-Caveat Lector-

an excerpt from:
Drugs, the U.S., and Khun Sa
Francis W. Belanger©1989
Editions Duang Kamol
Siam Square,
Bangkok, Thailand
ISBN 974-210-4808
146 pps. – First Edition – Out-of-print



The major producer of heroin in the Far East today is Khun Sa, an enigmatic
character who makes a fortune through his trade in narcotics and other
contraband. There are several other 'opium: warlords' in the Golden
Triangle—the Laotian leader, Kaysone Phomvihane; a Thai, Lao Su; a Burmese,
Kom Jerng—but Khun Sa is the man who during an interview at his fortress in
Burma a short time ago arrogantly and publicly announced his plan to step up
opium production in the Golden Triangle to 1200 tons a year.

Khun Sa, 54, is a likable man, growing old gracefully, and quick to smile.
Like many of the people in the Burma-Thailand-Laos area, he is the product of
a mixed marriage, of mixed Shan and Haw Chinese blood; he was born in 1933
(or 1934) in Loi Maw in the Mong Yai State and claims maternal descent from a
local sawbwa. Though his given name is Chang Chi-fu, he adopted the pseudonym
'Khun Sa', khun meaning "Lord" and' "Sa" being his stepfather's name, his
mother having remarried a' Shan prince. He had gained military experience
with the KMT, then became leader of his own army of several hundred men which
he transformed into a KKY unit.

The, young swashbuckler settled around the towns of Tang Yang and Ving Ngun
close to the Wa States, an area renown for its bountiful opium production,
and was soon sending large caravans of opium into Thailand and Laos. This led
to clashes with KMT troops, who until then had controlled 90 percent of
exports from Burma, thus sparking an 'Opium War'. The conflict ended in a
formal battle at Ban Khwan in Laos, involving Khun Sa's troops, KMT troops,
and Laotian troops. Khun Sa was defeated.

With his subsequent arrest by Burmese authorities, on charges of corruption
and drug trafficking, at Taunggyi in 1969, Khun Sa was thought to have been
eliminated from the Golden Triangle. However, his army still controlled the
opium-producing districts in the Lashio region, while Khun Sa languished in a
Mandalay prison where for months, at least according to his own word, he
underwent torture. In 1973, one of his lieutenants, Chang Tze Chuang
(sometimes referred to as Chan Shu-chin), abducted two Russian doctors
working at the Taunggyi hospital and ultimately exchanged them for his
imprisoned leader

Telling this story, Khun Sa's usually amiable face loses its smile and turns
hard. "I've never forgotten what they did to me," he said, rubbing his groin.
"I promised then that I'd make them pay somehow."

    After five years in jail, Khun Sa reassembled his army of about 2,000
men, which the Shan State army (SSA) had dubbed the Shan United Army (SUA),
hoping to improve the political image of Khun Sa's brigands. Khun Sa quickly
became deeply involved in the illegal drug trade and, with his subordinate
groups, soon controlled 70 percent of the heroin production to come from the
Golden Triangle refineries. His influence grew with his power and had soon
spread to Thai territory. A sector of the SUA settled in the Shan village of
Ban Hin Taek, eight kilometers from the Burmese frontier, which they used as
a drug distribution point. Khun Sa claimed to have entered the narcotics
trade as the only means of financing his struggle for Shan autonomy. However,
cynics believed-and continue to believe- his motives were purely avaricious.


There are several Shan warlords, the one most closely approaching the stature
of Khun Sa being Lo Hsin Han, who was born in Yunnan and emigrated to the
Shan States where he became chief of staff of Jimmy Yang's army of 3,000 men.

General Yang, a member of a noble Kokang family, withdrew to Thailand after
fighting the Burmese government for three years. The Yang family administered
Kokang like a private fief and had organized armed groups at the beginning of
1950. One of the first bandit groups was headed by Jimmy's sister, Olive
Yang. Jimmy was in charge of the Kokang Force, which joined the Shan State
Independence Army (SSIA) in 1964 and then broke away to cooperate with the
KMT. The SSIA was formed after Shan leaders called on a guerilla expert, Saw
Yan Da, from the Tai (Dai) community in Yunnan, to set up a clandestine army.
He adopted the name 'Sao Noi' and recruited high school students from
Mandalay and Rangoon, forming the rebel group 'Nom Suk Han' on May 21, 1958.
He operated in the mountains to the west of Lashio, but this group rapidly
split into a number of factions. In 1959, the SSIA was formed from the
nationalist-oriented faction, with 90 students and 140 Shan defectors from
the Burmese Army.

