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Click Here: <A HREF="http://members.truepath.com/overkill/specialgroup">The
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Assassinations update
The Special Group killed KennedySue Morrison
Those of you who have always been perplexed, regarding the operational
apparatus of the Kennedy assassination, the cat is out of the bag. Ever heard
of the Special Group?
The Special Group or the "5412 Committee" was a vehicle of covert action. It
was initially conceived in 1955, to satisfy the demand to coordinate the
working relationship between the CIA, the White House, the State Department
andthe National Security Council. The National Security Council met the need
with NSC 5412/1 and NSC 5412/2 and the secret groups that developed were like
a secret government within agovernment. Technically, the Special Group
derived its authority from the President of the United States, but when
matters of principle collided, the formality was abandoned.
The political assassination of enemies was one of the covert operations
options that preoccupied the Special Group and in January and March 1960,
formal, highly secretdiscussion took place in a subcommittee of the 5412
Committee, the Special Group, about assassination planning. Fidel Castro was
the target. The Special Group was an extremely capable covert assassinations
vehicle because it was interdepartmental and its membership was fluid -it
could recruit anyone within the entire government. The Special Group
[Augmented], set up after the Bay of Pigs, was charged with a single
responsibility -to supervise the bizarreOperation Mongoose efforts to murder
Castro. The obsession to cover up the truth about the Kennedy assassination
has produced controversy regarding Kennedy involvement in the plot to murder
Castro. Serious researchers clearly understand the fact that the Kennedys had
"cut off" the plots to murder Castro, and self-serving allegations to the
contrary betray propaganda. In particular, the name of the Special Group
became the Special Group "Augmented", and the add on allegedly refered to the
membership of Robert Kennedy. In actual fact, the add on "Augmented" was a
deliberate attempt to divert all suspicion, regarding the assassination of
John F. Kennedy. Clearly, the suggestion that the Special Group "Augmented"
its operations for the sake of Robert F. Kennedy is absolutely ludicrous. The
young Attorney General was not considered to be a foreign policy expert and
he was viewed to be more of an impediment and less of a Special Groupasset.
It was a neat idea to divert attention away from the truth, but like they all
say, it's always the cover up that gets you in trouble.
The Special Group was supposed to be fluid, operational and practical. Mired
in excessive secrecy and dangerously bizarre operations like "Operation
Mongoose", rogue CIA operatives like Bill Harvey, a gun-toting drunkard who
played a leading role in cloak-and-dagger, anti-Castro operations, reflect
the loose-canon mentality that the Special Group promoted. Indeed, Harvey had
established a closer working relationship with Mafia allies like Johnny
Roselli than he had with his own boss, John McCone, the Director of the CIA.
Is it any wonder that Roselli, who diverted attention away from the real
assassins by claiming that 'Castro did it', bragged about all of his "friends
in high places"?
In 1961, Harvey was the CIA agent who conceived the so-called "Executive
Action" contingency program, which advocated the assassination of foreign
enemies. The SpecialGroup was evidently intrigued and a host of bizarre,
anti-Castro assassination plots were planned and executed without success.
Beyond the use of armed force, the anti-Castro Mongoose team advocated a
biological and chemical attack on Cuban sugar crops, and the attempt to
convince Cubans thatthe Second Coming was imminent and that Christ would
return when the Cubans got rid of Castro, the so-called anti-Christ. The
architect of the bizarre anti-Christ plot was Brigadier General Edward G.
Lansdale, an expert in the execution of unconventional military tactics.
Lansdale hadsuccessfully used propaganda and deception to halt
communist-backed guerrillas in the Philippines and the action-oriented
Special group coordinator was expected to do the same in Vietnam. Engaged in
paramilitary operations in Saigon since 1954, Allen Dulles had appointed
Lansdale towage military, political and psychological warfare in Vietnam, and
there was not a single American who was more committed to the active reversal
of communism in SoutheastAsia than he was. In describing his experience in
the Phillipines Lansdale said, "Most of the lessons, we learned the hard
way...Then, because some of the lessons were highlyunorthodox, we had to
fight off interference from more conventional people for the right to apply
these lessons that win." Lansdale was prepared to do whatever was necessary
to remove all interference. In his own words: "As you know, Vietnam is very
close to my heart...Communism is of course an international effort...You will
find some seeming differences among the programs indifferent countries, but
you will find many, many more points of similarity. No matter in what portion
of the world you choose the countries for comparison, the pattern is
substantially the same everywhere."
