-Caveat Lector- <A HREF="http://www.ctrl.org/"> </A> -Cui Bono?- from:alt.conspiracy As, always, Caveat Lector Om K ----- Click Here: <A HREF="aol://5863:126/alt.conspiracy:590561">CIA's Afghan War; Ops Directorate; and, Wen Ho Lee</A> ----- Subject: CIA's Afghan War; Ops Directorate; and, Wen Ho Lee From: Ralph McGehee <A HREF="mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]">[EMAIL PROTECTED]</A> Date: Sat, 22 January 2000 10:29 AM EST Message-id: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> This is a multi-part message in MIME format. --------------75C3C63AF9CC71F1E13D10F2 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit --------------75C3C63AF9CC71F1E13D10F2 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii; name="afghan" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Disposition: inline; filename="afghan" The Afghanistani War's Terrorist Legacy; the CIA's Directorate of Operations; and, the Wen Ho Lee Case Compilation and comments by Ralph McGehee <A HREF="http://come.to/CIABASE">http://come.to/CIABASE</A> --------------------------------------------------------- Below are extracts from the book, The Bear Trap, written by the Pakistani General who supervised for four years the CIA/Pakistani/Afghanistani operation in Afghanistan. Recent criticisms document the consequences of this war that unleashed a generation of former CIA-supported terrorists on the world. Please see my web site for more information. Afghanistan, Pakistan, USSR, 80-90 Pakistan's ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence) had responsibility for all intel matters at the national level -- political, military, internal and external security, and counterintel. Richest contribution from CIA to Afghan war was satellite intel through photographs. Mohammad Yousai & Adkin, M. (1992). The Bear trap: Afghanistan's Untold Story 22,93 Afghanistan, Pakistan, USSR, 83-87 The mujahideen staged fire-fights for the media, with buildings wired in advance, all in true hollywood style. The journalists had to pay and ops gave the commander publicity but the films sold well in the U.S.. Mohammad Yousai & Adkin, M. (1992). The Bear Trap: Afghanistan's Untold Story 5 Afghanistan, Pakistan, USSR, 80-90 CIA placed funds each month in the ISI-controlled bank account. Rich individuals or organizations in the private world contributed much money. without the extra millions the flow of arms actually getting to the Mujahideen would have been cut to a trickle. Problem was that all this money went to the four fundamentalist parties, not the moderates. Mohammad Yousai & Adkin, M. (1992). The Bear Trap: Afghanistan's Untold Story 106 Afghanistan, Pakistan, USSR, 80-90 CIA supplied maps to the ISI from CIA's spy satellites. Charter on CIA support to the mujahideen through ISI. Casey went annually for 2-day visits to Pakistan.Yousai's experience with CIA over 4 years - foremost function of CIA was to spend money - billions of dollars on buying arms, ammo, and equipment. It was ISI policy that no Americans ever trained, or had direct contact with the Mujahideen, and no American went into Afghanistan. High proportion of U.S. aid in cash. CIA appeared to have total ignorance of military logistics - at times lacking even common sense. Mohammad Yousai & Adkin, M. (1992). The Bear Trap: Afghanistan's Untold Story 44,78-96 Afghanistan, Pakistan, USSR, 60-90 ISI's hqs in a large camp of 70-80 acres north of Rawalpindi, 12 kilometers from Islamabad. Inside high walls were offices, transit warehouse thru which passed 70 percent of all arms and ammo for the Mujahideen, at least 300 vehicles, several acres of training area, a psywar unit, barracks, messhalls and the stinger training school. This called Ojhri camp. General Akhtar set up another organization for the provision of clothing and rations purchased in hugh quantities throughout Pakistan, with CIA money. Richest contribution from CIA to Afghan war was satellite intel through photographs. Mohammad Yousai & Adkin, M. (1992). The Bear Trap: Afghanistan's Untold Story 27,29, 93 Afghanistan, Pakistan, USSR, 80-90 CIA's roles in Afghanistan were