Lo Hsin Han was captured in 1965, but the Burmese Army subsequently released
him to organize a KKY militia unit. After the defeat of Khun Sa, he became
one of the Shan State’s main opium suppliers until forced out of the Kokang
State by the BCP and made to confront the KMT and General Lee Wan Huan. He
tried to rally support from the different Shan. Lo Hsin Han was captured in
1965, but the Burmese Army subsequently released him to organize a KKY
militia unit. After the defeat of Khun Sa, he became one of the Shan State's
main opium suppliers until forced out of the Kokang State by the BCP and made
to confr[o]nt the KMT and General Lee Wen Huan. He tried to rally support
from the different Shan rebel groups, but withdrew to Thailand when one of
his camps was besieged by the Burmese. General Lee Wen Huan then seized the
opportunity to denounce him and he was arrested by the Thai police in the Mae
Hong Son area in 1973 and handed over—once again—to the Burmese Government.
Initially, Lo Hsin Han was condemned to death, but his sentence was later
commuted to life imprisonment. Khun SA was freed the same year and Lo Hsin
Han's fall enabled him to regain supremacy.

Other groups, such as the Shan United Revolutionary Army (the SURA, commanded
by Moh Heng) and the Wa National Army (WNA) have remained involved in illegal
drug activities, but only to the extent of sharing the crumbs that drop from
Khun Sa's table. The BCP, on the other hand, has managed to extend its
influence over almost the entire Kokang, Wa, and Kengtung States and thus
controls most of the high-yielding, areas. Initially, the BCP simply
'licensed' poppy cultivation and allowed the Haw traders to collect opium on
Khun Sa's behalf, but later the BCP itself became more directly involved in
drug production and trafficking.

Khun Sa enjoys relating stories about his past and, with a great flourish, in
a grandiloquent manner he rehashed to reporters the story of his capture by
the Burmese in early 1969. Khun Sa's 500-man caravan, carrying about 60 tons
of opium, uncut jade, and other contraband to Houei Sai Village in Laos, came
under attack by reinforced units of the remnant 93rd KMT Division.

The object of the attack was to rob the caravan and break the back of the
newly aspiring opium king.

The two factions engaged in a fierce running battle that lasted for several
days, with neither side gaining the advantage. They were suddenly intercepted
by Laotian soldiers under the command of General Oune Rattikone, commander of
the Lao Army. Both the KMT and Khun Sa's men were attacked by General Oune's
Lao infantry forces, which had the aerial support of T-28 planes. While the
troops of the two rebel factions fled back into Burma, General Oune and his
troops 'confiscated' the contraband. Khun Sa and the KMT lost more than 200
men in the intense fighting. "They thought they had finished me, but I
slipped away with several of my commanders," Khun Sa said, smiling.

"But I have friends all over," Khun Sa emphasized, smiling, "Upon my release,
and with the aid of influential Thais, I was brought into Thailand to live.
While there, I married a Thai, Khe Yoon."


The records show that with his Thai wife's help, he purchase a house at
Pattanawet 5, Sukhumvit Soi 71. While under the protection of the powerful
Thai friends, Khun Sa made a public statement renouncing the drug trade,
although he clandestinely continued to do business as usual. On March 19,
1977 Khun Sa and General Bo Mya, President of the Karen National Union, met
at a large hotel in Pattaya where they discussed the political situation and
drug trading.

"He turned down my proposal, to allow drugs to travel through his territory
under Karen control, but he did agree to allow the passage of other items,
such as jade, with the condition that I pay a tax to him for permitting the
transport of such items." As he spoke, his face again grew hard and he
paused, looking at the mountains.

While still under the protection of the powerful Thais in Bangkok, Khun Sa
stepped up his activities and established a small army at Ban Hin Taek in the
Mae Chan District of Chiang Rai Province. The headquarters was attacked by
Thai forces in 1982 and Khun Sa's men were forced back into Burma. Having
been given ample warning of what was taking place in the north, Khun Sa was
able to escape from his Bangkok home and slip back into Burma before the Thai
authorities could prevent it.

