borken [sic] Russian as opposed to English; the
transcript is shorter than the one she remembers; the
transcript is in her husband's style as opposed
-84-
to her own; and there is no mention of Oswald's finances in
the transcript.(332)
[ ] remembers the procedure for urgent
tapes.(333) Her memory is confirmed in this narrow respect by
the project files reviewed by House Select Committee on
Assassinations staff members.(334)
[ ] recalled that there would be a
piece of paper enclosed with the reel which would indicate
the footage number where the conversation occurred and ask
for priority handling over the other conversations on the
reel.(335) After the conversation was transcribed, the [
] would immediately notify their contact and then turn the
transcript over to him on the same day that it had been
delivered.(336)
[ ] was questioned about the details of
the conversation which she remembered. She stated that
Oswald definitely identified himself and that he was seeking
financial aid from the Russians.
-85-
(H)e was persistent in asking for financial aid in
order to leave the country. They were not about to
give him any financial aid whatsoever. He had also
mentioned that he tried the Cuban Embassy and they
had also refused financial aid.(337)
[ ] also testified before this
Committee on 12 April 1978. [ ] also
recognized the four transcripts from September 28, 1963 and
October 1st and 3rd as his work:(338) [ ]
testified that he recognized the 10/1/63 conversation as his
work because the name Lee Oswald was underlined.
We got a request from the station to see if we can
pick up the name of this person because sometimes we
had a so-called "defector" from the United States
that wanted to go to Russia and we had to keep an
eye on them, Not I -- the Station. Consequently they
were very hot about the whole thing. They said, "If
you can get the name, rush it over immediately,"
Therefore, it is very seldom that I underlined the
name because I put them in capitals, In this case I
did because it was so important to them.(339)
[ ] testified that he did not know
how Oswald had come to the Station's attention prior to this
conversation or what lead to the request to get his name.(340)
He speculated that it was possible
-86-
that Oswald first came to the Station's attention through
Oswald's contacts with the Cuban Embassy.(341)
[ ] did not confirm his wife's
recollection of another conversation including Oswald.(342) He
said that he did not remember any other calls involving Lee
Oswald or any details of Oswald's conversations that were
not reflected in the transcripts.(343)
Although [ ] memory was not confirmed
by the House Select Committee on Assassinations review of
the transcripts for the period while Oswald was in Mexico,
there are several points of circumstantial corroboration for
her story. There was a procedure by which tapes could be
expedited in the manner in which [ ]
recalls.(344) There are also indications that this procedure
may have been used when Oswald's conversation [
] (345) The first report that the Americans received regarding
Silvia Duran made mention of the fact that Silvia claimed
that she had told Oswald that the only aid they could five
him was to refer him to the Soviet Consulate.(346)
-87-
This statement in the original Mexican report given to the
CIA in Mexico after the assassination would tend to add
credence to [ ] recollection that Oswald
mentioned to the Soviets that he had also tried to elicit
aid from the Cubans.(347) At least one other CIA official who
was in Mexico also remembers that Oswald indicated in his
discussions with the Soviet Embassy that he hoped to receive
assistance with the expenses of his trip.(348)
[ ] a retired CIA employee who was
Deputy Chief of the Mexico City Station from 1967 to 1969,
told the House Select Committee on Assassinations staff that
he had seen a file on Oswald in Mexico City that contained
only one or two [ ] transcripts and surveillance
photographs of Oswald.(349) [ ] also told HSCA staff
investigators that Win Scott had a private personal safe in
which he maintained especially sensitive materials.(350)
According to [ ] these materials were removed from
the safe
-88-
by James Angleton at the time of Scott's death. (351) This
Committee requested access to any relevant materials from
this safe on July 6, 1978.(352) Access was granted on October
6, 1978. Two statements by Mr. Scott contained in these
materials lend circumstantial support for [ ] testimony.
In 1970 Mr. Scott wrote:
[handwritten: During my thirteen years in Mexico, ]
I had many experiences, some of which I can write in
detail. One of these pertains to Lee Harvey Oswald
and what I _know_ (emphasis in original) of his
activities from the moment he arrived in Mexico, his
contacts by telephone and his visits to both the
Soviet and Cuban Embassies _and his requests for
assistance from these two Embassies in trying to get
to the Crimea with his wife and baby._ During his
conversations he cited a promise from the Soviet
Embassy in Washington, that they would notify their
Embassy in Mexico of Oswald's plan to ask them for
assistance. (353)
In his unpublished manuscript, Scott refers to a
conversation in which Oswald gave the Soviet Embassy "his
name very slowly and carefully."(354) Although the transcripts
available do not bear out Scott's recollections, there are
interesting parallels with the testimony of
[ ] and David Phillips.(355)
-89-
There are indications also that there was one other
additional call that may have been available to the Mexico
City Station prior to the assassination of President
Kennedy. In the first statement by Silvia Duran provided to
the CIA by the Mexican government, Silvia says that the
Cuban Consul spoke to the Soviet Consular official who dealt
with Oswald.(356) This statement is also missing from most
subsequent reports of Ms. Duran's statements, with the
notable exception of the first CIA report to the Warren
Commission.(357) Ms. Duran's early statement was confirmed by
Eusebio Azcue.(358) This conversation was not discovered by a
review of the transcripts from the [ ] operation.
It is possible that the call made by Azcue was to a phone at
the Russian Consulate [ ] It
is known [ ]
[ ] (359) This
Committee has not determined how many telephones were in the
Soviet Consulate in Mexico City.
-90-
While this Committee has not been able to find any
direct corroboration of [ ] claim,
the circumstantial corroboration is such that the
possibility that there was an additional transcript
concerning Oswald that was available to the Mexico City
Station in late 1963 cannot be dismissed. In all likelihood,
the Azcue call to the Soviet Consulate concerning Oswald was
probably made on telephones [ (360)]
and, hence, would not have been available to the CIA's
Mexico City Station.
6. Possibility that the CIA Photosurveillance
Obtained a Photograph of Lee Harvey Oswald
This Committee cannot state with certainty that a
photograph of Lee Harvey Oswald was not obtained by the
photosurveillance operations in Mexico City because of three
reasons: (a) the photographs from [ ] the "alternate"
photographic base which covered the Soviet Embassy main gate,
and the photographs from the pulse camera, which covered the
Cuban Consulate entrance, with the exception of a
-91-
few samples were not made available for review by the CIA ;
(b) testimony from knowledgeable people that it would have
been unlikely that the photosurveillance would have missed
someone whom it had at least five chances of recording; (361)
and (c) reports that. such a photo did, in fact, exist.(362)
a. Missing Materials
The documentation and elaboration of the first reason
can be found in Sections II.A. and B. preceding. Simply put,
this Committee has not seen all of the photographs produced
by the photosurveillance operations in Mexico City.(363)
Hence, it cannot conclude that a photograph of Oswald does
not exist among those photographs it has not seen.
b. Likelihood that the Photosurveillance Operation
would have Missed Oswald
CIA officers who were in Mexico in 1963 and their
Headquarters counterparts generally agreed that it would
have been unlikely for the photosurveillance operations to
have missed ten opportunities to have photographed
Oswald.(364) The transcripts of
-92-
conversations about or involving Oswald [ ]
at the Soviet Embassy reveal that a man later identified as
Oswald was at the Cuban Consulate at least three times on
Friday and Saturday, September 27 and 28. They also reveal
that he was at the Soviet Embassy at least twice on those
same days.(365) The CIA technician who serviced the Cuban
photographic installations said that it was possible that
the operation missed Oswald if: (1) Oswald's visits were
after dark; (2) Oswald's visits were on Saturday afternoons
or Sundays; (3) the case officer had given the photographic
basehouse agents the days off that Oswald visited; (4) the
pulse camera was not working.(366) It is known that Oswald's
visits were on a weekday during daylight hours and a
Saturday morning.(367) This Committee has not been able to
determine with certainty, because of the missing production,
whether all of the basehouses were operating on the days of
Oswald's visits.(368) This Committee believes that the pulse
camera was in operation on at least one of the days that
Oswald visited (Friday, September 27, 1963) the Cuban
-93-
[page 93 missing, footnotes (369) (370) (371)
c. Reports of the Existence of a Photograph.
(1) Phillip Agee Allegation.
]
-94-
Soviet Union and other Socialist countries, excluding
Cuba.(372) At the time that he assumed this job, a woman named [
] was in charge of the operational support projects for
Mexico.(373)[handwritten Agee stated]
(S)he was the officer in Washington in charge of all
of the paperwork and other administrative matters
relating to the support in Washington to these
operations which were underway in Mexico City.(374)
[ ] trained Mr. Agee for his new position. Mr.
Agee characterized [ ] as "the key figure in the
Mexico Branch in Headquarters, because she had been there
for so long."(375)
After his transfer to the Mexico Branch, Mr. Agee heard
a story about photographs of Oswald. Mr. Agee could not
remember with certainty who it had been that told him the
story, but thought that it may have been [ ] (376)
Mr. Agee's recollection of the story he had heard was that
on the day of the assassination [ ] was working in
the Mexico Branch in much the same position that she
occupied in 1966.(377) When the news about Oswald's arrest
reached [ ], she recalled seeing his name and a
photograph taken by an observation post in Mexico
-95-
[page 95 missing,footnotes (378) (379)
(2) [redacted] Allegation
]
-96-
exactly, but I do recall that it was considered a
coup of some sort for her to act so fast in digging
out the photograph and the information on Oswald's
visit to Mexico City.(380)
Mr. Agee could not remember whether he had actually
seen the photograph that [ ]
allegedly found.(381) When Mr. Agee was told that the
photograph that the CIA produced from the Mexico
photosurveillance operations did not look anything at all
like Lee Harvey Oswald, Mr. Agee said that that was the
first time he had ever heard that. [hand written He
stated:]
... I was led to believe all along that it in fact
it was Oswald's photograph....I had ["always" added
by hand] been led to believe that that was
considered a very significant achievement on the
part of the Agency and Elsie in particular for
having done that so fast. And so accurately. But now
there seems to be some doubt. And it wasn't anything
that was particularly secret around the Branch. It.
was just one of those shop-talk stories that persist
over the years. (382)
Mr. Agee speculated that the production from the
photosurveillance was routinely sent to CIA Headquarters and
that [ ] would have had access to the file
at Headquarters.(383)
-97-
[page 97 missing,
footnotes (384) (385) (386) (387) (388)]
-98-
[ ] said that he could not recall why he had
requested to see Lee Oswald's file in 1965 or 1966.(389)
[ ] said that it was his understanding that the file
was the complete Mexico City personality file on Oswald.(390)
[ ] said that he would be surprised if Oswald's
Mexico City personality file was seven volumes long.(391)
[ ] was asked whether or not Winston Scott, the
Chief of the CIA Station in Mexico, would have destroyed
files or photographs.(392) [ ] said that that would
not surprise him.(393) At that point, [ ] volunteered
that Mr. Scott often kept highly sensitive information in a
personal safe in his office. He said that this information
would not have been filed or indexed in the usual manner.(394)
[ ] said that when Winston Scott retired he had
taken the contents of this personal safe with him and stored
them in a safe in his home. [hand written He added that]
When Mr. Scott died, James Angleton flew to Mexico and
removed the contents of this safe before Mr. Scott's
funeral.(395) [ ] said he did not know what had been
in Mr. Scott's safe or what happened to the
-99-
things that Mr. Angleton removed at the time of Scott's
death. [ ] said that his source for this allegation
was Winston Scott's widow, Janet.(396) [ ] stated
that he thought the CIA Mexico City Station had given the
Warren Commission all the material in its possession but,
he added, he also knew that Winston Scott was capable of
"phonying a photo if asked to produce one. I never believed
Win Scott the first time he told me something."(397)
(3) Joseph Burkholder Smith Allegation
Mr. Joseph Smith, a retired CIA officer, was
interviewed by the House Select Committee on Assassinations
on 19 October 1977. At this interview Mr. Smith mentioned
that the Mexico City Station had been very proud of finding
"the picture of Oswald."(398) He mentioned this in connection
with a woman who worked for Winston Scott in Mexico.(399) Mr.
Smith was reluctant to speak about this at the time and the
topic was not pursued.(400)
-100-
Mr. Smith was reinterviewed by the House Select
Committee on Assassinations on 20 April 1978. Mr. Smith was
shown the omnibus CIA release letter and fully cooperated in
answering the staff investigator's questions at this
interview.(401) At this time, Mr. Smith recalled hearing a
story that someone, at the time of the assassination, had
remembered seeing Lee Harvey Oswald's face somewhere in the
photographic coverage of the Cuban or Russian Embassies.(402)
This person went back through the files and found the
picture.(403) Mr. Smith said that he does recall that the
discovery of the picture had greatly pleased President
Lyndon Johnson and that it had made Winston Scott his
"number one boy."(404)
Mr. Smith said that he could not recall when he had
first heard this story about the photograph, but he said he
was certain, however, that he had heard the story more than
once.(405) He said that the earliest that he could have
possibly heard the story was in 1964 while he was stationed
in [ ].(406) He said that not long after the
assassination he may have heard the story from someone
"coming through"
-101-
[ ] (407)
Des (Fitzgerald) might have even mentioned it when
he came through, which was in early '64, or Gerry
Droller might have mentioned it when he came through
talking about how the Mexico City Station was
helping out during the investigation.(408)
Mr. Smith stated that he did know [
] he described her as a "very severe person and very
diligent and very much the Counter-intelligence
mentality."(409) Mr. Smith stated that he also knew Ann Goodpasture. He
said:
Annie was another one of Win Scott's case officers.
She was in Mexico City for about 14 years. Annie was
what we called the "resource person." Annie knew
everything.(410)
Mr. Smith said that Win Scott also had another very
knowledgeable woman who worked with Ann Goodpasture in the
Mexico City Station whose name he recalled as Leach or
Lynch.(411) Mr. Smith's recollection associated Ms. Leach (or
Lynch) with the discovery of the photograph of Oswald, but
Mr. Smith was not at all sure of this recollection.(412) When
asked if he had any recollection of [ ] finding the
photograph, he said:
-102-
It could very well have been, and Annie, too. But I
thought it was this other girl, Lynch. But no, I
don't think I ever heard specifically who found the
damn picture. I guess... I didn't care.(413)
(4) Joseph Piccolo, Jr. Allegation.
Mr. Joseph Piccolo, Jr. was interviewed by the House
Select Committee on Assassinations on 11 August 1978. Mr.
Piccolo is an operations officer in the CIA. He was
stationed in Mexico City from [
] August 1965 to January l968. Mr. Piccolo was
involved in anti-Cuban operations from [ ] to 1968.(414)
During this interview, Mr. Piccolo told the HSCA that
sometime after the assassination of John Kennedy he had seen
photographs of Lee Harvey Oswald.(415) Mr. Piccolo said that
he had been shown these photographs by an individual who
told him that they were photographs of Lee Harvey Oswald
that were obtained from the CIA's Mexico City surveillance
of the Cuban diplomatic compound.(416) Mr. Piccolo could not
remember the identity of the person who showed him the
photographs, nor when nor where he saw the
-103-
photographs.(417)
[illegible hand written notation]
The first picture shown was a three-quarter full shot
of Oswald, exposing a left profile as Oswald looked
downward. The second photograph which Mr. Piccolo [line
drawn through "Piccolo"] remembered seeing was a back of the
head view of Oswald.(418) Mr. Piccolo remembered that both of
these photographs were taken from above Oswald and to his
left.(419) Mr. Piccolo was shown a copy of Warren Commission
Exhibit #237 [ possibly wrong number] the famous Mexico
Mystery Man photograph. He stated that this was definitely
not the man in the photographs exhibited to him.(420) Mr.
Piccolo correctly identified an unlabeled frontal photograph
of Lee Harvey Oswald shown to him by the HSCA.(421)
Mr. Piccolo was also asked whether he knew anything
about the circumstances surrounding the Agency's initial
discovery of the photographs he claims to have seen. He
stated that he did not have any first-hand knowledge of
their discovery, but that it was the type of thing, "a
coup," that would have traveled through the Agency
"grapevine."(422)
-104-
Mr. Piccolo stated that he had heard stories about a
surveillance photograph of Oswald being found both in Mexico
City and at CIA Headquarters in Langley.(423) He stated that
Ann Goodpasture may have been the person who found a
photograph of Oswald in Mexico City.(424) Mr. Piccolo said
that he has heard several times that [ ] found a
photograph of Oswald.(425) The last time he heard this story
was two weeks prior to his interview by the House Select
Committee on Assassinations.(426)
Mr. Piccolo stated that he currently shares an office
at CIA Headquarters with a man who worked on the Oswald case
during a recent CIA "in-house" investigation.(427) Mr. Piccolo
said that they were discussing Oswald's case because of the
House Select Committee on Assassinations' release of several
unidentified photographs. Mr. Piccolo stated that during the
course of this discussion his officemate
[ ] stated that [ ], "the gal
at the Mexico desk," had found the surveillance photographs
of Oswald.(428) Mr. Piccolo stated that he assumed
[ ] had become aware of Ms. [ ] coup
through his research into the Oswald
-105-
case.(429) Mr. Piccolo was not certain as to when he first
heard the story that [ ] had found the photograph,
but he was certain that he had heard it prior to hearing it
from [ ].(430)
Mr. Piccolo speculated that the Mexico City Station may
have routinely sent photographs of unidentified Americans
who visited Communist Embassies to Headquarters for possible
identification.(431)
Mr. Piccolo also told the House Select Committee on
Assassinations interviewers that he was aware, when he was
in Mexico, that Win Scott had a personal safe in his office.
He said that "restricted materials" were held in Mr. Scott's
safe. "Restricted materials" were [hand written he] defined
as very sensitive materials that did not find their way into
the routine files and indexes.(432)
(5) Statements of [ ]
[ r] stated that he had never been involved
in any of the CIA's "in-house" investigations of the Kennedy
assassination or Oswald.(433) He did state, though, that he
had once worked on an
-106-
"Oswald Task Force."(434) He said that this occurred in late
September or October of 1975. At that time, there were two
or three FOIA suits brought against the Agency concerning
the Agency's files on Oswald.(435) These files had to be
processed and the task was delegated to the Counter-
Intelligence Staff and he was assigned to the task force.(436)
[ ] stated that he was also one of the
primary contacts with two investigators from the Senate
Select Committee who were looking into the Agency's files on
Oswald at approximately the same time.(437) The task force
that he was part of conducted no research and analysis of
which he was aware.(438) [ ] stated that the only
photograph he remembers seeing is the Mexico Mystery Man
photo.(439) He said that he did not recognize "the name
[ ]"(440) He stated that he did not recall ever
being told that there was a photo of Oswald from the Mexico
City surveillance operations.(441) He denied ever telling
anyone that such a photo was found.(442) He did admit,
however, to discussing the assassination with Joseph
Piccolo.(443)
-107-
d. HSCA Investigation of the Possibility that the
Mexico City Photosurveillance Operation
Produced a Photograph of Lee Harvey Oswald;
(1) Introduction
This Committee has conducted a general investigation
into the CIA's photographic surveillance operations in
Mexico City in l963 as well as a ["as well as a" scratched
out and "in addition to" written in by hand] specific
investigation into the allegations mentioned above.(444)
In an attempt to determine whether the CIA's Mexico
City photographic bases did, in fact, photograph Oswald,
this Committee requested the CIA to make available to the
HSCA the production of these bases.(445) The CIA has in part
responded to this request.(446) However, the production from [
] the second base that covered the Soviet Embassy entrance,
and the pulse camera that covered the Cuban Consulate
entrance, has not been made available for review.(447) The
Agency's withholding of certain production materials from
the photographic bases has prevented the Committee from
determining whether a photograph of Lee Harvey Oswald was
taken by these photosurveillance operations.
Also in the course of its general investigation into
the CIA's surveillance operations in Mexico City
-108-
and Oswald's visit to that city, the Committee has
interviewed many CIA officers who were stationed in Mexico
City, or worked in 1963 at CIA Headquarters in support of
Mexican operations. They uniformly testified that the
Station had not obtained a photograph of Oswald from the
photosurveillance operations in Mexico City.(448)
(2) Investigation of the Allegations
[ ] worked on the Mexico Desk in
1963.(449) [ ] could not recall her particular
responsibilities while she was assigned to the Mexico
Desk.(450) She told the HSCA that she would have been doing routine
case officer work which would have involved name traces,
projects, budgets, et cetera.(451) She could not recall any
specific projects that she worked on and she stated that the
case officers on the desk would not have had specific titles
such as "Chief of Support Operations."(452) She stated that
the work of the desk was assigned to the case officers by
project and that work that was levied that was not part of
an assigned project would have been done by anyone on the
desk who happened to be available.(453)
One of [ 's] supervisors, Mr. John
-109-
Scelso, Chief of the Mexico Branch in 1963, remembers that:
[ ]... was the, sort of the Major Domo of
the Branch. She managed all the records, handled
all of the cables from Mexico that dealt with
security suspects, or asked for traces on security
suspects.(454)
[ ] was in the position that Mr. Agee said
she was in 1963.(455)
A major part of the allegations is dependent upon
whether or not the CIA Mexico Station sent the
photoproduction to Headquarters. HSCA review of CIA files
has revealed no evidence that the photoproduction was
routinely sent to Headquarters in 1963.(456)
HMMA-22307 detailed the installation of a pulse camera
to cover the Cuban Consulate on September 27, 1963.(457) The
dispatch states that the results of the testing would be
sent to Headquarters as soon as they were available.(458) This
The Committee did not find any indication that photographs
from this camera were sent to Headquarters prior to 6/19/64,
when Headquarters was notified that some production was
being sent by unaccountable transmittal manifest,(459) with
the exception of HMMA-22433, 11/7/63 which sent samples of
the photographic production from the camera.(460) These
-110-
six samples when reviewed by the HSCA did not include a
photograph [hand written of Oswald].(461) [ ] was
asked about the allegations; however, her memory of 22
November 1963 is not good:
Q: When was the next time after you sent a cable to
Mexico City Station and you teletyped those other
agencies, when was the next time you heard of Lee
Harvey Oswald?
A: I don't remember. The only thing I can say is that
based on what is in the file that I must have
heard about it when the Station came in and asked-
-well, if there was nothing else in the file the
name popped up again, I just don't remember about
the assassination or whenever.
Q: Would the testimony be that to the best of your
recollection, the next time you heard the name was
when you heard about the assassination?
A: Probably.
Q: At that time did the name Oswald ring a bell? Did
you remember the earlier cable traffic about him?
A: I just don't know. When he was assassinated, I
don't even remember how long it was before they
got the name of Oswald.
Q: Oswald was picked up within two hours after the
assassination and the name was made public.
A: Immediately?
Q: Yes.
A: If I were in the office unless I had the radio on-
-we didn't have a radio in the office neces-
-111-
sarily--I would not have heard the name Oswald
until the next day probably. I would assume this
was a little bit unusual, I might have tied it in.
I am sure the first thing they would have done is
make a name trace when they came up with that name
and they would come up with a 201 file all over
again.
Q: Do you recall where you were on Friday, November
22, 1963?
A: The only thing I remember about it is going home
and finding my husband sitting in front of the TV
and talking about it. I probably was at the office
but I don't remember anything. I blanked out. I
must have been at the office.
Q: Do you remember bringing John Scelso the Oswald
file on that day?
A: I wouldn't remember that. If he had asked for it I
probably did. It would have been natural for me to
if I did. I just don't know.
Q: Did you ever find a photograph of Lee Harvey
Oswald at CIA Headquarters?
A: I don't remember ever finding an Oswald
photograph.
Q: Right around the time of the assassination?
A: I don't remember it.
Q: Did you find a photograph of someone whom you
thought to be Lee Harvey Oswald?
A: I don't remember that either.
Q: Do you know Philip Agee?
A: Yes.
-112-
...
Q: Did you ever tell Joe Smith or Phillip Agee that
you had found a photograph of Oswald or someone
you thought to be Oswald?
A: I did not know Joseph Smith in Mexico City. I had
never seen Joe except at the station in Mexico
City and Phil I only saw when I was in Mexico.
[illegible hand notation]
Q: So your answer to the question is no?
A: I don't recall it and I don't see that I would
have any reason.
Q: I guess for the purpose of clarification would
like to ask the question one more time. Did you
ever tell Phillip Agee or Joseph Smith that you
found a picture of Oswald or someone whom you
thought t to be Oswald?
A: Not that I can recall.(462)
At the time of the assassination the CIA's 201
personality file on Lee Harvey Oswald was in the possession
of the Mexico City Desk.(463) That desk had had possession of
the file from 10 October 1963 when it had received a report
that a man claiming to be Lee Oswald had been in contact
with the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City.(464) Fortunately [
] supervisor had a better memory of the events that
transpired at CIA Headquarters on the day that President
Kennedy was assassinated. He said:
A: ... I do not know how long after the actual
shooting it was that Oswald's name became
-113-
known, perhaps an hour, hour and a half. Within
minutes after that, they were out with the cables
in their hands.
Q: Within minutes of the name Oswald being on the
radio, an officer came in with Oswald cables?
A: Yes
Q: Who was that officer?
A: I believe it was [ ] who was the, sort
of the Major Domo of the Branch. She managed all
the records, handled all of the cables from Mexico
that dealt with security suspects, or asked for
traces on security suspects.
Q: Did you ask her how she was able to obtain the
Oswald cables so quickly?
A: No, I know where she would have gotten them. We
have copies of them right in our Branch.
Q: At that time, did she also have a photograph of
Oswald?
A: No. I do not think so.
Q: Do you know whether [ ] ever discovered
a photograph of Oswald at CIA Headquarters?
A: I do not think so... I do not remember any
photograph of Oswald at that time, the day of the
assassination, or even later. I do remember our
asking -- we had to ask ONI for a photo, and so
on. As far as I recall, they never sent us one. It
could be that later on she found one, but I don't
recall.(465)
-114-
The chief of the Mexico Branch quoted above was also
responsible for the initial CIA investigation into the
assassination of John Kennedy.(466)
Mr. Scelso also testified that, at the time of the
assassination, the name of Lee Harvey Oswald did not ring a
bell with him because thousands of names were crossing my
desk every month.(467) He was asked why [ ] who came
across as many names as he did, would have remembered Oswald
when he had not. [illegible notation]
She was concerned only with Mexico and I had five or
six other countries to work with as well. She has a
fantastic memory [illegible notation] [
] in her job as the manager of records,
traces and files, in this Mexico desk, was an
outstanding officer to whom I gave, in one of her
fitness reports, the highest evaluation,
outstanding, number 6 and so on, that can be given,
that was very rarely given at that time. Her work
was pretty near flawless and she also was an
outstanding trainer of new employees.(468)
Material removed from Win Scott's safe now in
possession of the CIA provides critically important
circumstantial evident that the CIA photo-surveillance
operations obtained photographs of Oswald:
"(Oswald's) visits and conversations are not
hearsay; for persons watching these embassies
photographed Oswald as he entered and left each one;
and clocked the time he spent on each visit."(469)
This Committee believes that a photograph of Lee Harvey
Oswald was probably obtained by CIA photosurveillance in
-115-
Mexico. There are allegations that such a photo was found;
there is testimony that such a photo should have been
obtained; the CIA's withholding of materials; [ ]
strange lapse of memory regarding the events of 11/22/63;
and Mr. Scott's manuscript these things, in the Committee's
view would tend to indicate that a photo of Lee Harvey
Oswald was obtained. On the other hand, the consistent
testimony that a photo was not obtained in Mexico; the
absence of any record of transmittal of the photo to
Headquarters. (The weight of the consideration is mitigated
by the fact that there were methods of communication
available that were not incorporated into the CIA's record
keeping systems.), and the testimony of Ms. [ ]
and Mr. Scelso that a photo was not discovered would tend to
indicate that, in fact the allegations that [ ]
found a photo of LHO are false.
B. Information Connected to Lee Harvey Oswald by the
Mexico City Station Prior to the Assassination.
1. Introduction
This study has demonstrated that the information from
the Soviet Embassy and from Headquarters was available to
the Mexico City Station prior to the assassination of
President John F. Kennedy. In addition to the Agency
acknowledged information, there is a distinct possibility
that
-116-
the Station had available to it one additional [
] transcript, and one or more surveillance
photographs.
This Committee has made an attempt to determine when
the available information was linked to Lee Harvey Oswald.
The Committee has also made an attempt to determine whether
all the [ ] telephone calls were in fact
connected with Oswald or involved Oswald. It should be
pointed out, however that this analysis can only be directed
at that information now known to have been available to the
Mexico City Station. This information will be discussed
briefly in the following section. In addition, the question
of whether Oswald or an Oswald impostor visited the
Embassies and made the phone calls, along with the
possibility that Oswald was not alone in Mexico City, will
be dealt with in greater detail in the final section of this
report.
2. Information Available from the Soviet [ ]
that was Connected with or involved Lee Harvey
Oswald.;
The Mexico City Station possessed nine [ ]
telephone conversations that may have dealt with Oswald. The
conversation are summarized below for easy reference.(470) In
the following discussion the conversations will be referred
to by date and time of occurrence.
-117-
_____________________________________________________________
DATE TIME SUMMARY
9/27/63 10:30 AM Man calls Soviet Military Attache
regarding a visa for Odessa
(Spanish)
_____________________________________________________________
9/27/63 10:37 AM Man calls Soviet Consulate regarding
a visa for Odessa (Spanish)
_____________________________________________________________
9/27/63 1:25 PM Man calls the Soviet Consulate and
asks for the Consul. (Spanish)
_____________________________________________________________
9/27/63 4:05 PM Silvia Duran calls the Soviet
Consulate. (Spanish)
_____________________________________________________________
9/27/63 4:26 PM Soviet Consulate calls Duran
(Spanish)
_____________________________________________________________
9/28/63 11:51 AM Duran calls the Soviet Consulate and
puts a man on the phone.
(Spanish Russian and English.)
_____________________________________________________________
10/1/63 10:31AM Man calls Soviet Military Attache
(Russian)
_____________________________________________________________
10/1/63 10:45AM Man calls Soviet Consulate identify-
ing himself as Lee Oswald.
(Russian and English)
_____________________________________________________________
10/3/63 ? Man calls the Soviet Miltary
Attache. (Spanish and English.)
-118-
After the assassination the CIA's Mexico City Station
passed copies of seven of the above listed conversations to
the U. S. Embassy Legal Attache.(471) The 9/27/ 10:30 and the
9/27 1:25 calls listed above are not included in this
dissemination.(472) The cover memorandum states:
Attached are photostatic copies of transcripts of
all conversations from [ ] operations of
this office which are possibly pertinent in this
case.(473)
The HSCA has not been able to determine why the 9/27
10:30 and 9/27 1:25 calls were not included in this
memorandum. While the 1:25 call could be considered
unrelated, it is unlikely that the same would apply to the
10:30 call since the 9/27 10:37 call is included in the
memorandum.
At the bottom of each attachment page to the Scott
memorandum, a summary of the conversation is provided.(474)
The Station questioned the relevancy of only one of the
seven calls presented in the memorandum. The summary of the
10/3 call says:
By the context of other conversations by Oswald and
the fact that this called (sic) spoke in broken
Spanish and English rather than Russian which he
used previously, it is probable that this caller is
not Oswald.(475)
(Ibid., p.9.)
A judgement that this call did not pertain to Lee
Harvey Oswald could be based on the following facts:
-119-
1) the caller spoke broken Spanish; 2) the caller did not
have the number of the Consulate; 3) the caller did not know
that visas were issued at the Consulate; and 4) the caller
states that he is seeking a visa, not that he is checking or
an application already made. The majority of the evidence
indicates that Lee Harvey Oswald could not speak Spanish.(476)
In light of Delgado's assertions, it is possible that
Oswald had at least a limited knowledge of Spanish. It
should be noted that the, 10/3 transcript listed above
indicates that the caller spoke [handwritten initially] in
broken Spanish.(477) The fact that this conversation was in
Spanish, should not by itself rule out the possibility that
Oswald made the phone call. This is especially true in light
of Delgado's allegations and the 9/27 10:30, 9/27 10:37 and
9/27 1:25 call which were also in Spanish.(478)
The record reflects that Oswald had the phone numbers
of both the Soviet Consulate and the Soviet Military Attache
in his notebook.(479) It can not be determined when Oswald
entered the numbers in the notebook. Since Oswald had
previously called the Consulate it is likely that he had the
number prior to 3 October. It is also clear that Oswald knew
that the Consulate was responsible for issuing visas due to
his prior dealings with the Soviet and Cuban Consulates.
Thus, it is probable that the 10/3 conversation did not
pertain to Oswald.
-120-
The 10/1 10:45 call is clearly relevant because the
caller identifies himself as "Lee Oswald" The 10/11 10:31
conversation is probably relevant due to the similarity with
the 10/1 10:45 call and the marginal notations about the
quality of the Russian spoken by the caller, The 9/28 call
is clearly relevant, again due to the marginal notation and
the involvement of Silvia Duran. Duran's calls on 9/27
clearly related to Oswald due to the substantive information
discussed in those calls.
In summary, the above listed calls contain the
substance of the information available to the CIA MCS prior
to the assassination from the Soviet [ ] operation
The first three calls on 9/27/63 and the one on 10/3/63, if
they were indeed Oswald, add little of substance to the
information that was available from the other calls.
3. When were the [ ] Conversations Linked to
Lee Harvey Oswald.
HSCA staff researchers reviewed the transcripts
[ ] on the Soviet Embassy. The chronological,
production from this operation is on microfilm at CIA
Headquarters.(480) In addition to the chronological file,
numerous copies of the transcripts that pertain to Oswald
were found throughout the CIA's files on Lee Harvey Oswald.
It is obvious that the Mexico City Station linked the
-121-
10/1 10:45 call to Lee Harvey Oswald because Oswald
identified himself in the call and the Mexico City Station
reported Oswald's contact with the Soviet Embassy to
Headquarters on 10/8/63.(481) On this transcript the
translator added the notation:
... the same person who phoned a day or so ago and
spoke in broken Russian.(482)
[footnote 483 missing]
The transcript from the 9/28 11:51 call also bears
marginal notations from the translator. "MO (man outside)
takes the phone and says in broken Russian... speaks
terrible hardly recognizable Russian."(484) The first copy of
this transcript in Oswald's Mexico City "P" file(485) also
bears routing indications that show that the transcript was
sent to Win Scott, Ann Goodpasture and [ ](486)
These routing indications were made by [ ](487) [
] testified that these routing indications would have been
made when she first saw the transcript.(488) [ ]
also wrote an instruction on this transcript to file it in
the "Soviet Contacts" file at the same time.(489) The 9/27
4:05 transcript also bears [ 's] routing and file
instructions.(490)
The 9/27 4:26 transcript also bears routing and filing
instructions.(491) In addition, this transcript also bears a
notation from Win Scot [sic] which says "Is it possible to
identify?"(492) [ ] wrote an instruction on this
transcript to file it in Oswald's "P" file.(493)
-122-
The above four conversations which occurred on 9/27 and
9/28 contain almost all of the substantive information that
was available to the Mexico City station on Oswald from the
Soviet [ ] operation. These
conversations were not linked to Oswald prior to 8 October
1963 when MEXI 6453 was spent to Headquarters reporting
Oswald's contact with the Soviet Embassy on 1 October,
1963.(494)
The conversations discussed above were linked to Lee
Harvey Oswald by 16 October 1963, the date that the Mexico
City Station opened its "P" file on Oswald.(495) The process
by which, and the events leading up to the linkage of Oswald
to the [ ] calls will be discussed in the following
section on the Mexico City Station's actions regarding the
Oswald case prior to the assassination.
4. The Photograph of the Mexico Mystery Man.
A photograph of an unidentified individual who visited
the Soviet Embassy was incorrectly linked to Oswald prior to
the assassination.(496) The manner in which this mistake was
made and the consequences of that mistake will be discussed
in the following sections on the Mexico City Station's
actions prior and subsequent to the assassination of
President John F. Kennedy.
-123-
IV. Reconstruction of the CIA Mexico City Station and
Headquarters Actions Prior to the Assassination of
President John F. Kennedy.;
A. Introduction--CIA Interest in and Liaison with FBI
Regarding American Citizens in Contact with Soviet
Bloc Embassies in Mexico City.
The Central Intelligence Agency has claimed that no
investigation of Oswald was made in Mexico prior to the
Assassination of President Kennedy. For this reason, the
Agency claimed the fact that Oswald was seeking a visa and
that he had also been to the Cuban Embassy was not
discovered until after the assassination:
It was not until 22 November 1963, when the Station
initiated a review of all transcripts of telephone
calls to the Soviet Embassy that the Station learned
that Oswald's call to the Soviet Embassy on 1
October 1963 was in connection with his request for
a visa to the USSR. Because he wanted to travel to
the USSR by way of Cuba, Oswald had also visited the
Cuban Embassy in an attempt to obtain a visa
allowing him to transit Cuba.
Inasmuch as Oswald was not an investigative
responsibility of the CIA and because the Agency had
not received an official request-from those agencies
having investigative responsibility requesting the
Agency to obtain further information, the Station
did nothing other than ask Headquarters on 15
October for a photograph of Oswald.(497)
Neither of the above assertions is accurate. An
analysis of the information available will show that the
insertion of the above quote, that the Station did not learn
of Oswald's contact with the Cuban Consulate and
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the fact that he was seeking a visa until after the
assassination is incorrect.(498)
CIA's IG Report inaccurately implies that no action
would have been taken by the Mexico City Station with
respect to an American in contact with the Soviet Embassy in
Mexico other than merely reporting the contact unless the
Station had received a specific request from an interested
U.S. government agency. The IGR's implication is inaccurate
because, as will become apparent in the following
discussion, the CIA had an understanding with the FBI
regarding this class of cases and often did more than just
report without any specific interest being expressed by any
other agency of the United States government.(499) In fact,
the station often monitored and mounted operations against
Americans in contact with Bloc Embassies.(500) At a minimum
they attempted to collect as much information as possible on
Americans in contact with the Embassies. This was routine,
it was also the case with Lee Harvey Oswald.
B. Narrative of Mexico City Station Actions Prior to The
Assassination;
On 27 September 1963 Silvia Duran contacted the Soviet
Consulate on behalf of Lee Harvey Oswald.(501)
-125-
Later that same day, the Soviet Consulate returned Ms.
Duran's call.(502) Under normal procedures, these transcripts
would have been in the CIA Station by the first of October
and Ms. Goodpasture brought these transcripts into the
Station on that morning and put them on [ ]
desk.(503) [ ] recognized the transcripts as containing
information of a possible counterespionage or counter-
intelligence interest and routed them to [redacted] Ms.
Goodpasture and Win Scott (in reverse order.)(504) Mr. Scott
wrote, at the top of the 9/27/4:26 call, "Is it possible to
identify?"(505) This was the first interest in Oswald recorded
by the Mexico Station even though the caller was as yet
unidentified. It indicates a routine interest in an American
who is in contact with the Soviet Embassy. After the
transcripts were routed they were file in a general subject
file.(506)
The 9/28/ call was probably received at the CIA Station
on Monday, 30 September 1963. The routing and filing
instructions indicate that it was handled in much the same
way as the 9/27 conversations. [hand written Cite]
On 1 October 1963 a conversation in which an English
speaking person identified himself to the Soviet
-126-
Consulate as Lee Oswald came to the attention of [
] (507) [
] immediately notified [
].(508) [ ]
had instructions "to alert the Station immediately if a U.S.
citizen or English speaking person tries to contact any of
the [ ] (509) [
] called [ ] and a meeting was arranged.(510) [
] marked the [ ] Urgent," specifying where the [
] occurred on the [ ] put it in a box, and delivered
it to [ ] within fifteen minutes of the
telephone call to [ ] (511) The [ ] was
delivered to [ ] who [ ] it and returned it
to the Station on that same day.(512)
As soon as the Station learned that an American had
contacted the Soviet Embassy [ ] began
to screen the photographs from the Soviet Surveillance
operations.(513) The photographs from the coverage of the
Soviet Embassy, however, were not delivered as promptly as
the [ ] The photographs from October l,
1963, were not removed from the camera until 3 or 4
October.(514) Hence, they would not have been received until 4
(Friday) or 7 (Monday) October by the Station.(515)
-127-
A cable reporting Lee Oswald's contact with the Soviet
Embassy was written and sent to Headquarters by
[ ] on 10/8/63. Various reasons have been advanced
to explain the seven day delay in sending this cable. David
Phillips explained the delay by saying [ ] was too
busy to be bothered by something of such a routine
nature.(516) [handwritten Phillips stated]
[ ] was a busy man, sometimes
procrastinating. His wife was working for him, and
on one or two occasions I spoke to [ ]
kiddingly saying, hey, where is the cable about this
fellow, or something like that, or maybe to his
wife. I am not sure. In any event, what happened a
few days passed and [ ] prepared a message-
-she was working for her husband, and as I recall
it, she typed it herself, but I am not positive on
that point, but in any event, she prepared the cable
and took it to [redacted] at which time he signed
off on lt. During that process it did come to me,
also to sign off on, because it spoke about Cuban
matters, and then went to the Chief of Station and
was released.(517)
A blind CIA memorandum entitled "Delay in sending the
first cable about Oswald" was located in a soft file on the
Unidentified Man photograph. This memorandum asserts that
Dave Phillips "didn't know what he was talking about." The
memorandum's assertion is correct. [ ] did not
sign off on the cable reporting Oswald's contact
-128-
with the Soviet Embassy.(518) Mr. Phillips did not sign off on
that cable.(519) The cable did not mention anything about the
Cuban Consulate or Oswald's contact with it.(520) Mr. Phillips
never discussed the cable with the [ ] [handwritten:
according to his testimony].(521) In fact, Mr. Phillips was on
a temporary duty assignment in Washington, D.C., and Miami,
Florida, from at least late September to October 9, 1963.(522)
The blind memorandum referred to above regarding the delay
offers another explanation for the seven day lapse before
sending the cable. After explaining that the photoproduction
would not have arrived at the Station until Monday, 7
October, the memorandum says:
A name trace could have been requested on the basis
of the name alone but that wasn't the way Win Scott
ran that Station. He wanted the photographic
coverage tied in with [ ]... sometimes
there was a U.S. automobile license number. It. was
also part of the "numbers game" of justifying a
project by the number of dispatches, cables or
reports produced.(523)
In all likelihood the delay in sending this initial
cable was due to a combination of factors. [ ]
testified that, in fact. he was not too concerned with the
task and left it to his wife. [hand written He stated:]
-129-
The only action I took was the action my wife took,
was to send the cable to Washington summarizing the
information we had on Oswald and his contact with
the Embassy...We also asked our headquarters for a
trace of an American. That was routine.(524)
The delay could also have been partially due to the
wait for the photo-production. Ms. Goodpasture did check the
photographs and did add a paragraph to the cable concerning
a photograph.(525)
Another reason that the cable was delayed was that
there was some question within the Station about who had the
responsibility to report Oswald's contact with the Soviet
Embassy.