Lansdale's view that the tactics that he used to solve the problem in the
Phillipines was transferable to Vietnam, defined the dangerous, Special Group
agenda. On January 18, 1962, NSAM 124 established the Special Group
[Counter-Insurgency] and the published list of regular members included
General Taylor [Chairman], the Attorney General, Deputy Under Secretary of
State for PoliticalAffairs, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs, Director of Central Intelligence, Special Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs, andAdministrator, Agency for
International Development. But as the Special Group evolved and subgroups
assumed specific responsibility, published membership did not mean
anythingand Maxwell Taylor essentially reflected the fact in a letter on
January 29, 1962, wherein he indicated that the Special Group resolved not to
develop a staff of its own andthat it would "lean heavily upon the resources
contained within the departments which the members represent." The
implication of that bombshell is that a foreign policy "amateur" like Robert
Kennedy was excluded at will, while anti-Communist crusaders like J. Edgar
Hoover had the necessary, monolithic view that the Special Group sought out.
McGeorge Bundy was an enthusiastic Special Group advocate and in a February
6, 1962 memorandum to Taylor, he indicated that he had asked Bob Komer, who
had "some background in these matters" to keep in touch with the "whole
counterinsurgency problem on my [Bundy's] behalf, in orderto permit me to
participate effectively in the new Counter-Insurgency Special Group". Robert
Kennedy was not a Special Group enthusiast, he was a critic, and in a
memorandum to Bundy in March of 1963, he wrote, "I think there are alot of
things that could be done under properauspices and I think our present
counter-insurgency program is most unsatisfactory." Not surprisingly, the
Special Group was deadlocked without the capacity to recruit on an "asdeemed
necessary" basis, and it was only a matter of time before the Special Group
was controlled by those who were intoxicated by the anti-Communist crusade.
The war against Communism was prone to cultivate bizarre, illegal plots that
aimed to contain Communism, and any so-called "waffling dissidents" like the
Kennedys, were prone to become Special Group obstacles.
In the absence of a necessary "purge", the action-oriented agenda of the
Special Group was mired in a fierce state of gridlock. When, for example,
Robert McNamara raised the subject of assassination on the August 10, 1962
meeting of the Special Group Augmented, CIA Director McCone violently
objected. Lansdale produced a memorandum and asked Harvey to look into the
question of liquidation of leaders and McCone was so infuriated that he "blew
up, calledMcNamara and demanded that it be withdrawn." McCone made it clear
that "the United States would not, as a matter of general policy, endorse
assassinations". Such controversy had the "cleansing" effect of sorting out
Special Group assets and liabilities; McNamara was evidently an asset, McCone
was a liability. Kennedy adviser Richard Goodwin defined the evident gap
between those who were prone to support and those who were against political
assassinations when he said:
About twenty people were gathered at a conference table in the State
Department, when Secretary of Defense McNamara, having sat through an hour of
inconclusive discussion, rose to leave for another appointment, and, firmly
grasping my shoulder with his right hand, announced, "The only thing to do is
eliminate Castro." I listened, puzzled, thinking, isn't that [the Bay of
Pigs] just what we have been talking about for a month? when the CIA
representative looked toward McNamara and said, "You mean Executive Action."
McNamara nodded, then, looking toward me: "I mean it, Dick, it's the only
way." I had never heard the phrase "Executive Action" before. But its meaning
was instantly apparent. Assassination.