Life was difficult for the warlord, but only for the short time that it took
to regroup and reestablish his authority over several smaller local drug
producers. "I continued to strengthen my positions and built several
scattered fortresses and bastions. Steadily, the size of the rank and file
increased, until it was 6,000 strong. These soldiers, under the leadership of
my trusted aides, were divided into numerous smaller units and scattered
throughout the Shan State near the Thai border. Refineries were set up and I
began the shipment of various grades of heroin."

Khun Sa also ordered a few units to infiltrate back into Thailand and
establish refineries there also in order to utilize the superior
transportation and communications. The Shan rebels then proceeded to drive
several other small, armed rebel groups—including the A-bi hilltribe and the
troops of the Chinese Kuomintang Force—away from Doi Lang. Khun Sa's men also
established bases on several nearby hilltops on the Burmese side of the
border. Thai police and government officials, as well as Burmese soldiers who
were looking for fast and easy money, were bribed and brought into the fold.
Business prospered, and tons of heroin were soon being shipped by many means
of transportation—mule trains, air planes, ships, boats, couriers-along a
myriad of routes through the Far East to reach destinations in Hong Kong,
Australia, Europe and America.


The American Drug Enforcement Agency stationed at Chiang Mai began increasing
the amount of evidence of drug production it provided to the Thai government,
disclosures which eventually led to the capture of both factories and
couriers. Incensed, Khun Sa ordered a hit squad to kill informants suspected
of helping the police. "I want," he said, "to have the monkeys watch while
the chicken's throat is being slit." (This is a Thai expression meaning "to
intimidate someone by making him witness harm done to another.") He also
wanted the agency itself hit, and so he initiated terrorist missions against
American officials in northern Thailand. Following Khun Sa's directives, two
CIA agents were killed, a move that proved to be a big mistake. Families of
U.S. officials were evacuated from the northern provinces to Bangkok for
their protection, and the war against Khun Sa was stepped up dramatically.

In 1982 over 2,000 Rangers, border policemen, and a special airborne unit
from Thailand's Third Army Region, sealed off the roads to Khun Sa's
stronghold on Doi Lang Mountain, which straddles the Thai-Burma border, and
attacked. Seven heliocopter  gunships provided air support and two 105mm
artillery pieces were airlifted to a base close to Doi Lang for additional
ground support. It was the first time artillery had ever been used against
Khun Sa's guerrillas. Once again, having had ample warning because of the
government's overcautious preparations and perhaps being tipped off, the
guerrillas pulled back across the border. The Thai troops followed them into
Burma, meeting only slight resistance from Wa rebels. Khun Sa's men passed
through Wa held territory and ordered the Wa rebels to fight a delaying

On the Burmese side of the border, 2,000 Burmese troops joined in the attack.
Another 800 troops were poised to attack a Shan rebel base at Ban Pong Hai,
immediately across the border from Mae Chan District in Chiang Rai. The
Burmese forces ultimately engaged rebels of the Karen, Shan, Pa-o, Kayah,
Kachin, Muser, and Arakan ethnic minorities along eight battle fronts in
Burma facing the Thai provinces of Chiang Rai, Mae Hong Son, and Chiang Mai.
Another 1,000 Burmese troops and porters had advanced to within 20 kilometers
of the KNU's Manerpror headquarters and were preparing to strike. All the
rebel forces succeeded in breaking contact, however, and withdrew safely.

But Khun Sa had been hurt. The drug kingpin hastily dumped narcotics from his
stock onto the market, gathering money to replace whatever equipment and
weapons that had been lost. The payment for his drugs was made in ammunition
and rifles, as well as in cash and bank drafts. The elimination of the SUA on
Thai soil also forced Khun Sa to set up new bastions, and he has since
extended his influence to the border areas adjacent to Chiang Rai, Chiang
Mai, and Mae Hong Son. In a few weeks, things were back to normal for Khun
Sa. When interrupted to ask why he had
ordered the killings of Westerners, he replied, "Because they turned on me,"
he shouted. "At one time, they were my partners—them, the DEA and the CIA,