Q: What action did you take after seeing this
transcript (from the 10/l conversation)?
A: I think I was the third or beyond person who saw
it. It was brought to my attention by the chief,
the Head of the Soviet Section and by Ann
Goodpasture who was discussing this and who was
going to notify headquarters and whose
responsibility it was. As I recall, I was told to
write it up.
Q: Why was there discussion, about whose
responsibility it was?
A: I think because when it was an American it sort of
fell between whether we should have to do it,
whether it was our responsibility to send this up
because it had to
-130-
be accompanied by a memo and it took time, or
whether it was Ann's responsibility. lt. was just
a little, not argument, but a discussion about,
well, "you do it, I don't want to do it, you
handle it," and I had to do it.(526)
The reason that the responsibility would have lain with
the Soviet Section is obviously because the American was in
contact with the Soviet Embassy. Ms. Goodpasture also had a
potential basis for responsibility because she was
responsible for liaison functions with the Legal Attache,
Army, Navy and Air Force on routine counter-espionage
cases.(527) She also assisted the Chief of Station and Deputy
Chief of Station on these cases as they occurred.(528)
The primary reason for the delay was most likely a
combination of the responsibility dispute and the routine
nature of the case as perceived by the CIA officers at that
time. [ ] [hand written stated:]
(Ann Goodpasture) probably came in--it was really a
matter of here is another one of those things again
and we were having a little gabble about who would
send it up because it was pain to do these. I
probably, I think I handled it as soon as I got it
but I think there was a discussion, as I say maybe a
half a day, about who was going to do it. lt. was
done because it was required but it was considered
unimportant.(529)
-131-
Important or significant information was usually sent
to Headquarters by cable as opposed to the slower dispatch
which was sent to Headquarters by diplomatic courier.
Cables were sent if the information was of such a
nature that it had to be acted on within a day or a
day and half or two days. Dispatches took so long
that you really could not take any kind of
operational action predicated on dispatch.(530)
[ ] the Chief of the Soviet Section in
Mexico City recalled that the criterion for a cable as
opposed to a dispatch was the perishability of the
information being transmitted:
The normal criterion would be the urgency attached
to that information, the perishability of the
information, not its importance necessarily. the
perishability was the criterion... If it was
something that concerned an event that was going to
happen in the two or three days you did not want to
use a medium which was going to take a week to get
to Washington.(531)
Hence, it is possible that Oswald's contact was
reported by cable because it was considered significant by
the Mexico Station; but this interpretation is not supported
by the weight of the testimony.
Two other criteria for reporting by cable were pointed
out: information concerning Soviets, Cubans and Americans.
Generally, "[e]verything Soviet was of high
-132-
priority. Cuban Operations, a lot of cables were sent."(532)
And, in the case of Oswald:
...in this specific case, a cable was used to send
this information to Headquarters only because it
concerned an American, not because it concerned a
matter was considered to be of importance.(533)
The testimony of former CIA Mexico City officers
consistently supports the position that Oswald's initial
contact with the Soviet Embassy was considered fairly
routine.(534) The testimony indicates that the routine
procedure of the Station was to report such a contact by
cable whether it was considered routine or not.(535) The
Station had instructions to report Americans in contact with
the Bloc Embassies to Headquarters because it was of
interest to the FBI.(536) The following quotes illustrate
these points. [ ] said:
Q: Was Oswald's contact at the Embassies in Mexico
considered to be important?
A: At the time it first occurred?
Q: Yes
A: I would have to conclude that it wasn't recognized
as anything extraordinary at the time it first
occurred.
Q: Why do you conclude that?
-133-
A: Because had it been, it would have been pulled out
and sent to Washington either with a complete
transcription, a complete excerpt out of the
transcription, or the entire tape and transcript
would have been sent to Washington by the first
available pouch, probably by special courier.
Q: Does the fact that Mexico City Station sent to
Headquarters a cable reporting Oswald's contact
suggest that the station considered the contact to
be important?
A: You are asking what is the significance of the
cable?
Q: Yes.
A: Well, operational, that is all. Here is an
American citizen, at least a man who appeared to
be an American citizen, speaking broken Russian
and in contact with the Embassy. This is of
operational interest. This is the kind of
information that we were directed among others, to
get back to Washington because they passed that
kind of thing to the Bureau.
Q: Were contacts by Americans with the Soviet Embassy
considered to be unusual?
A: Well, we were 1963 then. They were considered
worthy of note, let me put it that way. Of course,
from an operational point of view we were looking
for any way we could exploit a contact with the
Soviet Embassy.
Q: Were such contacts by Americans frequent?
A: Not terribly frequent. Not terribly frequent.
There were members of the exile
-134-
colony in Mexico City who were in kind of routine
contact with the Soviets, usually on cultural
matter. No, I would say they were relatively
infrequent. That is why---
Q: The cable was sent?
A: Yes.(537)
The Chief of the Soviet Section testified on this point
also:
Q: Was this particular contact considered to be
unusual or routine?
A: Routine.
Q: Why is that?
A: During the summer period, particularly, or toward
the end of the summer period, a relatively large
number of Americans, for various reasons, made
contact with the Soviet Embassy. This appeared to
me, when I had the information reported, to be
just another case of an American contacting the
Embassy, for no significant reasons.
Q: In each case that an American contacted the
Embassy, would a cable be sent to Washington?
A: Yes, indeed.(538)
[ ] the person who actually handled the
reporting, also considered the case to be routine:
Q: Was the Oswald contact with the Soviet Embassy
considered to be unusual?
A: No.
-135-
Q: Why not?
A: Well, there were cases of other Americans who
contacted the Embassy for various reasons. We were
only obliged to report the contact of any American
with the Soviet Embassy.
Q: So in Oswald's case it was just a routine contact
by an American as far as you were concerned?
A: Yes.
Q: If that is the case, then why was the cable sent
concerning Oswald?
A: That is why I asked you earlier, because in the
case of Americans we were required to send it by
cable and not by dispatch.
Q: Was that a written regulation?
A: I don't know if it was written but it was
understood at our Station that any Americans who
were in touch with the Soviet Embassy that that
fact had to be known [handwritten sic] to
Headquarters by cable. It was always sent that
way, whether we considered it very unimportant or
routine or not. So there must have been a
regulation but I am not aware of it.(539)
[scratched out] The reader should be reminded [hand
written "It should be noted"] here that the only
conversation that had been linked to Oswald at that point in
time was the one that occurred on 1 October.(540) The other
transcripts had passed over the [ ] and Goodpasture's
desk(541) but had not been linked to Oswald because his name
was not mentioned in them. [ ]
-136-
did not recheck the earlier transcripts, but did check the
Station's index system to see if it had any record of a Lee
Oswald, which it did not.(542)
Q: ...(H)ere it says in brackets, comment by the
translator, "the same who phoned a day or so ago
and spoke in broken Russian."
A: Right.
Q: Despite this indication here I believe your
testimony is that you did not go back to check the
transcript because by virtue of your memory you
knew that Oswald's name had not come up in any
earlier conversation, is that correct?
A: Yes.(543)
So, [ ] drafted the first paragraph of the
10/8 cable on the basis of the 10/1/10:45 conversation alone
even though the other information was available.(544) That
paragraph of the cable provided an accurate summary of the [
] conversation. It said:
Acc [ ] 1 Oct 63, American male
who spoke broken Russian said his name Lee Oswald
(Phonetic), stated he at Sovem on 28 Sept when spoke
with Consul whom he believed to be Valeriy
Vladmirovich Kostikov. Subj. asked Sov Guard Ivan
Obyedkov who answered, if there is anything new re
telegram to Washington. Obyedkov upon checking said
nothing received yet, but request had been sent.(545)
Ann Goodpasture added a second paragraph to the
-137-
cable.(546)
This paragraph concerned a photograph that she had
found in the production from one of the photosurveillance
bases that covered the Soviet Embassy.(547) This paragraph
said:
Have photos male appears be American entering Sovem
1216 hours, leaving 1222 on 1 Oct. Apparent age 35,
athletic build circa 6 feet, receding hairline,
balding top. Wore Khakis and sport shirt. Source
[ ] (548
of the mistake will be dealt with in more detail in
subsequent sections.
)
The explanation for mistakenly linking this photograph
to Oswald advanced by the CIA officers in Mexico who had
knowledge of the circumstances is that this was the only
photograph taken on October 1, the day that the conversation
occurred, that appeared to be of a non Latin, and, hence,
possibly an American.(549)
Q: Do you know how that photograph was linked to the
person mentioned?
A: By date. It was taken entering the Soviet Embassy
and leaving on the same date this conversation
took place. I remember that proceeding because we
were combing through the takes for that day to
determine any person who looked like an American
male. I believe this was the only one.(550)
The testimony also corroborates that the photographs
would have been checked for several days prior to the date
of
-138-
the conversation.
Q: You checked the photosurveillance materials for
approximately a four or five day period, is that
correct?
A: Yes, I think it is.
Q: During that four or five day period... this man
was the only non-Latin appearing man whose
photograph you found, is that correct?
A: I think it was the only non-Latin appearing
person's photograph that we found that we could
not identify as somebody else. A lot of the people
who went to the Soviet Embassy all the time, we
came to know who they were. After they had been
identified, they made frequent visits there.(551)
The review of the photoproduction from [ ]
the one base that has been made available to this Committee,
makes the explanation of the mistake about the identity of
the individual due to his being the only non Latin
implausible. The record reflects that unidentified American
males were listed on the log sheet as "U A M" after the time
was given. The photograph that was linked to Oswald was the
only "U A M" that appeared on 2 October 1963. But on
September 27, 1963 another "U A M" had appeared. The
Committee has concluded from a review of a note that Ann
Goodpasture wrote on the log sheet that this individual had
not been identified by the time that
-139-
the 10/8 cable was written. The note says: "This is a
Mexican named Gutierrez--license plate changed in Feb 64 to
Mexican."(552)
This Committee cannot be certain that other "U A M" did
not turn up on the production from the [ ] base
because that production has not been made available for
review.
Ms. Goodpasture was asked about this and explained that
the man, Gutierrez, was known in the station, and that the
base house agent was mistaken in identifying him as an
American.(553)
This Committee finds the above quoted explanation hard
to accept for other reasons. The October 1 transcript does
not indicate that Oswald visited the Embassy on that day,
however, it does indicate a visit on the previous
Saturday.(554) Even if he did visit the Embassy on the first of October,
the photograph referred to in the cable was not taken until
the second of October, 1963.(555)
The photographs from the one surveillance base for 1, 2
and 3 October were on one roll of film and one log sheet was
prepared by the base. The text of
-140-
the log sheet is in black type. The separate days coverage
is set off by a row of red typed percentage (%) marks.(556)
Ms. Goodpasture attempted to explain this mistake.
Q: Looking at the log, can you now explain to the
Committee why the cable referred to a photograph
taken on October 1st when actually it was taken on
another day?
A: If you look at the log here you see at the top--it
was just an oversight on the part of the person
who was writing that cable. It looks as though the
date is 1 October, but if you read it very closely
you see there are only two frames that were shot
on 1 October and 2 October, it starts up with
frame number 3, et cetera, et cetera, and there
the shots occur. That is the only explanation I
can give.
Q: Is your explanation that whomever referred to the
log simply looked at the date at the top of the
page, the date being October 1st, and did not see
any reference to the date October 2nd?
A: Right.(557)
This Committee finds it implausible that Ann
Goodpasture, who had the specific duty of "processing for
operational leads, all Station Surveillance info pertaining
to the Soviet target" since 1960 and had received a rating
of outstanding on her annual fitness reports,
-141-
would make such an oversight mistake and not discover it
until 1976.(558) This Committee thinks that the fact that the
mistaken date of the photograph was not discovered for so
long is especially suspect in light of the fact that on the
day after the assassination CIA Headquarters sent a cable to
Mexico which said:
"(FBI) says that photos of man entering Soviet
Embassy which MEXI sent to Dallas were not of
Oswald. _Presume MEXI has double-checked dates of
these photos _ and is also checking all pertinent
other photos for possible shots of Oswald.(559)
Headquarter's presumption was evidently mistaken. No
record exists that would indicate a reply to this cable by
the Mexico City Station. The likelihood that a photograph of
Oswald was indeed obtained makes the "explanation,"
proffered by Goodpasture, et al., even more implausible.(560)
At this time the Committee can not conclude why the original
mistake was made even though it does find the explanation
offered by Goodpasture, et al., to be highly implausible.
Regardless of why the mistake was made, Oswald's
contact with the Soviet Embassy and the mistaken
photographic identification of him were reported to
Headquarters. The 10/8 cable was received at Headquarters on
9 October
-142-
1963.(561) The cable, as was routine, went to the Mexico Desk
for action.(562) The person who handled the case for the
Mexico Desk was [ ].(563) [ i]
initially considered the information routine.(564) She took
the routine steps of requesting a name trace.(565) From the
name trace she learned that there was a 201 file on a Lee
Henry Oswald but that it was restricted to a branch of the
Agency known as "CI/SIG."(566) The custodian of Oswald's file,
in October 1963, was Ann Elizabeth Goldsborough Egerter of
the Counter-Intelligence/Special Investigations Group. This
group's purpose and interest in Oswald is detailed in
another section of this final report dealing with whether or
not Lee Oswald was an agent or asset of the Central
Intelligence Agency.(567)
[ ] went to Ms. Egerter and asked to see Lee
Oswald's file which was provided to her by Ms. Egerter.(568)
Once the information from the Oswald 201 and the information
in the cable from Mexico City was combined, the Oswald
contact took on more significance:
Q: Now, once the information...had been obtained by
you, did that in any way increase the significance
of Oswald's contact with the Soviet Embassy?
-143-
A: As I recall that is what I thought made it very
significant.
Q: Can you explain why?
A: Any American who had tried to renounce his U.S.
citizenship in the Soviet Union, now having again
a relationship with the Soviet Embassy would lead
one to wonder why he had tried to renounce his
citizenship in the first place, and why he was
still in contact with the Soviets, whether there
was a possibility he really was working for the
Soviets or what.(569)
Ms. Egerter remembers that the cable from Mexico City
caused a lot of excitement She was shown the 10/9 cable.
Q: Is this the cable that cause the excitement?
A: Yes, one of them.
Q: Why was excitement caused by this cable?
A: "Contact with Kostikov."
Q: What is the significance of the contact with
Kostikov?
A: I think we considered him a KGB man.
Q: Any other reason for the excitement?
A: He had to be up to something bad to be so anxious
to go to the Soviet Union. At least that is the
way I felt.(570)
After reviewing Oswald's 201, which CI/SIG loaned to
the Mexican Desk where it remained until the time of the
assassination, [ ] drafted a response to the
-144-
Mexico City 10/9 cable and --also disseminated information
about Oswald to other branches of the American intelligence
community.(571) These two documents were drafted at the same
time and were sent within several hours of each other.(572)
Several aspects of these two documents are interesting and
illustrate points, as well as raise serious questions.
The cable which [ ] sent to Mexico says, in
full:
1. Lee Harvey Oswald who called Sovemb 1 Oct probably
identical Lee Henry Oswald (201-289248) born 18
October 1939 New Orleans, Louisiana, former radar
operator in United States Marines who defected to
USSR in Oct l959. Oswald is five feet ten inches,
one hundred sixty five pounds light brown wavy
hair, blue eyes.
2. On 31 Oct 1959 he attempted to renounce his United
States citizenship to the United States Embassy
["assy" scratched out] in Moscow, indicating he
had applied for Soviet citizenship. On 13 Feb the
US emb Moscow received an undated letter from
Oswald postmarked Minsk on 5 Feb 1961 in which
subj indicated he desired return of his US ppt as
wished to return to USA if "we could come to some
agreement concerning the dropping of any legal
proceedings against me." On 8 July on his own
initiative he appeared at the Emb with his wife to
see about his return to the States. Sub stated
that he actually had never applied for Soviet
citizenship and that his
-145-
application at that time had been to remain in
USSR and for temporary extension of his Tourist
visa pending outcome of his request. This
application, according to Oswald, contained no ref
to Soviet citizenship. Oswald stated that he had
been employed since 13 Jan 1960 in Belorussian
Radio and TV Factory in Minsk where worked as
metal worker in research shop. Oswald was married
on 30 April 1961 to Marina Nikolaevna Pusakova, a
dental technician born July 1941 USSR. No HDQS
traces. He attempted arrange for wife to join him
in Moscow so she could appear at Emb for visa
interview. His American ppt was returned to him.
US Emb Moscow stated twenty months of realities of
life in Soviet Union had clearly had maturing
effect on Oswald.
3. Latest HDQS info was (State Department) report
dated May 1962 saying (State) had determined
Oswald is still US citizen and both he and his
Soviet wife have exit permits and Dept State had
given approval for their travel with their infant
child to USA.
4. Station should pass info ref and para one to (U.S.
Embassy, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Navy,
and Immigration and Naturalization) locally. Info
paras two and three originates with (State).
5. Ref and possible identification being disseminated
to HDQS of (FBI, State, Navy and INS). Pls keep
HDQS advised on any further contacts or positive
identification of Oswald.(573)
[redacted] wrote this cable.(574) Ms. Egerter was one of
the people who reviewed the cable for accuracy.(575)
The cable was released by the Assistant Deputy Director
-146-
of Plans, Thomas Karamessines.(576)
The teletype which [ ] wrote was sent to the
Department of State, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and
the Department of the Navy.(577) This teletype says:
1. On, 1 October 1963 a reliable and sensitive source
in Mexico reported that an American male, who
identified himself as Lee Oswald, contacted the
Soviet Embassy in Mexico City inquiring whether
the Embassy had received any news concerning a
telegram which had been sent to Washington. The
American was described as approximately 35 years
old, with an athletic build. about six feet tall,
with a receding hairline.
2. It is believed that Oswald may be identical to Lee
Henry Oswald, born on 18 October 1939 in New
Orleans, Louisiana, a former U.S. Marine who
defected to the Soviet Union in October 1959 and
later made arrangements through the United States
Embassy in Moscow to return to the United States
with his Russian wife, Marina Nikolaevna Pusakova,
and their child.
3. The information in Paragraph One is being
disseminated to your representative in Mexico
City. Any further information received is being
made available to the Immigration and
Naturalization Service.(578)
The first substantive conflict between these two
documents are the dissimilar descriptions of Oswald. The
response sent to Mexico gave a fairly accurate description
of Oswald while the dissemination to other government
-147-
agencies gave the description that had mistakenly been
connected to Oswald by the 10/9 cable from Mexico City.(579)
Ms. Egerter testified that she could not explain why the
description discrepancies occurred.(580) When [ ]
was asked why this occurred she first responded that there
was a rule that prevented the Agency from disseminating any
information obtained from a third agency of the
government.(581) Hence, the accurate description of Oswald which was from
information furnished to the Agency by the State Department
could not be included in the dissemination.(582) It was
pointed out to [redacted] that the information in the second
paragraph of the teletype was from the State Department
sources and that the Mexico City Station had been instructed
to disseminate the description locally which she claimed
could not be disseminated due to a third agency rule. She
was asked the question again and the following exchange
occurred:
A. Let us start over. The actual physical description
on Lee Henry Oswald from (the 10/10 cable) was
sent to the Station to assist them in further
investigation to see if they knew of anybody or
had anybody down there that really fitted what we
thought was an accurate physical description of
the Oswald that we had a
-148-
file on... When we came to...the teletype to
State, FBI and Navy, we did not, and would not
normally even today, provide those investigative
agencies with the physical description of Lee
Henry Oswald as we thought it to be then.
We provided them only with our intelligence, not
with State Department intelligence which gave the
stuff out about the audio and the possible
physical description. The wording here in
paragraph 1 on our teletype... is worded that the
American was described. As I told your man from
your Committee earlier, it possibly would have
been better, although it did not occur to me at
the time and this is the way those things were
written in those times, to say that an American
described as this could possibly be identifiable
and qualified but the normal procedure in 1963 was
to provide to the other government agencies
information and intelligence from our sources.
Q: Were you aware when you sent out the cable and the
teletype that you were giving different
descriptions?
A: Yes. I assume I was. I don't remember now. This is
some time [hand written ago.]
Q: Was there any intention of your part to deceive
any other agencies by giving a description
contained in that paragraph in the teletype?
A: None at all.(583)
[ ] was interviewed by Committee staff
members on 3/30/78. She was questioned, as she indicates in
the quote above, at that time about the description
-149-
discrepancy. When [ ] was shown the 10/9 cable
on that occasion she stated that she would not have taken
the description of the individual in paragraph two to be a
description of Oswald.(584) The description discrepancy was
specifically pointed out to [ ] and she was
specifically questioned on that point. The report of that
interview says:
We next pointed out to [ ] the
fact that the response to Mexico had a correct
description of Oswald and the dissemination had an
incorrect one. She said that the info in the first
paragraph of the dissemination came from MEXI 6453
and that explained the incorrect description. We
pointed out to her the fact that she had the correct
description and that had already told us that she
did not associate the description in 6453 with
Oswald, and that she had said that the cable and
teletype had been prepared simultaneously by three
knowledgeable people. She said, first, that the
correct description would not have been put in the
dissemination because it came from the file review.
I pointed out that all of the information in the
second paragraph of the dissemination was from the
file review. She responded that they had not been
sure that the "Lee Oswald" referred to in 6453 was
the same as "Lee Henry Oswald" on whom they had a
file, hence they would not have had included a
description from 6453 that she did not think was
connected to Oswald. She said that it had obviously
been a mistake that doesn't matter now, but if she
had it to do over again, she would not put any
description in the dissemination because she was not
sure that either applied to
-150-
the man who identified himself as Lee Oswald at the
Embassy in Mexico.(585)
The second point of interest that is illustrated by the
10/10 cable and teletype is the inference that can be made
from reviewing paragraph 3 of the teletype, paragraph 5 of
the cable, and Thomas Karamessines signing off on the cable,
that the CIA was asking for, and promising, a further
investigation of Oswald without a specific request from any
other government agency who [hand written which] might have
had, as the '77 IGR says, "investigative responsibility."
[ ] the Chief of the Soviet Section in Mexico
City recognized such a routine investigative responsibility
as part of the normal course of his duties. [hand written He
stated:]
One of our responsibilities was to assist the FBI in
identifying people who might become Soviet agents,
particularly in America.(586)
As a matter of fact, the Chief of the Branch of the CIA
responsible for the Mexican operations at Headquarters
thought this was one of the Mexico City Station's strongest
and most successful areas of endeavor.
They (Americans) were detected enough so that J.
Edgar Hoover used to glow every time that he thought
of the Mexico City Station. This was one of our
outstanding areas of cooperation with the FBI.(587)
-151-
The request for further investigation and dissemination
contained in paragraph 5 of the 10/10 cable to Mexico was
the reason that the cable was sent to the Assistant Deputy
Director of Plans for release.(588) The Chief of the Mexico
Branch was questioned extensively on this point:
A: Well, it went up to Mr. Karamessines because it
involved disseminating information on an American
citizen to the U.S. government agencies, you see.
At that time--probably still--the CIA did not
investigate or pass around information on American
citizens unless it were requested to by another
government agency, either in that particular case
or by some standard operating procedure. In other
words, the CIA, seeing an American abroad,
observing an American abroad, observing an
American abroad engaging in some skullduggery,
would inform the responsible U.S. agency here and
sit and wait for instructions before doing
anything further. In this case, we were passing on
information to other U.S. government agencies in
Mexico City and this probably went to other places
in Washington as well.
Q: This particular information was disseminated to
other agencies without a request of any such
agency. Is that correct?
A: Yes.
Q: This fit into the other category of cases where
disseminations were made?
A: Disseminations would be made to other interested
agencies, and any information we came across had
action taken to follow up to take investi-
-152-
gative steps. Dissemination would only be taken if
another agency requested it, either specifically
in that case, _or unless it were a part of
standard operating procedure, which would have
been agreed upon with another agency._
Q: Was any follow-up action contemplated by [hand
written this] (the 10/10) cable?
A: Yes. "Please keep Headquarters advised of any
further contacts or for positive identification of
Oswald."
Q: That would be considered follow-up?
A: Yes. They were instructed to stay alert and report
any further evidence of this man's presence.
Therefore, Mr. Karamessines had to sign off on it.
Q: Mr. Karamessines had to sign off on it because
follow-up action was contemplated?
A: With regard to a U.S. citizen abroad.
Q: For purposes of clarification, I think you said
that there were two situations where
Mr. Karamessines would have to sign off. One would
be where another agency requested the
dissemination?
A: Yes. No--not the question of the dissemination. It
is a question of operational action being taken.
Q: A request for operational action?
A: Well--
Q: Would the Agency itself decide to take operational
action?
A: Ordinarily, operational action in an ordinary case
would not require Mr. Karamessines approval at
all. It was only because an American citizen was
involved. That interest in an American citizen
might come about because of a specific statement
of interest about
-153-
this individual from another U.S. government
agency or it might come about _because of a
standard operating procedure._ [emphasized in
original]
For example, _we had an agreement with the FBI
that we would follow up leads on any American
citizen in Mexico City who appeared around the
Soviet Embassies,_ [emphasized in original] and so
on, or anybody who was down there appearing to
defect, which we might learn through [
]
We could just as well have sent this cable out
without Mr. Karamessines releasing it. I do not
know why we did it.
Q: In fact, you pointed to something which I was
going to ask you about. I was wondering why
somebody as high up in the Agency as Mr.
Karamessines was the releasing officer.
A: I would have been because of the U.S. citizen
aspect, because so many other U.S. Government
agencies were involved, State Department, FBI and
the Navy. I suppose one of these things is the
Navy. One of them could be the Immigration and
Naturalization Service.
Q: Let me attempt to summarize again. Karamessines
would be responsible for signing off on this
because operational action pertaining to an
American was taken?
Q: Either pursuant to the request of another
government agency or pursuant to some standard
operating procedure of the Agency itself.
A: Yes.
Q: Any other reason that you can think of?
A: No.
Q: I believe you indicated there was an arrangement
-154-
or an agreement, with the FBI that any activities
by Americans around the Soviet or Cuban Embassy
would be reported and followed up on by the
Agency. has that agreement in writing?
A: I do not know. It probably was in writing
somewhere. It antedated my tenure, and the
agreement was not in the files. It would have
been in the files of the DDP or of the CI
Staff.(589)
The Chief of the Mexico Branch hence believes that
further investigation of Oswald was requested by CIA
Headquarters Without the prior expression of interest from
another government agency with "investigative
responsibility." This request for "operational activity"
concerning an American abroad is advanced as the reason for
the Assistant Deputy Director of Plans signing off on the
cable. Even though the cable was brought to Karamessines'
attention and he did sign off on it, Mr. Scelso told this
Committee that that was not necessary due to a standing
agreement with the FBI under which the CIA had agreed to
investigate Americans in Mexico in contact with the Soviet
Embassy without any specific request from another agency.(590)
This recollection is corroborated by other testimony and
documents.(591) [ ] also recalled that it would
not have been necessary, in 1963, to bring such a request
for operational action to the ADDP's attention.(592) She
suggested that the reason for bringing it to the ADDP's
-155-
attention did not have to do with the request for
operational action, but because Oswald's contact was
considered important enough to merit his attention:
Q: Why would someone as high up in the organization
as Karamessines ask to be the releasing officer of
this particular cable?
A: I can only surmise now that I might have thought
or what several of us might have thought at the
time that since it involved somebody of this
nature who had tried to renounce his citizenship,
who was in the Soviet Union, married to a Soviet,
got out with a Soviet wife presumably, which is
very strange, and now the contact with the
Soviets, we could have a security, a major
security problem. This was one way of informing
him and getting attention at the higher level.(593)
Even though the CIA denies such an agreement (if it was
in writing) that covered the CIA's investigation of American
citizens in Mexico, this Committee is certain, on the basis
of the above detailed evidence, that such an agreement
existed, either formally or informally.(594) Hence, the
assertion in the 1977 IG report that "Oswald was not an
investigative responsibility of the CIA"(595) is seemingly
inaccurate and misleading.
This Committee has attempted to determine what actions,
if any, were taken by the CIA's Mexico City Station after
Headquarters responded to the initial report of Oswald's
contacts with the Soviet Embassy. In this
-156-
respect, two assertions of the '77 IGR are important: 1)
that it was not discovered that Oswald was seeking visa to
Russia and that he had also been in contact with the Cuban
Embassy until November 22, 1963; and 2) that the Station did
"nothing other than ask Headquarters on 15 October for a
photograph of Oswald" because no other government agency had
made an official request further information.(596) It has
already been shown that the "official request" that the
Agency claims was not forthcoming was, in fact, not
necessary and that, as a matter of fairly routine operating
procedure, the CIA Headquarters requested a follow-up on the
information already reported about Oswald. It has also been
shown that the Oswald matter, after the name trace was done
at Headquarters, was considered to be fairly significant by
the Headquarters officials involved. In this regard, it
should be pointed out that Headquarters communicated its
concern to Mexico by requesting in paragraph 5 of DIR 74830
more information on Oswald. It should also be noted that the
CIA Headquarters also, by notifying the interested
government agencies that "Any further information received
on this subject will be furnished to you"(597) belied the
necessity of one of the agencies
-157-
making an official request for further action. Hence, the
excuse offered for the claimed lack of action by the Mexico
Station is invalid and the question becomes l) whether or
not that Station did any follow-up; 2) whether they did
discover additional information about Oswald prior to the
assassination; 3) whether that information, if any, was
reported in an accurate and expeditious manner; and 4) if it
was not reported, what was the reason for the failure to
report.
The Mexico City Station received DIR 74830 on 11
October 1963. The Mexico City copy of this cable is in Lee
Harvey Oswald's Mexico City "P" file along with the Station
routing slip. There are several interesting aspects to this
copy of the cable and there is evidence that provides
indications of the Stations' actions and the timing of those
actions.
There are several marginal notations on this document.
Perhaps the most interesting is the notation "Sic" with an
arrow drawn, to the "Henry" in the name "Lee Harvey Oswald."
That notation was made by Win Scott when he read the cable
on the day it was received in Mexico.(598) This notation
struck committee investigators as very strange because it
was a possible indication that Win
-158-
Scott knew, at the time the cable was received, that Lee
Oswald's middle name was not "Henry." David Phillips was
questioned about that possibility:
Q: Do you have any reason to believe that when this
cable was received in October of 1963 Mr. Scott
knew that cable's reference to Lee Harvey Oswald
was incorrect?
A: No, I don't recall that, but reading this
obviously at whatever time he wrote that "sic" on
there he felt it was incorrect or he would not
have spotlighted it that way. But I don't have any
recollection. I don't have any recollection that
we know before this cable came back down that it
was Lee Harvey Oswald.(599)
The explanation most often advanced was that Mr. Scott
often used the symbols "Sic" and "aka" interchangeably and
that all he was indicating here was that the "Lee Oswald"
from the [ ] was also to be indexed and filed under the
additional name "Lee Henry Oswald."(600) Mr. Phillips was also
asked about this explanation:
Q: Was he [hand written Win Scott] the kind of
individual that would have interchanged or used
interchangeably the words, the letters "aka" and
"sic" interchangeably as having the same meaning?
Do you appreciate that?
A: Yes. I don't think so. He was an intellectual. His
great secret was that he wrote poetry. He didn't
want anyone else to know that. He was very well
educated, extremely well read, and no, he is not
the kind of man--
Q: He would appreciate the distinction?
-159-
A: He would appreciate the distinction between the
two.(601)
If Mr. Scott did in fact make this notation prior to
the assassination of John Kennedy, this Committee has not
been able to determine why "sic" was used.(602)
The description of Oswald is marked on this cable--with
a double black line, a check mark and the notation "24 years
old" in Ann Goodpasture's hand-writing.(603) At this point at
least Ms. Goodpasture and [ ] the DCOS,
realized that the photograph they had described in MEXI 6453
was not of Oswald.(604) But this realization was evidently not
shared by all the officers in the station. Ms. Goodpasture
remembers that there was some controversy in the station
about whether the man described in the 10/11 cable was the
same man who had been picked up by the Station's
photographic surveillance. Ms. Goodpasture remembers that
she believed, based on the cable, that the photograph
reported in MEXI 6453 was not of Oswald. She said that she
argued over the identification with Win Scott and that he
said, "Oh, that may be incorrect" and so forth. But there
was some quibbling over it.(605)
The routing slip on the 10/11 cable indicates some of
-160-
the dates when subsequent Mexico City Station actions
occurred. Ms. Goodpasture noted that "We should ask HQ for
photo. No?" [ ] noted that the dissemination
requested by paragraph 4 of the cable was done on l5 October
1963. Win Scott wrote, "Please set up 'P' file on Lee Henry
OSWALD and put all data we have into it. Photos?"(606) The
document was sent to the files on l5 October l963.(607) Hence,
we know that Oswald's Mexico "P" file was opened on or about
l5 October l963 and that Win Scott asked that "all"
information be included in the file. There is substantial
reason to believe that most, if not all, of the information
available to the Station was incorporated into the file at
that time.(608)
The 10/11 cable greatly increased the significance of
Oswald's contact with the Soviet Embassy in the eyes of the
Mexico City Station just as the name trace results reported
by that cable had made the matter more significant to the
officers involved at Headquarters.(609) This cable aroused the
Station's operational interest in Oswald. [illegible
notation]
Q: ...[T]o your knowledge did that (the 10/11 cable)
in any way enhance the importance of Oswald's
-161-
contact with the Soviet Embassy?
A: Oh. yes, sure, it did. The fact that he had that
kind of background. Sure, he became someone of
considerable operational interest. Again, there
was nothing other than operational interest.
Q: In all lik(e)lihood that cable would have prompted
the people at the station to go back and look at
the earlier transcripts?
A: Yes, I would think so.(610)
This Committee believes that Station personnel did,
between October 11 and October 15, go back and recheck the
transcripts and connect the important substantive calls to
Oswald. Under normal operating procedures a tape of Oswald's
calls to the Soviet Embassy should not have been erased
until 16 October, 4 to 5 days after the case took on added
significance.(611) The one transcript of the call on 10/1/63
that had definitely been linked to Oswald prior to receipt
of the 10/11 cable bore a reference to an earlier
conversation by a man who spoke broken Russian, the text of
the 10/l call allowed that the prior call had probably
occurred on September 28, 1963.(612) It should have been
possible at that point to compare the tapes to see if they
were in fact the same caller. Indeed, a notation made by Ann
Goodpasture on a newspaper article in 1964 suggests that
this was the case.
-162-
The note says:
The caller from the Cuban Embassy was unidentified
until HQ sent traces on Oswald and voices compared
by [ )] (613)
The cable traffic after the assassination confuses this
point rather than clarifies it. This will be dealt with in
more detail in a subsequent section. An examination of
documents in Lee Harvey Oswald's Mexico City Station P file
and the cable traffic from Mexico City to Headquarters after
the assassination, raised a possibility that at least one
tape of Oswald's voice existed as late as l6 October
1963.(614)
Assuming that the 10/1/63 call in which an individual
identifies himself as "Lee Oswald" was handled in an
expedited manner, the tape and the transcript would have
[ ] (615)
If the tape had been held for the normal two-week retention
period, it would have been erased on or about 16 October.
The tape from the 9/2/63 conversation would have probably
been in the station by the first or second of October at the
latest.(616) [hand written Moreover, it] would not have
normally been erased until on or about 16 October also. It
seems clear that the tapes, under normal procedures would
have been retained until at least the middle of
-163-
October. An examination of the documents does not clarify
this question but rather adds confusion to the issue.
Several documents and cables deal with the tapes and a voice
comparison of the recorded conversations. In Oswald's "P"
file there is a newspaper clipping of an article from the 21
October l964 Washington Post. The article, by Robert S.
Allen and Paul Scott, is entitled "CIA Withheld Vital
Intelligence from Warren Commission." One paragraph from
that article says:
"The investigators also are trying to determine why
the CIA in its preassassination report to the State
Department on Oswald's trip to Mexico City gave
details only of the defector's visit to the Russian
Embassy and not the Cuban Embassy. The CIA did not
report the latter visit until after Kennedy's
assassination in Dallas.
Next to that paragraph Ann Goodpasture wrote:
The caller from the Cuban Embassy was unidentified
until HQ sent traces on Oswald and voices compared
by [( ] (617)
That statement is very clear in saying that a voice
comparison was made. The cable traffic that went from Mexico
to CIA Headquarters after the assassination is not so clear.
-164-
On 23 November, the CIA Headquarters asked the Mexico
City Station to send the full transcripts of Oswald's
conversations and "original tapes if available" to
Headquarters as soon as possible by a special courier.(618) On
that same day, Ann Goodpasture sent a cable to Headquarters
reporting the 9/28/63 conversation. That cable said, in
part, "Station unable compare voice as first tape erased
prior receipt: second call."(619) Later that same day Ms.
Goodpasture wrote another cable which said:
[ ] who did transcriptions says Oswald
identical with person para one speaking broken
Russian who called from Cuban Embassy 28 September
to Soviet Embassy.(620)
The next day the Mexico City Station informed
Headquarters that it had been unable to locate any tape of
Oswald's voice. "Regret complete recheck shows tapes for
this period already erased."(621)
The statement in MEXI 7023 that a voice comparison was
not possible because of the first tape being erased prior to
the second tape being received is inconsistent with the
statements made in testimony and in other cables(622) and with
the procedure then in effect at the station at that time.(623)
It is, therefore, considered highly
-165-
unlikely that a tape would be held only one or two days, the
situation that is implied by the statement in MEXI 7023.
The other statements by Ms. Goodpasture in the cables
and on the newspaper articles clearly indicate that a voice
comparison was made. Ms. Goodpasture was questioned about
this:
Q: To your knowledge, was a voice comparison ever
made between the tapes to determine whether the
same person was speaking in each one?
A: I do not know. I did not make one. I do not know
whether someone else made one or not. There is a
transcript, a cable here, in which the transcriber
of the Soviet tape says that it is the same voice,
which would lead one to believe that he made a
voice comparison, but it just may have been that
he, from his memory, came to that conclusion.(624)
Q: On the lower right-hand corner of the newspaper
article that is contained there, marked off with a
dark line is a paragraph. Kindly read that
paragraph, starting with the words "The
investigators.."
(Pause.)
A: This would suggest--
Q: One moment.
A: -- [ ] compared the voices on a tape of
October.
Q: Whose handwriting appears?
A: That is mine.
-166-
...
Q: That indicates that the caller -- could you please
read that to us. Read that you wrote that day.
A: "The caller from the Cuban Embassy was
unidentified until Headquarters sent traces on
Oswald." Now, that would have been in answer to
the cable that was dated 8th October. I believe
their cable was 18 October, "and voices compared
by [ ]. [ s ] was the
pseudonym used by [ ]
Q: In fact, that indicates--
A: We compared the Cuban Embassy voices with the
others, with Oswald's call, in which he used his
name.
Q: When would that have happened?
A: I said 18 October because I thought that was the
date of the cable. 10 October.(625)
[ ] testified that he had not been queried
at all about Oswald in 1963 and that he had not done a voice
comparison.(626) [ ] testified that [ ] did
not do a voice comparison but connected the two
conversations in his marginal comments in the transcripts on
the basis of memory.(627)
Whether or not [ ] or someone else did a
voice comparison of the tapes, it is likely that the tapes
did exist until at least the 16th of October and would have
been available for such a comparison. It is possible that
the connection between the 10/l/63 call and the 9/28/63 call
was made on the basis of [ ]
-167-
memory. In any event the record clearly indicates that the
tapes should have been available, and probably were
available, as late as 16 October 1963.(628) This is
significant because it was after receipt of the 10/10 cable
from Headquarters that the Oswald case took on a more than
routine coloring.
The increased significance that the Oswald visit took
on during the period from October 11 to October 16, 1963,
could have provided the station with reason to retain the
Oswald tapes.(629)
Ms. Goodpasture was asked what became of the Oswald
tapes:
Q: What happened to that tape containing Oswald's
voice?
A: What happened?
Q: What happened to that tape? Yes.
A: I do not know.
Q: Do those tapes exist today?
A: What?
Q: Do those tapes exist today?
A: If they do, I do not know where they are.
-168-
Q: Are you aware of the fact that, after the
assassination, it has been alleged that some tapes
were given to the FBI to listen to and that it was
said that these tapes contained Oswald's voice on
them?
A: Someone asked me about that, but I do not think
that I had those tapes. I do not remember if I
did, and I was not aware that we gave any to the
FBI. I do not know whether [ ] got tapes
from [ ] and passed them to the FBI, or
if the Chief of Station or Deputy passed anything
to the FBI. I just do not know.(630)
On the whole most CIA officers who testified stated
that, if a tape of Oswald's voice existed at the time of the
assassination, they did not know anything at all about
it.(631) One CIA officer, the Chief of the Branch responsible for
Mexico, testified that he believed the tapes did exist at
the time of the assassination:
Q: Were they able to locate the original tapes?
A: I think so.
Q: Do you recall what was done with those tapes?