While assassination advocates like Harvey and McNamara looked towards
Executive Action-oriented solutions, the Kennedys, in attempt to drive a
wedge between Cuba and theSoviet Union, sought to open the door to Cuba. John
F. Kennedy had in fact authorized U.S. representative William Attwood to
begin a series of talks with the Cuban ambassadorto the United Nations to
discuss accommodation between Castro and the United States. Special Group
operatives mounted an anti-Communist, pro-assassination crusade whichwas
supposed to be authorized by the President, but but proved that lose-canons
were defining the agenda. In 1966, obviously frustrated over the controversy
that the gap between truth and propaganda had produced, Robert Kennedy
blurted, "I'm tired of all these Latins attacking mefor going after Castro.
The fact is that I'm the guy who saved his life." What Robert Kennedy did not
realize is that while the Kennedys plotted reconcilliation with Castro, the
Special Group was beginning to shift its focus from the need to assassinate
Casrtro to the determination to eliminate Special Group obstacles. In
particular, the Special Group 5412, which was responsiblefor covert
operations, began to see itself as an alternative rather than as a
subservient branch of the National Security Council. As normal channels of
political action were increasingly perceived to be inadequate, lockstep
ideologues naturally exploited the opportunity to develop anoperational,
action-oriented group to fight Communism. Under the command of Brigadier
General Edward Lansdale, Special Group 5412 was evidently on its way to
becoming the vehicleof choice amongst anti-Communist crusaders, and as
McNamara's special assistant, the Pentagon was essentially in his hands.
Lansdale was the expert. Having helped defeat communist insurrection in the
Phillipines, he was the legendary authority who dominated the action-oriented
agenda that the Special Group was supposed to dispatch. But beyond his hero
status, Lansdale was essentially a "dirty tricks" specialist who sowed deceit
and sought to capture "hearts and minds" through propaganda and concealed
acts of terror -like disguising Philippine army units as CommunistHuks and
attacking villages in order to generate support for the government. Stanley
Karnow captured the substance and the essence of Lansdale when he said: "A
deceptively mild,self-effacing former advertising executive, Lansdale counted
on psychological warfare techniques that resembled advertising gimmicks. He
also exuded a brand of artless goodwill that overlooked the deeper dynamics
of revolutionary upheavals, and he seemed to be oblivious to the social and
cultural complexities of Asia". Needless to say, Lansdale was everything that
Kennedy was not.
But Lansdale worked his magic within a monolithic Special Group that purged
dissidents like McCone on an "as needed basis". Having successfully contained
communism in the Phillipines, the belief that Lansdale could do the same in
Vietnam was certainly never questioned within a monolithic Special Group. Inde
ed, Lansdale was so committed and so preoccupied by the Vietnam War that the
anti-Castro crusade was transferred from the5412 Group to the NSC Special
Group. Since the transfer, the agenda of the Special Group 5412was so
secretive that most people assume that it ceased to exist. According to
author John Ranelagh, for example, after April 1962, the 5412 Committee
ceased for the remainder of the Kennedy presidency. Mr. Ranelagh is evidently
wrong and amemorandum dated January, 12, 1963, from Thomas Davis Jr. to Mr.
Bundy, indicates that "programs relating to covert activities would be
considered by the Special Group 5412 asthey are now". Moreover, the
memorandum which exposed the continued existence of the Special Group 5412
was, as Mr. Davis' cover letter suggests, inspired by the fact that Robert
Kennedy criticized Special Group projects. According to the letter, which
precedes the four page memorandum on the proposed future of the Special
Group, "The Attorney General's schedule has not yet permitted an opportunity
for me to discuss with him the attached memorandum on the futurerole of the
Special Group [CI]."