After uniting and absorbing the forces of several hilltribes in the area,
Khun Sa requested another meeting with Bo Mya, the leader of Burma's Karen
National Union's (KNU) 15,000 men at that time in its fortieth year of armed
struggle against the government in Rangoon. Their intent was to join forces
and to allow Khun Sa to transport narcotics through KNU territory in exchange
for arms and ammunition. When questioned about the meeting later, Bo Mya
denied the allegations and claimed that he had met Khun Sa solely to urge him
to stop narcotics production and to try and entice him into the struggle
against the Burmese government. The KNU has a reputation for being an
opponent of narcotics, instead financing their struggle against the Burmese
government by taxing cross-border trade, and by exporting raw
materials—mainly minerals and timber—from their 1,000 meter stretch of land
along Thailand's western border.

Although the KNU leadership is unwilling to disclose the details, it now
appears that Bo Mya was approached in the middle of last year and offered
financial assistance from abroad in exchange for an opium eradication
program. Khun Sa agreed to  the total eradication of opium in his territory
within six to eight years—if the necessary financial assistance were to be
obtained. An old idea had been replanted in Kung Sa's mind.

Once before, in 1977, Khun Sa had approached U S Congressman Lester Wolff
asking for money in return for his withdrawal from the opium business. "He
made no headway then, U.S. embassy official confirms, "because the United
States didn't then," a and still does not, engage in talks with a 'rebel' who
is engaged in fighting a government that Washington recognizes as
legitimate." 'But why not try again?' Khun Sa asked himself. And he did in
January 1988, through an emissary, Phra Chamroon Parnchand, the abbot of Wat
Tham Krabork, who is heavily involved in the fight against drug addiction in

Phra Chamroon urged. the United States to lead "damaged parties" (he didn't
specify who, but it is understood he meant other groups much like Khun Sa's)
in negotiations with the Shan State dealer, Khun Sa, whose activities along
the Thai-Burmese border were said to have supplied 60 to 90 percent of the
heroin reaching the U.S. and Europe. Phra Chamroon gave an inkling of his
plan to former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger during a brief meeting in
Bangkok in November, indicating that concerned U.S. officials should come to
Thailand for further discussions.

According to Phra Chamroon, Khun Sa proposed to put an end to the outflow of
drugs for the price of U.S. 'economic assistance' to the tune of US$95
million a year for six years. To most observers, requesting US$570 million
over a period of six years is a tall order. But for Phra Chamroon, it is not.
He argued that the United States already spends much more than that in its
war against drug addiction and prevention.

Phra Chamroon does not reject the notion that he is being used as a tool by
Khun Sa, but the abbot is convinced that he is working for world-wide
benefit, and stresses that there should be a common concern about reducing
the availability of drugs. "Khun Sa is serious about his proposal because of
the pressures of need," Abbot Chamroon emphasized. Some 3,500 men in the Shan
United Army are addicted to drugs, with the rest of the population under his
control awaiting certain death if Khun Sa does not wipe the slate clean.
Worldwide pressure on Khun Sa and the infighting among the rebel groups are
both threats.


His feet now on firmer ground in Burma, Khun Sa turned his eyes to Laos in
1982, seeking another ally in the person of Kaysone Phomvihane. The Lao
government, under the leadership of Kaysone Phomvihane, has been a major
narcotics peddler since at least 1977, with Kaysone and his regime having
poured huge amounts of heroin, morphine, opium, and marijuana on the world
markets. Except for a handful of Thai intelligence and anti-narcotics
officials, the only members of the international diplomatic community ever
to publicly criticize the Laotian government has been the United Nations.
Disclosures by both the Thai and foreign press have occasionally forced Laos
to change its methods of operation, but they have never forced it to close

Khun Sa's request for help from the Lao government met with success, although
many of the details of the Khun Sa-Kaysone alliance are unknown, and Khun Sa
refuses to elaborate. But clearly the small, tight Communist politburo in
Vientiane is in collusion with the notorious Khun Sa. The Burmese-Chinese
drug warlord receives both support and protection from Vientiane, and has
moved most of his factories into Laos. In one of its first administrative
announcements in 1976, the new People’s Republic legalized the growing of
poppies. Exactly when and how Kaysone and his cohorts became drug dealers is
murky and—barring a major defection or an overnight rebellion against the
communists which might expose incriminating documents—will remain so.