A: No.
Q: Did you ever--
A: I never heard them.
A: You never heard them?
A: No.
Q: On what basis do you say the original tapes were
found?
-169-
A: I had the impression that after the assassination
they did a lot of transcribing. I may be wrong.
Q: Let us look at (MEXI 7025.) Paragraph four there,
which indicates that the person who did the
transcript and says, "Oswald is identical with the
person in an earlier paragraph who spoke broken
Russian and called on 28 September." That
indicates that some sort of a voice comparison was
made.
A: Yes. Tapes were probably still in existence.(632)
The [ ] do not remember ever doing, or being
asked to, do, a voice comparison of the Oswald tapes.(633) But
the [hand written other] evidence, albeit circumstantial,
seems to indicate that the tapes were in existence and that
the voices were compared by someone.(634) [ ]
suggested that [ ] may have confirmed the fact that
the two calls were made by the same person by memory after
receipt of the 10/11 cable.(635)
However the Station made the connections, whether by
voice comparison and/or by comparison of the substantive
information in the 10/11 cable to the substantive
information in the transcripts, the conversations were
linked to Oswald prior to the assassination and probably by
the time that the "P" file was opened on or about 16 October
1963.(636) Ms. Goodpasture was also asked about this:
Q: On October 1st, you found out that Oswald had been
at the Russian Embassy the preceding
-170-
Saturday. Was any effort made to check your
materials from the surveillance operation, the
photographic surveillance operation, or from
[ ] to
get additional information on this?
A: I do not know whether I checked it immediately or
not at this stage. I do know that they were
checked thoroughly after the assassination._In
fact, I think they were checked thoroughly after
the information came back from Washington
identifying a Lee Oswald._(637)
On October 15, l963 a "P" file was opened on Oswald.(638)
That same day the CIA Mexico City Station requested that
Headquarters send them a photograph of Oswald.(639) On that
date also [ ] drafted a local dissemination memo
regarding Oswald's contact with the Soviet Embassy.(640) By
this date at least the 10/1/ 1O:45 call, the 9/28/11:51
call, the 9/27/4:05 call, and the 9/27/4:26 call had been
linked to Oswald.(641)
On 16 October 1963 the memorandum drafted by [
] was circulated at the U. S. Embassy. It said:
l. The following information was received from a
usually reliable and extremely sensitive source:
On 1 October 1963, an American male contacted the
Soviet Embassy and identified himself as Lee
OSWALD. This officer (sic) determined (emphasis in
original) that OSWALD had been at the Soviet
Embassy on 28 September 1963 and had talked with
Valeriy Valdimirivoch KOSTIKOV, a member of the
Consular Section, in order to learn if the Soviet
Embassy had received a reply from Washington
concerning his request. We
-171-
have no clarifying information with regard to this
request.
2. Our Headquarters has informed us that the OSWALD
above is probably identical with Lee Henry OSWALD,
born on l8 October 1939, in New Orleans,
Louisiana, a former radar operator in the U. S.
Marine Corps who defected to the Soviet Union in
October l959.
3. This office will advise you if additional
information on this matter is received.(642)
When [ ] was asked why she had stated that it had
been "determined" that Oswald had been in contact with the
Soviet Embassy on 28 September she said that it must have
been because she had rechecked the transcripts by this time
otherwise she would not have used such certain language.(643)
When asked why the 10/16 memo said that there was no
clarifying information on Oswald's "request" when it was
known by this time that he was seeking a visa [ ]
said that "They had no need to know all those other
details."(644)
There are no indications that any other actions were
taken by the Mexico City Station prior to the
assassination.(645)
Even though the Station's actions after the 10/11 cable
were not highly extensive, it is inaccurate and misleading
to say that those actions were limited to re-
-172-
questing a photograph of Oswald from Headquarters.- Other
actions included rechecking the transcripts and discovering
the substantive ones that concerned Oswald and reporting the
information in MEXI 6453 and DIR 74830 to various components
in the U. S. Embassy in Mexico City in a misleading manner.
Hence, the fact that Oswald was seeking a visa and had been
in contact with the Cubans as well as the Russians was known
prior to the assassination, and the Station's actions prior
to the assassination were more comprehensive than merely
requesting a photograph; although if any action other than a
file check was taken, no record of that action has been made
available to this Committee.
It is unlikely, but possible, that this information
that was developed by the Mexico City Station after 10/11/63
was reported to Headquarters. [ i ] pointed out
that a report of this additional information on Oswald's
activities in Mexico "would have been expected."
(646) [ ] belief that the information should have
been reported to Headquarters is shared for identical
reasons by her superior at Headquarters.(647)
The testimony from the people involved, both at head-
-173-
quarters and in Mexico, while often uncertain, is,
generally, that they do not remember that such a cable was
sent. [ ] said that she could not recall that
Mexico had sent any other information to Headquarters prior
to the assassination, but added, I "could not... swear to
that."(648) The head of the Mexico Branch at Headquarters was
certain that this information was reported but he could not
recall the form of the report or whether it occurred before
or after the assassination.(649) [ ] first testified
that, to his knowledge, the information was not reported
prior to the assassination and then added "but I would have
no way of knowing."(650) The Deputy Chief of Station in
Mexico, [ ] was also unsure on this point:
Q: ...[D]id they ever indicate to Headquarters that
Oswald had been to the Cuban Embassy as well as to
the Soviet Embassy and that he wanted a visa?
A: I would have to assume that they did. I realize
that "assume" is a bad word.
Q: You don't have personal knowledge one way or
another?
A: No, prior to the assassination I would not.(651)
Ann Goodpasture was also unsure of her recollection in
this area:
-174-
Q: But Headquarters was never appraised of that voice
comparison ?
A: I think they were in a cable.
Q: Prior to the assassination?
A: No, I do not think they were prior to the
assassination...
Q: It is determined that the same person was talking
on each tape and there is no follow-up to
headquarters, even though Headquarters clearly
considered this to be significant?
A: The follow-up was made by disseminating this
information from the traces locally and trying to
identify Oswald, trying to locate the man. That is
the way the follow-up was made. He thought that he
may still be in Mexico.
Q: The point is, however, that upon the making of a
voice comparison, if, in fact, that was done, that
information was not communicated to anyone.
A: I do not know if it was or not. You would have to
check the file completely, the cable traffic, to
see if it was. to the best of my knowledge, it was
not until after the assassination.
Q: In fact, headquarters did not know that he had
also been to the Cuban Embassy?
A: At that point, no.
Q: At least, according to your recollection, it was
not until after the assassination that
headquarters was informed of that fact?
A: That is probably right.(652)
Only one person who was interviewed by this Committee
was certain of her recollection. [ ] was
-175-
certain that a second cable reporting Oswald's contacts with
the Cuban Embassy had been sent to Headquarters prior to the
assassination.
Q: It does not strike you as more significant that
the American contacts the Soviet Embassy and he
also contacts the Cuban Embassy? To me that would
make him seem more significant and therefore, if
you found out about this after the time the
(first) cable was sent you would have sent another
cable.
A: I did not send another cable but I know another
cable was sent. I didn't send it.
Q: Another cable concerning Oswald was sent?
A: I think so. Where is the whole file? Wasn't there
a cable saying he was in touch with the Cuban
Embassy?
Q: We have not seen one.
A: I am pretty such there was.
Q: Did you send that cable?
A: No, I did not send the cable. When I found out
about it I remember this, I said how come?
Q: Who did? Do you know?
A: I don't know who sent it. I think Ann
(Goodpasture) might have. She might have sent a
follow-up one with this information.(653)
The staff of this Committee suggested that Mr.
Phillips' clear recollection of involvement in reporting
Oswald's visit to the Cuban Embassy and that he was seeking
-176-
a visa along with the fact that Mr. Phillips was not in
Mexico at the time that the first cable was sent,(654) could
possibly be an indication that he is recalling a second
cable. When asked about this, Mr. Phillips stated that he
had no knowledge of a second cable sent prior to the
assassination.(655)
Some corroboration of [ ]'s assertions were
found in the materials from Win Scott's safe. [hand written
Scott wrote ]
... (O)n page 777 of (the Warren) report the
erroneous statement was made that it was not known
that Oswald had visited the Cuban Embassy until
after the assassination!
Every piece of information concerning Lee
Harvey Oswald was reported immediately after it was
received to: U. S. Ambassador Thomas C. Mann, by
memorandum; the FBI Chief in Mexico, by Memorandum;
and to my headquarters by cable; and included in
each and every one of these reports was the
conversation Oswald had, so far as it was known.
_These reports were made on all his contacts with
both the Cuban Consulate and with the Soviets._(656)
If the cable was sent it is not in the files made
available to the HSCA by the CIA.
The head of the Mexico Branch admitted that the
information should have been reported and that, if it had
been, the Oswald case would have been handled differently,
at least as far as the dissemination of information about
him was concerned.
-177-
Q: Had the information concerning Oswald's visit to
the Cuban Embassy in addition to the Soviet one,
that Oswald had been requesting a visa, if it had
been sent to CIA headquarters, would his case
prior to the assassination have been handled in
any different manner?
A: It would have been in the case of dissemination of
information about him, but I do not think that any
operational action would have taken to apprehend
him or to contact him or to try to force him back
to the United States.
Q: ... how would the dissemination have been treated
differently?
A: Well, it simply means that we would have
disseminated any additional information that we
got.(657)
It cannot be determined with exactitude whether or not
this additional information about Oswald was reported to
Headquarters. In all likelihood it was not. The Chief of the
Mexico Desk was asked whether or not the Station was ever
criticized for this failure to report in the face of a
specific request to do so by CIA Headquarters. He said [hand
written replied]
No. That was not because we were trying to go easy
on them, it is simply because it is in the nature of
the business. What you are trying to do is engage,
as I used to say, in important illegal manipulations
of society, secretly.
[
]
-178-
I do not know whether you informed yourself about
the magnitude of our political action program at the
time--absolutely enormous.
[
(658) ]
Perhaps the nature of the CIA Mexico City Station's
handling of the Oswald case prior to the assassination can
best be summed up in Dave Phillips' response when he was
asked how he would characterize that handling: "At the very
best, it is not professional, at the best."(659)
V. Mexico City Station Reporting of Information Concerning
Oswald After the Assassination
A. Reporting of information concerning the photograph of
the Mexico Mystery Man
Even though some people in the Station clearly
disassociated the photograph that was described in MEXI 6453
from Oswald after receiving the 10/11 cable,659a it is clear
that some people still considered it possible for some
reason that the photograph was of Oswald. In October, Ann
Goodpasture had argued this very point with Winston
Scott.659b On the day of the assassination, the Mexico City
Station cabled Headquarters that it was sending as soon as
possible "copies of only visitor to
-179-
Sovemb 28 Oct who could be identical with Oswald.659c The
date was later corrected to read 1 October.659d Mr. Scott
was not the only person in the Mexico Station who still
thought that the photo could possibly be Oswald [
] testified on this point:
Q: As of the day of the assassination, you thought
that there was still a possibility that there was
a photograph of Oswald?
A: Indeed. As I recall, we tried to get that
photograph to headquarters as fast as we could. As
it turned out it wasn't necessary to send it. But
that was our intention.(660)
The photograph was sent to Dallas where Special Agent
Odum of the FBI showed it to Mrs. Marguerite Oswald on 23
November l963.(661) Mrs. Oswald would later claim it was a
photograph of Jack Ruby,(662) beginning a period of
controversy and uncertainty about this photograph that has
continued to this day. The interaction of the Warren
Commission and the CIA on this question is detailed in
another section of this report. On 23 November Mexico
informed Headquarters that "_it obvious photos sent to
Dallas were not iden with_ Lee Oswald."(663) Since the time of
the assassination this man has been identified as Yuriy
Ivanovich Moskalev, a Soviet KGB officer. The identification
is unconfirmed and comes from only one source.(664)
-180-
In any case, it is unlikely that this man had any connection
with Oswald outside of the mistaken belief of several CIA
officers in Mexico.(665)
B. Reporting of information concerning Lee Harvey Oswald
from the [ ]
aimed at the Soviet Embassy
The first cable that Mexico sent to Headquarters after
the assassination referred Headquarters to the cable traffic
concerning Oswald that had occurred prior to the
assassination.(666) Headquarters replied that they had also
noted the "connection."(667)
The cable traffic on the day of the assassination, and
the early traffic from the following day, deal almost
exclusively with the photograph of the person who later
became known as the Mexico Mystery Man. The first cable(668)
obviously referred to the October 1 contact and brought it
to Headquarters' attention by referring Headquarters to MEXI
6453. The first cable that specifically refers to the
transcripts occurred on the following day. Headquarters
cabled Mexico that it was important that the station review
all transcripts
-181-
"since 27 September to locate all material possibly
pertinent."(669) The cable went on to instruct the station to
send the full transcripts and original tapes to Headquarters
by special courier.(670) The cable also asks if the original
tapes are still available.(671)
This Committee has not been able to determine how the
CIA Headquarters knew, on 23 November 1963, that a review of
the [ ] material should begin with the production from 27
September, the day Oswald first appeared at the Soviet and
Cuban Embassies. There is no record that Headquarters had
been informed of the 9/27 visits prior to this cable having
been sent. It is possible, as some witnesses have suggested,
that his information was provided to CIA Headquarters by the
FBI in Washington.(672) If that is the case then it merely
shifts the question. This may indicate that the CIA
Headquarters was aware of the 9/27 visits prior to the
assassination. An even stronger inference is that they were
aware of those visits at least by the day after the
assassination. The manner in which they learned of these
visits by that date has not been determined. It is possible
that Headquarters was informed
-182-
by telephone. Even though witnesses generally denied that
there was telephone communication between Mexico City and
Headquarters at the time of the assassination, there is
strong evidence that there was such communication on at
least two instances.(673)
As will become evident, the transcripts were cabled to
headquarters that same day. It is not clear why.
Headquarters asked that the transcripts and tapes, if they
existed, be sent to Headquarters by special courier as
opposed to cabling the transcripts which would have been
faster.(674) There is no record that indicates that these
transcripts of Oswald's calls were sent to Headquarters by
special courier.
On the 23rd, the Mexico City Station reported all of
the substantive Oswald conversations to Headquarters by
cable. Logically, one would expect that since the
circumstantial evidence indicates that these conversations
were linked to Oswald prior to the assassination, that they
would all have been reported in one cable, especially in
light of the request from Headquarters in DIR 84886.(675) At
this point, according to the files and records made
available to the HSCA staff by the CIA, the Mexico City
Station had informed Headquarters of
-183-
only the 9/28 and the 10/1/10:45 conversations. It should be
noted that the 10/l/10:45 conversation makes reference to
the fact that Oswald was also at the Embassy on 9/28. The
next cable that Mexico City sent to Headquarters said, in
part, "Other than Info already sent re Oswald's connection
with Sov and Cuban Embs, no other info available."(676) The
next cable reports a literal transcription of the 9/28 and
10/l/10:45 conversations.(677) The next cable that refers to
the transcripts of Oswald's conversations reports the
9/27/10:30 call, the 9/27/4:05 call, the 9/27/4:26 call, the
10/l/10:31 call, and the 10/3 call.(678) With this cable
Mexico City informed Headquarters of all the substantive
information available from the Soviet Embassy [ ]
surveillance.(679)
Mexico City also informed Headquarters on 11/24/64 that
the tapes from the period in which Oswald had visited the
Soviet and Cuban Embassies had been erased.(680) A cable on
the previous day had informed Headquarters that it was
"probable" that the Oswald tapes had been erased.(681) An
earlier cable that same day reported that "Station unable
compare voice as first tape erased
-184-
prior receipt of second call."(682) This would imply that the
tape of the 28 September conversation, which may not have
been received at the station until the 30th or the 1st of
October, was destroyed before the tape of the conversation
on the 1st of October was received in the station on that
same day. In light of the standard operating procedures in
effect in the station at that time, that possibility is
highly unlikely.(683)
In view of what is now known about the standard
operating, procedures and about the Station's actions prior
to the assassination, the Station's confusing and somewhat
contradictory reporting after the assassination is
strange.(684) It is possible that these confusions and contradictions
arose out of the crisis atmosphere at the station and the
rush to report information. This Committee has not found any
solid evidence that there were sinister qualities in the
reporting after the assassination.
-184A-
C. Silvia Duran
When President John F. Kennedy was assassinated on
November 22, 1963, the United States investigative agencies-
-FBI, CIA, Secret Service, etc.--were asked to investigate
the assassination. When the Central Intelligence Agency's
Mexico City Station remembered that Lee Harvey Oswald had
visited Mexico City during late September and early October,
it reviewed the [ ] surveillance files and found
evidence of phone calls to the Soviet Embassy made September
27th, September 28th, and October 1st, that could have been
made by Oswald.(685
and a year later Ann Goodpasture noted on a newspaper
article that such a comparison was done. Note also that MEXI
7024 reported that HQ had all the available information when
in fact all conversations were reported in a later cable,
MEXI 7033.
) Review of the [ ] surveillance files also
produced telephone calls on September 27, 1963 between the
Russian Consul and Silvia Duran, a secretary at the Cuban
consulate, where Oswald was discussed.(686) In addition, the
Mexico City Station found a September 28, 1963 phone call
from Silvia Duran to the Soviet Consulate where Silvia Duran
stated that there was an American citizen at the Cuban
Consulate who had previously visited the Soviet
Consulate.(687) A final phone call was made on October 1, 1963 where the
"alleged" Oswald identified himself was also found.(688)
On November 23, 1963 the Mexico City Station deter-
-185-
mined that it would request the Mexican government--with
whom it had a good relationship--to arrest Silvia Duran (as
Silvia Duran was a Mexican citizen, she did not have
diplomatic immunity) because she might shed some light on
the circumstances surrounding the assassination.688a
The Mexico City Station sent a note to the Gobernacion
head, Luis Echevarria, with Silvia Duran's address, her
mother's address, her brother's address, her license plate
number, her home phone number, her place of work and a
request that she be arrested immediately.(689) The Mexico City
Station also suggested that Duran be held incommunicado
until she could be questioned on the matter.(690)
The Mexico City Station did not receive prior
authorization from CIA Headquarters to request the arrest of
Silvia Duran by Mexican authorities.(691) Headquarters feared
that a request to arrest Ms. Duran would jeopardize
[
] if it were disclosed that Americans
were behind Duran's arrest.(692) John Scelso, Chief of Western
Hemisphere/3, stationed at Langley Headquarters, telephoned
Winston Scott, the Mexico City Chief of Station, and
requested that Silvia Duran not be arrested.(693) Scott told
Scelso that he could not rescind the request, and that
Headquarters should already have received a cable stating
that Silvia Duran had
-186-
been arrested.(694) After Winston Scott's conversation with
John Scelso, Scott called Luis Echevarria and stated that
the Mexico City Station desired that all information
received from Duran be forwarded immediately to the Mexico
City Station, and that her arrest and statements not be
communicated to any leftist groups.(695)
On November 27, 1963, the Mexican government forwarded
to the Mexico City Station a copy of Silvia Duran's ten-page
signed statement.(696) It said,
"Upon learning about the assassination she and her
husband speculated that President Kennedy might have
been assassinated for racial reasons. Then she
became aware that the assassin was Lee Harvey
Oswald, she ascertained that it was the same man who
approximately two months prior had been to the Cuban
Consulate to solicit an intransit visa to Russia.
Having taken his name from the special documentation
he presented she knew that he was married to a
Russian woman and belonged to the Fair Play for Cuba
Committee." She checked the data in the Consulate
archives and became certain that it was the same
individual who was blonde, short, dressed
inelegantly and those face turned red when angry.
The Consul had denied the visa because to obtain an
intransit visa from the Cuban government, it was
imperative that he previously obtain a visa from the
Soviet Consulate. Since obtaining a visa from the
Soviets took four months and Oswald's Mexican visa
expired soon Oswald was advised that he see the
Soviet Consul, and calling the person in charge of
that office. The Soviet official told her that they
would have to consult Moscow which would take four
months. That afternoon, Oswald returned to the
-187-
Cuban Consulate and Silvia Duran confirmed that he
could get a Cuban visa only after he received a
Russian visa. She gave Oswald her name and business
phone number but never gave him her address because
she had no reason to give it to him. The only aid
she could give Oswald was advising that he see the
Soviet Consul and calling the person in charge of
that office. She knew that phoning the Soviet
Consulate was not one of her duties and that if she
did so she did it only to help Oswald. She gave
Oswald her business phone number only because he
would have to call subsequently to check whether he
had obtained a visa. He never called back."
[footnote missing? (697) ]
Silvia Duran, released on November 24, 1963, was
rearrested November 27, 1963, when the Mexican government
alleged that she was attempting to leave Mexico for travel
to Havana.(698) According to the Mexican officials who
detained Duran a second time, there was no addition to her
story.(699)
The Mexico City Station forwarded Duran's ten page
signed statement to Headquarters on November 27, 1963.(700)
The following day, Headquarters sent a clarification cable
to the Mexico City Station seeking to insure that neither
Silvia Duran nor the Cubans would have any basis for
believing that the Americans were behind her rearrest. The
cable stated, "We want the Mexican authorities to take the
responsibility for the whole affair."(701)
When the Central Intelligence Agency began to work with
the Warren Commission, Headquarters cabled the Mexico
-188-
City Station that its plan in passing information to the
Warren Commission was to eliminate mention of [
] (702)
Headquarters cabled that it would rely on Silvia Duran's
statements and on the Consular files which the Soviets gave
the State Department.(703) Headquarters stressed that exact,
detailed information from [ ] and
[ ] on
what Silvia Duran and other officials had said about
Oswald's visit and his dealings would be valuable and usable
corroborative evidence.(704)
When the Central Intelligence Agency forwarded to the
Warren Commission a copy of Duran's signed statement. It
read as follows:
... she remembered...(that Lee Harvey Oswald) was
the name of an American who had come to the Cuban
Consulate to obtain a visa to travel to Cuba in
transit to Russia, the latter part of September or
the early part of October of this year, and in
support of his application had shown his passport,
in which it was noted that he had lived in that
country for a period of three years; his labor card
from the same country written in the Russian
language; and letters in that same language. He had
presented evidence that he was married to a Russian
woman, and also that he was apparently the leader of
an organization in the city of New Orleans claiming
that he should be accepted as a "friend" of the
Cuban Revolution. Accordingly, the declarant,
complying with her duties, took down all of the
-189-
information and completed the appropriate
application form; and the declarant admittedly
exceeding her responsibilities, informally
telephoned the Russian Consulate, with the intention
of doing what she could to facilitate issuance of
the Russian visa to Lee Harvey Oswald. However, they
told her that there would be a delay of about four
months in processing the case, which annoyed the
applicant since, according to his statement, he was
in a great hurry to obtain visas that would enable
him to travel to Russia, insisting on his right to
do so in view of his background and his loyalty and
his activities in behalf of the Cuban movement. The
declarant was unable to recall accurately whether or
not the applicant told her he was a member of the
Communist Party, but he did say that his wife***was
then in New York City, and would follow
him,***(Senora Duran stated) that when Oswald
understood that it was not possible to give him a
Cuban visa without his first having obtained the
Russian visa,***he became very excited or angry, and
accordingly. the affiant called Consul Ascue
(sic),***(who) came out and began a heated
discussion in English with Oswald, that concluded by
Ascue telling him that "if it were up to him, he
would not give him the visa," and a person of his
type was harming the Cuban Revolution rather than
helping it," it being understood that in their
conversation they were talking about the Russian
Socialist Revolution and not the Cuban. Oswald
maintained that he had two reasons for requesting
that his visa be issued promptly, and they were:
one, that his tourist permit in Mexico was about to
expire; and the other, that he had to get to Russia
as quickly as possible. Despite her annoyance, the
declarant gave Oswald a paper***in which she put
down her name, "Silvia Duran," and the number of the
telephone at the Consulate, which is "11-28-47" and
the visa application
-190-
was processed anyway. It was sent to the Ministry of
(Foreign) Relations of Cuba; from which a routine
reply was received some fifteen to thirty days
later, approving the visa, but on the condition that
the Russian visa be obtained first, although she
does not recall whether or not Oswald later
telephoned her at the Consulate number that she gave
him.(705)
The Central Intelligence Agency had relied on Duran's
statements but had deleted Duran's description of Oswald as
blonde and short.(706) It had also excised Duran's statement.
"The only aid she could give Oswald was advising that he see
the Soviet Consul, and calling the person in charge of that
office" which alluded to Oswald asking for some type of aid
at the Cuban Consulate.(707) In addition, Ms. Duran's strong
statement "He never called her back"707a was changed to
"she does not recall whether or not Oswald later telephoned
her at the Consulate number that she have him."707b Had the
statements been included, the Warren Commission's
conclusions would not seemed as strong.
The Warren Commission staff was not completely
satisfied with Ms. Duran's ten page signed statement
obtained by the Mexican authorities. W. David Slawson wrote:
We then discussed...the problem of (interviewing)
Silvia Duran. He pointed out that our only interest
in witnesses (in Mexico) other than Duran was to get
their formal testimony for authenticated
purposes...this was not true of Duran, however,
because she had been interviewed only by the Mexican
police
-191-
and we considered that interview inadequate. (I
should point out that we do not consider it totally
inadequate, however, it is only on details such as
Oswald's physical appearance, side comments or
remarks he may have made, etc., that we would like
to interrogate Mrs. Duran further. On the essential
point of whether or not his contacts with the
Embassy consisted of anything other than an attempt
to travel to Cuba, Silvia Duran's knowledge has
probably been exhausted.)(708)
The Warren Commission staff's attempts to interview Ms.
Duran never succeeded.(709) Ms. Duran was not interviewed by
Americans until 1976, when two reporters from the Washington
Post interviewed her.(710) On June 6, 1978, representatives
of the House Select Committee on Assassinations interviewed
Ms. Duran in Mexico City.
VI. Information not available at the time of the Warren
Commission investigation
A. Silvia Tirado (nee Duran)
1. House Select Committee on Assassinations 6/6/78
Interview of Silvia Tirado
Ms. Tirado (Silvia divorced Horatio Duran in 1968) was
never questioned by American officials in 1963. Thus, the
Committee established contact with the Mexican government
and requested that the Mexican government make Silvia Tirado
available for an interview.(711) The Mexican
-192-
government complied on 6/6/78. Ms. Tirado told the House
Select Committee on Assassinations the following:
Lee Harvey Oswald visited the Cuban Consulate three
times on September 27, 1963, not twice as the Warren
Commission previously reported.(712) Oswald first visited the
Cuban Consulate at approximately 11:00 a.m., requesting an
intransit visa to Cuba with Russia as the final
destination.(713) He showed her some documents, then left to
obtain photographs needed for his application.(714)
Oswald returned at approximately 1:00 p.m. with four
photographs.(715) Ms. Tirado typed the application in
duplicate, stapled a picture on top of each and had Oswald
sign each in her presence.(716) As identification, Oswald
showed her documents he had brought: his Russian labor card,
marriage certificate with the name of his Russian wife, his
American Communist Party membership card and his Fair Play
for Cuba membership card.(717)
Ms. Tirado found Lee Harvey Oswald's behavior
suspicious because normally a Communist traveled only with
his passport as belonging to the Communist Party was illegal
in Mexico in 1963.(718)
There was a procedure whereby the American Communist
Party would arrange visa matters for their members with the
-193-
Cuban Communist Party.(719) The American would then come to
Mexico, visit the Cuban Consulate, and receive his visa
immediately.(720) When Tirado asked Oswald why he did not have
the American Communist Party arrange his trip to Cuba, he
stated that he had not had the time.(721)
After explaining to Oswald that he had to acquire a
Russian visa before he could receive a Cuban visa, Tirado
jotted her name and business phone number on a piece of
paper and gave it to Oswald who then left to get his Russian
visa.(722)
Oswald returned to the Cuban Consulate between 5:00
p.m. and 6:00 p.m., which was after normal working hours,
10:00 to 2:00 p.m.(723) The guard called Tirado, stating that
someone who did not speak Spanish was at the gate inquiring
about a visa.(724) As routine procedure, she asked the guard
to escort the individual to her office.(725) Oswald told her
that he had acquired a Russian visa.(726) Since he did not
produce it when asked, she called the Russian Consulate.(727)
The Consul told Duran that Oswald had been to the Consulate
requesting a visa and had been told that the reply would
take approximately four months.(728) When she relayed the
message to Oswald, he got very excited, insisting that as a
person who had been in jail because
-194-
of the Cuban Revolution he should receive a visa.(729) Oswald
stated that he could not wait that long because his Mexican
visa expired in three days.(730) At this point, Ms. Tirado
informed Consul Eusebio Azcue of the situation.(731) Azcue had
been in his private office which he shared with his upcoming
replacement, Alfredo Mirabal.(732) Azcue politely explained
the requisites for an intransit visa to Oswald.(733) When he
noticed that Oswald was a stubborn man he told Oswald that
he was obviously not a friend of the Cuban revolution
because he would otherwise understand that Cuba had to be
extremely careful with the people it allowed in the
country.(734) Azcue and Oswald yelled at each other.(735) Then
Azcue went to the door, opened it and asked Oswald to
leave.(736) Oswald did not revisit or telephone the
Consulate.(737) Ms. Tirado described Lee Harvey Oswald as
approximately five feet six, with sparse blond hair,
weighing about 125 pounds.(738)
2. CIA information not available at the time of
the Warren Commission investigation
a. [ ] allegation
In 1967 a report that Silvia Duran had had intimate
relations with Lee Harvey Oswald came to the attention
-195-
of the Central Intelligence Agency's Mexico City Station.(739)
The source, [ ] stated that he had recently received
a call from Silvia Duran.(740)
[redacted e ] confirmed that Silvia Duran had
called [ ] (741) [ ] reported that he had
visited Silvia to renew acquaintances.(742) During the visit,
Duran told [ ] that she had met Lee Harvey Oswald at
the Cuban Consulate when he applied for a visa and had dated
him on several occasions.(743) Duran admitted that she had had
intimate relations with Oswald, but insisted that she had no
idea of his plans.(744) In addition, Duran
told [ ] that when the news of the assassination
became public knowledge, the Mexican government arrested her
and during the interrogation beat her until she admitted
that she had had an affair with Lee Harvey Oswald(745)
.[ ] (746) counseled [ ] against any further
contact with Duran because the Cubans or the Mexican police
might become suspicious of him.(747) There is no indication in
[ ] report as to why contact with Silvia would make
the Cubans suspicious. [footnote (748) missing]
The CIA Mexico City Station reported this information
to headquarters:
First, that Silvia Duran had sexual intercourse
-196-
with Lee Harvey Oswald on several occasions when the
latter was in Mexico is probably new, but adds
little to the Oswald case. Second, the Mexican
police did not report the extent of the Duran-Oswald
relationship to this Station.(749)
In the chronology of the Mexico City investigation of
Oswald, Raymond Rocca notes: "Why didn't Mexico police give
us all info?"(750) This was not the first report of such a
relationship between Oswald and Duran. Elena Garro had
reported the same information to Charles Thomas in 1965.(751)
That the Mexican government did not disclose all the
information in its possession to American authorities raises
one of three possibilities:
l) the Mexican government did not want to disclose
that one of its citizens had had intimate
relations with the assassin of John Kennedy; or
2) Silvia Duran was a Mexican penetration agent in
the Cuban Consulate and the Mexican government was
protecting its informant by minimizing her
relationship with Oswald; or
3) they forgot, i. e., a pure and simple mistake.
-197-
b. The possibility that Silvia Duran was an agent
for either American, Mexican or Cuban
intelligence;
Since the publication of the Warren Commission Report
in September 1964, critics have written about the
possibility that Silvia Duran was an intelligence agent for
either the Americans, Mexicans or Cubans.
(l) Was Silvia Duran an agent, asset or source
for Mexican or American intelligence?
In an effort to resolve this question, the House Select
Committee on Assassinations reviewed the United States
investigative agencies files on Silvia Duran.(752) The
Committee found no evidence in this file review that Silvia
Duran was either an American or Mexican intelligence agent.
In addition, the Committee has interviewed most of the
Mexico City Station employees about the possibility. Only
David Phillips, Chief of Covert Action and the Cuban Section
in the Mexico City Station in 1963, a position which made
him very knowledgeable, considered that Duran was possibly
an agent or source. Mr. Philips stated that
-198-
"at one time [ sb. "pitched"] (753) almost everyone at
the Cuban Embassy."(754) Mr. Phillips stated that he had first
heard Duran's name from the [
] transcripts.(755) But Mr. Phillips asserted
that the CIA had no interest in Ms. Duran because "she
wasn't friendly with anyone."(756) Mr. Phillips had a
previously mentioned the CIA Mexico City Station's interest
in recruiting [
] (757) Mr. Phillips was shown a memorandum written
by W. David Slawson of the Warren Commission staff regarding
a trip to Mexico by Warren Commission staff members which
said:
Mr. Scott's (Chief of the CIA Station in Mexico
City) narrative disclosed that the CIA's action
immediately after the assassination consisted
basically of alerting all its confidential sources
of information throughout Mexico to immediately
channel all information into their headquarters, and
of compiling as complete dossiers as possible on
Oswald; and everyone else throughout Mexico who at
that time the CIA knew had had some contact with
Oswald. This meant especially _Silvia Duran, who
because she had previously been having an affair
with_ [
]... (758)
Mr. Phillips was surprised by this and stated that "No
one let me in on this operation."(759) But
-199-
Mr. Phillips added that he doubted that Duran would have
been pitched because the Station could not identify any of
her weaknesses. The Committee staff members then told Mr.
Phillips about the reporting on file concerning Ms. Duran
from one of the Station's [ (760)]
[ ] At one point [ ]
had reported to his case officer that all that would have to
be done to recruit Ms. Duran was to get a blonde, blue-eyed
American in bed with her.(761) With this, Mr. Phillips said
that it did indeed sound as if the Station had targeted Ms.
Duran for recruitment, that the Station's interest had been
substantial, and that the weaknesses and means had been
identified.(762) Mr. Phillips pointed out, however, that
because Duran had been targeted did not necessarily mean
that she had been pitched.(763) In addition, he stated that he
had never heard that Duran had been pitched.(764)
Mr. Phillips did state that he would expect that Ms.
Duran's file at the CIA would be "very thick" because of all
the [ ] that concerned her and the
substantial interest that the Station had in her.(765) He
stated that much of the material in her file should predate
the assassination.(766) Mr. Phillips stated that
-200-
he would be very surprised if Ms. Duran's 201 file was small
and contained only a few pre-assassination documents.(767)
This is in fact the case of the Headquarters 201 file.(768)
This Committee has asked the CIA to make Ms. Duran's Mexican
"P"(769) (personality) file available for review. The CIA
informed the Committee that there was no "P" file available
on Ms. Duran.(770
4) Eusebio Azcue Lopez P-6613 Destroyed
5) Guillermo Orestes Ruiz Perez (No info re "P" number}
6) No index card on Gilberto Policarpo Lopez, there is
an index card on one Gilberto Policarpo Lopez which
does not list any 201 or "P" number.
7) Juan Manuel Calvillo Alonso (no info re "P" number).
8) June Viola Cobb Sharp P-7381 Destroyed.
)
Another CIA employee, [ ], who worked on
an "Oswald Task Force" in late September or early October of
1975 dealing with Freedom of Information Act law suits
brought against the Agency concerning the files on Lee
Harvey Oswald, stated that he believed that Ms. Duran may
have been a source of information for either the CIA or the
Mexicans.(771) [ ] could not recall why he
specifically had this recollection, but thought that it was
due to something he had seen in Oswald's file.(772) He said
that it may have been the Agency's attempts to protect Ms.
Duran after the assassination and the heavy cable traffic
that those attempts generated that led him to his inference
that she was a source of information for either the Agency
or the Mexicans.(773)
Despite [ ] case officer's asking [ ]
not to recontact Ms. Duran, Mr. Phillips' statements, and
-201-
[ ] hazy recollections, the Committee cannot
definitely resolve whether Silvia Duran was a Mexican or
American intelligence agent or source.
(2) Was Silvia Duran a Cuban intelligence agent?
In an effort to resolve this question, the HSCA
reviewed the United States investigative agencies' files on
Silvia Duran.(774) The Committee found no evidence in the
files that would indicate that Ms. Duran was associated with
Cuban intelligence.
In addition. the HSCA interviewed most of the Mexico
City Station employees about the possibility that Duran
worked for Cuban intelligence. Only Barney Hidalgo, a CIA
officer who traveled to Mexico City in 1963, considered the
possibility to be likely.(775) Mr. Hidalgo, professing not to
remember all the details, stated that he thought that Duran
was a Cuban intelligence agent.(776) Hidalgo said:
At the time when this contact told me of Silvia
Duran I tied the two together, yes, sir. I don't
know, how at that time it was obvious to me as an
intelligence agent that there was some connection
there but it was of no interest whatsoever to me, I
do remember that when I next saw this contact of
mine I mentioned the fact to him and let him proceed
to do what ever he
-202-
wanted to.(777)
Mr. Hidalgo further stated that he never resolved the
issue.(778)
With no corroborating evidence for Mr. Hidalgo's
memory, the Committee must conclude that Silvia Duran was
probably never employed by Cuban Intelligence.
B. The Cubans
1. Eusebio Azcue Lopez
When Lee Harvey Oswald allegedly visited the Cuban
Consulate, Eusebio Azcue Lopez, a Cuban citizen, was the
Cuban Consul.(779) Because he had diplomatic immunity, the
Cuban government had never been asked to make him available
for questioning.(780) The Committee, in an effort to
investigate Oswald's contact with representatives of the
Cuban government, asked the Cuban government to make Eusebio
Azcue available for Committee and staff interviews.(781) The
Cuban government complied with the Committee's request on
April 1, 1978.(782)
During that interview, Mr. Ascue alleged that the man
Ruby shot in the Dallas Police Station was not the same
individual who had visited the Cuban Consulate in 1963.(783)
In addition, Mr. Azcue stated that Alfredo
-203-
Mirabal, who in September 1963, had recently arrived from
Cuba to assume the Consul's duties, had also been present
during Oswald's visit.(784) During a second trip to Cuba, the
Committee interviewed Alfredo Mirabal.(785) Subsequent to this
second trip to Havana, the Committee asked the Cuban
government to make Eusebio Azcue and Alfredo Mirabal
available for the public hearings on September 18, 1978.(786)
The Cuban government complied with the Committee's request.
Eusebio Azcue Lopez told the House Select Committee on
Assassinations at a public hearing on 9/18/78 the following:
An individual who gave the name Lee Harvey Oswald
visited the Cuban Consulate on three occasions in late
September(787) and early October 1963.(788) The individual first
visited the Cuban Consulate during working hours, requesting
an intransit visa to Cuba with Russia as the final
destination.(789) The man showed the secretary, Silvia Duran,
some documents789a which he believed would be sufficient to
obtain a visa.789b When the secretary would not grant him a
visa, the man asked Azcue to see whether upon examination of
the documents he could
-204-
grant him a Visa.789c Azcue answered negatively.789d The
individual then left to obtain photographs needed for his
application.789e
The man probably returned on September 27, 1963789f
with the photographs and completed the applications in Ms.
Duran's presence.789g As the amount of time required to
process this document could have taken as long as twenty
days or the response could have been negative, Azcue told
the man that he could grant him an intransit visa to Cuba,
without consulting his government, if he had a Russian
visa.789h The individual then left to attempt to obtain his
Russian visa.789i
After the man left the Cuban Consulate, Azcue received
a telephone call789j from the Soviet Consulate.(790) The
Soviet Consul explained that the man's documents were
legitimate, but that the Soviet Consulate could not issue a
visa until it received authorization from Moscow.(791)
Emphasizing that the Cuban Consulate never received
visitors after working hours(792) Mr. Azcue opined that the
individual probably returned to the Consulate on September
28, 1963.(793) When Ascue explained to Oswald that he could
not grant him a visa, the man made statements directed
against Cuba and called Cuba a
-205-
bureaucracy.(794) At that point, Azcue became upset and asked
the individual to leave the Consulate.(795) Oswald did not
revisit the Consulate.(796)
Mr. Azcue described the man who visited the Consulate
as follows: a white male, between 5'6" and 5'7", over 30
years of age, very thin long face, with straight eyebrows
and a cold look in his eyes.(797) Azcue alleged that he would
never have identified Lee Harvey Oswald as the man who
visited the Cuban Consulate in 1963.
2. Alfredo Mirabal Diaz
Alfredo Mirabal Diaz told the House Select Committee on
Assassinations, at a public hearing on 9/18/78,797a the
following:
Lee Harvey Oswald, seeking a visa, visited the Cuban
Consulate twice(798) in September 1963.(799) Since Mirabal could
not speak English though he was the New Consul, ex-Consul
Azcue handled the matter.(800) On both occasions there were
such loud arguments between Oswald and Ascue that Mirabal
thought the man's visit to the Consulate was a case of
provocation.(801)
Though Mirabal caught only glimpses of the man he
opined that the person whose picture appears on Lee
-206-
Harvey Oswald's visa application was the same Lee Harvey
Oswald who visited the Consulate.(802) Mirabal was about 4
meters away from Oswald each time he caught glimpses of
him.802a Oswald was at the Consulate between 15 and 2
minutes on each visit.802b
C. Elena Garro de Paz
On October 5, 1964, eleven days after the publication
of the Warren Commission Report, Elena Garro de Paz' story
alleging Lee Harvey Oswald's presence at a party in Mexico
City attended by Cuban government personnel came to the
attention of the Central Intelligence Agency.(803)
1. Elena's story as reported October 5, 1964
Elena Garro de Paz(804) and Deba Garro de Guerrero
Galvan, first cousins of Horatio, Ruben and Lydia Duran,
were invited to a twist party at the home of Ruben Duran in
the middle of the week in the fall of 1963.(805) Lee Harvey
Oswald was alleged to have been at this party in the company
of "two other beatnik-looking boys."(806) The Americans
remained together the entire evening and did not dance.(807)
When Elena tried to speak with the Americans, she was
"shifted" to another room by one of her cousins.(808) The memo
does not state whether Elena had mentioned which cousin had
not allowed her to speak
-207-
to the Americans. One of Elena's cousins told her at the
time that (he or she) did not know who the Americans were
except that Silvia Duran (an employee of the Cuban Embassy
and the wife of Horatio Duran), had brought them to the
party.(809)
The day after the party, Elena and Deba saw the three
Americans on the Insurgentes, a main avenue in Mexico
City.(810) The Garros claimed that they had recognized Oswald's
photograph when it was published after the assassination.(811)
Silvia Duran's arrest "underlined the Garros' certainty"
that the man had been Lee Harvey Oswald.(812)
The source of the memo was [
s.b. 'A "witting" asset' (813)]
whom the Committee identified as June Cobb Sharp while
reviewing the [ ] file. According to Elena, Ms.