to purchase arms and equipment and arrange their transportation to Pakistan; provide funds for vehicles and transportation inside Pakistan and Afghanistan; train Pakistani instructors on new weapons and equipment; provide satellite photos and maps for ops planning; provide radio equipment and training; and advise on technical matters. All training of the Mujahideen and the allocation and distribution of arms were the sole responsibility of Pakistan's ISI. Mohammad Yousai & Adkin, M. (1992). the bear trap: Afghanistan's Untold Story 95-6 Afghanistan, Pakistan, USSR, 83-87 Mohammad Yousai in 10/83 named to head of the ISI tasked with training and arming the Mujahideen (soldiers of god) and with planning their ops in Afghanistan. Until his retirement in 87, he coordinated one of largest guerrilla campaigns in modern times, with a staff of 60 officers and 300 senior ncos from the Pakistan army. during Yousai's 4 years some 80,000 mujahideen were trained; hundreds of thousands of tons of arms were distributed, several billion dollars were spent and ISI teams regularly entered Afghanistan with the guerrillas. mohammad yousai & Adkin, M. (1992). The Bear Trap: Afghanistan's Untold Story 2,4,6 Afghanistan, Pakistan, USSR, 70-90 Yousai was incredulous at American's Afghan policy over the previous two decades. Their response to USSR encroachment seemed to be based on ignorance, apathy and appeasement. Mohammad Yousai & Adkin, M. (1992). The Bear Trap: Afghanistan's untold story 26 Afghanistan, Pakistan, USSR, 80-90 There were seven Afghan resistance parties formed into an alliance. political heads of each party called a leader to distinguish from the mujahideen military commanders. Alliance established after 83. Until the Quetta incident commanders usually received supplies directly from ISI. Supplies then channeled through the parties. Gul Badin Hekmatyar the youngest and toughest of alliance leaders. Mohammad Yousai & Adkin, M. (1992). The Bear Trap: Afghanistan's Untold Story 40-1 Afghanistan, Pakistan, USSR, 80-90 In 87 the broad percentages of material allocated [to the fundamentalists] parties was between 67-73 per cent. allocations to the parties were: hekmatyar 18-20 per cent, rabbani 18-19 per cent, sayaf 17-18 per cent, khalis 13-15 per cent, nabi 13-15 per cent, gailani 10-11 per cent, and mujaddadi 3-5 per cent. Mohammad Yousai & Adkin, M. (1992). The Bear Trap: Afghanistan's Untold Story 97,105,215 Afghanistan, Pakistan, USSR, 80-90 CIA contributed substantially with installation of interception equipment. op provided up-to-the-minute reliable info on Soviet and Afghan intercepted messages. High-grade tactical info on movement of units and their intentions. Mohammad Yousai & Adkin, M. (1992). The Bear Trap: Afghanistan's Untold Story 94 Afghanistan, Pakistan, USSR, 80-90 A discussion of the weapons and equipment pipeline. it in three distinct parts with the CIA owning the first part, the purchase and transport of weapons to Pakistan. second part ISI's responsibility - getting everything carried across Pakistan, allocated to, and handed over to the parties at their hqs near peshawar and quetta. the third leg was the parties allocated weapons to their commanders and distributed inside Afghanistan. in 87 the broad percentages allocated to the parties were hekmatyar 18-20 per cent, rabbani 18-19 per cent, sayaf 17-18 per cent, khalis 13-15 per cent, nabi 13-15 per cent, gailani 10-11 per cent, and mujaddadi 3-5 per cent. fundamentalists received a total of 67-73 per cent. Mohammad Yousai & Adkin, M. (1992). The Bear Trap: Afghanistan's Untold Story 97, 105 Afghanistan, Pakistan, USSR, 80-90 On 9/25/86 stinger missiles used for first time in Afghanistan. For six years it was politics that prevented the use of stingers. neither the Pakistani nor american gvts would allow this. stinger best of its kind in the world with which even an infantry man can knock an aircraft out of the sky. in 10-month period, 187 stingers used in Afghanistan. twice in early 87, stingers were lost, first to the soviets, and then to the iranians. Mohammad Yousai & Adkin, M. (1992). The Bear Trap: Afghanistan's Untold Story 174-88 Afghanistan, Pakistan, USSR, 80-90 The Chinese supplied weapons for the mujahideen and always insisted on absolute accuracy in all dealings. Mohammad Yousai & Adkin, M. (1992). The Bear Trap: Afghanistan's Untold Story 27 Afghanistan, Pakistan, USSR, 80-90 Until 1985 it was a firm policy that only communist bloc weapons could be bought for the Mujahideen. China, Egypt and later Israel supplied such. Until 1984 the bulk of arms and ammo were purchased from China - they were reliable and discreet. In 1985 CIA began buying weapons from Egypt but weapons were often rusty and unserviceable. CIA had two officers then increased to five in hqs of Yousaf. Mohammad Yousai & Adkin, M. (1992). The Bear Trap: Afghanistan's Untold Story 83 --------------------------------------------------------- Extracts From A Washington Post Article A new DO leadership team under Pavitt, a former ops officer and NSCer, includes his new deputy, Associate Deputy Director for ops Hugh Turner, a legendary DO operator who won the Silver Star, Bronze Star and Purple Heart as a Green Beret in Vietnam... RMC Comment: Hugh Turner, above, has an admirable record of achievement and courage -- but what sort of objectivity does an action person of this sort bring to this "intelligence" agency? Did he recognize the futility of the Vietnam war and makes those views known? Stephen W. Richter, 57, former chief of the Near East Division was named the director of the technology management group within the DO. Richter in 1998 earned the wrath of Richard Perle, an assistant secretary of defense during the Reagan administration, who publicly demanded Richter's ouster for botching a series of covert actions aimed at toppling Iraqi's Saddam. "Stephen Richter has an unbroken record of failure," Perle said. "The head of the Near East division at CIA....should be removed on grounds of incompetence and a lack ...qualifications..." Far from removing Richter, CIA awarded him its Distinguished Intelligence Medal. Washington Post 9/21/99. RMC Comment -- an outside-of-CIA evaluation of Richter's abilities by the hard-liner Richard Perle damns his incompetence. His elevation indicates the self-protecting old-boys club in action. I recall the Church Committee investigation of the mid-1970s reported that in the CIA there was a close correlation between failure and promotion. Here is a current demonstration this phenomenon. To protect the institution, failure is promoted. It is far better to do this than expose Agency problems. Since secrecy protects the CIA, no outside authority can document or challenge its record. (Except for the Senate and House Intelligence Committees who serve more as cheerleaders for, rather than oversees of, the CIA.) After more than 50 years of non-examination by the outside world, the CIA masses, accumulates and promotes failure. Its refusal to declassify operational documents, even under a recent Presidential Directive, marks the degree to which it sinks to keep its failures and activities from public examination. ------------------------------------------------------------------ The Wen Ho Lee case. It looks like only Walter Pincus of the "Washington Post" has discovered a more coherent explanation of the Lee case. The Taiwan-born scientist may well be innocent of espionage for mainland China, but perhaps not for his homeland. ----- Aloha, He'Ping, Om, Shalom, Salaam. Em Hotep, Peace Be, All My Relations. Omnia Bona Bonis, Adieu, Adios, Aloha. Amen. Roads End <A HREF="http://www.ctrl.org/">www.ctrl.org</A> DECLARATION & DISCLAIMER ========== CTRL is a discussion & informational exchange list. Proselytizing propagandic screeds are not allowed. Substance—not soap-boxing! These are sordid matters and 'conspiracy theory'—with its many half-truths, misdirections and outright frauds—is used politically by different groups with major and minor effects spread throughout the spectrum of time and thought. That being said, CTRL gives no endorsement to the validity of posts, and always suggests to readers; be wary of what you read. 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