The Kaysone-Khun Sa alliance is at first glance curious, not incongruious. It
mixes a Vietnamese-trained, Marxist-Leninist leader with an outlaw warlord
sporting a $25,000, dead-or-alive reward on his head. As in most strange
marriages, however, there are advantages for both partners. For Khun Sa,
whose main business is selling heroin, the alliance offers another source of
raw materials and a sanctuary in which to make the drug. After establishing
himself in his new surroundings, his first priority was to move several
factories already in operation from Vientiane to the province of Sayaboury.
These refining operations now abut Khun Sa's territory in Thailand, separated
only by a mere trickle of a stream that a few miles downstream turns into the
mile-wide Mekong River. The move of the operation, ironically, provided Laos
with even more opportunity to move in on another growth industry—marijuana
smuggling. The cover story for the world is that it is merely a centuries-old
tradition in Laos to use marijuana as a cooking spice.

In 1985, Mo Hein, chairman of the TRA, and Khun Saeng, who is Khun Sa's
uncle, held discussions which led to another alliance. They formed a new
party, the United Shan State Patriotic Council (USSPC), in September 1987.
The Mo Hein political philosophy has declared itself to be in opposition to
the Burmese government, the Burmese Communist Party, and narcotics
trafficking. These goals have been proclaimed as the official USSPC ideology.
Mo Hein's role in the USSPC appears to be little more than a figurehead, and
naming the TRA leader as president of the alliance was clearly a sop to his
well-known ego. Real power-control of the council's finances—was retained by
the dominant partner, Khun Sa, who immediately proclaimed that his current
right-hand man, Chang Hsuchern, would succeed him if he should be
assassinated. Khun Sa also stated that in 1987 some Russian officials had
approached him with an offer of military material and men, but he turned them
down because he disliked Communism.

Khun Sa claims to have over eight million people under his domination in six
'provinces' of the Shan State, the southern extremities of which border the
Thai provinces of Chiang Mai, Chiang Rai, and Mae Hong Som. He declined to
state the strength of his Shan United Army, but it is estimated to be
anywhere between 6,000 and 8,000 men. The Shan State itself is not a major
grower of opium but rather buys the raw material from others in the Golden
Triangle, and then processes it into heroin. According to field sources, Khun
Sa's supply comes mainly from Burmese Communists, who tend poppy fields east
of the- Salween River close to the southern Chinese province of Yunnan.


Khun Sa readily confirmed that retired U.S. Marine Corps Lt-Col. James "Bo"
Gritz had made several trips into the Shan State seeking assistance from him
while searching for Americans missing in action during the Vietnam War. Khun
Sa stated that he thought Gritz would be able to relay his offer to high
officials in the United States.

But Gritz had no success when he told the House Foreign Affairs Panel, under
oath, that the Thai Government had built a road that would boost the flow of
narcotics from the kingpin's Shan territories. The maverick MIA-searcher
emphasized to the  panel's International Narcotics Control Task Force that
Khun Sa's Shan United Army would no longer have to rely on mule and pony
caravans to get the drugs out. The road, capable of accommodating 10-ton
trucks, was ironically built by the Thai Government with manpower, time, and
materials financed by U.S. taxpayers' money allocated to drug suppression

Despite hundreds of millions of dollars of U.S. taxpayers' money spent on the
drug suppression program in Southeast Asia, Gritz testified, Thailand and
Burma had done little to eradicate the flow. Thai officials countered that
Gritz's allegations were groundless and insisted that the government was
determined to stamp out the drug trade. In his testimony, which was based on
disclosures by Khun Sa, the former Green Beret accused several United States
officials of involvement in the opium trade, linking them to a covert CIA
operation in the region. Among the officials he named were CIA operatives
Jerry Daniels and Theodore Shackley, who were responsible for covert
operations in Asia; Richard Armitage, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security, who worked in the Defense Attache's office in Saigon
between 1973-75; and Daniel Arnold, a former CIA station chief for Thailand
and Laos.