Cobb was sent to her house shortly after the assassination
for a few days, by a mutual friend, a Costa Rican writer
named Eunice Odio.(814) Ms. Garro asserted that while at her
house, Ms. Cobb expressed interest in the Kennedy
assassination.(815) One night, Elena's sister Deba, who was
visiting, got drunk and told the whole story.(816)
[ ] Cobb suggested that Elena and
-208-
Deba go to Texas to tell their story.(817) Elena stated that
when Cobb's suggestion was rejected, Cobb stated that she
would arrange a meeting with [
] (818) The meeting did not occur because Ms. Cobb
was asked to leave the Garro house evidently because she
kicked Elena's cat.(819) A notation on the memo says that [
] never regained contact with Elena Garro de Paz.(820)
The memo was not inserted in either the Elena Garro or
Lee Harvey Oswald "P"(821) (personality) file but in a local
leftist and Cuban project file. The Committee learned about
the memo from Wx-7241, a chronological history of the Oswald
case prepared by Raymond Rocca for the CIA in 1967. The memo
was found in December, 1965 by [ (822)]
A marginal notation on Wx7241 says, "Why was this not sent
to Headquarters?"(823) The Committee has been able to
determine that the memo was forwarded to Headquarters
shortly thereafter.
2. October 12,1964 CIA Memo for the Record
On October 12, 1964 the CIA Mexico City Station's Chief
of Covert Action, Jim Flannery, wrote a memo for the record
reporting that Elena Garro do Paz had told
-209-
her story to Eunice Odio.(824) The Committee has not been able
to determine if Elena Garro told Ms. Odio the story
personally or if Ms. Cobb related the story to Ms. Odio who
relayed it to [ ] (825)
The story is not as detailed as the 10/5/64 version.
There is no mention of Deba Garro Guerrero Galvan. The
story, perhaps because it is third hand, differs from the
previous story in two areas: It states that the party was at
the Cuban Embassy, as opposed to Ruben Duran's; and that
Elena talked to a Cuban Embassy official instead of her
cousins about the three Americans.
Attached to the memo was a note from Flannery to the
Chief of Station, Winston Scott, which read, "Do you want me
to send the gist of this to Headquarters?" Scott then noted
that the memo should be filed.(826) The file indications show
that the memo went into the Oswald "P" file and the Elena
Garro "P" file.(827)
3. November 24, 1964 CIA Informant Report
On November 24 1964 a Central Intelligence Agency
agent(828) reported information(829) derived from an asset,
[ ].(830) The agent asserted that June Cobb was
-210-
an "American Communist" who rented a room from Elena
Garro.(831) In addition, the informant claimed that Elena had also
told her story to an American official at the Embassy, who
claimed to represent the Warren Commission.(832) The Chief of
Station noted that he had asked [ ] to pursue the
story(833) but there is no indication that the Chief of
Station followed through with the request.(834)
4. November 24,1964 Elena Garro meeting with
Mexico City Legal Attache officers
Elena and her daughter reported their story to the
Mexico City Legal Attache on November 24, 1964.(835) (The
Legal Attache in 1964 was Clark Anderson.) They recounted
the same story previously given to June Cobb Sharp in
October 1964.(836) Elena gave the date of the party as
September 30, October 1 or October 2, 1963.(837) The agent who
wrote the report(838) noted that Lee Harvey Oswald could not
have been identical with the American(839) allegedly observed
be Mrs. Paz at the party if this party were held on the
evening of October 1 or October 2, 1963.(840)
Elena was questioned regarding the identity of other
persons attending the party at the Ruben Duran home
-211-
who might have been in a position to observe the three
Americans.(841) Elena stated that in the course of the party
her daughter met a young man named "Alejandro" at the party
and danced with him.(842) He was apparently quite smitten with
the daughter and tried to call her on several occasions
after the party.(843) The daughter did not take the calls and
as a result "Alejandro" wrote several letters to the
daughter.(844) Ms. Garro exhibited two of the letters, as well
as a business card which identified the young man as Ario
Alejandro Lavagnini Stenius.(845)
The letter which Ms. Garro said was the first written
by the young man to her daughter bore the date September 1,
1963 and the Mexico City Post Office postmark date September
2, 1963.(846) When this was pointed out to Ms. Garro she
commented that the Communists probably had facilities for
falsifying postmarks.(847)
To investigate Ms. Garro's story further,
representatives from the Legal Attache's office interviewed
Ario Alejandro Lavagnini Stenius on November 27, 1964.(848)
Lavagnini recalled that there were approximately thirty
people at Ruben Duran's party, few of whom he knew.(849) He
recalled having met a Mexican girl who had recently
-212-
returned from living in France.(850) He was unable to fix the
date of the party but felt it was probably early in
September because of a heavy rain which occurred as they
were leaving the party about 2:00 a.m.(851)
Lavagnini said that no Americans were present at this
party.(852) He was familiar with the physical description of
Lee Harvey Oswald because of publicity following the
assassination of President Kennedy, but otherwise had no
knowledge of him and had never seen him except for news
photographs following the assassination.(853)
Lavagnini was the only person interviewed by the Legal
Attache representatives who attended parties at the Duran
house in the September-October time frame.
There is no indication in the FBI document that this
information was given to the Central Intelligence Agency's
Mexico City Station.(854)
5. Charles Thomas' first meeting with Elena Garro
where Lee Harvey Oswald is discussed
On 12/10/65, Charles Thomas, a political officer at the
American Embassy, wrote a memorandum about a conversation
with Elena Garro de Paz.(855) The meeting with Elena had been
about other matters,(856) but she men-
-213-
tioned knowing Oswald.(857) Thomas noted that she was
reluctant to talk but did.(858)
Elena's story repeated here is the same as that given
in the [ ] memo dated 10/5/64, but with more details.
She said that General Jose Jesus Clark Flores (a friend of
Ruben Duran's), Silvia Duran, Eusebio Azcue, Emilio
Carballido (a pro-Communist writer-friend of the Durans),
and a Latin American Negro man with red hair (unidentified)
were at the party.(859) A marginal comment by this entry in Wx-
7241 says, "How did Elena know about a red-haired Negro?"(860)
Elena also told Thomas that she had later learned that
"Silvia Duran had been Oswald's mistress while he was
there."(861) A note by this entry in Wx-7241 says, "How did
Elena Garro know about Silvia being the mistress of Oswald?
This is 1965."(862) The Mexico City Station did not hear
about the Oswald-Duran "affair" until July 1967 when a CIA
asset, [ ] reported it.(863)
Elena told Thomas that she and her daughter had gone to
the Cuban Embassy on November 23, 1963 and shouted
"Assassins" and other insults at the Embassy employees.(864)
According to Elena, that same day, a friend, Manuel
Calvillo, whom the Garros thought to be an official in the
-214-
Gobernacion, took her and her daughter to a small hotel in
the center of Mexico City.(865) Calvillo kept Elena Garro and
her daughter there for eight days under the pretext that
they were in danger of being harmed physically by
Communists.(866) Elena claimed she told Calvillo her story and
that she wanted to tell it to the American authorities at
the U.S. Embassy(867) but that Calvillo dissuaded her by
telling her that the American Embassy was full of Communist
spies.(868) Elena said that some of the other people who had
been at the party were taken to Veracruz where they were
"protected" by Governor Lopez Arias.(869) She said that Ruben
Duran, reportedly "protected" by General Clark Flores, was
very prosperous and was driving a big car.(870) Elena also
claimed that Ruben Duran told her months after the
assassination that he was not really a Communist and that
killing Kennedy had been a mistake.(871) Ruben Duran claimed
he had no reason to tell Elena that killing Kennedy had been
a mistake since he had no involvement.(872)
Charles Thomas circulated a copy of his memorandum
concerning Elena's allegations in the American Embassy
including the Central Intelligence Agency's Mexico City
Station to aid them in their investigation of the John
-215-
F. Kennedy assassination.(873) The COS wrote a note on the
memo: "What an imagination she has!?! Should we send to
Headquarters?"(874) The Officer replied, on the memo, "Suggest
sending. There have been stories around town about all this,
and Thomas is not the only person she has talked to... If
memory serves me, didn't [ ] refer to Oswald and the
local leftists and Cubans in one of her squibs?"(875)
The Mexico City Station cabled the information in
Thomas' 12/10/65 memorandum of conversation to CIA
Headquarters.(876) The cable reported that Elena's story would
be checked with [ ] against the production from the
Cuban surveillance operation "and other sources."(877) Winston
Scott wrote, next to the routing indications on the cable
"Please ask Charles Thomas if he'll 'follow up.' Get
questions from Ann G.(878) Please let's discuss. Thanks."(879)
After the December 10 memorandum of conversation,
Winston Scott(880) and Nathan Ferris(881) called Charles Thomas
for a meeting.(882) They asked him to get a more detailed
account of Ms. Garro's story.(883) At this meeting, Winston
Scott made it clear that the FBI had full responsibility for
any further investigation in the
-216-
Oswald case.(884)
6. Charles Thomas's Meeting with Elena Garro on
December 25, 1965
Thomas met with Elena again on December 25, 1965. On
that date, he wrote a memorandum of conversation which
provided a much more detailed restatement of Ms. Garro's
alleged encounter with Lee Harvey Oswald.(885)
Elena admitted that she had spoken to two men at the
Embassy, "presumably from the Legal Attache's Office."(886)
Elena said that she did not tell them the complete story
because "the Embassy officers did not give much credence to
anything she and Elenita said."(887)
She stated that the party had been at Ruben Duran's
home.(888) She was unclear about the date of the party.(889) She
thought it had been a few days before the Soviet Astronaut,
Gagarin, visited Mexico; she thought that this would put the
party around September 2 or 3, 1963.(890) She believed that
the party was on a Monday or Tuesday because it was an odd
night for a party.(891) Elena could not check her calendar to
refresh her memory at the time of this interview because the
calendar was in a desk that had been stored away.(892)
-217-
During the conversation, Elena described Oswald and his
companions.(893) The man who she thought was Oswald wore a
black sweater.(894) She said he was quiet "and stared a lot at
the floor."(895) One of his companions "was very tall and
slender and had long blond hair and a rather long protruding
chin."(896) The other companion was also tall, with short,
light brown hair and no distinguishing characteristics.(897)
The three Americans did not dance or mix with the other
guests.(898) Elena saw the same three men on the street the
next day(899)
Elena was certain that Eusebio Azcue, Horacio Duran.
Silvia Duran, Lydia Duran, Deba Guerrero, General Clark
Flores and his mistress, a doctor from Dalinde Hospital, a
young American couple who were honeymooning in Mexico, and
several other people were at the party.(900) She said that
Ricardo Guerra, whom she claimed converted Horatio Duran to
Communism, and his wife, Rosario Castellanos, were supposed
to be at the party but did not attend.(901)
Elena alleged that the red-haired man and Emilio
Carballido were not at the party that Oswald attended but at
another party where Carballido and Ascue got into
-218-
a heated argument about President Kennedy.(902) "They came to
the conclusion that the only solution was to kill him(903) (904)
Elena was not clear on whether this party was before or
after the party where she met Oswald.(905) Eusebio Azcue
stated that this conversation never occurred.(906)
Elena reiterated that the incident at the Cuban
Embassy, where she and her daughter shouted "assassins,"
etc., at the Embassy employees, occurred on November 23 at
or about 3:00 p.m.(907) Elena and Elenita were driven to the
Cuban Embassy by Elena's brother who was embarrassed by
their behavior.(908) This occurred before they had seen
photographs of Oswald.(909)
Ms. Garro claimed that later in the day she and Elenita
were visited by Manuel Calvillo who told them that they were
in serious danger from the Communists and that he would take
them to a small hotel, where they would be safe for a few
days.(910) Elena said she trusted and believed Calvillo
because he was a known undercover agent for the Mexico
government.(911) He was also a friend of Noe Palomares(912) and
of President Gustavo Diaz Ordaz.(913) Calvillo also told Elena
and her daughter that Silvia Duran had been arrested.(914)
-219-
Duran's arrest was not public information at that time.(915)
Elena could not remember the name of the hotel so that same
day (12/25/65) she took Thomas to the section of Mexico City
where she thought it was.(916) They found the hotel, the Hotel
Vermont.(917) Elena said that she assumed that Calvillo had
registered them as relatives or friends from San Luis
Potosi.(918) They stayed at the hotel until the following
Friday, November 30, 1963, hardly leaving their rooms.(919)
Elena claimed that while she and Elenita were at the
hotel they saw the photos of Oswald and realized that he had
been the man at Ruben Duran's party.(920) When Calvillo
visited them at the hotel, Elena told him that she wanted to
report her story, which she related to Calvillo, to the
American Embassy. Calvillo, however, dissuaded her by saying
that the American Embassy was full of Communists.(921) Elena
stated that when she returned home, guards were posted
outside her house.(922)
Elena alleged that after she returned home she saw her
sister, Deba Guerrero, who had independently come to the
conclusion that Lee Harvey Oswald had been at Ruben Duran's
party.(923) Deba was "terrified" because approximately two
months after the assassination
-220-
two "Communists" personally warned her never to reveal that
she had been to a party with Oswald.(924) Deba, consequently,
would not accompany Elena to the American Embassy to tell
her story on November 24, 1964.(925)
Elena stated that it was "common knowledge" that Silvia
had been Oswald's mistress.(926) When asked who could verify
the allegation, she could only remember one person who had
told her this.(927) Elena claimed that person was Victor Rico
Galan,(928) a "pro-Castro journalist."(929) (See Section VI, A,
2, a, above.)
Subsequent to December 25, 1965, Elena found her
calendar and reconstructed the date of the party as late
September and not early September.(930) Then Thomas went to
Ferris' office and informed him, Ferris replied that Elena
had given the late September date when she had originally
reported her story an the American Embassy.(931) However, Mr.
Ferris explained to Thomas that someone who had been at the
twist party had stated that there were no Americans
there.(932) Mr.Ferris did not tell Mr. Thomas that Ario Alejandro
Lavagnini Stenius had provided this information in 1964.(933)
Mr. Ferris suggested that it was not necessary for Thomas to
pursue Elena's allegations since he considered the
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Oswald case closed and had heard all the rumors before.(934)
Thomas forwarded (the same day) a copy of his memorandum to
the Central Intelligence Agency's Mexico City Station to aid
in its investigation of the John F. Kennedy
assassination.(935) On the first page of the memorandum of conversation,
Winston Scott wrote, "Shouldn't we send to Headquarters?"
Someone responded, "Of course."(936)
The Mexico City Station sent a cable to Headquarters on
December 12, 1965, reporting that it was "following up" and
would cable the results.(937)
7. December 27 1965 Legal Attache Memo to the
United States Ambassador re Elena Garro
On December 27, 1965 Nathan Ferris wrote a memo to the
Ambassador reporting that Elena and her daughter were
interviewed on 17 and 24 November 1964 by the Legal
Attache's office in Mexico City.(938) The memo recorded that
Elena and her daughter had furnished information similar to
the information reported in Thomas' 12/10/65 memo.(939) The
memo further stated,
"Inquiries conducted at that time (November 1964);
however, failed to substantiate the
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allegations made by Mrs. Garro de Paz and her
daughter. In view of the fact that Mrs. Garro de
Paz' allegations have been previously checked out
without substantiation, no further action is being
taken concerning her recent repetition of those
allegations.(940)
The Legal Attache forwarded a copy of the memorandum to
the Central Intelligence Agency's Mexico City Station(941)
prior to 12/29/65.(942)
A cable written by Anne Goodpasture on December 29,
1965 reporting the Legal interview with Elena and the Legal
Office's failure to substantiate Elena's story was sent to
Headquarters.(943) The cable promised to keep Headquarters
advised if any further information was to developed.(944)
[ (945)] 10/5/64 memo is attached to the
12/29/65 Wx-7241 explained this in a marginal comment, "This
document by [ ] was not in (Oswald's file), but was
copied from (a project file) and attached to MEXI 5741, 29
Dec. 65.(946)
A note stapled to this cable by [ ] stated,
"I don't know what FBI did in November 1964, but the Garros
have been talking about this for a long time and she is said
to be extremely bright."(947) Anne Goodpasture wrote that the
FBI had found Elena's allegations
-223-
unsubstantiated but that "we will try to confirm or refute
Ms. Garro de Paz' information and follow up."(948) Win Scott
wrote, "She is also 'nuts.'"(949)
8. CIA Investigation of Elena's Allegation that
She Created a disturbance at the Cuban Embassy
on November 23, 1963.
On February 3, 1966, Anne Goodpasture forwarded Thomas'
December 25, 1965 memo to the Cuban section at the Mexico
City Station with an attached note asking the Section to
check whether Elena was "seen creating such a disturbance as
they claimed in front of the Cuban Embassy."(950)
One Cuban section officer responded. "No bells ring
with me." Another one wrote, "Me neither." The third officer
wrote, "No pictures either."(951) There was no question, after
reviewing CIA files, that the [
] were queried about Elena's allegation:(952)
there are no pictures is reasonable since Elena claimed the
event happened 1.) on a Saturday at 3:00 p.m. when the Cuban
Embassy was not normally photographically surveilled;(953) and
2.) the "disturbance" occurred inside the Cuban compound.
HSCA examination of the CIA
-224-
Cuban Embassy photographic surveillance showed no
surveillance on 11/23/63.(954) The Committee found that
Central Intelligence Agency made no other effort to
corroborate Ms. Garro's allegations.
9. Legal Attache 2/23/66 memo to the United States
Ambassador Regarding Elena Garro's Allegations
On 2/23/66 the Legal Attache wrote a memo to the
Ambassador reporting that "extensive investigation" failed
to disclose that Oswald had traveled to Mexico prior to
September 26, 1963 and that no information had developed
that would show that he had not been in New Orleans in the
early part of that month.(955) The memo reiterated that no
further action was being taken by the FBI, because Elena's
allegations had not been substantiated by it.(956) The Legal
Attache forwarded a copy of this memo to the Central
Intelligence Agency's Mexico City Station.(957) A marginal
comment made by Raymond Rocca next to this entry in Wx-7241
says, "How can it be ascertained that Oswald did _not_
(emphasis in original) travel to Mexico prior to early
September 1963? There must be some basis for Elena's
reporting."(958)
-225-
10. Legal Attache Memo to Winston Scott re Elena's
Allegation that She had Stayed at the Hotel
Vermont from the Day After the Assassination
Until November 30, 1963;
On 10/13/66, the Legal Attache wrote a memo to Win
Scott reporting that a reliable confidential informant had
reported that the records of the Hotel Vermont disclosed
that one "Elena Paz, housewife from San Luis Potosi," had
registered at the Hotel Vermont on November 23, 1963.(959) She
left on November 30, 1963.(960) The memo said, "The above
individual may or may not be identical with Elena Garro de
Paz."(961) The House Select Committee on Assassinations has
been unable to determine why the Central Intelligence Agency
and the Federal Bureau of Investigations waited until 1966
to investigate this aspect of Elena's story.
Charles Thomas' 12//25/65 memo stating "She and her
daughter did not personally register at the hotel. She
thinks Calvillo registered them as relatives or friends of
his from San Luis Potosi," corroborates Elena Garro's
presence at Hotel Vermont.(962) The
-226-
entry for the 10/13/66 Legal memo in Wx-7241 bore the
notation. "This is what Elena claimed and no one would
believe her."(963)
11. Charles Thomas' September 30, 1969 Letter to
State Department and Legal Attache's Response
No further report on Elena's story was generated until
1969 when Charles Thomas was "selected out" of the United
States Foreign Service.(964) At that time, he wrote a
memorandum to the Secretary of State which included a cover
letter stating, "Since I was the Embassy Officer in Mexico
who acquired this intelligence information, I feel a
responsibility for seeing it through to its final
evaluation."(965)
Charles Thomas' memorandum stated that "he got no
reaction from Nathan Ferris and Winston Scott" regarding his
memorandum of December 25, 1965.(966) In addition, Thomas
wrote that the only person to speak to him about the
December 25, 1965 memorandum, Clarence Boonstra(967) told him
that Oswald had not been in Mexico on the date given for the
party.(968) Thomas noted that even when he reiterated that
Elena had not changed her
-227-
story but rather that she had now given a more detailed
account. Boonstra stated that the date was wrong and
dismissed the entire affair.(969)
One of the Mexico City Legal Officers, Nathan Ferris,
in reply to Thomas' letter and memorandum, asserted that
Thomas' office had been advised by memoranda dated December
27, 1965 and February 23, 1966 that since Elena Garro's
allegations had previously been investigated without
substantiation, no further action was being taken concerning
her recent repetition of those allegations.(970) In its
report, the Legat's Office concluded that either the
Counselor for Political Affairs did not route the memoranda
to Charles Thomas or that Thomas did not recall receiving
them.(971)
Thomas wrote that then he went to Nathan Ferris' office
to inform him that Elena had found her calendar972a and had
reconstructed the date of the party as late September.
Ferris replied that Elena had given the late September date
when she had originally reported her story at the American
Embassy.(972) Thomas noted that Ferris explained that someone
who had been at the party had stated that there had not been
any Americans in attendance.(973) Thomas wrote that he had
assumed that Elena could have
-228-
clearly been mistaken about the identity of the American she
saw there, but never doubted that she had seen some
Americans.(974) Thomas wrote that Ferris had suggested that it
was not necessary for Thomas to pursue the matter since he
considered the Oswald case closed and had heard all the
rumors before.(975)
The Legal Attache's reply to Thomas' memo stated that
Mr. Ferris had not told Thomas that someone who was at the
party had stated that there had not been any Americans
present.(976) The Legal Attache's memo asserted that Thomas
had been told that it would not be necessary for him to
pursue the matter any further since Elena's story had been
investigated previously without being substantiated.(977) In
addition, the memo stated that Thomas had been told that
Elena's story was considered a closed issue, not that the
Oswald case was closed.(978)
l2. House Select Committee on Assassination's
Investigation of Elena Garro's Allegations
The House Select Committee on Assassination's
investigated Elena Garro's story both through file reviews
and personal interviews. The Committee requested and
-229-
reviewed the CIA's, FBI's and State Department's files on
Elena Garro de Paz, Elenita Garro de Paz, Manuel Calvillo,
Noe W. Palomares, June Cobb Sharp, Victor Rico Galan, Eunice
Odio, Sylvia Duran, Lydia Duran, Ruben Duran, Betty
Serratos, Horatio Duran Eusebio Azcue, and Emilio
Carballido. Only the Elena Garro de Paz file contained
information on her allegations. Though all the names listed
above played a role in Elena Garro de Paz' story, not one of
their files included a reference to Elena Garro de Paz.
Furthermore, the House Select Committee on
Assassinations requested and reviewed the Central
Intelligence Agency's [ ]
files. Once again, not one of the files included a mention
of Elena Garro's allegations. The House Select Committee on
Assassinations learned that [ ] who first
reported to the CIA Elena's allegation, was [
] (979) [ ] Manuel
Calvillo who had hidden Elena Garro and her daughter in a
hotel the day following the assassination.(980) He also told
Elena that Silvia Duran had been arrested before this fact
had become public knowledge.(981)
Since a file review was inconclusive, the Committee
arranged interviews in Mexico with Ruben Duran, Horatio
-230-
Duran, Elena and Elenita Garro, Silvia Duran. Lynn Duran,
Emilio Carbillido and Betty Serratos.(982) The Mexican
Government informed the House Select Committee on
Assassinations that Elena and Elenita Garro disappeared in
1968 during the student uprisings and have never returned to
Mexico.(983) The officials stated that Elena and her daughter
might be in Spain.(984) The Mexican government reported that
Emilio Carballido could not be found.(985) The others were
interviewed between June 1 and June 6, 1978.(986)
Betty Serratos, Lydia Duran, Ruben Duran and Horatio
Duran all stated that Elena was not the dancing type and
therefore did not attend any of the twist parties at the
Duran homes.(987) When Silvia Duran was asked if Elena or
Elenita Garro ever attended twist parties at the Duran
homes, she recalled Elena attending one twist party at
Ruben's home in 1963 after the Garros returned to Mexico
from France.(988) The Durans denied that Lee Harvey Oswald had
attended any party at one of their homes.(989)
The Committee next asked [
] to arrange interviews with [
] who may have had information related
to Lee Harvey Oswald's trip to Mexico City.(990) [ ]
-231-
[ ] declined to aid the Committee
in this aspect of the investigation.(991)
The Committee returned to Mexico City on August 7, 1978
and attempted to locate June Cobb Sharp and Manuel Calvillo
on its own.(992)
The Mexican government told the Committee that June
Cobb Sharp received a Tourist permit, number 72781, on June
27, 1947 when she entered Mexico through Nuevo Laredo. She
asked, but was denied, permission to represent the magazine,
Modern Mexico. On June 21, 1948, she received a courtesy
permit number 25556. Furthermore, the Mexican government
explained that she disappeared in l954 [sic] and never
returned to Mexico.(993)
The Committee believes that this information is
incorrect. [
] (994) Elena also stated that Ms. Cobb resided at her
home in 1964.(995)
The Mexican government told the Committee that Manuel
Calvillo did not live at Cuchtemos 877-B as the Committee
had informed it. The Mexican Government's Agent-in-charge
had spoken to the superintendent at the apartments at which
Manuel Calvillo was believed to reside,
-232-
and was informed by the superintendent who had worked at the
apartments for twenty-five years, said that no Manuel
Calvillo had ever resided there. When Committee staffers
gave the Mexican government Calvillo's pen name, the
Mexicans gave the same answers.(996)
The Committee believes that there is a possibility that
Sr. Calvillo lived at this address since it acquired the
address from a recent CIA document.(997)
The Committee believes that there is a possibility that
a U.S. Government agency requested the Mexican government to
refrain from aiding the Committee with this aspect of its
work.(998) (See Procedural Write-up Trip 2 Mexico City and
Section VII, C, below.)
The Committee made every attempt possible to locate
Elena On July 7, 1978 the Committee telephoned her
publisher, Mortiz, in Mexico City and inquired about Elena's
whereabouts.(999) The publisher stated that Ms. Garro was
living in the Hotel S.A.C.E. in Madrid, Spain.(1000) The
Committee telephoned the Hotel S. A. C. E. in Spain and
spoke to the manager who told him that Ms. Garro had
moved.(1001) On July 14, 1978 the Committee called her publisher again
and was told to contact the Mexican Embassy
-233-
in Madrid, Spain.(1002) The publisher stated that all Elena's
payments were sent there because she did not even trust her
publisher with her address.(1003)
The Committee called the Mexican Embassy in Madrid,
Spain and spoke to Adolfo Padilla, a Mexican employee of the
Embassy who stated that when Elena had visited the Embassy a
couple of weeks before to pick up a check she seemed
financially destitute.(1004) He stated that when he asked Elena
her new address she declined to give one, stating that she
would return every few weeks to pick up checks and mail.(1005)
The Committee gave Padilla a telephone number and a message
asking Elena to telephone the Committee collect.(1006)
On September 5, 1978 Elena Garro called the
Committee.(1007) Then it was explained that the Committee wished to talk to
her in person and would pay both her daughter's and her
travel from Spain to the United States, Ms. Garro asked why
she should believe the Committee was what it claimed to
be.(1008) The Committee asked Ms. Garro to call back collect in the
next few days when it could explain to her to her when and
where she could receive a Committee letter delineating why
the Committee wished to interview her.(1009) The Committee
wrote the letter and made arrange-
-234-
ments with the State Department for a letter to be hand
delivered to Elena at the American Embassy in Spain.(1010)
On September 7, 1978, Elena Garro called the Committee
and asked when the letter would arrive.(1011) The Committee
explained that she could pick up the letter on Monday,
September 11, 1978 from George Phelan, the Counselor for
Consular Affairs at the American Embassy.(1012) Ms. Garro
stated that she would get the letter on September 11, 1978
and follow our suggestions.(1013)
Ms. Garro never went to the American Embassy in Spain
to pick up the Committee's letter.(1014) The Committee, hoping
she would pick up the letter before her flight date,
proceeded to purchase air tickets for both Elena and her
daughter.(1015) Elena did not pick up the tickets at the
airport.(1016) The Committee has not been able to regain
contact with Ms. de Paz again.
The Committee also investigated whether Charles Thomas'
"selection out" was related to the Oswald case. After
interviewing his widow, Ms. Cynthia Thomas, the Committee
has concluded that his dismissal was unrelated.(1017)
In sum, the House Select Committee on Assassinations
has not been able to confirm the evidence that would indi-
-235-
cate that Lee Harvey Oswald, on one night while he was in
Mexico, attended a "twist party" at the home of Ruben Duran
Navarro, the brother-in-law of Silvia Duran. In addition,
the House Select Committee on Assassinations has been unable
to confirm the allegation that Lee Harvey Oswald traveled
while in Mexico City with "two beatnik-looking boys." A
large part of the Committee's attempts to investigate these
issues has met with frustration.
D. Oscar Contreras Lartigue
On March 16, 1967, B. J. Ruyle, the American Consul in
Tampico, reported to the American Embassy that he had spoken
to a reporter who allegedly had met Lee Harvey Oswald at the
National Autonomous University of Mexico City(1018) in 1963.(1019)
The reporter, stressing that he had only a fleeting contact
with Oswald, had claimed to have known only about Lee Harvey
Oswald's desire to travel to Cuba and the Embassy's
unwillingness to grant him a visa.(1020) When B. J. Ruyle asked
the reporter for permission to cable the story to the
American Embassy, the reporter declined, stating that he
feared losing his job.(1021) Subsequent to the assassination,
the reporter had told his editor about his contact with Lee
Harvey Oswald, who
-236-
had advised him not to report it.(1022) The reporter granted B.
J. Ruyle permission to cable the story to the American
Embassy when Ruyle promised that it would be handled with
the strictest confidence.(1023) Ruyle wrote that he thought the
reporter was genuinely concerned about his job.(1024)
A letter from B. J. Ruyle to the State Department dated
May 11, 1967 provided additional details of the reporter's
story.(1025) The reporter alleged that he and some fellow
students had met Lee Harvey Oswald as they exited the
Cineclub at the Escuela de Filosofia (School of Philosophy)
at the National Autonomous University of Mexico.(1026) Oswald
told the group that he had gone to the National Autonomous
University of Mexico looking for pro-Castro students who
might help him persuade the Cuban Embassy to grant him a
visa.(1027) Oswald claimed that he was from California and was
a member of a pro-Castro group in New Orleans.(1028) Oswald
remained with the students the rest of that day and evening,
as well as the following day.(1029) The reporter described
Oswald as a strange and introverted individual who spoke
very little Spanish.(1030)
-237-
The State Department forwarded a copy of Ruyle's letter
to the Central Intelligence Agency.(1031) On June 14, 1967, CIA
Headquarters sent the Mexico City Station a copy of Ruyle's
letter to Bowles.(1032) CIA Headquarters considered Ruyle's
report "the first piece of substantive info about Oswald's
sojourn in Mexico" since the assassination.(1033) Consequently,
Headquarters cabled that though it understood the source's
reluctance to become involved "the fact remains that this
info cannot continue to be withheld or concealed."(1034)
Headquarters instructed the Mexico City Station to elicit
the identity of the source from Ruyle.(1035) In addition,
Headquarters asked the Mexico City Station to bear in mind,
while interviewing Ruyle's source, that Lee Harvey Oswald
was a homosexual.(1036) The final sentence of the dispatch, "It
is our hope that the facts obtained through these interviews
will help to confirm that several of Garrison's allegations
about involvement of anti-Castro Cubans, the CIA, etc. are
false,"(1037) explained the Central Intelligence Agency's
motives for pursuing the story.
On June 29, 1967, the Mexico City Station cabled
-238-
Headquarters that a station officer had gone to Tampico
where he had interviewed Ruyle's source, Oscar Contreras.(1038)
The cable reported that Contreras was a reporter for El
Sol(1039) in Tampico; was circa thirty years old; married, with
three children; studied law at the National Autonomous
University of Mexico (UNAM) from 1960 to 1964; belonged to a
pro-Castro group at UNAM; was persecuted by the Mexican
police for this affiliation and moved to Tampico to escape
the persecution.(1040)
Contreras told the Mexico City Station official that he
and four other individuals(1041) had met Oswald as they exited
a roundtable discussion held at the School of Philosophy at
UNAM.(1042) Contreras stated that Oswald had made inquiries on
the UNAM campus about pro-Cuban groups and had been directed
to his group.(1043) Contreras reported that though the group
initially mistrusted Oswald fearing he was a "CIA
provocation," they allowed Oswald to remain with them that
day and night and part of the following day.(1044) Contreras
noted that Oswald never mentioned assassination but kept
emphasizing that he had to get to Cuba.(1045) In addition,
Oswald had exhibited no homosexual tendencies while he was
with the
-239-
group.(1046)
On July 4, 1967, Headquarters cabled the Mexico City
Station that Contreras' story should be explored to the
fullest even though he might have fabricated it.(1047)
Headquarters suggested that the FBI handle the story.(1048) The
following day, July 5, 1967, the Mexico City Station cabled
that it preferred turning Contreras' case over to the
Mexican authorities and to the F.B.I.(1049) The same day, the
Chief of Station informed the Legat of Contreras' story, but
asked him not to take any action without first consulting
the Mexico City Station.(1050)
On July 10, 1967 [ ] ("JKB") wrote
a memo delineating the results of a Mexican government
review of Oscar Contreras' file.(1051) According to a memo, a
lone Oscar Contreras appeared in the UNAM law school
records, Oscar Contreras Lartigue, born 2/14/39 in Ciudad
Victoria, Tamaulipas.(1052) The memo also reported that a
newspaper article appearing in "Excelsior" listed an Oscar
Contreras as a signer of a protest for the Bloque
Estudiantil Revolucionario(1053) which had been formed mid-
1961.(1054) The memo speculated Contreras probably signed the
protest as a front man to protect the real leaders of the
group.(1055) The Mexico
-240-
City Station cabled the information to Headquarters the
following day, June 11, 1969.(1056)
The Committee has determined that the Central
Intelligence Agency's main interest in Oscar Contreras was
"to confirm that several of Garrison's allegations about
involvement of anti-Castro Cubans, the CIA, etc. are
false."(1057) After the CIA Mexico City Station official's
interview with Contreras(1058) revealed nothing that could be
useful to the agency, it decided to allow the FBI to follow
the story through.(1059) Nonetheless, the Agency's Mexico City
Station interviewed the key witness, revealed pertinent
files and records about the witness in the Mexican
government's possession, and reported all the information to
Headquarters expeditiously.
VII. Analysis of Lee Harvey Oswald's Activities in Mexico
City
A. Introduction
After the Warren Commission published its report two
very important allegations related to Lee Harvey Oswald's
activities in Mexico City came to the attention of the
United States investigative agencies. In 1964, Elena
-241-
Garro de Paz reported that she had seen Lee Harvey Oswald,
accompanied by two other men, at a party at the home of
Ruben Duran Navarro the brother-in-law of Silvia Duran.(1060)
In 1967, Oscar Contreras Lartigue reported that he met Lee
Harvey Oswald on the campus of the National Autonomous
University of Mexico.(1061)
In addition, the testimony of the Warren Commission's
primary witness related to Mexico City, Silvia Tirado Duran,
has been called into question by the critics throughout the
years.(1062) Some of the information that is inconsistent with
Ms. Duran's original story--that Oswald visited the
Consulate on two occasions which were the only times she saw
him--was available at the time of the 'Warren Commission's
inquiry although it was ignored.(1063) Some of the information
was developed after the publication of the Warren Report.(1064)
The Garro and Contreras allegations, in conjunction
with the inconsistencies of Ms. Duran's story raise three
major questions: (1) did Lee Harvey Oswald or an impostor
visit the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City?; (2) other than
his visits to the Cuban consulate, what were Lee Harvey
Oswald's activities in Mexico City; and (3) was Lee Harvey
Oswald traveling alone in Mexico? These
-242-
three questions overlap somewhat in detail; e.g.. if Oswald
was not traveling alone, did one of his companions
impersonate him at the Cuban Consulate? Nonetheless, each of
the three questions will be dealt with in separate sections
below.
In an attempt to answer these questions the House
Select Committee on Assassinations has: 1) interviewed
Mexican(1065) and Cuban citizens(1066) who could have knowledge of
Oswald's visits to the Cuban Consulate; 2) interviewed
Mexican citizens(1067) who could have knowledge of Oswald's
activities and associations in Mexico City; 3) conducted an
extensive review of the files of the Central Intelligence
Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation that pertain
to Oswald's sojourn in Mexico City.(1068)
B. Did Lee Harvey Oswald or an Impostor Contact the
Cuban and Soviet Consulates in Mexico
Lee Harvey Oswald himself probably visited the Cuban
Consulate at least once since his application for a Cuban
intransit visa bears his signature.(1069) Though the Cuban
Consulate allowed visa applicants to take blank
-243-
applications out of the Consulate to be returned when
completed,(1070) Silvia Duran stated she was certain that
Oswald signed the application in her presence.(1071) Oswald's
signature on the Cuban visa application. however, does not
by itself rule out the possibility that someone impersonated
Oswald in contacts with the Cuban and Soviet Embassies.
An analysis of the telephone conversations [
] reveals that someone, later identified by the CIA as
Oswald visited the Cuban Consulate at least two times and
the Soviet Consulate at least three times.(1072) On September
27, 1963, at 4:05 p.m. Silvia Duran called the Soviet
Consulate. In this conversation she referred to an American
seeking an intransit visa to Cuba.(1073) The substantive
information given indicates that she was discussing
Oswald.(1074) At this time the individual using Oswald's name already
had been at the Soviet Embassy at least once, since Silvia
requested the name of the Soviet Embassy official who dealt
with the American.(1075) Silvia also stated that the American
was, at that time, in the Cuban Consulate.(1076) At 4:26 p.m. a
Soviet Consular official
-244-
returned Silvia Duran's call.(1077) This official stated
specifically that Oswald had visited the Soviet
Consulate.(1078)
On September 28, 1963, at 11:51 a.m. Silvia Duran
called the Soviet Consulate.(1079) She put the American, later
identified as Oswald, on the telephone.(1080) The American, who
was at the Cuban Consulate at the time, said that he had
just been at the Soviet Consulate.(1081) The conversation ended
with the American stating that he was returning to the
Soviet Consulate.(1082)
Analysis of Silvia Duran's and Eusebio Azcue's
testimony would tend to indicate that Oswald, or someone
impersonating him, visited the Cuban Consulate at least one
and possibly two additional times on September 27, 1963.
Silvia Duran says that Oswald first visited the Cuban
Consulate at approximately 11:00 a.m. requesting an
intransit visa to Cuba with Russia as the final
destination.(1083) Ms. Duran sent Oswald to obtain photographs,
that he needed for the visa application.(1084) Eusebio Azcue
recalls that this visit probably occurred on the date on the
visa application, 9/27/63.(1085) Ms. Duran also stated that
Oswald returned at approximately 1:00 p.m. with four
photographs.(1086) Eusebio
-245-
Azcue also stated that the individual later identified as
Oswald returned to the Cuban Consulate about 1:00 p.m. with
the photographs probably on "the date that appears on the
application, that is to say on the 27th."(1087) The Committee
believes that there is a possibility that the argument
between Azcue and the individual occurred during this
visit.(1088)
Ms. Duran stated that Oswald's third and last visit
occurred in the late afternoon after working hours on the
27th.(1089) This visit is confirmed by [ s
] (1090)
In addition to the alleged Oswald visits to the
Consulates, there were other telephonic contacts that may
have been between Oswald, or an impostor, and the
Consulates.(1091) Several details about Oswald's visits to the
Cuban Consulate, and telephonic contacts with both
Consulates suggest that the individual involved may not have
been Oswald.
Silvia Duran's description of Oswald did not resemble
Oswald's true physical appearance.(1092) This description,
which appeared early in the reporting of information
obtained from Ms. Duran was deleted from subsequent reports
and was not at all mentioned in the Warren
-246-
Report.(1093) (See Section V, C, for details.) Eusebio Azcue's
description of Oswald was similar to Silvia Duran's, but
more detailed.(1094) Perhaps the most remarkable thing about
these descriptions is their similarity to Elena Garro de
Paz' description of one of Oswald's alleged companions.(1095)
Another possible indication that an impostor may also
have visited the Consulate is the 9/28/63 [ ]
conversation.(1096) Silvia Duran adamantly denies that Oswald
or any other American visited the Cuban Consulate on
Saturday September 28, 1963.(1097) In light of the
[ ] of that date, Ms. Duran has either lied to
the Committee or the individual who visited the Consulate on
September 28 was not Oswald.(1098) Ms. Duran, in light of the
inconsistencies detailed in Sections V, C and VI, A above,
may not be the most credible witness, but there are
indications that she was truthful when she stated that
Oswald did not visit The Consulate on September 28. The
September 28, 1963 conversation was linked to Oswald because
of the marginal notations made by the CIA translator on the
transcript.(1099) The translator noted on the transcript that
the caller spoke "terrible, hardly recognizable
-247-
Russian."(1100) On October 1, 1963, a man called Soviet
Consulate and identified himself as "Lee Oswald."(1101) This
man also stated that he had been at the Consulate on
Saturday, the 28th.(1102) The translator noted that this was
the same man who had called the Consulate "a day or so ago"
and had spoken in broken Russian.(1103) From this information,
and possibly a voice comparison(1104) , the 9/28 caller was
identified as Oswald.(1105) The problem with assuming that the
caller on 9/28 and 10/1 was Oswald is that Oswald spoke
fluent Russian.(1106) Granted, Ms. Duran's denial of the
Saturday visit and the proficiency of the caller's Russian
is not sufficient evidence to conclude that the person who
visited the Cuban Consulate on Saturday and who called the
Soviet Consulate on Saturday and on October 1st was an
impostor. Yet the information is sufficient to question the
assumption that it was Oswald, especially in light of
Azcue's and Duran's descriptions and Elena Garro de Paz'
allegation.