The extraordinary degreeof secrecy makes it difficult to unravel the specific
details of the covert operations of Special Group 5412, but the emotional
commitment of known members is definite enough that it isultimately possible
to "chip away" at the excessive secrecy. In particular the relationship
between Special Group 5412, Brigadier General Edward G. Lansdale and William
Harvey,essentially spelled the assassination of John F. Kennedy. Harvey was
the architect of "Executive Action" capability, Lansdale was determined to do
whatever was necessary to contain Communism in Vietnam and the Special Group
5412 was the powerful, interdepartmental foreign policy vehicle which
provided the opportunity to plan and execute assassination. To be sure,
Castro was the initial assassination target in reference to Cuba, but when
Vietnam became the object of covert operations, the perceived enemy shifted
from Castro to Kennedy. And so, in the final analysis, the Special Group
advocates who plotted the murder of President Kennedy were ideologically
aligned through their obsession to fight and to win the Vietnam war and to
veto Kennedy's withdrawal plans. Lansdale certainly made that very clear when
he exposed his transferable willto "fight off interference from more
conventional people for the right to apply these lessons that win." It may
have worked in the Phillipines, but Vietnam proved to be anunparalleled
fiasco.
The ideological alignment of thosewho secretively prosecuted the Vietnam war
betrays the membership of the Special Group that claimed the life of John F.
Kennedy. In particular, Lyndon Johnson's "TuesdayCabinet" was the ultimate
power behind the group. Clearly, if one carefully examines the record, the
entire "Tuesday Cabinet" was extremely frustrated over the decision-making
process of the Kennedy administration. The prospect of withdrawal from
Vietnam generated an extreme degree ofanxiety, and Johnson's "Tuesday
Cabinet" had evidently resolved it in secret because they certainly did not
debate the issue. Indeed, insiders indicated that the only knowndiscussion
within the "Tuesday Cabinet" related to military strategy and to technical
matters like the efficiency of helicopters... Lyndon Johnson, McGeorge Bundy,
RobertMcNamara and Dean Rusk were absolutely committed in their determination
to win the Vietnam war and as far as they were concerned, any discussion
which was not strategy-orientedwas absolutely not necessary. To be sure, they
all claimed that the agenda they pursued was simply an extension of the
Kennedy will, but their obsession to promote that nonsensefurther betrays
their obsession to cover up the truth. The credibility of objective analysts
who had nothing to do with the assassination of John F. Kennedy is certainly
far morereliable than organized propaganda. Roger Hilsman, Kennedy's
Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs defined the genuine
record when he said: "The historical record, insum, is clear: President
Kennedy was determined not to let Vietnam become an American war -that is, he
was determined not to send U.S. combat troops [as opposed to advisers]
tofight in Vietnam nor to bomb North Vietnam." McGeorge Bundy vigorously
disputes Hilsman, and when Tom Brokaw of NBC said "some of his [Kennedy's]
admirers, as you know, say well he would have gotten out of it [the Vietnam
war], Bundy's jaw quivered with intense emotion as he defiantly declared; "Sur
e. And it's very easy to project one's own conclusions unto a dead man. I
myself believe that he hadn't decided." But Kennedy had developed a planned
schedule of withdrawal that Bundy conveniently ignored, the suggestion that
Kennedy had not decided is simply not credible.
Bundy's reluctance to admit the obvious is understandable, he is trying to
cover up the motivation that claimed Kennedy's life. But he is certainly
aware of Kennedy's determination to keep America out of the Vietnam war.
Clearly, his own memorandum of discussion on Southeast Asiaexposes the
scepticism that motivated Kennedy and the President's reluctance to commit
America to war Southeast Asia is clearly not subject to credible dispute.
According to a memorandum that Bundy wrote on July, 28, 1961;
"the President made clear his own deep concern with the need forrealism and
accuracy in such military planning. He had observed in earlier military plans
with respect to Laos that optimistic estimates were invariably proven false
in the event. He was not persuaded that the airfields and the existing
situation in Southern Laos would permit any realoperation to save that part
of the country, and he emphasized the reluctance of the American people and
many distinguished military leaders to see any direct involvement of U.S.
troops in that part of the world. In reply it was urged that with a proper
plan, with outside support, andabove all with a clear and open American
commitment, the results would be very different from anything that had
happened before. But the President remarked that General de Gaulle, out of
painful French experience, had spoken with feeling of the difficulty of
fighting in this part of the world."