Gritz stated that Khun Sa's ledgers showed that the U.S. intelligence
community became an active participant in drug smuggling—to the extent of
buying, selling, and transporting the contraband—in order to fund covert
operations When the Thai Government came under criticism from the United
States in 1987 for lacking enthusiasm in its war against Khun Sa, certain
Thai elements which profit enormously from the opium trade approached the
kingpin and proposed that a "show" be staged to appease Washington. Khun Sa
agreed to let Thai officials visit the border for a Fort Benning-style "map
minute" for press purposes so the Thais could claim they were doing their
part in fighting him.

In return, the Thai officials had to build the road for Khun Sa.

To do this, they used gigantic earth rippers and moving equipment that had
been left in Thailand by the Americans at the end of the Vietnam War,
bulldozers which can hack roads through the densest jungle. The road was
carved over mountains and through a forest rich in teak. Teak had become very
valuable in Thailand due to its scarcity, and the thousands of logs stacked
up waiting to be marketed meant a huge bonus for the officials.

Throughout his testimony, Lt-Col. Gritz presented himself as the carrier of a
message and an offer from Khun Sa to the United States. According to Gritz,
Khun Sa was not comfortable with the present conditions of the drug trade
into which his people had been forced for their survival. The Shans needed to
grow opium to fund their defense against the constant warfare being waged
against them. If the fighting could be stopped, the Shan people could return
to more normal methods of economic development. Khun Sa proposed that if the
United States gave the Shans support, both morally and through treaty
obligations (by which he means, basically, money), he would guarantee the
eradication of opium production in the Golden Triangle. The Support, Khun Sa
argued, did not have to be military, but could be political and educational.

No one on the committee took the proposal seriously, though perhaps they
should have since Gritz's statements were—and are—not far off the mark
Instead, Gritz was subsequently investigated for a passport violation. A
congressional source said that Gritz had lacked credibility on the MIA issue,
and that his interpretation regarding the narcotics situation was no more
credible. At least one committee staffer, however, declared Gritz's
allegations were very serious and said that the task force should investigate
the road issue.

It is interesting to note that despite the Thai Government's denial that such
a road ever existed—a story that the Americans seemingly believed—a small
item hidden in the back pages of an October 1988 edition of the Bangkok Post,
stated that the Thai government was going to blow up several kilometers of a
seldom used highway near theThai-Burma a border. The article stated that the
road had been built a couple of years before, but that it was not used, so
actually served no purpose.

Three -days later, another small item appeared saying that Khun Sa had warned
the Thais that if they were to proceed with the destruction of the highway,
he would bomb government buildings and assassinate officials in Mae Hong Son.
The Thais did delay blowing up the road for several weeks, although they
ultimately did demolish five kilometers later.


Thailand is positioned geographically so that it contains ideal routes for
the transport of heroin from its mountains origins to jump-off points for the
international markets. Some elements of the Thai government work hard to
intercept and destroy any drugs being transported through the country, but
the flood is overwhelming. Over the past several years, narcotics produced in
the Golden Triangle have been transported from northern Thailand to Bangkok
where they are expedited on their way around the world. In Thailand the major
drug kingpins behind the trafficking are mainly Chinese Haws and Taechews who
have been naturalized while living in Bangkok. About one hundred of these
affluent immigrants are believed to be financial backers for the illicit

Opium, morphine, and heroin leave Thailand by mule train, air, car, and
railroad. Bangkok International Airport provides the major avenue for air
transport to Europe, America, Australia, and other pans of Asia. Land routes
used for transportation to Malaysia pass through Songkhla, Narathiwat, and
Yala Provinces, while shipment by sea starts at the port of Klong Toey in
Bangkok. More drugs are sent north by packtrain into the southern Chinese
province of Yunnan. From there, the drugs move over China's relatively good
road, air, and rail networks to the ports of Canton and Hong Kong, some 2,000
kilometers away. It is generally believed that Beijing's official policy is
to crack down on narcotics smuggling, but sources in Thailand, who asked for
anonymity, said there is substantial evidence that officials at various
levels in Yunnan allow the movement of drugs from Burma. Bribing local
authorities is very easy in the Far East, and the exploitation for drug
trafficking is widespread. Hence, authorities throughout Asia seize only a
miniscule percentage of the flow.