The Committee notes the possibility, but does not
conclude, that the missing production from the pulse camera
and the [ ] base has something to do with the
possibility that someone impersonated Oswald in Mexico.
-248-
Three calls that also occurred early on September 27,
1963 may have been by an impostor. At approximately 10:30
a.m. a man called the Soviet Military Attache looking for a
visa to Odessa and was referred to the Soviet Consulate.[
(1107) ] (1108) At 10:37 a.m. a man called the Soviet Consulate and
asked for a visa to Odessa.(1109) He was told to call back at
11:00.(1110) At 1:25 p.m. a man called the Soviet Embassy and
was told the Consul would return between 4:00 p.m. and 5:00
p.m. that day.[ (1111) ]
While only the callers' requests for a visa to
Russia(1112) (Odessa) connect these calls to Oswald, the HSCA believes
that they do fit logically into a time sequence created by
what is known from testimony [
] about his actions on that day.
For example, the following is a reasonable possible
chronology of Oswald's actions on 9/27/63 based on analysis
of the available evidence. Oswald probably arrived in Mexico
around 10:00 a.m. on September 27.(1113) By l0:30 Oswald had
time to arrive at the Hotel del Comercio and to place a call
to the Soviet Military Attache who referred him to the
Consul.(1114) The military attache also gave the caller
directions to the Consulate.(1115)
-249-
During the 10:37 a.m. call to the Consulate, the caller
learned that he could contact the Soviet Consul at 11:00
a.m.(1116) This done, Oswald then visited the Cuban Consulate
where he arrived around 11:00 a m on his way to the Soviet
Consulate.[ (1117) maybe ] This meeting lasted only
approximately fifteen minutes.(1118) Oswald was then sent to
obtain photographs and to the Russian Embassy to get the
necessary Russian visa.(1119) Oswald returned to the Cuban
Consulate around 1:00 p.m.(1120) At this point he had his
encounter with Azcue and completed his application.[ (1121)
maybe ] Oswald realized at this point that he would have
problems obtained the visas.(1122) After this visit to the
Cuban Consulate. which lasted approximately fifteen
minutes,(1123) Oswald tried to contact the Soviet Consul whom
Oswald claimed had assured him that he would have no
problems obtaining a visa.(1124) Hence, the 1:25 call.(1125)
During this conversation Oswald learned that the Consul
would be in that evening between 4:00 p.m. and 5:00 p.m.(1126)
Oswald returned to the Cuban Consulate at 4:00 and Sylvia
Duran called the Soviet Consul on his behalf.(1127) Hence, the
4:05 and 4:26 p.m. calls involving Duran.(1128)
But there is a problem with attributing the first three
calls on September 27, 1963. to Oswald. The conversa-
-250-
tions are all in Spanish. With the exception of the(1129)
testimony of Delgado, the evidence indicates that Oswald did
not speak Spanish.(1130) Hence, either the above detailed calls
were not made by Oswald or Oswald could speak Spanish.
There is not enough evidence firmly to conclude that
some one did impersonate Oswald in Mexico. On the other
hand, the evidence is of such a nature that the possibility
cannot be dismissed.
C. What were Lee Harvey Oswald's Activities in Mexico
City?
When the Warren Commission wrote about Lee Harvey
Oswald's activities in Mexico City, it concluded:
The Commission undertook an intensive investigation
to determine Oswald's purpose and activities on this
journey, with specific reference to reports that
Oswald was an agent of the Cuban or Soviet
Governments. As a result of its investigation, the
Commission believes that it has been able to
reconstruct and explain most of Oswald's actions
during this time.
By Saturday, September 28, 1963, Lee Harvey Oswald
had failed to obtain visas at both the Cuban and
Soviet Embassies. From Sunday, September 29, through
Wednesday morning, October 2, when he left Mexico
City on a bus bound for the United States, Oswald
spent considerable time making his travel
arrangements, sightseeing and checking with the
Soviet Embassy to
-251-
learn whether anything had happened on his visa
application.(1131)
Subsequent to the Warren Commission's Report, the
allegations of Elena Garro(1132) and Oscar Contreras
Lartigue(1133) came to the attention of the United States investigative
agencies. The main allegation of both these people, that
they met Lee Harvey Oswald in Mexico City, remains to this
day without direct corroboration. Yet the Committee feels
that it cannot dismiss these allegations without giving them
any consideration.
The testimony of Silvia Duran and the Cuban Consulate
Officials Azcue and Mirabal place Oswald's last contact with
the Cuban Embassy on Friday evening, September 27, 1963.(1134)
The transcripts from [
] the Soviet Consulate place Oswald's last visits
to the Soviet and Cuban Consulates on Saturday morning,
September 28, 1963.(1135) Oswald's last telephonic contact with
the Soviet consulate came on Tuesday, October 1, 1963.(1136)
Oswald's activities on the days between September 28, and
October 1 are not clearly recorded. The Warren Commission
speculated that he spent most of this time sightseeing and
making travel arrangements.(1137)
-252-
It is entirely possible that Oswald did spend some of his
time during this weekend sightseeing and making his travel
arrangements. It is also entirely possible that, after his
failure to obtain his visas on Saturday, September 28, that
Oswald did not give up completely and did attend a party
where he would have come into contact with the Cuban
Consular officials and, later, sought help from pro-Castro
students.
It is entirely possible that Ruben Duran had a "twist
party" on September 30, or October 1(1138) as Elena Garro has
claimed. Ruben, Horacio, Lydia and Silvia Duran all admitted
that they frequently had twist parties in 1963.(1139) Only
Silvia Duran recalled Elena Garro attending any of the
"twist parties" at the Durans' home.(1140) She recalled Elena
and Elena's daughter, Elenita. attending one twist party at
Ruben's home in 1963.(1141) The other Durans adamantly denied
that Lee Harvey Oswald had attended a twist party at one of
their homes.(1142)
Many of the details of Elena Garro's allegations have
not been, or cannot be, corroborated. For example. Elena's
allegation that some of the people who had been
-253-
at the party were taken to Veracruz under the protection of
Governor Lopez Arias(1143) has not been verified. Ruben Duran
denied that he had ever discussed the assassination with
Elena Garro.(1144) Eusebio Azcue denied that he had discussed
President Kennedy with Emilio Carballido at a party at the
Durans' home as alleged by Elena Garro.(1145) The Committee has
not been able to verify whether or not guards were posted
outside of Elena's home in 1963 as she claims.
But other details of Elena's story are very credible.
Perhaps the most striking is the suggestion that Oswald's
relationship with Silvia Duran was more extensive than just
the business contacts in the Cuban Consulate.(1146) Another
detail is the manner in which Elena's allegations were
handled, and the manner in which this Committee's attempts
to investigate those allegations have been frustrated.(1147)
In 1965 Elena Garro reported that Silvia Duran had been
Oswald's mistress while he was in Mexico City.(1148) In 1967
this report was confirmed by [ ] who talked to
Sylvia Duran.(1149) The CIA Station did not consider the
information significant and told the agent to end his
contact with Ms. Duran.(1150) If that informa-
-254-
tion is accurate, then that Silvia invited Oswald to a party
would not have been surprising. Silvia Duran admitted that
the Mexican police had questioned her on this point but
denied that she had had an affair with Oswald.(1151) Ms. Duran
denied having any extra-marital affairs while she was
married to Horacio Duran.(1152) This denial is not consistent
with evidence of her reputation at the Cuban Consulate.
[ ] reported to [ r ] that all
that would have to be done to recruit Silvia Duran, whom he
referred to by using the Spanish word for whore, would be to
get a blond blue-eyed American into bed with her.(1153) There
is also CIA information that indicates that Silvia Duran had
an affair with a [ ] in the
early 1960's.(1154)
The HSCA attempted to interview [
] about Ms. Duran.(1155) An interview with [
] was also desired so as to attempt to verify whether
Elena Garro had created a disturbance at the Cuban Embassy
on November 23. 1963.(1156) The Committee's attempts to
interview [ ] were frustrated.(1157)
Ms. Garro's claim that she stayed at the Hotel Vermont
was verified by the Mexico City Attache on
-255-
October 13, 1966.(1158) Ms. Garro claimed that she had been
held there by Manuel Calvillo whom she believed worked for
the Mexican Ministry of Government.(1159) In 1963, Mr. Calvillo
was [
] (1160) Ms. Garro claimed that she told Mr. Calvillo
her story on November 23, 1963.(1161)
Yet [ ] did not receive a report
from Calvillo on this matter until November 24, 1964, the
same day that Elena first told her story to American
officials.(1162) For these reasons it was felt that Manuel
Calvillo could well be a key to determining the veracity of
Ms. Garro's story. The Committee's attempt to interview Mr.
Calvillo were also frustrated.[ (1163) maybe ]
There is also circumstantial corroboration of Ms.
Garro's allegations regarding June Cobb Sharp. For example,
Ms. Cobb was [ ] and she did file the
first report of Ms. Garro's story.(1164) It should be noted
that this first report was accurate in its detail in that
Ms. Garro's story remained essentially the same in
subsequent repetitions. Ms. Garro claimed that she kicked
Ms. Cobb out of her house.(1165) There is a notation on Ms.
Cobb's report that she was not able to regain
-256-
access to Ms. Garro.(1166) The Committee attempted to obtain an
interview with Ms. Cobb, but was once again frustrated.(1167)
Reviewing the manner in which the CIA Mexico City
Station and the Legal Attache's office in Mexico City
handled Ms. Garro's allegations reveals that, at best, her
allegations were handled in an irresponsible manner because
they were dismissed after a superficial investigation. The
first report that came to the CIA was misfiled and
forgotten.(1168) The Legat, after talking to Elena, dismissed
her story after interviewing one person whom she said may
have been at the party.(1169) The manner in which the official
American community handled Charles Thomas' reporting is
detailed in Section VI, C, 11, above. Mr. Thomas speculated
in 1969 about why Ms. Garro's story had been largely ignored
by the American officials in Mexico:
It would appear that whereas the FBI has discounted
the Elena Garro allegations, the CIA is still
considerable disturbed by them. The CIA may not have
pressed for further investigation, however, for a
number of reasons: 1) considering the sensitive
overlap and subtle competition between the two
intelligence collecting agencies, it had to yield to
the FBI's clear jurisdiction; 2) there are obvious
complications
-257-
in conducting such an investigation in a foreign
country; 3) [
]
and 4) some of the people appearing in the Elena
Garro scenario may well be agents of the CIA. Under
the circumstances it is unlikely that any further
investigation of this matter will ever take place
unless it is ordered by a high official in
Washington.(1170)
The Committee attempted to locate Elena Garro. Although
the Committee established telephonic contact with Ms. Garro,
the Committee was totally frustrated in this aspect of its
investigation, but yet believes that there is a possibility
that Lee Harvey Oswald did attend a twist party at the home
of Ruben Duran.[ (1171) maybe]
The Committee also considers it possible that Lee
Harvey Oswald contacted pro-Castro students at the National
Autonomous University of Mexico (Universidad Nacional
Autonoma de Mexico, hereinafter UNAM) as claimed by Oscar
Contreras Lartigue.(1172) Silvia Duran admitted that she had
told Oswald of two ways in which he could get a Cuban visa:
1) he could get an intransit visa by first obtaining a visa
to another Communist country such as Russia; 2) he could
obtain a regular Cuban visa by knowing someone in Cuba who
would vouch for him.(1173)
-258-
It is possible that after Oswald's attempts to obtain a visa
by the first method were frustrated on Saturday, September
28, that he made one final effort to locate someone trusted
by the Cuban Consulate to vouch for him.
There is no direct evidence about how Oswald could have
learned of the pro-Castro group at UNAM. There is a
possibility that Ernesto Leffeld Miller, a friend of the
Durans who borrowed Horacio's car often took Lee Harvey
Oswald to the campus of the National Autonomous University.
On the days when Lee Harvey Oswald allegedly visited the
Consulate, Mr. Miller did also. It is possible that Silvia
Duran asked him to escort Oswald to the campus. Mr. Miller
denied having ever met Oswald.1174a Oscar Contreras says
that Oswald first contacted him as he was leaving a round-
table discussion at the school of philosophy(1174) It is known
that, in 1963, the Durans were close friends with the
Chairman of the Philosophy Department at UNAM, Ricardo
Guerra, who held seminars on Kant, Hegel, and Marx in the
Durans' home.(1175) It is possible, if Silvia Duran had more
than just a purely business relationship with Oswald
-259-
that she referred Oswald to one of Guerra's Marxist seminars
in his search for help. Unfortunately, Contreras does not
name who headed the round table discussion at which he met
Oswald.(1176) Silvia Duran denied that she referred Oswald to
anyone for help.(1177) Ricardo Guerra is presently the Mexican
Ambassador to East Germany and was not available to the
Committee for an interview. On both of the Committee's trips
to Mexico, the Mexican Government told the Committee that
Mr. Contreras would be made available for an interview. The
interview never occurred.(1178) Although the Committee's
attempt to investigate Mr. Contreras' allegation met largely
with frustration, the allegation can not be dismissed.
D. Was Lee Harvey Oswald alone while he traveled to
Mexico?
The Warren Commission concluded that Lee Harvey Oswald
traveled alone while he was in Mexico.(1179) All of the
witnesses, with the exception of Elena Garro de Paz who
stated that Oswald was accompanied by two "beatnik looking
boys"(1180) at Ruben Duran's party, have stated that when they
saw Oswald in Mexico he was
-260-
alone. Although the American authorities did not handle the
Elena Garro allegation properly, the Committee does not
believe that it can readily dismiss Ms. Garro's allegation
that Oswald had a companion in Mexico in light of: 1) the
corroboration of details of Ms. Garro's story;(1181) 2) the
possibility that someone impersonated Oswald in Mexico(1182)
and 3) the similarity in the description of Oswald by Ms.
Duran and Mr. Azcue and the description of Oswald's
companion by Ms. Garro.(1183)
-261-
Appendix 1: HSCA Procedural write-up Cuba Trip 1;
Select Committee members Chairman Louis Stokes and
Congressman Christopher Dodd, accompanied by G. Robert
Blakey, Gary Cornwell and Ed Lopez of the Select Committee
staff arrived in Cuba at 3:30 p.m., March 30, 1978. They
were met and escorted through Cuban Customs by the Mayor of
Havana, Honorable Oscar Fernandez Mell, the Minister of
Justice, Dr. Armando Torres Santrayll, Senor Buergo, Ricardo
Escartin and the Cuban government translator, Juanita Vera.
At approximately 7:30 p.m. Senor Mell escorted the Select
Committee staff to a restaurant in Old Havana. The following
day Congressman Richardson Preyer arrived in Cuba at 7:00
a.m.
At 9:30 a.m. on March 31, 1978 the Select Committee
representatives met with Reardo Escartin, Senen Buergo and
Captain Felipe Villa of the Ministry of the Interior. The
Cuban Government gave the Members and Committee its official
reply to the Committee's questionnaire, given to the Cuban
government prior to the Committee's trip to Cuba.
At 3:00 p.m., the Select Committee met again with
-262-
Ricardo Escartin, Senen Buergo, Felipe Villa and Juanita
Vera. During this session, the two major areas of discussion
were Lee Harvey Oswald's visa application and the dates of
Jack Ruby's visits to Cuba in 1959.(1184) At 7:30 p.m. the
House Select Committee on Assassinations staff dined with
the Minister of Justice, Armando Torres Santrayll.
At 9:00 a.m. on April 1, 1978, the Select Committee
staff again met with the same Cuban officials for a third
session. Santo Trafficante was the major area of
discussion.(1185) At noon, Committee members and staff
representatives met with Cuba's Minister of Education,
Honorable Jose Ramon Fernandez, who gave a presentation on
the improvement in quality of Cuban education since the
Cuban Revolution.
Following Senor Fernandez's discussion, at 3:15 p.m.,
Eusebio Azcue was interviewed by the Committee staff
representative. Azcue was questioned extensively about
Oswald's alleged trip to Mexico City, Oswald's alleged
visits to the Cuban Consulate, and Senor Azcue's alleged:
argument with Lee Harvey Oswald.(1186)
-263-
At 7:30 p.m., April 1, 1978, Messers. Escartin and
Hernandez accompanied the House Select Committee staff for
dinner and show to the Tropicana Club which, prior to the
Revolution, was operated by organized crime. The Tropicana
Club is presently run by the Cuban government.
At 11:00 a.m. on April 2, 1978, the Committee staff
again met with Senen Buergo, Ricardo Escartin, Felipe Villa,
Aramis Guetierrez and Juanita Vera. Santo Trafficante, Jack
Ruby and Mexico City were the major areas of discussion.(1187)
This session terminated at 1:00 p.m. At 4:50 p.m., the
morning's meeting resumed. During the afternoon session, the
major areas of discussion was the alleged pro-Castro
involvement in the assassination.(1188)
At 9:15 a.m., April 3, 1978, the Committee staff met
with the Cuban officials for a final work session. During
this session, the intelligence agencies and general
questions derived from the questionnaire which the Committee
had provided to the Cuban government were the major areas of
discussion.(1189) During the session, the Committee staff and
Cuban officials also
-264-
exchanged listings of pending material which might be
covered during a subsequent trip to Cuba by HSCA
representatives and Congressmen.(1190)
At 6:00 p.m. the Committee staff met with President
Fidel Castro Ruz who assured the Committee that neither he
nor his government had any involvement in the assassination
of President John F. Kennedy.
The House Select Committee on Assassinations staff
departed Havana, Cuba at 10:00 a.m., April 4, 1978, arriving
in Washington, D.C. at 4:30 p.m.
-265-
Appendix 2: HSCA Procedural Write-up Mexico Trip 1;
House Select Committee on Assassinations staffers Gary
Cornwell, Dan Hardway, Edwin Lopez and Harold Leap arrived
at the Mexico City airport at 8:30 p.m., May 30, 1978. (All
times are Mexico City times, unless otherwise specified.)
They were met and escorted through Customs by David Patton,
an employee of the United States Embassy.
The following morning, May 31, 1978 the HSCA
representatives met with U.S. Embassy Political Officer
Richard Howard concerning procedure. [
maybe footnote (1191)]
At 12:00 noon, the HSCA representatives and Richard
Howard met representatives of the Government of Mexico. The
Mexican representatives were: 1) Dr. Jesus Yanes, Advisor to
the Attorney General's Executive Officer; 2) Fernando Baeza,
Chief Administrative Officer of the Attorney General; and 3)
Commandante Florentino Ventura, Chief of the Mexican Federal
Police. The Mexicans
-266-
informed the staff members at this meeting that they had
located Silvia Duran, Horacio Duran, Ruben Duran and Pedro
Gutierrez Valencia(1192) and that each person was willing to be
interviewed by the HSCA representatives. Procedure for
conduct of the interviews was also discussed at this
meeting.
The Mexican government decided that the initial
interview would be an informal contact with the witnesses in
which the Committee's objectives would be described. The
witnesses' statements would be formalized at a later, taped
interview. The Mexican officials informed the HSCA staff
members that they had been unable to locate Oscar
Contreras,(1193) Elena Garro de Paz, and Elenita Garro de
Paz.(1194) The Mexican Government had not had contact with the Garros
since 1968. The Mexicans said that they were trying to
locate the Garros through the Foreign Ministry since Elena's
ex-husband, Octavio Paz, had once been an important person
in that ministry. The Mexicans asked that we determine the
name of the Mexican Government contact during 1964 with the
Warren Commission so that they could locate their records in
the Archives.
The Mexican officials left to set up the preliminary
-267-
interviews with witnesses. The preliminary interviews were
conducted by Gary Cornwell. HSCA staff members Dan Hardway.
Edwin Lopez and Harold Leap were present during Cornwell's
questioning. The Mexican Government was represented by Dr.
Jesus Yanes, Commandante Florentino Ventura. and Jesus
Meixueiro Kanty, second in command to Ventura. Pedro
Gutierrez Valencia was interviewed at 2:30 p.m. Ruben Duran
was interviewed at 5:00 p.m. Horacio Duran was interviewed
at 5:30 p.m. Silvia Duran was interviewed at 6:15 p.m.
At 9:30 a.m. on June 1, 1978, the HSCA staff
representatives met with the Mexican police representatives.
The HSCA staff requested 1) the records of the company that
employed Gutierrez Valencia in 1963; 2) press clippings of
the Mexican newspaper coverage of Oswald and Silvia Duran
(attached); 3) once again, an interview with Oscar
Contreras; 4) individual files on Elena Garro de Paz and
Silvia Duran; 5) evidence related to Silvia Duran's
assertion that Oswald was at the Cuban Embassy on one day
only; 6) an interview with Deba Garro de Guerro Galvan;(1195)
7) an interview with Eunice Odio;(1196) 9) an interview with
Emilio Carballido;(1197) and 10) an interview with Victor Rico
Galan.(1198) The
-268-
HSCA also asked to be shown the Cuban Consulate.
The Mexican representatives informed the HSCA staff
that Victor Rico Galan had, at one time, been arrested on
political charges but that he was subsequently pardoned by
either Diaz Ordaz or Luis Echevarria.(1199) The Mexicans said
that they were searching for all files and newspaper
articles requested by the HSCA.
The Mexican officials also offered their observations
orally on the preliminary interviews conducted the previous
day. They pointed out that they found it strange that Silvia
had told Oswald he could not travel while in Cuba. They
wondered what Duran was trying to tell Oswald and whether
she thought that Oswald had some objective in going to Cuba
other than that ascribed by the popular version. They also
considered the manner in which Silvia obtained employment at
the Cuban Consulate unusual. Generally they noted that
Silvia and her brothers seemed to have almost programmed
responses and a defensive demeanor. They pointed out,
however, that all the Durans had been very interested in
talking to us. In their opinion, Ruben Duran was the most
credible of those interviewed by the HSCA the previous day.
-269-
At this point, a Mexican official who had been checking
the computer records informed us that Victor Rico Galan had
died.
HSCA staff members provided the Mexican authorities
with the names of the Mexican officials who had been
involved in the investigation in 1963.
HSCA staff members met again with the Mexican police
authorities at 10:00 a.m. on June 2, 1978. At this time, the
Mexican police provided the copies of the news clippings on
the assassination of John F. Kennedy from the Excelsior.
HSCA staff members asked if the Mexicans could persuade the
newspapers to reveal the sources of their stories about
Oswald and Silvia Duran. The Mexican officials' response was
negative The Mexican officials informed the HSCA staff
members that most of the data we wanted from the files is in
their Security Service files. The Mexican officials working
with the HSCA explained that they were the Mexican
equivalent of the FBI and that the Security Service was the
Mexican equivalent of the CIA; hence there was the usual
bureaucratic problem involved in obtaining access to the
HSCA representatives that Emilio Carballido had been
located;
-270-
that Deba Garro could not be located; and that there was no
record of anyone named Eunice Odio. HSCA representatives
told the Mexican officials that Odio, who was either Costa
Rican or Guatemalan, had been the mistress of Emilio
Carballido. The assassination and the reaction of the
Mexican people to it was discussed.
At 1:00 p.m., HSCA staff members conducted an interview
at the United States Embassy in connection with the CIA
aspects of the Mexico City investigation.
At 2:30, Gary Cornwell discussed problems with
[
]
At 6:00 p.m., the HSCA staff members, accompanied by
Jesus Meixuerio Kanty and his assistant, Honorio Escondon,
met with the assistant chief the Mexican Security Service
Nazar. Mr. Nazar gave an oral resume of the interviews which
Mexican officials conducted in 1963 of Silvia, Horatio and
Ruben Duran and Betty Serratos. Mr. Nazar said that the
files had to be formally requested before he could consider
releasing them. He suggested that we secure statements
admissible in United
-271-
States courts from the witnesses whom we wished to
interview. Mr. Nazar suggested that our best investigatory
avenue would be to concentrate on Oswald's interrogation
after his arrest on November 22nd. Mr. Nazar had a very low
opinion of Elena Garro de Paz' credibility. He felt that she
confused fact and fiction.
June 3 and 4, 1978, were spent on CIA-related aspects
of the Mexico City investigation. Two interviews were
conducted. All interviews, with the exception of interviews
with [ ] were taped and later transcribed.
At 11:00 a.m. on June 5, 1978, the HSCA staff
interviewed Horacio Duran for the record.(1200) At 1:00 p.m.,
HSCA staff member Edwin Lopez and Mexican officials Honorio
Escondon and Dr. Alfonso Orozco Gutierrez interviewed Pedro
Gutierrez Valencia for the record.(1201) At 5:00 p.m., HSCA
staff members interviewed Lynn Duran, aka Lydia Duran, for
the record.(1202)
On June 6, 1978 at 11:00 a. m., the HSCA staff
interviewed Ruben Duran for the record.(1203) At 1:00 p.m., the
staff representatives met with Commandante Ventura. The
staff representatives agreed to supply the Mexicans with
questions for the two witnesses, Oscar Contreras and
-272-
Ernesto Lehfeld Miller, who could not then be
interviewed.(1204) Commandante Ventura authorized Honorio Escondon to
interview Oscar Contreras Lartigue and Ernesto Lehfeld
Miller. At 5:00 p.m., the wife of Ruben Duran, Betty
Serratos,(1205) was interviewed for the record. At 5:45 p.m.,
Silvia Duran was interviewed for the record.(1206)
The HSCA staff representatives left Mexico City at 8:30
a.m. on June 7, 1978, arriving in Washington, D.C. at 5:30
p.m., Washington time.
-273-
Appendix 3: HSCA Procedural Write-up Mexico Trip 2;
House Select Committee staffers Edwin Juan Lopez and
Harold Leap traveled to Mexico City on August 7, 1978. The
staff members were met by David T. Patton, a State
Department official, at the Mexican airport at 10:15 p.m.
Mr. Patton then checked the staffers into Room 1754 at the
Maria Isabel Hotel. Mr. Patton informed the staff members
that [
] wished to see us at 8:30 a.m. the following morning.
On Tuesday, August 8, 1978, Committee staffers met with
[ (1207)] He informed the staffers that
the two individuals the Committee wished to
interview [
] (1208) were now available.
At 9:30 a.m., August 8, 1978, Committee staff members
interviewed [ ] (1209) The interview ended at
approximately 10:15 a.m.
Committee staff members returned to [ ]
office. [ ] stated that it appeared that the
Government of Mexico had only been able to locate two
-274-
witnesses for the Committee, Oscar Contreras Lartigue(1210) and
Noe W. Palomares.(1211) [ ] asked the staff members to
whom they wished to speak. The Committee staff members
explained that they would like to interview [
possibly footnotes (1212) (1213)] then
stated that it appeared that the House Select Committee on
Assassinations had already asked the Mexicans to locate the
individuals listed above.
[ ] stated that the HSCA's interview with
[ possibly footnote (1214)] as considered "highly
sensitive." He explained that three rooms at a nearby hotel
would be used. In one room, [ (1215)] would sit.
Committee staff members would sit in a second room and two
CIA personnel officers would insure that the equipment
worked properly in a third room. [ ] then
phoned Mr. Niles Gooding, who had been sent [
] from Headquarters to arrange the procedures for
the interviews. Mr. Gooding explained that in 1977
Stansfield Turner had created a new position at Headquarters
to insure that important sensitive meetings were within the
guidelines previously
-275-
arranged. Mr. Gooding stated that the Central Intelligence
Agency had been under greater Congressional scrutiny the
past two years. Therefore, Director Turner, in order to
demonstrate the Agency's good faith, had engaged a retired
Army officer to act as liaison at sensitive interviews by
Congressional representatives. Mr. Gooding then explained
that the HSCA staff would be escorted by two CIA personnel
to the interview with [ possibly footnote (1216)]
At 10:55 a.m., August 8, 1978, Committee staff members
interviewed [ ](1217)
At 12:30 p.m., Committee staff members telephoned
Captain Fernandez Ventura Gutierrez. His secretary explained
that Mr. Ventura was not in the office, but that she would
have him call us when he returned. At 6:30 p.m., since Mr.
Ventura had not yet returned the staffer's call, they again
called his office. His secretary apologized for Mr. Ventura
and explained that he had not yet returned to the office and
she assured us Mr. Ventura would telephone upon his return.
At 9:15 p.m., Dr. Jesus Yanez, the Assistant to the official
mayor, telephoned the staff members explaining that Mr.
Ventura was very busy on an important assignment and asked
us
-276-
to visit the Police Station known as the Procuraduria
General at 11:00 a.m. the following morning.
At 10:15 a.m., August 9, 1978, Committee staff members
met with State Department Official Richard Howard to alert
him that the Committee would request the Mexican officials
to make Silvia Duran available in Washington for an HSCA
hearing. Mr. Howard explained that once we had permission
from the Mexican government, the State Department would
insure that she was in Washington when necessary.
At 11:00 a.m., August 9, 1978, Committee staff members
met with Dr. Jesus Yanes and Ciprianio Martinez Novoa. Mr.
Yanes told Committee staff members that Ciprianio Martinez
Nova, the Mexican agent in charge, would try to aid us in
all our interviews. Mr. Martinez then briefed the Committee
staff members on their up to date progress:
Oscar Contreras Lartigue had been located and pre-
interviewed by Mr. Martinez in Tampico, Mexico. The
Committee would fly to Tampico on Friday, August 11, 1978 at
7:35 a.m. to interview him.
Noe W. Palomares had been located and could be
interviewed during the afternoon of Thursday, August 10,
-277-
1978 at his office, Cerrada de la Presa 4. His phone number,
595-0891, was made available to the Committee.
June Cobb Sharp received a tourist permit, number
72781, on June 27, 1947. She entered Mexico through Nuevo
Laredo, Texas. She requested but was denied permission by
the Mexican government to represent the magazine, Modern
Mexico. On June 2l, 1948, she received a courtesy permit,
number 25556. She disappeared in 1954 and never returned to
Mexico.
The Committee staffers did not tell the Mexicans that
the House Select Committee on Assassinations had evidence
from review of June Cobb's 201 file that she was in Mexico
in the Sixties.
Eunice Odio Infante, a Costa Rican, received a three-
month tourist permit from the Mexican government on February
9, 1964. She remained in Mexico, illegally residing at Nacas-
45-a, until 1972. She applied to write for the Excelsior
magazine on many different occasions, but was rejected every
time. In 1972. Ms. Odio married a Communist painter, Rudolfo
Sanabria Gonzalez and moved
-278-
to Rio Neba-16 Apartment 40. On May 24, 1972, Ms Odio was
found dead in her bathtub. The official presiding at her
autopsy concluded that Ms. Odio had poisoned herself.
Emilio Carballido Fontanes was in Caracas, Venezuela on
vacation and scheduled to return to Mexico in early
September. His address is Constituyentes 207. His phone
number is 515-8345.
[ ] personnel record in
Mexico could not be located. When the Mexican officials
inquired about her at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City prior
to the Committee's trip, no one at the office remembered
that she had worked there. Committee staff Members were told
that [ ] was probably dead. No basis was given for
the Mexican government's conclusion.
[ ] was born in Cuba
on November 3, 1927. He entered Mexico July 1, 1965 and
taught Graphics and Art at U.N.A.M. until January 1, 1968
when he disappeared. The Mexican officials assumed that he
returned to Cuba.
-279-
General Jesus Jose Clark Flores (1218) died in the early
1970's.
Ernesto Lehfeld Miller,(1219) Academic Coordinator at the
School of Interior Design, had not yet been located.
[ ] lives at [
] Mexico City. His phone
number is [ ] The landlady at his apartment explained
to the Mexican officials that [ ] had left town
hurriedly on Monday, August 7, 1978. Mr. Martinez, wishing
to know when he returned, had placed a piece of scotch tape
on the bottom right edge of his door. Mr. Martinez explained
that he checked it every four hours and would notify us if
[ ] returned before we left.
[ ] did not live at Cauhtemoc
877-5 as the Committee had stated. The landlady or the past
twenty-five years at the apartments told Mr. Martinez
that [ ] had never resided there. Committee staff
members explained that [ ] went by a pen name which
would be forwarded to the Mexican officials following
morning.
-280-
When Committee staff members inquired whether Ms.
Silvia Tirado Bazan could testify at an HSCA hearing, the
Mexican officials stated that they would have an answer for
the staffers by Friday morning. The Mexican officials
explained that they would have to speak to her to insure
that she was willing to travel to Washington.
On Thursday, August 10, 1978, at 11:00 a.m. the
Committee staff members met with Dr. Jesus Yanez, Agent
Ciprianio Martinez Novoa, Captain Florentino Ventura
Gutierrez and Attorney General Licensiado, [ ]
"pen name" was given to the Mexicans who stated that they
would check it with the landlady at his alleged apartment
building.
Committee staffers returned to their hotel room with
Agent Ciprianio Martinez Novoa after the meeting. Agent
Martinez attempted without success to telephone Oscar
Contreras Lartigue to inform him of our visit. At 3:30 p.m.
Agent Martinez finally reached Mr.Contreras' child who
informed him that Mr. Contreras was not in Tampico. He had
traveled to Mexico City for a Partido Republicano
-281-
Institucional convention. When Agent Martinez asked the
child if he knew where his father was staying in Mexico
City, he responded that he did not. Agent Martinez explained
to the child that he would call at a later time to speak to
his mother.
Agent Martinez telephoned Noe W. Palomares it 4:00 p.m.
and arrange an interview for 6:30 p.m. that evening. Mr.
Martinez asked Committee staff members to meet him at his
office at the Procuraduria General at 6:00 p.m.
At 6:00 p.m., August 10, 1978, Committee staff member
met Agent Ciprianio Martinez at the Procuraduria General.
Martinez then drove the HSCA representatives to
Mr. Palomares office. At 6:30 p.m., Committee staff members
interviewed Noe W. Palomares.(1220)
Following the interview, Agent Martinez returned to the
Maria Isabel Hotel with Committee staff members. He
attempted to reach Mrs. Contreras telephonically at Tampico
twice without success. At 9:45 a.m., he finally contacted
her Mrs. Contreras told Agent Martinez that Mr. Oscar
Contreras had told her that he would try to get a room
-282-
at either the Hotel Regis or Hotel San Francisco. Mrs.
Contreras explained that since there were a few conventions
scheduled in Mexico City that weekend she could not assure
that he would be at either hotel. Mrs. Contreras told Agent
Martinez that she would notify him if her husband should
call.
Mr. Martinez called both hotels and inquired whether
Oscar Contreras Lartigue was registered. He was not
registered at either; they were completely booked up.
Mr. Martinez attempted to reach by telephone Silvia
Tirado Byazan [sic] at their home to ask her whether she
would be willing to travel to Washington to testify at a
HSCA hearing and to ask if she knew where Mr. Ernesto
Lehfeld Miller could be located. She was not at home,
however.
Agent Martinez explained that he would attempt to
locate Oscar Contreras Lartigue at the hotel where the
Partido Republicano Institucional (Institutional Republican
Party) was holding its convention early the following
morning after which he would meet the staff members at 9:30
a.m. at their hotel room
-283-
At 9:45 a.m., August 11, 1978, Agent Martinez met
Committee staffers at their hotel room and explained that he
was unable to locate Mr. Contreras Lartigue at the
convention. Mr. Martinez then left to check the whereabouts
of Mr. Alberue Suoto and Silvia Tirado Bazan.
At 12:30 p.m., August 11, 1978, Agent Martinez returned
to the Committee staff members' hotel room. He telephoned
Mrs. Contreras in Tampico who stated that her husband had
not telephoned her since she had last spoken to Agent
Martinez. At 1:50 p.m., another agent, Honorio Escondon,
telephoned Agent Martinez at the Committee staffer hotel
room to inform him that [ ] must be
back in town because the scotch tape placed at the base of
his entranceway door was no longer in place. At 1:55 p.m.,
Agent Martinez telephoned [ ] During the
phone conversation, [ e] denied that he had worked at
the Cuban Embassy in the Sixties, stated that he knew
nothing about the assassination, and declined the Committee
staff members' request to interview him.
At 2:00 p.m., August 11, 1978, Agent Martinez
telephoned
-284-
Silvia Duran. Agent Martinez then gave the telephone to
Committee staffer Lopez. Mr. Lopez asked Ms. Tirado whether
she would be willing to testify sometime in September at a
Committee hearing in Washington; she answered affirmatively.
She stated that September 13th, 14th and 15th would not be
"good days" because the Mexican Revolution celebration would
be taking place and she was a planner and participant. When
Mr. Lopez asked Ms. Tirado if she knew Mr. Ernesto Lehfeld
Miller's phone number, she stated that she did not, but she
stated that if we telephoned her husband Horatio at either
516-0398 or 515-8621, he would be able to help us.
At 2:15 p.m., Committee staffer Lopez telephoned
Horatio Duran, who gave him Ernesto Lehfeld Miller's office
phone number, 548-4839. At 2:20 p.m., Lopez telephoned
Mr. Miller and arranged a meeting for 9:00 p.m. that
evening.
At 2:30 p.m., Agent Martinez telephoned Captain Ventura
to report on his progress, pertaining to his work with the
HSCA. When Martinez told Ventura that he had located [ ]
-285-
Ventura asked Martinez if he was alone. When Agent Martinez
lied and stated that he was alone, Ventura told him that he
should under no circumstances allow us to interview
[ ] When Agent Martinez completed his phone call, he
said, "I don't understand why nobody wants you to talk to
him."
At 9:00 p.m., August 1, 1978, Committee staffers
interviewed Ernesto Lehfeld Miller.(1221)
At 11:15 a.m., August 12, 1978, Committee staffer Lopez
called [ ] at his home. When Mr. Lopez
identified himself, [ ] immediately stated that
he knew nothing. He further stated that he never worked for
the Cuban Embassy. When Lopez explained to him that
employees at the Cuban Embassy had stated that he had been
employed there, [ ] hung up. [ 's] voice
quivered throughout the short talk.
At 11:45 a.m., Silvia Tirado called Lopez and stated
that she had thought all night about traveling to
Washington. She said she had seen a report in the newspapers
in which Ascue had stated that the man who visited the Cuban
Consulate
-286-
in 1963 was not Lee Harvey Oswald. She stated that Azcue had
only seen Oswald once while she had seen Oswald at least
three times.
Ms. Duran further stated
that if she testified in Washington and the Committee
concluded that she was lying she would be crucified when
she returned to Mexico. Mr. Lopez reassured her and explain
that when he returned to Washington he would send her a long
letter explaining procedures.
At 12:05 p.m., Agent Martinez met the Committee staff
members at the airport. He stated that Contreras and
Calvillo had not been located. The Committee staffers gave
Martinez a list of questions to ask Oscar Contreras
Lartigue. Agent Martinez stated that he would mail the
results of the interview to Lopez at the Committee offices
in Washington. The Committee never received any interview
reports from the Mexican government.
The Committee staff members left Mexico City at 1:55
p.m. and arrived at Washington's Dulles Airport at 10:35
p.m.
-287-
Appendix 4: HSCA Procedural Write-up Cuba Trip 2;
On August 25, l978, Congressman Richardson Preyer and
HSCA staff members G. Robert Blakey and Edwin Juan Lopez
Soto traveled to Cuba from Miami at 8:25 a.m. on an Air-Taxi
Service charter plane. The Committee representatives arrived
in Cuba at 10:15 a.m. They were met by the Minister of
Justice, Armando Torres Santrayll; Washington Consul Ricardo
Escartin; American Department official, Senen Buergo; and
translator, Nellie Ruiz de Zarade. The Committee
representatives were escorted to their suite, room number
2003, at the Hotel Riviera at 11:00 a.m.
At 12:15 p.m., the Committee representatives met with
Ricardo Escartin, Felipe Villa, Senen Buergo and translators
Juanita Vera and Nellie Ruiz de Zarade. Also present were
two Cuban stenographers. Senen Buergo, the spokesperson.
welcomed the Committee representatives to Cuba and thanked
the Committee for its correspondence. Mr. Buergo apologized
on behalf of the Cuban government for the postponement of a
previously scheduled trip of
-288-
May 24th and 25th, 1978. Mr. Buergo stressed that in his
opinion there was a conspiracy to link Cuba to the
assassination of John F. Kennedy. At that point, he handed
four files to Congressman Richardson Preyer. The files
consisted of: a) Material concerning Santo Trafficante b) a
letter dated 25 November 1963 from Hernandez Armas (Mexican
Ambassador in 1962 to Raul Roa (Minister of Foreign
Relations in 1963); c) the results of the Cuban government's
research into mis-information linking the Cuban Government
to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy; and d)
the report of the Investigative Committee of the
International Tribunal of the Eleventh Festival reporting on
the defamation campaign to link Cuba to the assassination of
John F. Kennedy. Mr. Buergo stated that both Eusebio Azcue
Lopez and Alfredo Mirabal Diaz would that day be made
available for interviews. Mr. Buergo stated that Nilo
Otero(1222) would be made available for interview the following day,
26 August 1978. Mr. Buergo stated that Roselio Rodriguez(1223)
was presently stationed in West Germany. Buergo stated that
Ricardo Escartin previously interviewed Mr. Rodriguez and
-289-
was told by Rodriguez that he had had no contact with Lee
Harvey Oswald. Mr. Buergo stated that if the Committee still
desired to interview Rodriguez, he would be made available
to the Committee. Mr. Buergo stated that an interview with
Rolando Cubela Secades(1224) would be arranged.