And so, despite his anxiety-ridden reluctance to admit it, Bundy is fully
aware of the fact that it was not possible to convince Kennedy to commit
America to war inSoutheast Asia, and every objective person who examines the
historical record cannot ignore the fact. Absolutely determined to avoid a
repeat of the 50,000 French combat troops who had perished in the jungles of
Southeast Asia, it was absolutely impossible to convince Kennedy to repeat
thefiasco -and the only option available to those who were otherwise obsessed
by the determination to prosecute the Vietnam war was the Executive Action
capability of the Special Group.
Executive Action capability, the authority to plot assassination for the
advancement of a foreign policy goal, was certainly a topic of discussion
within the Special Group, and the reluctance to admit it further reflects the
obsession to cover up thetruth about the Kennedy assassination. David Belin,
counsel to the Warren Commission, exposed the general amnesia and the
outright lies which surround discussion about ExecutiveAction capability.
Lansdale, for example, claimed that at no time during 1960, 1961, 1962, or
1963 did he know of the existence of any plans for the assassination of any
Cubanleader or any other leader. Lansdale was obviously not telling the
truth, sand now we know why he lied. Mcnamara was equally evasive, and in his
own words;
I am almost certain that were an assassination contemplated, which seems to
me...extremely unlikely, if it were contemplated or any action taken in that
direction, it would have had to receive the approval of not just Mr. Bundy
but other officials at that same level, including my deputy, I think, and my
deputy never would have approved anything like that without discussing it
with me.
Mr. Bundy claimed to be equally ignorant of any "actual decision" to
assassinate any foreign leader and admitted only "a vague recollection of the
existence or the possible existence of contingency planning in this area. I
am sorry to say I can't fish them out of my memory, but I could not exclude
that there were contingency plans, and a contingency capability of some sort,
or plans for such a capability at some time." Bundy was testifying before the
Rockefellar Commission and, according to Belin, "Bundy's testimony did not
ring true in light of other evidence..." Moreover, Bundy, like McNamara,
seemed ill at ease during portions of his testimony. He seemed worried as he
left the commission hearing room. Indeed, every Kennedy administration
official who was evasive about executive action capability discussions was
obviously obsessed by the need to cover up the truth about the Kennedy
assassination, and all the evident worry is absolutely understandable.
The truth about the Kennedy assassination has steadily "dribbled out" since
November 22, 1963, but every dribble was countered with such a massive dose
of propaganda that it became extremely difficult to separate the dribble from
the fiction. The most sensational dribble which was widely ridiculed by
experts in the United States and in France [if one chooses to call an evident
propagandist like Robert Blakey an expert], was the theory that three
Marseilles gunmen killed President Kennedy. While there is alot of
controversy about the identity of the gunmen, independent researchers have
proven "that someone, representing someauthority in Washington, apparently
authorized the pickup and deportation of a known French terrorist on the day
of the assassination."
Now that is certainly a sensational dribble which is evidently consistent to
the unfolding of the Kennedy assassination conspiracy. On the surface, the
Mafia was an ideal partner in the crime of the century, but in reality, it
was too obvious a suspect to entrust with the actual shooting. Invariably,
discussions were held and ideaswere exchanged, but in the final analysis, it
was too risky. Having failed to murder Castro, the American Mafia did not
inspire the necessary confidence, and while the Mafia couldmop up the mess at
home [shoot Oswald and the like], the actual murder was probably the reserve
of out-of-country killers because they were harder to trace, they provided an
additional layer of cover and they had the untarnished reputation which was
demanded. Clearly, the Special Grouphad the power and the will to cultivate
many layers of plausible denial, and beyond Lee Harvey Oswald the patsy, they
had Oswald's Cuba, Oswald's Soviet Union, and the American Mafia, to deflect
the blame. The French Mafia connection was evidently the ultimate cover which
was supposed to make it impossible to uncover the truth.
nsnews | Guestbook | JFK Jr. | Clinton versus Starr | Lewinsky | Isikoff |m
edia bias | Link to us | 1980's |
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Aloha, He'Ping,
Om, Shalom, Salaam.
Em Hotep, Peace Be,
All My Relations.
Omnia Bona Bonis,
Adieu, Adios, Aloha.
Amen.
Roads End
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