Heroin is stashed in hollow places specially built in automobiles to escape
the eyes of authorities, making it hard to detect the drugs unless the
officials have been tipped off in advance. Drugs have been hidden in
furniture, orchids, canned foods, bales of raw rubber, and fresh fish; they
have been packed in condoms and swallowed or hidden in body orifices; they
have been worn in pouches under clothing and girdles. Drugs have been hidden
in vases, clocks, boxes of chocolate, and candy—you name it and it has been

Buyers trust the quality of heroin according to its brand name. Brand names
also determine profitability. Most of the brand names being traded today come
from Khun Sa's factories, most of which are now in Laos, opposite Thailand's
Chiangsaen District The following are some of the more famous—or
infamous—brands that have been seized by the Thai police:

Super 100% (No. 1): This is Khun Sa's brand, certifying that the product is
manufactured at Ta Khee Lek in Laos. The lettering and artwork on the
packaging of this brand is all red. The two upper comers bear a circle with a
deer's head, while the two bottom comers each bear a circle with a tiger's
head. The word "super" is written within the enlarged "1", above "100%".

Crouching Lion: The flaming red package shows a crouching lion within a
circle. This brand also comes from Ta Khee Lek in Laos and is produced by
Mooser tribes under the control of Khun Sa.

A pair of rabbits with mountains in the background: This signifies the origin
of the product as from the Shan State, also another brand of Khun Sa's.
"Guaranteed 100%" is written in English across the top, and "Yong Yee
Product" is written at the bottom. A pair of green rabbits face each other in
the center, with mountains in the background.

A pair of lions with a globe: A couple of red lions am holding a blue globe.
Written at the top is "Good Luck to You", while the bottom carries Chinese
characters. This brand is produced in Burma by Khun Sa.

Other brands which are not Khun Sa's, include, but are not limited to: Super
No. 1, 100%; Red lion holding globe; Two lions holding a Roman-style helmet;
Dragon; Lucky Strike (both the name and trade mark stolen from the American
cigarette); Lion; Flying Horse; Cards; Chinese Alphabets; and, Panda. Panda
is the original brand introduced and made notorious by two of the region's
pioneer drug traders, Lo Chin Han and Lo Chin Ming.

When Lao Su (whose aliases include Su Wan Ho and Wanko Sae Wan), a former
subordinate of these early drug kingpins, set up his own manufacturing
facilities, he used the Panda brand for his products. The brand remains
famous among drug users, and it sells as briskly as it did in earlier days.

Whether Khun Sa's statement that he will increase production to 1200 tons
this year is true or not, more and more drugs are appearing on the scene
around the world. 1,280 kilos of heroin were seized at Bangkok's Klong Toey
Port in February 1988. The largest seizures on record have taken place in
Hong Kong, Spain, Australia, Los Angeles, Miami, and New York. Several Thai
policemen, soldiers, and politicians have also been apprehended with drugs.

Maybe Gritz's story of Khun Sa's offer is true. After meeting Khun Sa, I
could believe it. But whatever the case, the fact remains that vast amounts
have materialized around the world.

Khun Sa is a shrewd and conniving person—a survivor-and is not averse to
manipulating anyone whom he feels can help him. Maybe, just maybe, the man
with the highest price tag on his head in the history of Thailand has kept
his word. Maybe he has doubled the production of heroin in the Shan States.

pps. 96-114
Aloha, He'Ping,
Om, Shalom, Salaam.
Em Hotep, Peace Be,
All My Relations.
Omnia Bona Bonis,
Adieu, Adios, Aloha.
Roads End

CTRL is a discussion and informational exchange list. Proselyzting propagandic
screeds are not allowed. Substance—not soapboxing!  These are sordid matters
and 'conspiracy theory', with its many half-truths, misdirections and outright
frauds is used politically  by different groups with major and minor effects
spread throughout the spectrum of time and thought. That being said, CTRL
gives no endorsement to the validity of posts, and always suggests to readers;
be wary of what you read. CTRL gives no credeence to Holocaust denial and
nazi's need not apply.

Let us please be civil and as always, Caveat Lector.
Archives Available at:

To subscribe to Conspiracy Theory Research List[CTRL] send email:

To UNsubscribe to Conspiracy Theory Research List[CTRL] send email:


Reply via email to