Mr. Buergo asked if the Committee was still interested
in interviewing Orestes Guillermo Ruiz Perez.(1225) Mr. Buergo
stated that the Cuban government had no record of a citizen
named Griselle Rubio.(1226) Mr. Buergo inquired whether the
Committee representatives were interested in watching the
videotaped statements of James Wilcott(1227) and Phillip
Agee(1228) at the Tribunal.(1229) Congressman Preyer responded that the
Committee's representatives would want to view the Wilcott
and Agee videotaped statements.
Mr. Buergo stated that our schedule included dinner
with the Minister of Justice at 8:00 P.M. on 25 August 1978,
fishing on 27 August 1978 (Sunday), and a farewell dinner on
27 August 1978.
Congressman Preyer thanked the Cuban officials for
-290-
making both the documents and witnesses available to the
Select Committee.
Professor Blakey stated that the Committee was no
longer interested in interviewing Rolando Cubela. Mr. Blakey
stated that Griselle Rubio had been found in Miami and
interviewed by a Committee investigator. Mr. Blakey stated
that the Committee wanted to interview Oreste Guillermo Ruiz
Perez for two reasons: He worked at the Cuban Embassy in
September 1963 when Oswald allegedly visited the Cuban
compound in Mexico City; and, he is married to the cousin of
a counter-revolutionary, Antonio Veciana Blanch. Mr. Blakey
stated that Rogelio Rodriguez need not be interviewed
Captain Felipe Villa stated that the Cuban government,
relying on the seriousness and honesty of the Committee's
work thought that the Committee should have knowledge of
Cuebela's statements. Mr. Villa stated that the Committee
still needed to provide the Cuban government with the
following: a) a workable formula on counter-revolutionaries
that could be used by the Cuban government to aid the
Committee in its investigation of such organizations;
-291-
b) copies of Lee Harvey Oswald's signatures that the Cuban
government could use to perform its own handwriting
comparison test; and c) E. Howard Hunt's aliases;
Mr. Blakey stated that examples of Lee Harvey Oswald's
handwriting would be forthcoming. Mr. Blakey stated that the
Committee had not yet developed a formula for identify [sic]
counter-revolutionary groups active against the Cuban
government in l963 or a method for providing E. Howard
Hunt's aliases. Mr. Blakey stressed that both these areas
would be discussed in the Committee's final report.
At 1:00 p.m. the first work session ended.
At 3:15 p.m. House Select Committee on Assassinations
representatives interviewed Juan Nilo Otero in Room 2003 of
the Hotel Riviera. Present were Congressman Richardson
Preyer, G. Robert Blakey, Edwin Juan Lopez Soto, Senen
Buergo, Ricardo Escartin, Captain Felipe Villa, translator
Juanita Vera and two stenographers.(1230) The interview ended
at 5:15 p.m.
At 8:00 p.m. the Committee's representatives met Senen
Buergo and translator Nellie Ruiz de Zarade at the
-292-
Hotel Riviera's lobby. The group was chauffeured to the
Bodeguita del Medio--one of Cuba's most famous restaurants--
where they dined with the Minister of Justice, Armando
Torres Santrayll.
At 10:15 a.m., 26 August 1978, Select Committee
representatives interviewed Alfredo Mirabal Diaz(1231) in Room
2003 at the Hotel Riviera. Present were Congressman
Richardson Preyer, G. Robert Blakey, Edwin Juan Lopez Soto,
Senen Buergo, Captain Felipe Villa, Ricardo Escartin,
translators Juanita Vera and Nellie Ruiz de Zarade and two
stenographers. The interview ended at 12:45 p.m.
After the Mirabal interview Mr. Buergo asked whether
the HSCA representatives wished to interview Jose Verdacia
Verdacia,(1232) the Warden of Trescornia while Santos
Trafficante was a detainee. When Congressman Richardson
Preyer stated that the Committee would indeed be interested
in interviewing Jose Verdacia Verdacia. Mr. Buergo stated
that he would be available for an interview at 3:00 p.m.
At 3:30 p.m., HSCA representatives interviewed
-293-
Jose Verdacia Verdacia in Room 2003 of the Hotel Riviera.
Present were Congressman Richardson Preyer, G. Robert
Blakey, Edwin Juan Lopez Soto, Senen Buergo, Captain Felipe
Villa, Ricardo Escartin, Arias Gutierrez, translators
Juanita Vera and Nellie Ruiz de Zarade, and two
stenographers.(1233) The interview ended at 4:20 p.m.
On Sunday morning, 27 August 1978, the Cuban Government
representatives took the Select Committee representatives to
Veradero Beach.
At 8:35 p.m. Select Committee representatives
interviewed Orestes Guillermo Ruiz Perez at the Hotel
Internacional at Veradero Beach. Present were Congressman
Richardson Preyer, G. Robert Blakey, Edwin Juana Lopez Soto,
Richardo Escartin, Captain Felipe Villa, Senen Buergo and
translator Juanita Vera.(1234) Because there were no
stenographers present the Cuban representatives tape-
recorded the interview. The interview ended at 9:20 p.m.
On 28 August 1978, at 10:25 a.m., HSCA representatives
interviewed Rolando Cubela Secades in Room 2003 at the Hotel
-294-
Riviera. Present were Congressman Richardson Preyer, G.
Robert Blakey, Edwin Juan Lopez Soto, Ricardo Escartin,
Captain Felipe Villa, Senen Buergo, translator Juanita Vera
and Nellie Ruiz de Zarade, and two stenographers. Also
present was Antonio Hernandez who escorted Mr. Cable from
prison to the Hotel.(1235) The interview ended at 11:45 p.m.
At 3:25 p.m., HSCA representatives interviewed Maria
Teresa Proenza y Proenza in Room 2003 of the Hotel Riviera.
Present were Congressman Richardson Preyer, G. Robert
Blakey, Edwin Juan Lopez Soto, Ricardo Escartin, Captain
Felipe Villa, Senen Buergo Antonio Hernandez, translator
Nellie Ruiz de Zarade and two stenographers.(1236) The
interview ended at 4:15 p.m.
On 29 August 1978, at 9:30 a.m., the HSCA
representatives met the Cuban delegation for a final work
session in Room 20 of the Hotel Riviera. Present were
Congressman Richardson Preyer, G. Robert Blakey, Edwin Juan
Lopez, Ricardo Escartin, Senen Buergo, Captain Felipe Villa,
translators Juanita Vera and Nellie Ruiz de Zarade and two
stenographers.(1237)
-295-
The Cuban delegation spokesperson, Senen Buergo,
explained that Mr. Manuel Piniero(1238) was out of the country
and therefore an interview could not be arranged. Mr. Buergo
explained that the Cuban delegation had located Luisa
Calderon Carralero(1239) but because she was ill an interview
could not be arranged. Mr. Buergo suggested that the HSCA
forward questions to the Cuban Government. Ms. Calderon's
answers would then be forwarded to the Committee.
Mr. Buergo explained that Raul Roa(1240). had a very busy
schedule. Mr. Roa felt that he could not add any more
information to what Nilo Otero had already provided and
declined the interview.
Material handed to the HSCA representatives at this
time included:
a) a list of persons whom the Cuban delegation
believed to have had close relations with Santo
Trafficante;
b) photographs depicting what the Cuban government
believed to be a Central Intelligence Agency
-296-
photographic surveillance base targeted against
the Cuban Consulate and Embassy in Mexico City
during 1963;
c) an essay entitled "Imperialism's Political,
Economic, and Military Organizations and Agencies
of Crime, such as the CIA" and
d) an article entitled "Finally We Have Eliminated
That Pinto in the White House, said Bob, When He
Heard About JFK's Assassination"
The final work session ended at 11:00 a.m.
At 1:00 p.m., the Cuban delegation escorted the
Committee's representatives to the airport. At the airport
they were bid farewell by the Minister of Justice, Armando
Torres Santrayll, Senen Buergo, Juanita Vera and Nellie Ruiz
de Zarade.
At 3:30 p.m., the HSCA representatives and Washington
Consul, Ricardo Escartin, departed Cuba.
-297-
Appendix 5: Biography: Elena Garro de Paz;
Elena Garro de Paz was born of Spanish parents in
Puebla, Mexico on December 11, 1917. (All information in
this section culled from Biography Data form prepared by
Charles Thomas.) Ms. Garro attended the National Autonomous
University of Mexico and later did graduate work at Berkeley
in California and at the University of Paris. In 1963, Elena
had long been married to Octavio Paz, a career diplomat who
is also one of Mexico's finest poets and leading
intellectuals. Then Octavio was named Mexican Ambassador to
India, the couple separated by mutual consent. Elena's
daughter, also named Elena, has always resided with her
mother.
Since Elena spent seventeen years of her early life in
Europe she had a rather un-Mexican objectivity about her
native land and had a reputation for being one of its more
articulate detractors. At the same time, Elena was
considered emotionally committed to many aspects of Mexican
life and made an important contribution to its artistic
development.
-298-
In the 1960's Elena became a significant writer. Hogar
Solido, El Rey Mago, La Senora en su Balcon, Ventura
Allende, Andaise por las Ramas, Parada Empresa, and El Viaje
are plays that have had appreciative audiences in Europe,
where they were translated into German, as well as in
Mexico. Ms. Garro's short stories are collected in a volume
called La Semana de Colores. The Literacy Supplement of the
London Times has called her novel, Los Recuerdos de Porenir,
"a splendid success." Critics have said of her: "For Elena
Garro, there is no frontier between reality and fantasy; in
any case, the latter is a second reality--perhaps more
intense--to which one may penetrate without passport or
forewarning, thanks to the effectiveness of a literature
fired with passion, flavor and life." Many people who knew
Elena have asserted that the frontier between reality and
fantasy is also difficult for her to distinguish 1n real
life. (Biography Data Form on Elena Garro de Paz prepared
by Charles Thomas.)
Ms. Garro, for many years, was an active worker in the
Confederation Nacional Campesina (CNC), the agrarian
-299-
arm of the Partido Reformista (PRI). Because Ms. Garro was a
tireless propagandist and agitator on behalf of the poorer
Mexican peasants, she was on close personal terms with and
enjoyed the respect of peasant leaders from all over the
country. (Ibid.)
Elena was considered a witty, urbane and opinionated
woman with an unflagging sense of humor. Her forthright
opinions and sharp wit tended on occasion to ruffle feathers
in Mexico, but her important social, literacy, and political
connections rendered her fairly immune from serious
counterattack until 1968. Then, Ms. Garro was forced to flee
the country with her daughter, Elenita and her sister, Deba
Guerrero de Galvan, in the midst of the student strikes. The
House Select Committee on Assassinations has been unable to
determine the exact reason Ms. Garro had for fleeing Mexico.
Before her disappearance from Mexico, Elena was well
disposed toward the United States and had been friendly with
Embassy officers. Her broad range of significant personal
friends, the views of many important to the
-300-
American Embassy, made her a useful Embassy target. (A
"useful Embassy target" is a person deemed important enough
because of acquaintances to merit frequent contact, either
witting or unwitting, with American Embassy officials.)
-301-
APPENDIX SIX: GLOSSARY OF TERMS USED IN REPORT.;
Agent: A person who knowingly works for the CIA on a
contract or job basis.
Asset: A general term for persons, not officers, used by the
CIA. For example, both agents and sources are assets.
An asset is anyone used in an operation or project,
whether or not that person is aware that he is being
used.
Case officer: See Operations officer.
Coverage: Surveillance.
Cryptonym: A series of letters used by the CIA to identify
someone or something while protecting that person or
things true identity. All the letters in a cryptonym
are capitalized. The first two letters are assigned by
the subject matter or local to which the person or
thing belongs. The rest of the cryptonym is randomly
assigned. [
]
Chronological file: A folder in which material is stored in
chronological order. Usually used for production or
communications type material.
[
.]
FOIA: Freedom of Information Act
[ ] CIA cryptonym for photographic project aimed at
the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City.
[ ] CIA cryptonym, pre-1964, for surveillance
operation aimed at the Cubans in Mexico City.
[ ] CIA cryptonym assigned to one of the three bases
which provided photographic surveillance of the Soviet
Embassy in Mexico City.
-302-
[ ] CIA cryptonym meaning "Soviet".
[ ] CIA cryptonym of one of three bases which
provided photographic surveillance of the Soviet
Embassy in Mexico City.
[ ] CIA cryptonym for photographic surveillance
operations aimed at the Cuban diplomatic compound in
Mexico City after July, 1964.
[ ]
Logs: A list of photographs taken and the times they were
taken prepared by agents in the photographic base
houses.
[
]
Officer: CIA career employee.
Operation: A subpart of a project. Often used
interchangeably with "project".
Operations officer: CIA career employee; term usually used
in connection with an employee with responsibility for
a particular operation or project.
Penetration agent: An agent who works inside a target
institution. For example [
]
P file: Designation assigned to a personality file in the
Mexico City Station. A file for the retention of
information of information in written form arranged
according to individual's names.
Photographic base: House, apartment, or building used for
housing of photographic surveillance equipment and the
agents who operate it. Always located near the target.
-303-
Pitched: Made an effort to recruit as an agent, asset or
source.
Production: Materials or information generated by an
operation or project.
Project: A group or set of operations by the CIA aimed at a
specific person, institution or thing, with the aim of
collecting information, influencing behavior, etc.
Project files: A folder for the retention of information
generated by, or relating to a project. Generally
broken down into four sub-files: Development and plans,
production; support; and operations.
Pseudonym: False name assigned to CIA officers for use in
communication channels.
Pulse camera: A camera with a shutter that is automatically
tripped by a triggering device activated by changes in
light density.
Resuma: [
]
Selected Out: Phrase used when a Foreign Service officer is
retired after having been in one grade for the maximum
period of time and is not considered qualified for
promotion to a higher grade.
Source: A person who either wittingly or unwittingly
provides information to the CIA.
Station: A CIA over-seas installation. It is the
headquarters for operations in a particular country and
is usually located [
]
Subject file: Folder for the retention of information in
written form arranged by the subject matter of the
information contained
-304-
Target: A person, institution or thing at which a project,
operation or pitch is aimed.
VLS-2 trigger device: A machine which automatically triggers
the shutter of a camera when it senses a change in
light density. Used along with a camera and a spotting
scope in a "pulse" camera.
-305-
APPENDIX SEVEN: LISTING Of CIA DOCUMENTS CITED.;
Annual Fitness Report on Ann Goodpasture, 1/14/64.
Article, with note in margin, in Oswald P file, by Robert S.
Allen and Paul Scott, "CIA Withheld Vital Intelligence
from Warren Commission," 10/21/64.
Blind Memorandum entitled "Delay in sending the first cable
about Oswald."
Blind memorandum re: Lee Harvey Oswald/Silvia Tirado de
Duran, Source: [blank] 11/26/63.
CIA Component Report on [
]
DIR 74830, 10/10/63. (A "DIR" is a cable from Head quarters
to a field station. In this report the field station is
always Mexico City.)
DIR 84886, 11/23/63.
DIR 84888, 11/23/63.
DIR 84916, 11123/63.
DIR 85371, 11/28/63.
DIR 87770, 12/9/63, with attached note.
DIR 88680, 12/13/63.
DIR 90466, 12/21/63.
DIR 16823, 7/14/67.
Draft of letter from Win Scott to John Barron, 11/25/70.
Foul Foe, The, by Winston Scott writing as Ian Maxwell.
HMMA 4300 3/12/56. (An "HMMA" is a dispatch from Mexico City
to Headquarters.
HMMA 14793, 4/8/60.
-306-
HMMA 21845, 7/30/63.
HMMA 22005, 8/23/63.
HMMA 22135, 9/13/63.
HMMA 22267, 10/8/63.
HMMA 22307, 10/18/63.
HMMA 22433, 11/7/63.
HMMA 22452, 11/7/63.
HMMA 22536, 11/9/63.
HMMA 22726, 1/16/64.
HMMA 23343, 4/30/64.
HMMA 26006, 4/30/65.
HMMA 26160, 5/21/65.
HMMA 26414, 6/22/65.
HMMA 31303, 2/7/67.
HMMA 32243, 5/27/67.
HMMA 32497, 7/11/67.
HMMW 12725, 7/8/64. (An "HMMW" is a dispatch from CIA
Headquarters to Mexico City.)
HMMW 13645, 5/13/65.
HMMW 15557, 6/14/67.
HMMW. 1548, 5/18/67 (Mexico City Copy.)
Inspector General Report, 1977, Tab G-2.
Log Film 143, 9/25/63 through 9/27/63 in CIA file.
-307-
entitled [ ] July 63 (J110) to 9 Dec 1963 (J163)
from Archives-Job #70.209 Box #1 [ ]
Production material.
Log Film 144, 10/1/63 through 10/3/63, in CIA file entitled
[ ] 17 July 63 (J110) to 9 Dec 1963 (J163) from
Archives-Job # 70.209 Box # 1, [ ]
Production material.
[ ] Project Renewal Request, 1/1/66.
Memorandum entitled "Response to HSCA request of 25 July,
1978," 8/20/78.
Memorandum for the Record from W. David Slawson re: Trip to
Mexico City, 4/22/64.
Memorandum from Chief DDP/PG to Chief of Operations/DDP,
2/3/61.
Memorandum from Chief of FI/OPS to Chief of Operations/DDP,
1/8/60.
Memorandum from Chief/WHD, to COS/Mexico City, 12/30/63.
Memorandum from "JKB" re: Oscar Contreras, 7/10/67.
Memorandum from Shepanek to Scott Breckinridge, 7/31/78.
Memorandum from Winston Scott to the files re: June Cobb,
11/25/64.
Memorandum to Clark Anderson from Winston Scott, 11/27/63,
with seven attachments.
Memorandum to DDP from Chief/WHD, 1/21/64
Memorandum to the Legal Attache from the COS/Mexico City,
7/5/67
Memorandum to the Ambassador from Winston Scott, 10/16/63
re: "Lee Oswald Contact with the Soviet Embassy."
Mexico City Investigation Chronology, Bulky # WX-7241,
Volume I
-308-
MEXI 6453, 10/8/63. (Mexico copy. A "MEXI" is a cable from
Mexico City.)
MEXI 6453, 10/9/63. (Headquarters copy.)
MEXI 6534, 10/15/63.
MEXI 7014, 11/22/63.
MEXI 7023, 11/23/63.
MEXI 7024, 11/23/63.
MEXI 7025, 11/23/63.
MEXI 7029, 11/23/63.
MEXI 7033, 11/23/63.
MEXI 7054, 11/24/63.
MEXI 7101, 11/27/63.
MEXI 7105, 11/27/63.
MEXI 7364, 12/12/63.
MEXI 9332, 5/6/64.
MEXI 9440, 6/19/64.
MEXI 5621, 12/16/65.
MEXI 5741, 12/29/65.
MEXI 1950, 6/29/67.
MEXI 1991, 7/5/67.
Note from Ann Goodpasture to Mexico City Station Cuban
Section, 2/3/66.
Note to Luis Echeverria, 11/23/63.
Notes made by A. Goodpasture for John Leader, IG Staff,
-309-
re: "Background on Mexico Station Support Assets
(Coverage of Soviet and Cuban Embassies)," 2/10/77.
Project Renewal Request, 1/11/65, attachment to HMMA 25141.
Report on Oswald from John Scelso, C/WH/3, to James
Angleton, C/CI, 12/24/63.
Review of Project [ ] attachment to HMMA 15979
11/18/60.
Review of Project [ ] attachment to HMMA 17999,
10/31/6l.
Review of Project [ ] attachment to HMMA 20054,
10/18/62.
Review of Project [ ] attachment to HMMA 22387,
10/25/63
Routing and Record Sheet for DIR 74830, 10/11/63.
Routing and Record Sheet for MEXI 7028, 11/23/63.
Routing and Record Sheet for MEXI 7033, 11/23/63.
Teletype from the CIA to the State Department, FBI and Navy,
DIR 74678, 10l/1O/63.
Transcript. from Cuban Embassy, 9/27/63.
Transcripts from Russian Embassy, 9/27/63, 9/28/63, 10/l/63
and 10/3/63.
Undated Draft of 1977 CIA Staff Report, Tab F, "Mexico
Station Coverage of Soviet and Cuban Embassies
(1963)."
Write-up: [ ] meeting with [ ] 5/26/67
Note: in addition to the above listed documents many
Summaries of file reviews, depositions of employees,
interviews of employees, etc., are cited in the report.
[An additional handwritten document was included in the
photocopy packet. It was probably intened to be a
footnote.]
149A
There is evidence that when the [redacted] base was
originally set up that it was planned to have it operate in
this manner.
"The [redacted] base will be principally used for
photographic surveillance of the [redacted] ta[illegible]
_working alternatively but without a pattern,_ with the
[redacted] base (HMMA-4160, 2/20/56, para. 5. emphasis
added) the station planned the operation in this manner so
that "many of the outward signs of photographic surveillance
will be reduced." (Ibid., para [illegible] )
FOOTNOTES
FOR LEE HARVEY OSWALD, MEXICO CITY
AND THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
_______________________________
1 See Warren Report, pp. 299-304, 733-736. In support of its
account of Oswald's contacts with the Soviet and Cuban
diplomatic missions, the Warren Commission published the
following as exhibits:
1) A note from the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs to
the Swiss Ambassador in Cuba. (Commission Exhibit
2445.)
2) Lee Harvey Oswald visa application and the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cuba's letter
denying the visa. (Commission Exhibit 2564.)
3) Letterhead Memorandum to J. Lee Rankin from Richard
Helms re: "Technical Examination of Photographs of Lee
Harvey Oswald's Application for a Cuban Visa."
(Commission Exhibit 3127.)
4) The pages of Lee Harvey Oswald's notebook with the
telephone numbers of the Cuban Consulate, the Soviet
Consulate and the Soviet Military Attach�'s office.
(Commission Exhibit 2121.)
5) A letter dated 11/9/63 from Lee Harvey Oswald to the
Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C. (Commission Exhibit
15.)
6) A letter from J. Edgar Hoover to the Warren Commission
listing the contents of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation's file holding on Lee Harvey Oswald prior
to the assassination. (Commission Exhibit 834. - This
document listed a Central Intelligence Agency "release"
dated 10/9/63 that reported Oswald's contact with the
Soviet Embassy in Mexico City.)
7) A memorandum dated 5/14/64 to the United States
Embassy in Mexico City from the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs for Mexico. (Commission Exhibit 2120.)
8) A memorandum dated 6/9/64 from the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs for Mexico to the United States Embassy in
Mexico City. (Commission Exhibit 2123.)
9) A letterhead memorandum to J. Lee Rankin from Richard
Helms re: "Hours of Work at the Cuban and Soviet
Consulates." (Commission Exhibit 2568.)
2 Warren Commission Report, p. 305
3 Classified Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents,
undated, pp. 1-2; David A. Phillips Testimony, 11/27/76,
p. 123; HSCA Outside Contact Treport, David A. Phillips,
5/11/78, JFK Document No. 008321; [ ]
Interview, 3/24/78, p. 2; [ ] Interview,
6/3/78, p. 2
4 [ ] Interview, 6/3/78, p. 4
5 See JFK Exhibit F-438, reprinted at page [blank].
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.; see also Section II, A, 3, below.
10 See JFK F-438 and Section II, A, 3 below. A pulse camera
is a camera equipped with a device that automatically
triggers the shutter of the camera thereby exposing the
film.
11 [ ] Interview, 3/24/78, p. 3 [was 4]
12 Undated Draft of 1977 CIA Staff Report, Tab F, "Mexico
Station Coverage of Soviet and Cuban Embassies (1963),"
p. 5. Hereinafter cited as Tab F Draft.
13 David A. Phillips Testimony, 11/27/76, p. (1?)23; Ann
Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, p. 44.
14 Ibid.
15 Phillips Testimony, 11/27/76, p. 123; [stricken: Phillips
Testimony, 4/25/78, p. 43.]
16 Outside Contact Report, David A. Phillips, 5/11/78, JFK
Document No. 008321.
17 [ ] Interview, 6/3/78, p. 2.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid., p. 3.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid., p. 4. CF: Phillips Testimony, 11/27/76, pp. 107-108
and Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, pp. 45-46 in which
[redacted] is said to have printed the contact sheets.
24 Classified Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents,
undated, pp. 1-2.
25 HMMA 22307, 10/18/63.
26 Ibid., para. 5, c. There were two common means of
communication between the CIA Mexico City Station and CIA
Headquarters: cables and dispatches. A dispatch from
Mexico City to Headquarters always has the letter prefix
"HMMA." A dispatch from Headquarters to Mexico City
always has the letter prefix "HMMW." A cable from Mexico
City to Headquarters always has the letter prefix "MEXI."
A cable from Headquarters always has the letter prefix
"DIR."
27 HMMA 22307, 10/18/63, para. 5, c.
28 Ibid.
29 See JFK Exhibit F-438.
30 HMMA 22307, 10/18/63, para. 5, c.
31 Ibid. There is general agreement that [ ] was
the case officer for this operation. The only person who
takes exception to that characterization of [
]s role in the project is [ ] (See: Phillips
Testimony , 11/27/76, pp. 107-108; Goodpasture Testimony,
4/13/78, pp. 45-46; [ ] Interview, 6/3/78, p.
6. But see: Deposition of [ ] 5/16/78, p. 34.)
32 HMMA 22307, 10/18/63, para. 5,c.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid. The Committee declines to assume that there had been
no production by the by the time of this dispatch in
October. The handling of the production, i.e., when it
was picked up and taken to the Station, when it was
developed, etc., is not known. But as the following
analysis will show, there is a strong likelihood that the
pulse camera was operating in late September and early
October 1963.
36 HMMA 22433, 11/7/63.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid., para. 1.
39 Ibid., para. 2.
40 Ibid., para. 3
41 Ibid., attachment B.
42 Ibid., para. 3.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid., Attachment C.
45 HMMA 22307, 10/18/63, para. 5, c.
46 HMMA 22433, 11/7/63, para. 3.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid., para. 4.
50 MEXI 9440, 6/19/64.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
54 HSCA Classified notes of discussion with CIA employee,
7/20/78.
55 Ibid.
56 HMMA 22726, 1/16/64, CIA #4098.
57 Ibid., para. 5, g.
58 HMMA 26414, 6/22/65.
59 Ibid., para. 1.
60 Ibid., para. 3.
61 HSCA Classified Notes of discussion with CIA employee,
7/27/78. The cryptonym was changed on 8 July 1964. (HMMW
12725, 7/8/64.)
62 Letter from Blakey to BrekInridge, 7/21/78.
63 See Sections III, A, 5 and 6 below.
64 JFK Classified Document #142.
65 Ibid.
66 JFK Classified Document #146.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
69 HMMA 22307, 10/18/63, para. 5, c.
70 HMMA 22433, 11/7/63.
71 Ibid., para. 3.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid., and para. 4
75 HMMA 22726, 1/16/64, para. 5, g.
76 HMMA 22307, 10/18/63, para. 5, c.
77 HMMA 22433, 11/7/63, para. 3.
78 This assumption is considered reasonable in light of the
desire of the Mexico City Station to establish coverage
of the newly reopened Consulate entrance. See HMMA 22307,
10/18/63.
79 HMMA 26414, 6/22/65, para. 3.
80 See MEXI 9440, 6/19/64; HMMA 26414, 6/22/65, para. 5.
81 [ ] Interview, 6/3/78, p. 4.
82 1966 [ ] Project Renewal Request, 1/1/66. [ ]
was the CIA cryptonym for photographic surveillance
operations aimed at the Cuban diplomatic compound.
83 Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, pp. 43-44.
84 HSCA Outside Contact Report, David A. Phillips, 5/11/78,
JFK Document No. 008321.
85 MEXI 9332, 6/6/64
86 See discussion of this memo in Section II, B, below.
87 [ ] Interview, 6/3/78, p. 2.
88 Ibid., p. 4.
89 Ibid.
90 HMMA 26414, 6/22/65, para. 5.
91 See pages 24-27, above.
92 Classified Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents,
undated, pp. 1-2.
93 Ibid.
94 Ibid.
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid.
99 Ibid.
100 Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, p. 47.
101 [ ] Testimony, 5/16/78, p. 35; HMMA 26006,
4/30/65, para. 8.
102 Ibid.; HMMW 13645, 5/13/65; HMMA 26160, 5/21/65, paras. 1
and 2.
103 See MEXI 9440 and HMMA 26414
104 JFK Classified Document #142.
105 Notes made by A. Goodpasture for John Leader, IG Staff,
re: "Background on Mexico Station Support Assets
(Coverage of Soviet and Cuban Embassies)", 2/10/77, p. 1.
Hereinafter cited as Goodpasture Notes. See also: Tab f
Draft, p. 1; Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, p. 15.
106 Review of Project [ ] attachment to HMMA 15979,
11/18/60; Memorandum from Chief DDP/PG to Chief of
Operations/DDP, 2/3/61.
107 HMMA-23343, 4/30/64, para. 2. It is possible that the
Saturday coverage was more extensive in 1963 during
Oswald's visit. See the following discussion of Review of
Project [ ] attachment to HMMA-15979, 11/18/60;
Review of Project [redacted] attachment to HMMA 17999,
10/31/61; Review of Project [ ] attachment to HMMA-
20052, 10/18/62; Review of Project [ ] attachment
to HMMA-22387, 10/25/63; and Section B. 4, following
[ ] is the CIA cryptonym referring to the overall
photo-surveillance operation aimed at the Soviet
diplomatic compound.
108 Sketch based on HMMA-4300, 3/12/56 with attachments;
Goodpasture Notes, 2/10/77, p. 1; Tab F Draft, p. 1; HMMA-
14793, 4/8/60, para. 3; Goodpasture Exhibit #1, 11/20/78.
109 Goodpasture Notes, 2/10/77, p. 1; Tab F Draft, p. 1;
Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, p. 15.
110 Ibid.
111 Ibid.
112 Ibid. See Map above. Even though [ ] is referred to
as the "primary" base because it was the first to be put
into operation, the [ ] base produced the best
photographs. (HMMA-14793, 4/8/60, para. 3)
113 Tab F Draft, pp. 2 and 5; HSCA Executive Session Testimony
of Ann Goodpasture, 4/13/78, p. 13; HSCA Staff Interview
of [ ], 3/24/78, p. 3.
114 Ibid. on all preceding; HSCA Staff Interview of [ ]
and [ ] 3/20/78, p. 5; HSCA Deposition of
[ ] 4/28/78, pp. 18-19; Memorandum from
Chief DDP/PG to Chief of Operations/DDP, 2/3/61.
115 Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, p. 13.
116 [ ] and [ ] Interview, 3/20/78, p. 5.
117 Tab F Draft, p. 5; parenthetical in original.
118 Goodpasture Notes, p. 9.
119 MEXI 9332, 5/6/64.
120 Ibid.
121 [ ] and [ ] Interview, 3/20/78, p. 5.
122 See also Section II, A, 3 above.
123 Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, p. 23. Ms. Goodpasture
stated that the case officer handling the project was
[ ] (Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, p. 34.)
[ ] could not remember with certainty the
scope of the photographic coverage of the Soviet Embassy
gate. [ ] Interview, 3/24/78, pp. 3-6.)
124 Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, pp. 28-29.
125 See below for more detail.
126 Classified Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents,
5/12/78; Classified Staff Summary of Review of CIA
Documents, 10/31/78; CIA File entitled "[ ] 17
July 63 (J 110) to 9 Dec. 1963 (J 163) from Archives-Job
#70.209 Box #1 [ ] Production Material."
127 Ibid.
128 Goodpasture's Notes, p. 2; HSCA Staff Interview of
[ ] [ ] 3/24/78, p. 4; Classified Staff
Summary of Review of CIA Documents, 5/12/78; [blank]
31303, 2/7/67 with attached map; [blank, s.b. HMMA ] -
23343, 4/30/64, para. 2.
129 Goodpasture Notes, p. 2. See also map printed above at p.
32.
130 Classified Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents,
5/12/78; Classified Staff Summary of Review of CIA
Documents, 10/31/78; CIA File entitled "[ ] 17 July
63 (J 110) to 9 Dec. 1963 (J 163) from Archives-Job
#70.209 Box #1 [ ] Production Material."
131 See above chart.
132 [ ] Interview, 3/24/78, p. 4.
133 Ibid.
134 Ibid.
135 Review of Project [ ] attachment to HMMA 15979,
11/18/6[?], Emphasis added. [ ] is a CIA cryptonym
meaning "Soviet."
136 Review of Project [ ] attachment to HMMA 17999,
10/31/6[?]
137 See Review of Project [ ] attachments to HMMA 20052,
10/18/62 and HMMA 22387, 10/25/63.
138 Memorandum from Chief of FI/OPS to Chief of
Operations/DDP, 1/8/60.
139 HMMA 14793, 4/8/60, para. 3.
140 HMMA 23343, 4/30/64, para. 2. Emphasis added.
141 Memorandum for the Record, 5/19/78 from
Gabielson/Cornwell.
142 Letter from Blakey to Breckinridge, 7/25/78. [redacted?
] See also JFK Classified Documents #'s 142
and 146.
143 Memorandum entitled "Response to HSCA request of 25 July
1978," 8/20/78; HSCA Classified Staff Summary of Review
of CIA Documents, 10/31/78, p. 1. CF. Goodpasture
Testimony, 4/13/78, pp. 47-51, Goodpasture Deposition,
11/20/78, pp. 50-51, where Ms. Goodpasture testified that
although the logs and the contact prints from the [
] base are missing, the negatives are on file at the CIA.
144 Memorandum entitled "Response of HSCA request of 25 July
1978," 8/20/78; HSCA Classified Staff Summary of Review
of CIA Documents, 10/31/78, p. 1.
145 Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, p. 41. HMMA 23343,
4/30/64, para. 2. Win Scott was the Chief of Station in
Mexico City in 1963. He was a demanding and "hard" boss.
(Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, p. 11.) He was also a
stickler for detail and for recording information in a
retrievable form. (Ibid.; Goodpasture Notes, p. 6; [
] Interview, 3/24/78, p. 6; Phillips Testimony, 4/25/78,
p. 30.)
146 Log Film 144; [ ] Interview, 3/24/78, p. 2.
147 Log Film 144; Goodpasture Notes, p. 8; Tab F Draft, p. 5;
Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, p. 41.
148 Ibid.
149 Goodpasture Notes, p. 7.
150 Tab F Draft, p. 2; Goodpasture Notes, p. 2. In 1962 or
1963, a cut-out was instituted in [ ] dealings
with the [ ] photographic base. The films were
still developed and processed by [ ] (Project
Renewal Request, attachment to HMMA-23387, attached to
Memorandum for DDP from J. C. King, 11/27/63, section I,
B, 1.)
151 Goodpasture Notes, p. 2.
152 Goodpasture Notes, p. 7; [blank] Interview, 3/24/78, p. 2.
153 Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, p. 33.
154 Ibid.; [ ] Interview, 3/24/78, p. 2.
155 Ibid.
156 Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, p. 34.
157 Ibid., p. 38.
158 [ ] Interview, 3/24/78, p. 1.
159 Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, pp. 33-38, 14-15.
160 Classified Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents,
6/26/78, pp. 3-5; Annual Fitness Report on Ann
Goodpasture, 1/14/64.
161 Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, pp. 14-15.
162 Goodpasture Deposition, 11/20/78, pp. 38-39.
163 Ibid., p. 40.
164 Ibid., p. 41.
165 [ ] Deposition, 5/18/78, p. 7.
166 Ibid.
167 Ibid., p. 9.
168 Ibid., p. 15.
169 See [ ] Deposition, 4/28/78, p. 4; where he
calls Ms. Goodpasture "an assistant to the Chief of
Station;" [ ] Deposition 4/28/78, p. 9, where
she calls Ms. Goodpasture "Win Scott's right-hand
person"; Robert Scelso Deposition, 5/16/78, p. 22, where
he calls Ms. Goodpasture "sort of special assistant to
Win Scott"; [ ] Deposition , 5/16/78, p. 11,
where he says that Win Scott "relied very heavily on Ann
Goodpasture."
170 Goodpasture Deposition, 11/20/78, p. 34.
171 Ibid., pp. 8-9. See Section II, C below for detail on the
[ ]
172 Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, pp. 34-35.
173 Ibid., p. 35.
174 Ibid., pp. 42-43.
175 Ibid.
176 HSCA Deposition of [ ] 4/28/78, pp. 11-12.
177 HSCA Deposition of [ ] 4/28/78, p. 15. [
l ] was in charge of the Soviet Branch of the CIA
Station in Mexico City. [ ] was his
assistant.
178 Ibid.
179 Ibid.[ ] Interview, 3/20/78, p. 3.
[crossed out Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, p. 47.]
180 HSCA Deposition of [ l ] 4/28/78, p. 15; HSCA
Deposition of [ ] 4/28/78, pp. 11-12.
181 Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, pp. 64-69; [ ]
Interview, 6/2/78, p. 4.
182 Ibid. [handwritten: "Goodpasture pp. 67-61" [sic]]
183 Blind Memorandum entitled "Delay in sending the first
cable about Oswald"; Classified Staff Summary of Review
of CIA Documents, 3/15/78, p. 4; ["Goodpasture Testimony,
4/13/70, p. 65" scratched out]
184 Ibid.[handwritten Goodpasture pp. 64-65.]
185 [ ] and [ ] Interview, 3/20/78, p. 12.
186 Blind Memorandum entitled "Delay in sending the first
cable about OSWALD"; Classified HSCA Staff Summary of
Review of CIA files, 3/15/78, p. 4.
187 Goodpasture Notes, p. 1; Goodpasture Testimony, pp. 12-13;
HSCA Deposition of [ ] p.6; HSCA Deposition of [
] pp. 21-24.
188 CIA Component report on
[
] pseudonym) was a Headquarters
technician. He was in Mexico City from 22 September to 1
October, 1963, preparing a report on this [ ]
operation. ([blank] 22267, 10/8/63, para, 8.) This report
will be referred to in some cases in this discussion of
the [ ] operation. The report, however, was
simplified in order "not to risk losing the reader."
(Memorandum from Chief, WHD, to COS, Mexico City,
12/30/63, para. 2.) This simplification was mainly in the
area of a distinction between reels of tape and
transcripts and in the procedures [redacted] used in the
collection and distribution of the reels and transcripts.
(Ibid.) In this discussion of the operation other sources
will be relied upon in these areas.
[
]
189 Project Renewal Request, l/l1/65, attachment to HMMA-
25141; Goodpasture Notes, p. 5.
190 HMMA 21845, 1/30/63, para. 8.
191 Goodpasture Notes, p. 4; [ ] Interview, 6/2/78,
p. 1 [ ] Memo, p. 22.
192 Goodpasture Notes, p. 5; Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78,
p. 54.
193 Goodpasture Notes, p. 7.
194 Tab F Draft, p. 4; [ ] Memo, p. 21.
195 Tab F Draft, p. 4; Memorandum to DDP from Chief WHD,
1/21/64, para. 5.
196 [ ] Interview, 3/20/78, pp. 1-2; HSCA Deposition of [
] 4/28/78, p, 4.
197 [ ] Interview, 3/20/78, p. 2; HSCA Deposition of
[ ] 4/28/78, pp. 7, 31.
198 [ ] Interview, 3/20/78, p. 2.
199 HSCA Deposition of [ ] 4/28/78, pp. 22-24.
200 Memorandum to the Ambassador from Winston M. Scott,
10/16/63 re: Lee Oswald/Contact with the Soviet Embassy;
[ ] Interview, 3/20/78, pp. 17-18; HSCA
Deposition of [ ] 4/28/78, pp. 21, 31, 36; HSCA
Deposition of [ ] 4/28/78, pp. 51-52.
201 Phillips Testimony, 11/27/76, p. 19.
202 Ibid., p. 20.
203 HMMA-22005, 8/23/63, para. 4. See also HMMA-22267,
10/8/63, para. 4; HMMA-22135, 9/13/63, para. 11/7/63,
para. 4 which all list reports [ ] of
American citizens, or English speaking people, in contact
with Communists in Mexico. HMMA-21845, 7/30/63, para. 4,
reports that the "traffic" is reviewed daily for English
speaking persons making contact with the Soviet or Soviet
satellite embassies.
204 HMMA 22267, 10/8/63, para. 2.
205 Ibid. [
] (Ibid.)
206 HMMA 22452, 11/7/63, para. 2.
207 Classified Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents,
5/12/78, p. 1.
208 See above; HMMA 22267, 10/18/63, para. 2.
209 Classified Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents,
7/26/78, p. 1.
210 Ibid.
211 See Tab F Draft, p, 4, which states that [ ]
were covered; Goodpasture Notes p. 8, which also states
that [ ] and Phillips Testimony,
11/27/76, p. 11, and Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, pp.
51-53, in which they state their belief that more than
[
]
212 Project Renewal Request, 1/11/65, attachment to HMMA
25141, section D, 1, (b), (1).
213 Phillips Testimony, 11/27/76, p. 11. See also Section
III, A, 3, below.
214 Classified HSCA Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents,
undated, entitled "Periodic File Summary - Dave Phillips
- 3 Components," p. 1.
215 [ ] Interview, 6/2/78, p. 5; [ ] Memo, p. 22.
216 [ ] Interview, 6/2/78, p. 2.
217 Ibid., [ ] Memo, p. 11.
218 [ ] Interview, 6/2/78, p. 3.
219 Ibid., p. 2; [ ] Memo, p. 11; HSCA Deposition of R.
Shaw. 5/16/78, p. 20.
220 Ibid. See also Tab F Draft, p. 4. Cf. [ ] and [ ]
[ l ] Interview, 3/20/78, p. 8, in which the Chief
of the Soviet Section in the Mexico City Station claims
never to have heard of such summaries.
221 [ ] Interview, 6/2/78, pp. 2-3.
222 Ibid.; Goodpasture Notes, p. 8; [ ] Memo, p. 11;
Memorandum from [ ] to Chief/FI, 10/2/63,
para. 2.
223 Ibid.
224 Letter from Blakey to Breckinridge, 7/6/78.
225 [ ] Interview, 6/2/78, p. 2; [ ] Memo, p. 11.
226 Ibid.
227 [ ] Interview, 6/2/78, p. 2.
228 Ibid., p. 4; Project Renewal Request, 1/11/65, attachment
to HMMA-25141, Section D, (2).
229 Ibid.
230 [ ] Interview, 6/2/78, p. 5.
231 Ibid.
232 Ibid., p. 2. The resuma provided quick summaries with the
full detailed transcripts arriving at the Station one or
two days after the resuma.
233 Ibid.
234 Ibid.
235 Ibid.
236 Ibid., p. 3.
237 Ibid., p. 5.
238 Ibid.
239 Ibid., p. 2.
240 HMMA 22267, 10/2/63, para. 8; HMMA 21845, 7/30/63, para.
8. For handling of English language conversations see
Sections II, C, 4, b, (3), (c), (d) and (e) below.
241 DIR 88680, 12/13/63; Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, p.
63; Phillips Testimony, 11/27/76; p. 43.
242 [ ] Interview, 6/2/78, p. 3.
243 Ibid.
244 [ ] Testimony, 4/12/78, p. 11.
245 After the assassination Headquarters asked Mexico City not
to destroy any of the Soviet tapes [
] (DIR 87770, 12/9/63.) A note written by Ann
Goodpasture in 1963 seems to confirm [ ]
assumption that the tapes were retained at the station.
[ ] people just keep bringing
in the reels to me (the ones I give them are not
labeled so they don't necessarily know which ones
return.) The storage problem is one for us and as the
reels come in with transcriptions, I store them. When
we can erase them, I'll take off the labels and send
them back out.
(Note by Ann Goodpasture, 12/10/63, attached to DIR 87770,
12/9/63. Second parenthetical in original.)
246 [ ] Interview, 6/3/78, p. 5.
247 Emphasis added. [ ] was absolutely positive
that Cuban tapes were retained for thirty days because he
maintained them in the special rack. [redacted]
Interview, 6/2/78, p, 3. Hence, the two week "usual
practice" is probably not correct insofar as the Cuban
tapes are concerned.
248 Phillips Testimony, 11/27/76, pp. 40-47.
249 Ibid.
250 Ibid., p. 47.
251 p. 5.
252 p. 8.
253 p. 61.
254 Ibid.; Goodpasture Notes, p. 8; Tab F Draft, p. 5; HSCA
Deposition of [ ] 3/28/78, pp. 28-29; [
f] Testimony, 4/21/78, p. 7; HMMA 22267, 10/8/63, paras.
3 and 8; HMMA-21845, 7/30/63, paras. 3 and 8; [
] Interview, 6/3/78, p. 4 [ ] Interview, 6/2/78,
p. 4.
255 B.[ ] Testimony, 4/12/78, p. 19.
256 A. [ ] Testimony, 4/12/78, pp. 2-3.
257 [ ] Interview, 6/2/78, p. 5.
258 Ibid.
259 Ibid. See also Section (e) below.
260 Classified Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents,
3/9/78, pp. 2-4.
261 [ ] Memo, p. 32.
262 A. [
]
263 [scratched out, illegible] [ ] [handwritten
note: "not transcribed"] Interview, 4/11/78 ; [
] Interview, 11/30/76, pp. l7-l8.
264 Goodpasture Notes, p. 8; B. [ ] Testimony, 4/12/78,
p. 9.
265 Ibid. [ ] prepared an original and two carbon
copies of all of his transcriptions. All three copies
were delivered to the Station. (B [ ] Testimony,
4/12/78, p. 15.) One carbon was cut and pasted onto a
separate sheet of paper, with the conversations grouped
by identity of the caller or by subject matter. This was
done by [ ] (Ibid., and p. 19.) The
original, one intact carbon and the one cut up carbon
were all delivered to the station. (Ibid.)
266 [ ] Testimony, 4/12/78, p. 9.
267 Ibid., p. 12.
268 Goodpasture Notes, p. 8; Tab F Draft, p. 5.
269 Goodpasture Testimony 4/13/78, p. 61.
270 [scratched out: Goodpasture Testimony 4/13/70; p. 112;]
Phillips Testimony, 11/27/76, p. 36; A. [ ]
Testimony, 4/12/78, pp. 8-11; B.[ l ] Deposition,
4/28/78, p. 28.
271 Tab F Draft, pp. 5-6; Phillips Testimony, 11/27/76. pp. 36-
37.
272 [ ] Interview, 6/2/78, p. 5; HMMA-22267. 10/8/63,
para. 8; HMMA 21845, 7/30/63, para. 8; HMMA-22452,
11/7/63, para. 8.
273 [ ] Interview, 6/2/78, p. 5.
274 Ibid. The daily resuma for Spanish language conversations
(See Section II, C, 4, b, (1), above) largely negated the
need for a similar procedure for Spanish language
conversations in that the important and/or interesting
ones were summarized in the resuma.
275 [ ] Interview, 6/2/78, p. 5.
276 Ibid.
277 Ibid.
278 Ibid.
279 HMMA 22005, 8/23/63, para. 4. See also [ ] Memo,
p. 19.
280 A. [ ] Testimony, 4/12/78, pp. 8-12.
281 Ibid.
282 HMMA 22005, 8/23/63, para. 4.
283 HSCA Deposition of [ ] 4/28/78, p. 8 [8 is
scratched out, 4 written in.]
284 Ibid., p. 6.
285 A. [ ] Testimony, 4/12/78, pp. 8-12.
286 Ibid., p. 12; Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, pp. 62-63.
287 Ibid.
288 Ibid.; HSCA Deposition of [ l ] 4/28/78, p. 8.
289 Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, p. 63; Phillips Testimony,
11/27/76, p. 14.
290 [ ] Interview, 3/20/78, p, 3; Phillips Testimony,
11/27/7[?], pp. 14-16; Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78,
pp. 54, 63.
291 Ibid.
292 Project Renewal Request, 1/11/65, attached to HMMA 25141.
293 HMMA-22135, 9/13/63, para, 3; HMMA-22005, 8/23/63, para.
3.
294 Classified Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents,
3/9/78, p, 1.
295 [ ] Testimony, 4/12/78, p. 7.
296 Ibid., pp. 16-19; Classified Staff Summary of Review of
CIA Documents, 3/9/78, pp. 3-4.
297 Ibid., pp. 2-3.
298 [ ] Testimony, 4/12/78, p. 30.
299 Ibid., p. 13.
300 Ibid.
301 Ibid., p. 14; [ ] Interview, 3/20/78, pp. 4 and 11.
302 See Section II above.
303 See Section II, C, 4 above.
304 See Sections II, A and B above.
305 Classified Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents,
3/9/78, p. 5; MEXI 7025, 11/23/63.
306 Ibid.; CIA Transcript from Russian Embassy, 9/27/63.
307 Classified Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents,
3/9/78, p. 6.
308 Classified Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents;
3/9/78, pp. 6-7; CIA Transcript from Russian Embassy,
9/27/63.
309 Classified Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents,
3/9/78, pp. 7-10; MEXI 7025, 11/23/63; CIA Transcript
from Russian Embassy, 9/27/63.
310 Classified Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents,
3/9/78, pp. 10-12, CIA Transcript from Russian Embassy,
9/28/63.
311 Classified Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents,
3/9/78, p. 12; CIA Transcript from Russian Embassy,
10/1/63.
312 CIA Mexico City Investigation Chronology, Bulky #WX-7241,
Vol. I, p. 3. The transcript of this call does not give
the time the call occurred. (CIA Transcript from Russian
Embassy, 10/1/63.)
313 Classified Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents,
3/9/78, pp. 12-14; CIA Transcript from the Russian
Embassy, 10/1/63.
314 Classified Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents, 3/9/7
8, p. 14; CIA Transcript from Russian Embassy, 10/3/63
315 DIR 74830, 10/10/63. See also MEXI 6453, 10/8/63 and
Section IV, B, below
316 DIR 74830, 10/11/63. (Mexico City copy.)
317 Ibid.
318 Ibid.
319 Classified HSCA Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents,
5/12/78, p. 1. On September 27, 1963, at 10:54 a.m., the
following call occurred. A woman named Silvia named [sic]
Guillermo Ruiz. Ruiz tells her that he has not yet been
able to reach the consul and because of that he has not
called her. Silvia tells him that "we" have no time for
that and asks him for the Consul's phone number. Ruiz
responds by asking her not to get annoyed and he wants to
know if Silvia wishes to speak to the Consul personally.
Silvia responds that she does. Ruiz says that the number
is 11-28-47. Silvia says that is fine and the
conversation ends. (CIA transcript from Cuban Embassy,
9/27/63.) It cannot be determined whether this caller was
indeed Silvia Duran or if she subsequently called the
Consul since [
]
320 Classified Staff Summaries of Review of CIA Documents,
undated and 5/12/78.
321 See Sections II, A and B above.
322 See Sections II, C, 4, b, (2), (c) and (d) above.
323 A.[ ] Testimony, 4/12/78.
324 See Section III, A, 1 above.
325 A.[ ] Testimony, 4/12/78, p. 4.
326 Ibid.
327 Ibid., p.6.
328 Ibid.
329 Ibid.
330 Ibid.
331 Ibid. See also Sections II, C, 4, b, (3), (c) and (e),
above.
332 A [ ] Testimony, 4/12/78, pp. 7-8
333 Ibid.
334 See Section II, C, 4 b, (3), (e) above.
335 A [ ] Testimony, 4/12/78, pp. 7-8
336 Ibid., p.9
337 Ibid., p.10.
338 B. [ ] Testimony, 4/12/78, p.25.
339 Ibid, p. 26.
340 Ibid.
341 Ibid., p. 27.
342 Ibid., p. 33.
343 Ibid.
344 See Section II, C, 4, b, (3), (e), above.
345 See Section III, B below.
346 Bind Memo re: Lee Harvey Oswald/Silvia Tirado de Duran,
Source: LI/4, 11/26/63, p. 5.
347 A. [ ] Testimony, 4/12/78 p.10. It is also
interesting to note that Ms. Duran's statement that
Oswald had blond hair is also left out of subsequent CIA
and Mexican official reports. (See Section V, C an
below.)
348 Phillips Testimony, 11/27/76, pp. 52-53.
349 [ ] Interview, 6/4/78, p. 1.
350 Ibid., p. 2.
351 Ibid. James Angleton testified that he had in fact cleaned
out Win Scott's safe but that he had not found any
photographs or [ ] transcripts pertaining to Lee
Harvey Oswald. HSCA Deposition of James Angleton,
10/5/78, p. 116.)
352 Classified Letter from Blakey to Breckinridge, 7/6/78.
353 Draft of letter from Scott to John Barron, 11/25/70, p. 3.
Emphasis added.
354 Foul Foe manuscript, p. 267.
355 See discussion above.
356 Blind Memo re: Lee Harvey Oswald/Silvia Tirado de Duran;
Source: LI/4, 11/26/63. p. 5.
357 See Sections V, C and VI, A, below.
358 Eusebio Azcue Public Testimony, 9/18/78, pp. 33-35.
359 See Section II, C, 3 above.
360 See Sections II, A and B, above.
361 See below.
362 See below.
363 It should be noted that the two sets of photographs which
are missing are the most relevant of all the photographs
produced by the Mexico City surveillance operations. Had
a photograph of Oswald been obtained, it would have most
likely have been done by one or both of the bases from
which production is missing. Oswald visited the Cuban
Consulate which was covered by a pulse camera. The
photographs of people entering the Cuban Embassy have
been made available to this Committee for review but the
material from the pulse camera which covered the entrance
to the Consulate which Oswald visited has not been
forthcoming. (See Section II, A, 3, above, for details.)
The documented standard operating procedure of the Soviet
target bases indicates that [ ] the base from
which production was not forthcoming, would have been the
one in operation at the time of Oswald's visit. (See
Section II, B, 4 above and Section (b) below for
details.) In addition, HMMA 14793, 4/8/60, indicated that
the base from which production is missing "performs the
best photography of persons visiting the front gate."
364 Deposition of John Scelso, 5/16/78, p. 95 HSCA Deposition
of [ ] 5/19/78, p. 65; HSCA Deposition
[ ] 5/18/78, p 42; HSCA Deposition of [ ]
4/28/78, p. 51; Ann Goodpasture, 4/13/78, p. 98.
365 See preceding Section III, A, 1. In fact, Oswald may have
visited the Soviet Embassy 3 times also. See analysis in
Classified Letter from Turner to Stokes 10/25/78, JFK
Classified Document #l46.
366 [ ] Interview, 6/3/78, p. 6.
367 See Section III, A, 1, above.
368 See Sections II, A and B, above.
369 See Sections II, A, 3 and II, B, 3 above.
370 HSCA Outside Contact Report, Phillip Agee, 1/6/78, JFK
Document No. 004578.
371 Phillip Agee Interview, 1/11/78, p. 1, JFK Document No.
004633.
372 Ibid., p. 3.
373 [ ] is the CIA assigned pseudonym of this
individual.
374 Agee Interview, 1/11/78, pp. 3-4.
375 Ibid.
376 Ibid.
377 Ibid.
378 Ibid.
379 Ibid., pp. 5-6.
380 Ibid., pp. 6-7.
381 Ibid., p. 11.
382 Ibid., pp. 18-19.
383 Ibid., p. 12.
384 [ ] Interview, 6/4/78, p. 1.
385 Ibid.
386 Ibid.
387 Ibid.
388 Ibid.
389 Ibid.
390 Ibid.
391 Ibid.
392 Ibid.
393 Ibid. and p. 2
394 Ibid., p. 2
395 See HSCA Deposition of James Angleton, 10/5/78, p. 116.
396 [ ] Interview, 6/4/78, p. 2.
397 Ibid.
398 Joseph B. Smith Interview, 10/19/77, p. 2, JFK Document
No. 003012.
399 Ibid.
400 Ibid.
401 Joseph B. Smith Interview, 4/20/78, p. 1, JFK Document No.
008279.
402 Ibid., p. 6.
403 Ibid.
404 Ibid.
405 Ibid.
406 Ibid.
407 Ibid.
408 Ibid., and p. 7. Des Fitzgerald was the Chief of the CIA's
Cuban Task Force in 1964. Droller was a CIA Officer.
409 Ibid., p. 7. Mr. Smith explained the "Counter-Intelligence
mentality" by saying that people who had it were "rabid
anti-Communists" (Smith Interview, 11/2/77, p. 3, JFK
Document No. 003012) and "confirmed believers in the
world Communist conspiracy theory . . . these guys
actually believed that the split between the Russians and
Chinese was a great deceptive operation. Colby (former
Director of Central Intelligence) even says something
more amazing. He claims that Angleton absolutely believed
that all CIA operations were run by the KGB.(Soviet
Intelligence.) He says Angleton (former Chief of Counter-
Intelligence for the CIA) believed that every top Soviet
defector we took in was a plant. I think that's
incredible but I know there were some guys on his staff
were his true believers." (Smith Interview, 4/20/78, p.
3, JFK Document No. 008279.)
410 Ibid., p. 7
411 Ibid.
412 Ibid.
413 Ibid.
414 Joseph Piccolo Interview, 8/11/78, p. 1.
415 Ibid., p. 4
416 Ibid.
417 Ibid.
418 Ibid.
419 Ibid.
420 Ibid., p. 4
421 Ibid., p. 4
422 Ibid., p. 5.
423 Ibid.
424 Ibid.
425 Ibid.
426 Ibid.
427 Ibid.
428 Ibid.
429 Ibid.
430 Ibid.
431 Ibid.
432 Ibid., p. 6.
433 [ ] Interview, 8/29/78, p. 1, [ handwritten:
JFK Classified Document No. 156.]
434 Ibid.
435 Ibid.
436 Ibid.
437 Ibid.
438 Ibid.
439 Ibid.
440 Ibid.
441 Ibid.
442 Ibid.
443 Ibid.
444 Ibid. In considering the above detailed allegations, it is
important to distinguish between the allegation that a
photograph was found at headquarters as opposed to the
assertion that a photograph was found in Mexico City. It
is also important to remember that these allegations are
what can be termed "grapevine stories." There was a
photograph found in Mexico City of a man that was thought
possibly to be Oswald. This photograph and the
circumstances surrounding it will be dealt with in a
subsequent section. Ms. Anne Goodpasture of the Mexico
City Station found this photograph. (See below.) In the
absence of any evidence otherwise--Note: The [ ]
allegation says there was a photo in Mexico City in the
mid-60's; not that it was found there--it is most likely
that the grapevine stories about a photo being found in
Mexico arise from Ms. Goodpasture's reporting the photo
of the man who has since become known as the Mexico
mystery man in the same cable that reported Oswald's
visit to the Soviet Embassy. (See below.) The findings of
this Committee regarding the general Mexico City
surveillance operations are presented in Section II, A
and B above. In summary, this Committee found that there
were three photographic surveillance bases (four cameras)
that may have photographed Lee Harvey Oswald in September
and October of 1963. This was determined from analysis of
project files for these operations and the testimony of
CIA officials. (See preceding sections.)
445 Letter from Blakey to Carpentier, 3/2/78, JFK Document No.
00587[9?].
446 See JFK Classified Document No. 146; HSCA Classified Staff
Summary of Review of CIA Documents, undated; HSCA
Classified Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents,
5/12/78; JFK Classified Document No. 142; and Sections .
II, A, 4 and II, B, 3 above.
447 See JFK Classified Document No. 142; JFK Classified
Document NO. 146.
448 HSCA Deposition of John Scelso, 5/16/18, pp. 37, 96; HSCA.
Deposition of Ann Elizabeth Goldsborough Egerter,
5/17/78, p. 73; HSCA Deposition of [blank] 5/16/78, p.
56; HSCA Deposition of [ ] 5/18/78, p. 25;
HSCA Deposition of [ ] 4/28/78, pp. 20, 47;
David Phillips Testimony, 11/27/76, p. 67; David Phillips
Testimony, 4/25/78, p. 44; Ann Goodpasture Testimony
4/13/78, pp. 77, 97.
449 HSCA Deposition of [ ] 5/19/78, pp. 6-7.
450 [ ] interview, 3/30/78, pp. 3-4
.
451 Ibid.
452 Ibid.
453 Ibid.
454 HSCA Deposition of John Scelso, 5/16/78, p. 31.
455 Ibid.
456 In addressing this question, the HSCA staff reviewed all
the cable and dispatch traffic between Mexico City and
Headquarters for the period from October 1, 1963 to 26
November 1963 in an attempt to determine whether Oswald's
photo may have been sent to Headquarters. This
examination also revealed no evidence that a photograph
of Oswald was sent to CIA Headquarters. This Committee
did find that there were several types of communications
between Headquarters and field stations that were treated
as non-record material. Because of the non-record nature
of these communications, it was not possible to review
that material.
457 See Section II, A, 3 above.
458 HMMA 22307, 10/18/63, para. 5, c.
459See Section II, A, 3 above.
460 Ibid.
461 HMMA 22433, 11/7/63, attachments B and C.
462 HSCA Deposition of [ ] 5/19/78, pp. 44-47.
463 HSCA Deposition of Ann E. G. Egerter, 5/17/78, p. 70; HSCA
Deposition of John Scelso, 5/16/78, p. 31.
464 Ibid.
465 Ibid., and p. 32
466 Ibid., p.7
467 Ibid., p. 47
468 Ibid. Emphasis added
469 Foul Foe manuscript, p. 273.
470 See Section III, A, 1 above for a more detailed exposition
of the conversations.
471 Memorandum to Clark Anderson from Winston Scott, 11/27/63,
with seven attachments.
472 Ibid.
473 Ibid., p. 1
474 Ibid.
475 Ibid., p. 9
476 Warren Commission Testimony of Pamela Mumford, 5/19/64,
Vol. II, p. 217; Warren Commission Testimony of Evaristo
Rodriguez, 7/21/64, Vol. II, p. 341; Commission Exhibit
2120, p. 7; Commission Exhibit 2121, p. 54. CF, Warren
Commission Testimony of Nelson Delgado, Vol. VIII, p. 236
and 237 in which it is claimed that Oswald spoke
Castillian Spanish.
477 CIA Transcript from Russian Embassy, 10/3/63.
478 If one assumes that Oswald could not speak any Spanish
then only two conclusions about the first three calls of
9/27/63 are possible: 1) either these calls do not
pertain to Oswald, or 2) they do pertain to Oswald but
were made by someone other than Lee Harvey Oswald. This
second possible conclusion will be addressed in a more
detailed fashion in subsequent sections due to its
ramifications vis a vis Oswald's activities and possible
associates as opposed to the substance of the information
available to the CIA Station prior to the assassination.
479 Warren Commission Exhibit 2121, p. 112.
480 Classified Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents,
3/9/78.
481 CIA Transcript from Russian Embassy, 10/1/63; MEXI 6453,
10/8/63. This cable was sent from Mexico on 8 October and
was received by Headquarters on 9 October. Hence it is
alternately referred to as either the 10/8 or 10/9 cable.
482 CIA Transcript from Russian Embassy, 10/1/63; [ ]
Testimony, 4/12/78, pp. 26-28.
483 CIA Transcript from Russian Embassy, 10/1/78.
484 CIA Transcript from Russian Embassy, 9/28/63.
485 A "P" file is simply a personality file. It was the Mexico
City Station equivalent of a 201 file.
486 Ibid.
487 HSCA Deposition [ ] 4/28/78, p. 38; HSCA
Deposition of [ ] 4/28/78, p. 72.
488 Ibid.
489 HSCA Deposition of [ ] 4/28/78, p. 46.
490 Ibid.; CIA Transcript from Russian Embassy, 9/27/63.
491 Ibid.
492 HSCA Deposition of [ ] 4/28/78, p. 76.
493 Ibid., HSCA Deposition of [ ] 4/28/78, p. 46.
494 HSCA Deposition of [ ] 4/28/78, p. 69; HSCA
Deposition of [ ] 4/28/78, pp.. 38-39.
495 HSCA Deposition of [ ] 5/18/78, pp. 33-34; HSCA
Deposition of [ ] 4/28/78, p. 46; HSCA
Deposition of [ ] 4/28/78, pp. 84-86, 88-89.
496 Ann Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, p. 107; MEXI 6453,
10/8/63, para. 2.
497 1977 CIA Inspector General's Report, Tab G-2, pp. 2-3.
Hereinafter cited as '77 IGR.
498 See Sections III, B, 2, above, and IV, B, below.
499 D. Phillips Interview, 8/24[3?]/78; Report on Oswald from
John Scelso to J. Angleton, 12/24/63, p. 4.
500 Ibid.
501 CIA Transcript from Russian Embassy, 9/27/78.
502 Ibid.
503 See Section II, C, 4, b, (3), above.
504 HSCA Deposition of [ ] 4/28/78, p. 72; HSCA
Deposition of [ ] 4/28/78, p. 38
505 CIA Transcript from Soviet Embassy, 9/27/63; HSCA
Deposition of [ ] 4/28/78, p. 76.
506 CIA transcripts from Russian Embassy, 9/27/63.
507 Tab F Draft, p. 5.
508 [ ] Interview, 6/2/78, pp. 4-5.
509 HMMA-22005, 8/23/63, para. 4; see also Section II, G, 4
above.
510 Ibid.
511 Ibid.; [ ] Interview, 6/2/78, p. 5; Testimony of
[ ] 4/2/78; p. 10.
512 Testimony of [ ] 4/12/78, p. 11; Testimony of
[ ] 4/12/78, p. 14.
513 Tab F Draft, p. 5.
514 Ibid.
515 Tab F Draft, p. 5; Preceding Section II, B, 5; Log Film
144, 10/1/63 through 10/3/63.
516 See Nightwatch, pp. 140-141.
517 David A. Phillips Testimony, 11/27/76, p. 64.
518 MEXI 6453, 10/8/63.
519 Ibid.
520 Ibid.
521 HSCA Deposition of [ ] 4/28/78, p. 58; HSCA
Deposition of [ ] 4/28/78, p. 35.
522 Classified HSCA Staff Summary of CIA documents, undated,
entitled "Periodic File Summary - Dave Phillips - 3
Components."
523 Blind Memorandum entitled "Delay in Sending the first
Cable about Oswald."
524 HSCA Deposition of [ ] 4/28/78, p. 30.
525 Tab F Draft, p. 5; ,MEXI 6453, 10/8/63; HSCA Deposition of
[ ] 4/28/78, pp. 62-63; HSCA Deposition of
[ ] 4/28/63, p. 21.
526 HSCA Deposition of [ ] 4/28/78, pp. 56-57.
527 Classified HSCA Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents,
6/26/78, p. 4.
528 Ibid.
529 Deposition of [ ] 4/28/78, p. 65. CF. "Foul Foe"
manuscript, p. 268, where Win Scott writes: "In fact, Lee
Harvey Oswald became a person of great interest to us
during this 27 September to 2 October 1963 period"; and
on page 269, where he writes: "Because we thought at
first that Lee Harvey Oswald might be a dangerous
potential defector from the U.S.A. to the Soviet Union,
he was of great interest to us, so we kept a special
watch on him and his activities."
530 HSCA Deposition of John Scelso, 5/16/78, p. 25.
531 HSCA Deposition of [ ] 4/28/78, pp. 25-26.
532 HSCA Deposition of John Scelso, 5/16/78, p. 26.
533 HSCA Deposition of [ ] 4/28/78, p. 36.
534 See above. Cf. "Foul Foe" manuscript, pp. 268-269.
535 HSCA Deposition of [ ] 4/28/78, p. 52.
536 HSCA Deposition of [ ] 5/18/78 p. 26-28
537 Ibid.
538HSCA Deposition of [ ] 4/28/78, p. 30.
539 HSCA Deposition of [ ] 4/28/78, pp. 51-52. The
HSCA has requested a copy of any internal regulations or
any liaison agreement with the Federal Bureau of
Investigation that may have been in existence in 1963.
(Letter to Breckinridge, 7/20/78.) The CIA responded
"that there are not now, nor were there any, agreements
between the CIA and FBI or other U.S. government agencies
concerning CIA responsibility to report on contacts of
U.S. citizens with Communist Embassies or officials...The
CIA under operative legislation has a counterintelligence
responsibility for counterintelligence cases...but it is
not a matter of agreement with other agencies nor does it
concern simple contacts of Americans abroad with
Communist Embassies or officials." (Memorandum to
Breckinridge from Shepanek, 7/31/78.)
540 HSCA Deposition of [ ] 4/28/78, p. 69; HSCA
Deposition of [ ], 4/28/78, pp. 38-39.
541 See Section III, B, 2, above.
542 HSCA Deposition of [ ] 4/28/78, pp. 59-60.
543 Ibid., p. 62.
544 Ibid., p. 59
545 MEXI 6453, 10/8/63, para. 1.
546 Tab F Draft, p. 5; HSCA Deposition of [ ]
4/28/78, pp. 62-63, 66; HSCA Deposition of [ ]
4/28/78, p. 21; MEXI 6453, 10/8/63, para. 1.
547 HSCA Deposition of [ ] 4/28/78, pp. 62-63
548 MEXI 6453, 10/8/63, para. 2. The connection of this
photograph to Oswald by including the description in the
cable that reported Oswald's contact with the Soviet
Embassy has created more confusion and controversy than
perhaps any other CIA related issue stemming from
assassination. Consequently. this Committee has made an
attempt to determine the circumstances surrounding the
mistaken linkage of this photograph to Oswald as well as
the consequences of that mistake. The consequences
549 HSCA Deposition of [ ] 4/28/78, p. 33; HSCA
Deposition of John Scelso, 5/16/78, p. 35; Ann
Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, pp. 81, 86-87.
550 HSCA Deposition of [ ] 5/18/78, p. 28.
551 Ann Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, p. 107. See also Ann
Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, p. 84; and HSCA
Deposition of [ ] 5/18/78, p. 32.
552 Log Film 143, 9/25/63 through 9/27/63.
553 HSCA Deposition of Ann Goodpasture, 11/16/70, pp. 57-58.
554 CIA Transcript from Russian Embassy, 10/1/63.
555 This mistake was evidently not discovered until 1976. See
WX7241, a chronology of the Mexico City investigation
prepared by Raymond Rocca in 1967 which lists the date as
1 October; A note on HMMW-15488, 5/18/67 which indicates
that Ann Goodpasture checked the photographs and that
"negatives are in [ ] photo chrono for 1 Oct 1963.
556 Log film 144, 10/1/63 through 10/3/63.
557 Ann Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, p. 102.
558 See Classified HSCA Staff Summary of Review of CIA
Documents, 6/26/78, pp. .3-5.
559 DIR 84888, 11/23/63.
560 See Section III, A, 5 above.
561 MEXI 6453, 10/9/63.
562 Ibid.
563 HSCA Deposition of John Scelso, 5/16/78, p. 34; HSCA
Deposition of [ ] 5/19/78, p. 26
564 Ibid.
565 Ibid.
566 Ibid. A restricted file is a method of keeping abreast of
any information that develops on the subject of the file.
The file is marked to indicate that it cannot be reviewed
without the permission of the person who made the
restriction. The effect is that if anyone wants to see
the file, the custodian of the file learns of that desire
and the information leading to it. (HSCA. Deposition of
Ann E. G. Egerter, 5/19/78, p. 51.)
567 See Section [blank]
568 HSCA Deposition of A. Egerter, 5/17/78, p. 77.
569 Deposition of [ ] 5/19/78, p. 29.
570 HSCA Deposition of Ann Egerter, 5/17/78, pp. 78-79.
571 Ibid., pp. 70-71, HSCA Deposition of [ ]
5/19/78, p. 33.
572 Ibid. The Zed (Greenwich) times stamped on the cable and
the teletype indicates that the teletype was sent before
the cable.
573 DIR 74830, 10/10/63.
574 Ibid.
575 Ibid.
576 Ibid.
577 Teletype from CIA to State, FBI and Navy, DIR 74678,
10/10/63.
578 Ibid.
579 The mistaken identification of Oswald as "Lee Henry" is
dealt with in another section of this final report.
580 HSCA Deposition of A. Egerter, 5/17/78, p 77.
581 HSCA Deposition of [ ] 5/19/78, pp. 34-35.
582 Ibid.
583 Ibid., pp. 35-37.
584 [ ] Interview, 3/30/78, p. 8.
585 Ibid., pp. 11-13.
586 HSCA Deposition of [ ] 4/28/78, p. 37.
587 HSCA Deposition of John Scelso, 5/16/78, p. 51.
588 Report on Oswald from John Scelso, C/WH/3, to James
Angleton. C/CI, 12/24/63, p. 4.
589 HSCA Deposition of John Scelso, 5/16/78, pp. 40-43.
Emphasis added.
590 Ibid.
591 See preceding text.
592 HSCA Deposition of [ ] 5/19/78, p. 31.
593 Ibid., p. 30; See also HSCA Deposition of John Scelso,
5/16/78, pp. 27, 28.
594 HSCA Deposition of John Scelso, 5/16/78, pp. 40-43,
51;HSCA Deposition of [ ] 4/28/78 p. 37; HMMA-
22005, 8/23/63, para. 4.
595 '77 IGR, Tab G.3, p. 3.
596 Ibid.
597 Teletypes from CIA to State, FBI and Navy, 10/10/63, DIR
74678.
598 HSCA Deposition of [ ] 4/28/78, p. 43. HSCA
Deposition of [ ] 4/28/78, pp. 89-90.
599 David A. Phillips Testimony, 4/25/78, p. 30.
600 HSCA Deposition of [ ] 4/28/78, pp. 90-91; Ann
Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, p. 142.
601 David A. Phillips Testimony, 4/25/78, pp. 92-93.
602 Scott's manuscript may provide a clue when he writes that
during his first contact with the Soviet Embassy, Oswald
"gave his name very slowly and distinctly." (Foul Foe
Manuscript, p. 267.) If Oswald used his middle name at
that time it would explain why Scott wrote "sic." by
"Henry." But it should be noted that Oswald's name does
not come up in any of the transcripts made available by
the CIA until 10/1/63, and Oswald's middle name is not
given in that transcript. It is possible that there is
one additional transcript, possibly of the conversation
that Scott, on page 267 of his manuscript, refers to as
Oswald's "first contact," which, if in existence, has not
been made available to this Committee. (See Section III,
A, 5, above.)
603 DIR 74830, 10/11/63.
604 HSCA Deposition of [ ] 5/18/78, p. 35; Ann
Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, p. 104.
605 Ann Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, p. 105.
606 Emphasis in original.
607 Routing and Record Sheet for DIR 74830, 10/11/63.
608 HSCA Deposition of [ ] 5/18/78, pp. 33-34;
HSCA Deposition of [ ] 4/28/78, p. 46; HSCA
Deposition of [ ] 4/28/78, pp. 84-86, 88-89.
609 HSCA Deposition of [ ] 4/28/78, pp. 43-44; David
A. Phillips Testimony, 11/27/76, p. 89.
610 HSCA Deposition of [ ] 5/18/78, p.37.
611 See Section III, A, 7, above.
612 See Section III, A, 1, above.
613 Note on Article by Robert S. Allen and Paul Scott, "CIA
Withheld Vital Intelligence from Warren Commission,"
10/21/64.
614 The Chief of the Mexico Branch at Headquarters has told
this committee that it is his belief that the tapes were
probably still in existence at the time of the
assassination. (HSCA Deposition of John Scelso, 5/16/78,
p. 76-77.) But the testimony of the persons at the Mexico
City Station is consistent in saying that the tapes did
not exist at the time of the assassination. (See HSCA
Deposition of [ ] 5/16/78, p. 29; HSCA
Deposition of [ ] 5/18/78, p. 20; David A.
Phillips Testimony, 11/27/78, p. 63; David A. Phillips
Testimony, 4/25/78, pp. 17, 23; Ann Goodpasture
Testimony, 4/13/78, p. 94.)
615 See Section II, C, 4, b, (3), (e); Tab F Draft, pp. 5-6.
616 If the 9/28/63 conversation received expedited handling
also it is possible that it would have been in the
Station prior to the first or second of October.
617 A. Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, p. 95.
618 DIR 84886, 11/23/63, para. 2.
619 MEXI 7023, 11/23/63, para. 2.
620 MEXI 7025, 11/23/63, para. 4.
621 MEXI 7054, 11/24/63, para. 3.
622 See discussion in text above and below.
623 See Section II, C, 4, above.
624 Ann Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, p. 94.
625 Ann Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, pp. 95-96; See also
pp. 77, 93, 110.
626 [ ] Testimony, 4/12/78, pp. 12, l3.
627 HSCA Deposition of [ ] 4/28/78, p. 28.
628 See discussion above.
629See footnote 614 above.
630 Ann Goodpasture Testimony 4/13/78. P. 96.
631 HSCA Deposition of [ ] 5/16/78, p. 29; HSCA
Deposition of [ ] 5/18/78, p. 20; David A.
Phillips Testimony, 11/27/76, p. 63; David A. Phillips
Testimony, 4/25/78, pp. 17-23; Ann Goodpasture Testimony,
4/13/78, p. 94.
632 HSCA Deposition of John Scelso, pp. 76-77.
633 [ ] testimony, 4/12/78, pp. 12, 13.
634 See Ann Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, pp. 94-95, 77.
635 HSCA Deposition of [ ] 4/28/78, p. 28.
636 [ ] and [ ] Interview, 3/28/78, pp. l4-
15; HSCA Deposition of [ ] 5/18/78, pp. 33-34;
HSCA Deposition of [ ] 4/28/78, pp. 88-89, 84-
86; HSCA Deposition of [ ] 4/28/78, pp. 38-39,
46.
637 Ann Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, p. 75. Emphasis added.
638 Routing and Record Sheet for DIR 74830, 10/11/63.
639 MEXI 6534, 10/28/63.
640 HSCA Deposition of [ ] 4/28/78, p. 96.
641 [ ] and [ ] Interview, 3/18/78, p. 14-45;
HSCA Deposition of [ ] 5/18/78, p. 33-34; HSCA
Deposition of [ ] 4/28/78, pp. 84-86, 88-89;
HSCA Deposition of [ ] 4/28/78, pp. 38-39, 46;
Ann Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, p. 75. See also
Section III, B., above.
642 Memorandum for the Ambassador from Winston M. Scott, re:
Lee OSWALD/Contact with the Soviet Embassy, 10/16/63.
Emphasis added.
643 [ ] Interview, 3/28/78, p. 17.
644 Ibid., p. 18.
645 There are some cryptic references to the CIA Station
trying to determine Oswald's whereabouts after receiving
the 10/11 cable. (See Testimony of Ann Goodpasture,
4/13/78, p. 113) The procedures used in this attempt and
the actions that may have been taken have not been
determined. If any records exist of these efforts they
have not been made available to this Committee.
646 HSCA Deposition of [ ] 5/19/78, p. 43.
647 HSCA Deposition of John Scelso, 5/16/78, pp. 61-62.
648 HSCA Deposition of [ ] 5/19/78, pp. 29-30.
649 HSCA Deposition of John Scelso, 5/16/78, pp. 44-47.
650 HSCA Deposition [ ] 5/16/78, pp. 62, 69.
651 HSCA Deposition of [ ] 5/18/78, p. 36.
652 Ann Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, pp. 111-114.
653 HSCA Deposition of [ ] 4/28/78, pp. 75-76; See
also Ibid., p. 81.
654 See discussion above.
655 Phillips Interview, 8/30/78, p. 5.
656 Foul Foe manuscript, pp. 268-269. Emphasis added.
657 HSCA Deposition of John Scelso, 5/16/78, pp. 63-64.
658 HSCA deposition of John Scelso, 5/16/78, pp. 64-65.
659 David A. Phillips Testimony, 1l/27/76, p. 96.
659a See preceding section.
659b Ibid.
659c MEXI 7014, 11/22/63, para. 3.
659d MEXI 7203, 11/23/63, para. 3.
660 HSCA Deposition of [ l] 4/28/78, p. 53.
661 JFK Classified Document, #131.
662 Ibid.
663 MEXI 7029, 11/23/63, para. 1.
664 Classified HSCA Staff Summary, 3/15/78, p. 11.
665 See Section III, B, 2, above.
666 MEXI 7014, 11/22/63, para. 2.
667 DIR 84802, 11/22/63; para. 1. The sequence of the cables
can be determined in that they were numbered sequentially
as they were sent. In this regard it should be noted that
this system can indicate the order in which he cables
were sent but not the order in which they were written
because, at least in Mexico, several of the Station
officers were drafting and sending cables. Hence, the
order of writing them may not be the same as the order in
which they were sent.
668 MEXI 7014; see preceding paragraph.
669 DIR 84886, 11/23/63, para. 1.
670 Ibid., para. 2.
671 Ibid., para. 3.
672 HSCA Deposition of John Scelso, 5/16/78, p. 37.
673 David A. Phillips interview, 8/24/78, p. 16: Routing and
Record Sheet for MEXI 7033, 11/23/63; HSCA Deposition of
John Scelso, 5/16/78, pp. 45, 87.
674 DIR 84886, 11/23/63. para. 2.
675 MEXI 7023, 11/23/63.
676 MEXI 7024, 11/23/63, para. 6.
677 MEXI 7025, 11/23/63.
678 MEXI 7033, 11/23/63:
679 HSCA staff have wondered whether or not the Mexico City
Station was entirely forthcoming of their own will with
Headquarters. This speculation was based on three pieces
of information. The first is the report in MEXI 7024 that
Headquarters had all the available information. The
second is a note from Win Scott on the Routing and Record
Sheet for MEXI 7033 which says:
I had a call from Washington ( John Scelso) at 1620
hours on 23/XI. I told John Scelso at 1630 hours (our
time) on 23/XI that this would be on route to him.
The third is a cable reporting that on the 23rd Win Scott
had an urgent call to see the President of Mexico. The
cable reports that Scott expected the President to
express his condolences over the assassination but [
]
The Committee declines to speculate that the Mexico City
Station was possibly considering not reporting all the
information available to them. It was considered that
this may have been contemplated in order to protect
themselves from a charge about their failure to report
the information prior to the assassination.
[
] Hence, the full report followed very shortly
after the meeting between the Mexican President and Win
Scott, and immediately after Scott discussed the
situation with his nominal superior in Washington by
telephone. Scott's superior was asked about this. He said
that he did not remember the substance of his telephone
call to Win Scott on the 23rd. (HSCA Deposition of John
Scelso, 5/16/78, p. 88) "I do not have any idea why (I
called). I may have been ordered to call him on any
number of things." (Ibid., p. 87.) He was also asked
about Scott's meeting with the Mexican President.
You get a psychological question. [
] There had been a big fight
when the new Ambassador got there--no, it wasn't that.
It was a very peculiar situation in Mexico [
] This caused no great problem with the then-
Ambassador whose name I have forgotten.
Q: Thomas Mann?
A: [
]
[
]
[
]
Q: [
]
A: [
]
(HSCA Deposition of John Scelso, 5/16/78, pp. 83-84.)
Win Scott indicated that he was going to write a
memorandum concerning his meeting with the President of
Mexico. (Routing and Record Sheet for MEXI 7028,
11/23/63.) If Mr. Scott wrote such a memo, it has not
been made available to the HSCA. David Phillips, who
after serving in Mexico, went on to accumulate quite an
impressive record as a Chief of Station in several
countries himself, told Committee investigators that a
memorandum of this sort, along with other "sensitive"
information would be the type of thing that Win Scott
probably kept in his private safe. (David A. Phillips
Interview, 8/24/78, p. 10.) Mr. Phillips added that he
did not know what happened to Mr. Scott's safe after he
died but he had heard vague stories about someone finding
a lot of documents that Scott had kept. (Ibid.)
680 MEXI 7054, 11/24/63, para. 3.
681 MEXI 7024, 11/23/63, para. 8.
682 MEXI 7024, 11/23/63, para. 8.
683 MEXI 7023, 11/26/63, para. 2.
684 See Section II, C, 4, above.
685 For example, MEXI 7023 reports that a voice comparison was
not done while MEXI 7025 implies that one was done
686 See Section III, A, 1, above.
687 See Section III, A, 1, above.
688 See Section III, A, 1, above.
688a [not footnoted]
689 Note to Luis Echevarria, November 23, 1963, CIA No. 444;
Cable re Oswald-Duran, MEXI 7029, November 23, 1963. CIA
No. 441; Raymond Rocca Chronology 7241, Entry 36,
November 23, 1963, CIA No. 635.
690 Ibid.
691 See below, p.
692 Note written by Winston Scott re phone call with John
Scelso, November 23, 1963; Chronology prepared by Raymond
Rocca, WX 7241, entry 37, November 23, 1963, CIA No. 635.
693 Ibid.
694 Ibid.
695 Chief of Station phone call to Luis Echevarria, November
1963, CIA No. 440; Flash Cable from Karamessines to
Mexico City Station, November 23, 1963, DIR 84916, CIA
No. 403; Chronology of Raymond Rocca, entry 46, November
23, 1963. CIA No. 636.
696 Blind Memo re Lee Harvey Oswald and Silvia Duran, November
26, 1963, CIA #473.
697 Ibid.
698 Cable from Mexico City Station to Headquarters, November
27, 1963, MEXI 7101, CIA #493.
699 Cable from Mexico City Station to Director, December 12,
1963, MEXI 7364, CIA No. 557-558.
700 Cable Mexico City Station to Headquarters, November 27,
1963, MEXI 7105, CIA No. 479; Chronology of Raymond
Rocca, November 27, 1963, entry no. 127, CIA No. 562.
701 Cable from Headquarters to the Mexico City Station,
November [8?3?] 1963, DIR 85371, CIA No. 464; Chronology
of Raymond Rocca, Nov. 28, 1963, Wx 7241, entry No. 141,
CIA No. 658.
702 CIA Cable from headquarters to Mexico City Station,
December 21, 1963, DIR 90466, CIA No. 549; Chronology of
Raymond Rocca, December 21, 1963, Entry No. 268, CIA No.
682.
703 Ibid.
704 Ibid. also see Section VI, B, 1.
705 CE 2120, pp. 37-40.
706 Supra, p. 186.
707 Supra, p. 187.
707a Supra, p. 187.
707b Supra, p. 190.
708 Memorandum for the record re Trip to Mexico City, from W.
David Slawson, 4/22/64, pp. 39-40. Last Parenthetical in
the Original.
709 Ibid.
710 HSCA Interview of Silvia Duran, 6/6/78, JFK Document
#011775.
711 Letter HSCA to Mexican government, [redacted] , JFK
Document # [blank]
712 HSCA interview of Silvia Duran, 6/6/78, JFK Doc. #011775,
p. [blank]
713 Ibid., p. 19-23.
714 Ibid., p. 19-23.
715 Ibid., p. 23.
716 Ibid., p. 24-25.
717 Ibid., p. 28.
718 Ibid., p. 30.
719 Ibid., p.29-30.
720 Ibid., p. 30.
721 Ibid., p. 29.
722 Ibid., p. 45, 31.
723 Ibid., p. 40.
724 Ibid., p. 40-41.
725 Ibid., p. 41.
726 Ibid.
727 Ibid., p. 42.
728 Ibid., p. 43.
729 Ibid.
730 Ibid.
731 Ibid., p. 42.
732 Ibid., p. 43.
733 Ibid., p. 43, 51,
734 Ibid.
735 Ibid., p. 48.
736 Ibid., p. 51.
737 Ibid.
738 Ibid., p. 96.
739 Write-up: [ ] meeting with [ ] May
26, 1967.
740 Ibid.
741 [ ] was a source the CIA rated reliable.
742 Ibid.
743 Ibid.
744 Ibid.
745 Ibid.
746 [ s] case officer's pseudonym.
747 Ibid.
748 Ibid.
749 HMMA-32243, 5/27/67.
750 See Section, VI, C, below.
751 W -7241, entry no. 613.
752 FBI, CIA, State Department.
753 "Pitched" is a term used by the CIA to designate an
attempt to recruit an individual.
754 HSCA Interview of David Phillips, 8/3/78, p. 8. See also
HSCA Testimony of Ann Goodpasture, 11/20/78, p. 63.
755 HSCA, interview of David Phillips, 8/3/78, p. 8.
756 Ibid.
757 Ibid.
758 Memorandum for the Record on Trip to Mexico City, from W.
David Slawson, 4/22/64, pp. 22-23. Emphasis added.
759 HSCA Interview of David Phillips, 8/3/78, p. 8.
760 Extremely reliable source.
761 HSCA Review of [ ] file.
762 HSCA Interview of David Phillips, 8/3/78, p. 9.
763 Ibid.
764 Ibid.
765 Ibid.
766 Ibid.
767 Ibid.
768 Summary of CIA file review of Silvia Duran.
769 Personality.
770 The HSCA requested of the CIA on August 20, l978 an
explanation of why there was no "P" file on Silvia Duran,
Luisa Calderon Carralero, Teresa Proenza Proenza, Eusebio
Azcue Lopez, Guillermo Oresta, Ruiz Perez, Gilberto
Policarpo Lopez, Juan Manuel Calvillo Alonso and June
Viola Cobb Sharp.
The agency responded with the following on September 11,
1978:
Station index cards show the following information re
201 numbers and "P" numbers:
1) Silvia Duran (No info re "P" number)
2) Luisa Calderon Carraero P-8292 Destroyed
3) Teresa Proenza Proenza (No info re "P" number)
771 HSCA Interview of [ ] 8/29/78, p. 1.
772 Ibid.
773 Ibid., p.1.
774 CIA, FBI, State Department.
775 HSCA Testimony of Barney Hidalgo, 8/10/78, p. 16.
776 Ibid.
777 Ibid.
778 Ibid.
779 Warren Commission, p. 302.
780 The U.S. relations with Cuba in 1963-1964 were not very
good. See U.S.-Cuban Relations Section. Also, Azcue
traveled from Mexico to Cuba on November 18, 1963.
781 Letter from HSCA to Cuban Government, [blank], JFK Doc.
#[blank]
782 See Transcript Cuba Trip 1, April 1, 1978.
783 HSCA Interview of Eusebio Azcue, April 1, 1978, pp. 12-21,
JFK Doc. # 007005. See p. 205.
784 Ibid.
785 See Cuba procedural write-up trip 2.
786 Letter HSCA to Cuban government, [blank], JFK Doc. #
[blank]
787 Mr. Azcue could not pinpoint the exact dates of the visit.
788 HSCA public hearing testimony of Eusebio Azcue Lopez,
9/18/78, pp. 30-31.
789 Ibid.
789a Communist party membership card, Fair Play For Cuba
membership card, Soviet Union residence card, marriage
certificate with the name of his Russian wife.
789b HSCA Public Hearing Testimony of Eusebio Azcue,
9/18/78, p. 5-30.
789c Ibid., p. 29-30.
789d Ibid., p. 30.
789e Ibid., p. 20.
789f Azcue could not pinpoint the exact date.
789g HSCA Public Hearing Testimony of Eusebio Azcue Lopez,
9/18/78, p. 32.
789h Ibid., p. 33.
789i Ibid.
789j Azcue could not pinpoint the time of the phone call.
790 HSCA Public Hearing Testimony of Eusebio Azcue Lopez,
9/18/78, p. 34.
791 Ibid., p. 35.
792 10:00 - 2:00
793 HSCA Public Testimony of Eusebio Azcue Lopez, 9/18/78, p.
36.
794 Ibid., p. 38.
795 Ibid.
796 Ibid.
797 Ibid., pp. 50-51.
797a AMMUG, a CIA Defector alleged that Mirabal Diaz was a
DGI agent.
798 Mr. Mirabal could not pinpoint the exact dates of Oswald's
visit but opined that the second visit occurred on
September 27, 1963.
799 HSCA Public Testimony of Alfredo Mirabal Diaz, 9/18/78, p.
117.
800 Ibid.
801 Ibid., p. 113.
802 Ibid., p. 120.
802a Ibid., p. 199.
802b Ibid.
803 Wx 7241, p. 94. entry no. 430; Blind Memo dated 10/5/64.
804 See appendix 5 for biography.
805 Wx 7241, p. 94. entry no. 430; Blind Memo dated 10/5/64.
806 Ibid.
807 Ibid.
808 Ibid.
809 Ibid.
810 Ibid.
811 Ibid.
812 Ibid.
813 A "witting" asset is the title given to a CIA source whose
information is being used by the CIA.
814 CIA No. 580-583, Wx 7241, Entry #427. p. 92, CIA #719.
815 Ibid.: circa October 1964.
816 Ibid.
817 Ibid.
818 Ibid. Also, Winston Scott was the Mexico City Chief in
1964.
819 CIA No.'s 580-583: Wx 7241, Entry #427, p. 42, CIA #719.
820 Wx 7241, p. 94, Entry #430, CIA #721; Blind memo dated
10/5/64, CIA #576.
821 Personality.
822 See Wx 7241, p. 94., CIA #721.
823 Wx. 7241 p. 87, CIA #714.
824 CIA 10/12/64 memo, CIA #596; WX 7241, p. 87, CIA #714.
825 [ ] was [ ] cryptonym. [ ] was a
witting asset who wrote propaganda pieces for the CIA.
After careful review of [ ] CIA file, the HSCA has
not been able to establish a link from [ ] to
either Ms. Odio or Cobb.
826 The Committee has not been able to determine why the memo
was not sent to Headquarters.
827 CIA 10/12/64 Memo, CIA #596: Wx 7241, p. 87, CIA #714.
828 The House Select Committee has been unable to determine
the agent's identity since his name does not appear in
any CIA files.
829 Memo from Winston Scott to the files, re June Cobb,
11/25/64, CIA No. 592-593; Wx 7241, p. 88, Entry #404,
CIA #715.
830 While reviewing [ ] file the Committee determined
that the [ ] was Manuel Calvillo who
Elena claimed escorted her and her daughter to the
Vermont Hotel for protection the day following JFK's
assassination.
831 Memo from Winston Scott to the files, re June Cobb Sharp,
11/25/64. CIA Nos. 592-593, Wx 7241, p. 88, Entry #404,
CIA No. 715.
832 Ibid.
833 Ibid.
834 HSCA Review of Classified CIA Documents.
835 The Legal Attach� in 1964 was Clark Anderson.
836 FBI 105-825555 Report, December 11, 1964 entitled Lee
Harvey Oswald, p. 1.
837 Ibid.
838 To be checked at FBI.
839 FBI investigation of President Kennedy's assassination had
established that Lee Harvey Oswald had departed Mexico
City by bus at 8:30 a.m. on October 2, 1963. Elena
Insurgen [sic]
840 FBI 105-825555 Report, December 11, 1964 entitled Lee
Harvey Oswald, p. 1.
841 Ibid., p. 3.
842 Ibid.
843 Ibid.
844 Ibid.
845 Ibid.
846 Ibid.
847 Ibid.
848 Ibid., p. 4.
849 Ibid.
850 Ibid.
851 Ibid.
852 Ibid.
853 Ibid.
854 A review of CIA files corroborrated that the FBI never
forwarded the information to the CIA.
855 CIA #586-587, WX-7241, Entry No. 425, p. 91, CIA p. 718.
856 The Committee has been unable to determine who initiated
the discussion re Lee Harvey Oswald.
857 CIA #586-587. WX-7241, Entry No. 425, p. 91, CIA p. 718.
858 Ibid.
859 Ibid.
860 Ibid.
861 Ibid.
862 CIA #586-587, WX-7241, Entry No. 425, CIA p. 718.
863 See Section VI, A, 2a.
864 CIA #586-587, WX-724, Entry No. 425, p. 91, CIA p. 718.
865 Ibid.
866 Ibid.
867 Ibid.
868 Ibid.
869 Ibid.; also see HSCA investigation of Elena Garro de Paz
allegations.
870 CIA No. 586-587, Wx-7241, Entry No. 425, p. 91, CIA p.
718.
871 Ibid.
872 HSCA pre-interview of Ruben Duran, 5/31/78.
873 The House Select Committee has determined that the Central
Intelligence Agency received the copy of the Thomas
memorandum prior to December 25, 1965, his next meeting
with Elena Garro; Also, see below.
874 CIA No. 588, note from [ ] to Chief of Station.
875 Ibid.
876 Cable from Mexico City to the Director, MEXI 5621, Dec.
16, 1965, CIA No. 584-585.
877 Ibid.
878 Ann Goodpasture.
879 Cable from Mexico City to the Director, MEXI 5621, Dec.
16, 1965 CIA Nos. 584-585.
880 Chief of Station in Mexico City.
881 Successor to Clark Anderson as Legal Attach� in Mexico
City.
882 State Department: Letter from Charles Thomas to William P.
Rogers, July 25, 1969, JFK Document No. 011684.
883 Ibid.
884 Ibid.
885 CIA Nos. 580-583, Wx-7241, Entry #427, p. 92, CIA #719.
886 Ibid.; The meeting With the Legal Attach� officer occurred
on November 24, 1964 . Also, see supra, p. [blank]
887 CIA Nos. 580-583, Wx-7241, Entry #427, p. 92, CIA #719.
888 Ibid.
889 Ibid.
890 Ibid.
891 Ibid.
892 Ibid.
893 Ibid.
894 Ibid.
895 Ibid.
896 Ibid.
897 Ibid.
898 Ibid.
899 Ibid.
900 Ibid.
901 Ibid.
902 Ibid.
903 Him: John F. Kennedy.
904 CIA Nos. 580-583 WX-7241, Entry #427, p. 92, CIA # 719.
905 Ibid.
906 HSCA Public Testimony of Eusebio Azcue, 9/18/78, p. [hand
written 84-85 ]
907 CIA Nos. 580-583; Wx-7241, Entry #427, p. 92, CIA #719.
908 Ibid.
909 Ibid.
910 Ibid.
911 Ibid.
912 Noe Palomares was the Mexican Minister of Immigration in
1963.
913 CIA Nos. 580-583; Wx-7241, Entry No. 427, p. 92, CIA #719.
914 Ibid.
915 Ibid.
916 Ibid.
917 Ibid.
918 Ibid.
919 Ibid.; Also, for confirmation see Memo from Legat to
Winston Scott, 10/13/66, CIA No. 564; Wx-7241, Entry
#466, p. 98, CIA #725.
920 CIA Nos. 580-583; Wx-7241, Entry No. 427, p. 92, CIA p.
719.
921 Ibid.
922 Ibid.
923 Ibid.
924 Ibid.
925 Ibid.
926 Ibid.
927 Ibid.
928 Victor Rico Galan is dead. The Committee could not verify
Ms. Garro's allegation.
929 CIA Nos. 580-583; WX-7241, Entry No. 427, p. 92, CIA, p.
719; also, Silvia Duran denied the allegation, (see HSCA
Interview at Silvia Duran, 6/6/78, JFK Document No.
011775, p. 81. Also, see Section VI, A, 2a.)
930 CIA Nos. 580-583; WX-7241, Entry No. 427, p. 92, CIA, p.
719.
931 FBI Report, 9/30/69, pp. 3-4, JFK Doc. No. 011684.
932 Ibid.
933 Supra, p. [missing]
934 FBI Report, 9/35/69, pp. 3-4, JFK Doc. #011684.
935 CIA Nos. 580-583; Wx-7241, Entry #427. p. 92, CIA #710.
936 Ibid.
937 MEXI 5621, Dec. l6, l965; Wx-7241, Entry #426, p. 92, CIA
#710.
938 Memo to the Ambassador from the Legal Attach�, 12/27/65,
CIA #578; Wx-7241, Entry 429, p. 94, CIA #721.
939 Ibid.
940 Ibid.
941 Ibid.
942 Winston Scott superimposed a note to Ann Goodpasture on
this memo which read, "Can we send in a report to
Headquarters 'dismissing' our cable? Goodpasture
responded, Done." The cable Winston Scott wanted
dismissed was MEXI 5621 which reported that station was
"following up" and cabling results. The new cable was
written and sent on December 29, 1965; see text.
943 Cable from Mexico City to the Director, 12/29/65. MEXI
5741, CIA #575; Wx-7241. Entry #430, p. 94, CIA #721.
944 Ibid.
945 Ibid.
946 Ibid.
947 Ibid.
948 Ibid.
949 Ibid.
950 Note from Ann Goodpasture to Mexico City Station, Cuban
Section, 2/3/66, CIA No. 579; Wx-7241, Entry 428, p. 94,
CIA #721.
951 Ibid.
952 Ibid. HSCA Staff Summary of CIA Files on [ ] and
[ ].
953 See Section II, A, 3 above.
954 Classified Summary of Staff Review of CIA Documents,
undated, p. 3, CIA #763.
955 Memo from Legat to Ambassador, 2/23/66, CIA #571; Wx-7241,
Entry #455, p. 95, CIA #722.
956 Ibid.
957 The House Select Committee has been unable to determine
when the copy was forwarded to the CIA.
958 Ibid.; see also 12/25/65 Thomas memo for corroboration.
959 Memo from Legat to Winston Scott, 10/13/66. CIA No. 564;
Wx-7241, Entry #466, p. 98, CIA #725; Thomas' 7/13/66
memo.
960 Ibid.
961 Ibid.
962 Memo of conversation by Charles Thomas, 12/25/65, p. 3,
CIA #582. JFK Doc. #011584.
963 Wx-7241, Entry #466, p. 98, CIA #725.
964 "Selected out" is a phrase used when an officer is retired
after having been in one grade for the maximum period of
time and is not considered qualified for promotion to a
higher grade.
965 State Department: Letter from Charles Thomas to William
Rogers, Secretary/State, July 25, 1969. JFK Doc. #011684.
966 Ibid.
967 Deputy Chief of Mission, State Department. Chief of
Affairs at the time of President Kennedy' s assassination
and subsequent Oswald investigation.
968 Letter from Charles Thomas to William Rogers,
Secretary/State, July 25, 1969. JFK Doc. #011684.
969 Ibid.
970 FBI Report, 9/30/69, pp. 3-4, JFK Doc. #011684.
971 Ibid.
972a The Committee was unable to determine when Elena found
her calendar.
972 Letter from Charles Thomas to William Rogers, Secretary of
State, July, 25, 1969. JFK Doc. #011684.
973 Ibid.
974 Ibid.
975 Ibid.
976 FBI Report, 9/30/69, p. 4. JFK Doc. #011684.
977 Ibid.
978 Ibid.
979 Supra, p. [blank]
980 Supra, p. [blank]
981 Supra, p. [blank]
982 Letter HSCA to Mexican Government, [blank], JFK
Document, No. [blank]
983 See Mexico city Procedural C-up Trip 1.
984 Ibid.
985 Ibid.
986 Ibid.
987 See HSCA Staff Interview of Betty Serratos, 6/6/78, p. 6,
JFK Document No. 013392; HSCA Staff Interview of Lydia
Duran, 6/5/78, p. 6, JFK Document No. 011681; HSCA Staff
Interview of Horatio Duran Navarro, 6/5/78, p. 25, JFK
Document No. 011683; HSCA Staff Interview of Ruben Duran,
6/5/78, p. 16, Document No. 011680.
988 HSCA Staff Interview of Silvia Tirado Duran. 6/6/78, p.
90, JFK Document No. 011775.
989 HSCA Staff Interview of Silvia Duran, 6/6/78, JFK Doc.
#011775, p. 54; HSCA Staff pre-interview of Lydia Duran
6/5/78 [redacted] HSCA Staff pre-interview of Betty
Serratos, 6/6/78, [redacted] HSCA Staff Interview of
Horatio Duran Navarro, 6/5/68, JFK Document #011683, p.
9; HSCA Staff pre-interview of Ruben Duran, 5/31/78.
990 Letter from HSCA to CIA, [blank], [blank]
991 Letter from CIA to HSCA.
992 See Procedural Write-up Trip 2, Mexico City.
993 Ibid.
994 HSCA Staff Review of June Cobb Sharp file at CIA Head-
quarters.
995 Supra, p. [blank]
996 See Procedural Write-up Mexico city Trip 2.
997 HSCA Staff Review of Manuel Calvillo file.
998 See procedural write-up Trip 2, Mexico city and Section
VII, C, below.
999 HSCA Staff contact Report, 7/7/78, JFK Document No. 10016.
1000 Ibid.
1001 HSCA Staff Contact Report, 7/7/78, JFK Document No.
013486.
1002 HSCA Staff Contact Report, 7/14/78, JFK Document No. 9950.
1003 Ibid.
1004 HSCA Staff Contact Report, 8/31/78, JFK Doc. #013487.
1005 Ibid.
1006 Ibid.
1007 HSCA Staff Contact Report, 9/5/78, JFK Document No.
011268.
1008 Ibid.
1009 Ibid.
1010 Letter to Elena Garro from Committee, 9/6/78, JFK Document
No. 011383; see also, HSCA Staff contact Report, 9/5/78,
JFK Document No. 011268.
1011 HSCA Staff Contact Report, 9/7/78, JFK Document No.
011345.
1012 Ibid.
1013 Ibid.
1014 HSCA Staff contact Report, 9/15/78, JFK Document #013488.
1015 HSCA Staff Contact Report, 9/12/78, JFK Document #011344.
1016 HSCA Staff Contact Report, 9/15/78, JFK Document #013488.
1017 HSCA Staff Contact Report, [blank], JFK Document #
[blank]
1018 UNAM-Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico
1019 American Embassy Incoming Telegram # A-43-570, p. 110, CIA
#737.
1020 Ibid.
1021 Ibid.
1022 Ibid.
1023 Ibid.
1024 Ibid.
1025 Letter to Wesley D. Bowles, Chief of Mexican Political
Affairs, Office of Mexican Affairs, Department of State
for B. J. Ruyle, American Consul, Tampico, 5/11/67; Wx-
7241 Entry #597, p. 114, CIA #741.
1026 Ibid.
1027 Ibid.
1028 Ibid.
1029 Ibid.
1030 Ibid.
1031 The Committee could not determine when the State
Department forwarded the letter to the CIA.
1032 Dispatch from the Director to Mexico City, 6/14/67, HMMW
15557; Wx-7241, Entry #616, p. 117, CIA #744.
1033 Ibid.
1034 Ibid.
1035 Ibid.
1036 Ibid.
1037 Ibid.
1038 Cable from Mexico city to the Director, MEXI 1950,
6/29/67; Wx-7241, Entry #622. p. 118, CIA #745.
1039 El Sol is a newspaper, The Sun.
1040 Cable from Mexico City to the Director, MEXI 1950,
6/29/67; Wx-7241, entry #622. p. 118, #745.
1041 Then Contreras was asked to identify the other four
individuals who had met Lee Harvey Oswald, he refused to
reveal their names because he feared that informing on
them might endanger his family.
1042 Cable from Mexico City to Director, MEXI 1950, 6/29/67; Wx-
7241, entry #622, p. 118, CIA #745.
1043 Ibid.
1044 Ibid.
1045 Ibid.
1046 Ibid.
1047 Cable from the Director to Mexico City, 7/4/67, DIR 16823,
Wx-7241, Entry 626, p. 119, CIA #746.
1048 Ibid.
1049 Cable from Mexico City to the Director, 7/5/67, MEXI 1991;
Wx-724l, Entry 627, p. 119, CIA #746.
1050 Memo to Legat, 7/5/67 from Chief of Station; Wx-7241,
entry 628, p. 119, CIA #746.
1051 Memo from JKB re Oscar Contreras, 7/10/67, Wx-7241, Entry
#634, p. 120, CIA #747.
1052 Ibid.
1053 The leaders of the group were Victor Manuel Barcelo,
Carlos Andaluz, Hugo Castro Aranda, Antonio Tenario
Adame, Jose Guerrero Guerrero, Carlos Ortiz Fejeda,
Daniel Molina, Brion Balvez, Humberto Hiriarte, Oscar
Gonzales, Hibam Garcia, Pedro Sainz Zepeda, Alberto
Cerecer, Jose Eduardo Pascual, Juan Saldana, Martin Reyes
Baissadel, Vicente Luillamar, Rubelio Fernandez Durado
and Jesus Ochoa.
1054 Memo from JKB re Oscar Contreras, 7/10/67: Wx-7241, Entry
#634, p. 120, CIA #747.
1055 Ibid.
1056 Dispatch from Mexico City to Director, HMMA 32497,
7/11/67; Wx-7241, Entry #635, p. 121, CIA #748.
1057 Dispatch from the Director to Mexico, 6/14/67, HMMW 15557;
Wx-7241, Entry #616, p. 117, CIA #744.
1058 Cable from Mexico City to the Director, MEXI 1950,
6/29/67; Wx-7241, entry #622, p. 118, CIA #745.
1059 Cable from Mexico City to the Director, 7/5/67, MEXI 1991;
Wx7241, Entry 627, p. 119, CIA #746.
1060 See Section VI, C.
1061 See Section VI, D, above.
1062 See Warren Commission Report, pp. 299-304. 733-736; also,
Section I, B, VC and VI A above. Some of the more
prominent are Paul Hoch and Peter Dale Scott in the
Assassination Dallas and Beyond and A. T. [sic] Weberman
in Coup d'etat in America
1063 See Sections V C, VIA and B respectively.
1064 Ibid.
1065 Silvia Duran.
1066 Eusebio Azcue Lopez, Alfredo Mirabal Diaz, Orestes
Guillermo Ruiz Perez, Nilo Otero, Maria Teresa Proenza y
Proenza.
1067 Noe W. Palomares, Pedro Gutierrez Valencia, Silvia Duran,
Horacio Duran, Ruben Duran, Lydia Duran, Betty Serratos,
Ernesto Lehfeld Miller.
1068 See Glossary.
1069 The Handwriting Panel concluded that the signature on the
visa application was identical to other samples of Lee
Harvey Oswald's handwriting.
1070 HSCA Interview of Silvia Duran, 6/6/78, JFK Document
011775. Consul Azcue stated that standard operating
procedure at the Cuban Consulate did not allow
applications to be removed from the office. (HSCA Public
Testimony of Eusebio Azcue, 9/18/78, p. 41)
1071 Ibid., pp. 31-33.
1072 See Sections II C, III A 1 and III B 2 above.
1073 See Section III B 2 above.
1074 Ibid.
1075 [ ] transcript from Soviet Embassy,
9/27/63.
1076 Ibid.
1077 Ibid.
1078 Ibid.
1079 [ ] transcript from Soviet Embassy,
9/28/63.
1080 Ibid.
1081 Ibid.
1082 Ibid.
1083 HSCA Staff Interview of Silvia Duran, 6/6/78, JFK Document
No. 011775, p. 19.
1084 Ibid., pp. 20-23.
1085 HSCA Public Testimony of Eusebio Azcue, 9/l8/7 8, p. 36.
1086 HSCA Staff Interview of Silvia Duran, 6/6/78, JFK Document
#011775, p. 23.
1087 HSCA Public Testimony of Eusebio Azcue Lopez, 9/18/78, p.
32-33.
1088 See Sections VC, and VIB above.
1089 HSCA Staff Interview of Silvia Duran, 6/6/78, JFK Document
#011775, p. 37.
1090 See Supra, p. [blank].
1091 See Sections III, A1, and III B above.
1092 HSCA Staff Interview of Silvia Duran, 6/6/78, JFK Document
#011775, p. 92-100; also, see Section VC for details.
1093 See Sections VC for details.
1094 HSCA Public Testimony of Eusebio Azcue Lopez 9/16/78, p.
51.
1095 See Section VI C above and VII B below.
1096 See Section III A 1 above.[ ]
1097 HSCA Staff Interview of Silvia Duran, 6/6/78, JFK Document
No. 011775, p. 44.
1098 The CIA' s classification of the transcript of this
conversation prevented the HSCA from directly confronting
Ms. Duran with the information.
1099 See Sections II, C, 3, 4 and above.
1100 [ ] transcript of Soviet Embassy,
9/28/63.
1101 Ibid., October 1, 1963.
1102 Ibid.
1103 Ibid.
1104 See Section IV, B above.
1105 Ibid.
1106 HSCA Public Testimony of Marina Oswald, [blank], Warren
Commission , testimony of George DeMorenschildt. Warren
Commission Testimony of George Boule.
1107 [ ] of Soviet Embassy, 9/27/63.
1108 Ibid.
1109 Ibid.
1110 Ibid.
1111 Ibid.
1112 The caller said Odessa.
1113 Warren Commission Report, p. 301.
1114 [ ] of Soviet Embassy, September
27, 1963.
1115 Ibid.
1116 Ibid.
1117 HSCA Staff Interview of Silvia Duran, 6/6/78, JFK Document
No. 011775, P. 31.
1118 HSCA Public Testimony of Alfredo Mirabal Diaz, 9/l8/78, p.
119.
1119 HSCA Staff Interview of Silvia Duran, 6/6/78, JFK Document
011775, p. 23.
1120 Ibid., p. 31.
1121 Ibid.
1122 Ibid.
1123 HSCA Public Testimony of Alfredo Mirabal Diaz, 9/18/78, p.
119.
1124 [ ] of Soviet Embassy, 9/27/63.
1125 Ibid.
1126 Ibid.
1127 Ibid.; also HSCA Staff Interview of Silvia Duran, 6/6/78,
JFK Document No. 011775. p. 41.
1128 Ibid.
1129 Warren Commission of Nelson Delgado, Vol. III, p 236-237.
1130 Warren Commission Testimony of Pamela Mumford, 5/19/64,
Vol. II, p. 227; Warren Commission Testimony of Evaristo
Rodriguez, 7/21/64, Vol. II. p. 34, CE 2120, p. 7. CE
212, p. 54.
1131 Warren Commission Report, p. 301.
1132 See section VI C, above.
1133 See Section VI D, above.
1134 See Section VII D, above.
1135 See Sections III A 1 and III B 2.
1136 Ibid.
1137 Warren Commission Report, p. 301.
1138 A night when Oswald's activities are not known.
1139 HSCA. Staff pre-interview of Ruben Duran, 3/31/78, No.
01168[3?], p. 54; HSCA Staff Pre-interview of Lydia
Duran, 6/5/78, HSCA Staff Interview of Horacio Duran,
6/5/78, JFK Document No. 011683 p. 9, HSCA Staff
Interview of Betty Serratos 6/1/78, HSCA Staff Interview
of Silvia Duran, 6/6/78, JFK Document No. 011775, p. 54.
1140 HSCA Staff Interview of Silvia Duran, 6/6/78, JFK Document
No. 011775, p. 91.
1141 Ibid.
1142 HSCA Staff Interview of Ruben Duran, 6/6/78, JFK Document
No. 011680, p. [blank] HSCA Staff Interview of Lydia
Duran, 6/5/78, JFK Document No. 011681,. p. [blank] HSCA
Staff Interview of Horacio Duran, 6/ 5/78, JFK Document
No. 011683. p. [blank]. HSCA Staff Interview of Betty
Serratos, 6/6./78, JFK Document No. 13392.
1143 See Section VI, C, [blank] above.
1144 HSCA Staff Pre-interview of Ruben Duran, 5/31/78.
1145 HSCA Public Testimony of Eusebio Azcue Lopez, p. 84-85.
1146 See Section VI, C [blank] above.
1147 See Mexico City Procedure Write-up Trip 2 Appendix 3.
1148 See Section VI, C, [blank] above.
1149 See Section VI, C, [blank] above.
1150 See Section VI, A 2 above.
1151 HSCA Staff Interview of Silvia Duran, 6/6/78, JFK Document
No. 011775, p. 81.
1152 Ibid., p.87-88.
1153 HSCA Staff Review of [redacted] file.
1154 HSCA Staff Review of CIA Silvia Duran file.
1155 See Appendix 3.
1156 Ibid.
1157 Ibid.
1158 See Section VI, C 10 above.
1159 See Section VI, C, [blank] above.
1160 See Section VI, C, [blank] above.
1161 See Section VI, C, [blank] above.
1162 See Section VI, C, [blank] above.
1163 See Appendix 3.
1164 See Section VI, C, 1 above.
1165 Ibid.
1166 Ibid.
1167 See Appendix 3.
1168 See Section VI, C 1 above.
1169 See Section VI, C, [blank] above.
1170 Letter from Charles Thomas to William P. Rogers, July 25,
1969, JFK Document No. 011684.
1171 See Section VI, C, [blank] above.
1172 See Section VI, D above for details.
1173 HSCA Staff Interview of Silvia Duran, 6/6/78, JFK Document
No. 011775, p. 95.
1174a [non-existant]
1174 See Section VI, D above.
1175 HSCA Staff Interview of Silvia Duran, 6/6/78, JFK No.
011755, p. 101-102.
1176 See Section VI, D above.
1177 HSCA Staff Interview of Silvia Duran, 6/6/78, JFK Document
No. 011775, p. 95.
1178 See Appendices II and III.
1179 Warren commission Report, p. 305.
1180 See Section VI C above.
1181 See Section VII, C above.
1182 See Section VI, B above.
1183 See Sections VI ABC above.
1184 See Verbatim transcript of meetings prepared by Cuban
government. Hereinafter, called transcript. JFK Doc.
#01221[last number missing].
1185 Ibid.
1186 Ibid.; see also, HSCA Staff Interview of Eusebio Azcue,
4/1/78, JFK Document No. 007005.
1187 See transcript.
1188 Ibid.
1189 Ibid.
1190 Ibid.
1191 See HSCA Interview of Fidel Castro Ruz [sic] , April 3,
1978 JFK Document #007004.
1192 Pedro Gutierrez Valencia claimed that he bumped into Lee
Harvey Oswald at the Consulate on September 27, 1963.
Valencia was at the Consulate doing a credit check on one
of the Cuban employees.
1193 See Section VI, D above for details on Oscar Contreras'
allegations.
1194 See Section VI C for details on Elena and Elenita Garro's
allegations.
1195 Elena Garro's sister who came to the conclusion that Lee
Harvey Oswald was at one of Ruben Duran's twist parties
in the fall of '63.
1196 Eunice Odio reported on Elena Garro's allegations in 1965.
See Section VI, C, [blank] above.
1197 Elena Garro reported that at one of the twist parties,
Emilio Carballido and Eusebio Azcue had come to the
conclusion that Kennedy had to be assassinated. (See
also, Section VI, C, [blank] above.
1198 Elena Garro alleged that Victor Rico Galan had claimed
that Lee Harvey Oswald had been Silvia Duran's lover. See
also, Section VI, C, [blank] above.
1199 Diaz-Ordaz and Echevarria were the two presidents of
Mexico respectively from 1964 to 1970 and 1970 to 1976.
1200 See HSCA Staff Interview of Horacio Duran, 6/5/78, JFK
Document No. 011680.
1201 See HSCA Staff of Interview of Pedro Gutierrez Valencia,
6/5/78, JFK Document No. 011682.
1202 Lynn Duran is the sister of Horatio and Ruben Duran. The
Committee wished to ask her whether Lee Harvey Oswald had
attended any twist parties at the Duran homes. See HSCA
Staff Interview of Lynn Duran, 6/5/78, JFK Doc #011681.
1203 See HSCA Staff Interview of Ruben Duran, 6/6/78, JFK Doc.
#011680.
1204 The Committee never sent the Mexican government the
question because a 2nd trip to Mexico was arranged.
1205 The Committee wished to ask Ms. Serratos whether Lee
Harvey Oswald had attended any twist parties at the Duran
homes. See HSCA Staff Interview of Betty Serratos, JFK
Doc. #01l392.
1206 See HSCA Staff Interview of Silvia Duran, 6/6/78, JFK
Document No. 011775.
1207 [ ] was one of AMMUG's (a Cuban DGI Defector in
1964,) Security Officers. The Committee wished to ask
[redacted] about AMMUG's statements about Lee Harvey
Oswald's trip to the Cuban Consulate.
1208 [ ] as a CIA agent in charge of
picking up the photographic surveillance film from,
personnel stationed at the three bases and delivering it
to his brother-in-law (unknown) and later delivering it
to his case officer Ann Goodpasture.
1209 See HSCA Staff Write-Ups of [ ] Interview
8/8/78.
1210 Oscar Contreras Lartigue claimed that he met Oswald in
Mexico City in the fall of 1963. See Section VI, D above.
1211 Elena claimed that when she told Noe W. Palomares about
meeting Lee Harvey Oswald, he advised her to send an
anonymous letter to Texas, explaining her account. The
Committee wished to question Mr. Palomares about Elena's
credibility.
1212 [ ] See Section VI, C for details
and significance.
1213 [ ]. See Section IV, C for details.
1214 [ ] The
Committee wished to ask [ ] about commentary
after the assassination at the Cuban Embassy about both
Lee Harvey and John F. Kennedy's assassination.
1215 [
] The Committee wished to
question [ ] about the Cuban Embassy employees'
reactions to the to the assassination. The Committee also
wished to question [ ] about Silvia Duran and
his knowledge of Lee Harvey Oswald.
1216 [
] He had reported that Silvia
Duran had told him that she had had an affair with Lee
Harvey Oswald. The Committee wished to question him about
Silvia Duran.
1217 See HSCA Staff write-up of Interview with
]
1218 General Jesus Jose Clark Flores escorted Ruben Duran to
Russia in 1962 and was considered by many to be Duran's
protector. Also, Elena claimed that Flores was at the
party that she stated Lee Harvey Oswald was in
attendance. The Committee wished to ask Mr. Clark Flores
about all the above.
1219 Ernesto Lehfeld Miller is a Mexican citizen that resembled
Eusebio Azcue's description of the man that allegedly
visited the Cuban Consulate. All the Durans recognized
Miller. Horatio and Silvia said that Miller was a close
friend and borrowed Horatio's car often.
1220 See House Select Committee on Assassinations Staff Write-
Up of Noe W. Palomares, 8/10/78.
1221 See HSCA Staff write-up of Interview with Ernesto Lehfeld
Miller, 8/11/78.
1222 In 1963 Nilo Otero as an official in the Cuban governments
Ministry of Foreign Relations, interviewed Eusebio Azcue
about Lee Harvey Oswald's visits to the Cuban Consulate.
1223 In 1963 the Cuban government employed Rogelio Rodriguez at
the Cuban Embassy. The Committee wished to interview Mr.
Rodriguez about Lee Harvey Oswald' s visits to the Cuban
Embassy employees' reactions to the Kennedy
assassination.
1224 Rolando Cubela, known as AMLASH, was prominent in the
Senate Select Committee's Book V which reported the
possibility that the Central Intelligence Agency attempts
to assassinate Cuban President Fidel Castro provoked the
Cuban government to orchestrate the assassination of
President Kennedy in retaliation.
1225 In 1963 the Cuban government employed Orestes Guillermo
Ruiz Perez at the Cuban Embassy. The Committee wished to
interview Mr. Rodriguez about Lee Harvey Oswald's visits
to the Cuban Consulate and about the Cuban Embassy
employees' reactions to the Kennedy assassination. In
addition, Mr. Ruiz, is the cousin-in-law of one of the
most active anti-Castroites, Antonio Veciana Blanch.
1226 Griselle Rubio claimed in a letter Dec. 1963 to DRI that
Ruby had been in Cuba in 1962 or 1963 visiting Solomon
Pratkins. The Committee located and interviewed Ms. Rubio
in Miami.
1227 James Wilcott is an ex-CIA employee who appeared
voluntarily in August 1978 at the Cuban Government's
Tribunal which accused the CIA of complicity in the John
F. Kennedy assassination.
1228 Phillip Agee is an ex-CIA employee who appeared
voluntarily in August 1978 at the Cuban government's
Tribunal which accused the CIA of complicity in the John
F. Kennedy assassination.
1229 The Tribunal, held in August 1978 was an effort by the
Cuban government to accuse the CIA of complicity in the
John F. Kennedy assassination. Ex CIA agents, James
Wilcott and Phillip Agee testified at the Tribunal along
with ex-Cuban Consul in Mexico, Eusebio Azcue.
1230 See HSCA Interview of Juan Nilo Otero, 9/25/78, JFK Doc.
No. [blank]
1231 Alfredo Mirabal Diaz assumed the Consul position, in the
Cuban government' s Mexico City Consulate on September 2,
1963. He was present during all of Oswald's visits to the
Consulate. Also, see HSCA Interview of Alfredo Mirabal
Diaz, 8/26/78, JFK Document No. [blank].
1232 The committee wished to question Mr. Verdacia about the
identities of the organized Crime figures detained in
Trescornia at the inception of the Cuban revolutionary
government.
1233 HSCA Interview of Jose Verdacia Verdacia, 8/26/78, JFK
Doc. #012224.
1234 See HSCA Interview of Orestes Guillermo Ruiz Perez, 8/27/7
8, JFK Doc. [blank].
1235 See HSCA Interview of Rolando Cubela Secades, 8/28/78, JFK
Document # [blank]
1236 In 1963 the Cuban government employed Maria Teresa Proenza
y Proenza at the Cuban Embassy. The Committee wished to
interview Ms. Proenza about Lee Harvey Oswald's visits to
the Cuban Consulate and about the Cuban Embassy employees
reactions to the assassination of John F. Kennedy. Also,
See HSCA Interview of Maria Teresa Proenza y Proenza,
8/28/78, JFK Doc. #[redacted].
1237 See Verbatim transcript of 8/28/78 session. JFK Doc.
#012208.
1238 In 1963, Manuel Pi�iero, Chief of the Ministry of Foreign
Relations, interviewed Eusebio Azcue about Lee Harvey
Oswald's visits to the Cuban Consulate. In addition, Mr.
Pi�iero was the Cuban revolutionary government official
who met with Santo Trafficante and gave him 24 hours to
leave the country.
1239 In 1963 the Cuban government employed Luisa Calderon
Carralelo at the Cuban Embassy. The Committee wished to
interview Ms. Proenza about Lee Harvey Oswald's visits to
the Cuban Consulate and about the Cuban Embassy
employees' reactions to the assassination of John F.
Kennedy.
1240 In 1963 Raul Roa interviewed Eusebio Azcue in Cuba about
Lee Harvey Oswald's activities in Mexico City.
