-Caveat Lector- <A HREF="http://www.ctrl.org/"> </A> -Cui Bono?- an excerpt from: Treason's Peace Howard Watson Armbruster�1947 A Crossroads Press Book Beechurst Press New York 438 pps. -- First/Only Edition -- Out-of Print ----- CHAPTER X Senators and Congressmen -Who Never Knew MENTION IS made elsewhere of the concealed interference by the German dye trust with tariff and patent legislation; also the strange desire of members of the House and Senate to force through the act of 1928 for the payment of claims and the restoration of German property which had been seized in the First World War. One of the Senators who joined with King and Moses to help put through that 1928 statute, was Doctor Royal S. Copeland. The nonpartisan broadmindedness of the German dye trust in chosing its American friends is shown by the fact that Copeland held office and was a candidate, from time to time, as a Republican, a New Deal Democrat and an anti-New Deal Democrat. Farben also appeared to have no objections to the friendship of a doctor whose medical attainments did not qualify him for membership in his own county medical society, or for the dubious honor of belonging to the American Medical Association. Copeland once made the claim that he was a former professor in the Medical School of the University of Michigan but, according to the University authorities, his teaching experience was in a defunct homeopathic college which was in no way related to Michigan's famous school of medicine. As a Senator and a doctor of medicine, Copeland's name and picture and voice were seen and heard in press advertisements and radio broadcasting for patent medicine-or home remedies, as they were politely termed. And among those advertised nostrums were preparations manufactured and sold by two of the leading American affiliates of I.G. Farben-Sterling Products and Standard Oil of New Jersey. Such arrangements for the Senator's services were presumably made at the New York offices of Copeland Service, Inc., where one Ole Salthe, his manager (of whom more later), was also prepared to arrange for the advice of the Senator on matters pertaining to the enforcement of Food and Drug Laws. These were, of course, strictly business or semiprofessional arrangements and bore no relationship to the Senator's engagements as a statesman, or his daily newspaper contributions as a literary authority on public health matters. As to his kindly feeling towards I.G. Farben and its affiliates, our Senatorial healer made the record very clear in a speech on the Senate floor on February 21, 1928, just before the final approval of the statute to pay Farben's claims and to return Farben's properties. His address, in part, was as follows: Can we doubt that international business partnerships are the best preventative of international wars and conflicts that statesmen can devise? It is time to cease ringing the changes upon war hatreds and animosities, and extend the helping hand of friendship to our former enemies ..... Let it be remembered that some of our infant industries are predicated upon the confiscated inventions of the people of a nation originally invited into our midst by the terms of our Constitution. No compensation has 'ever been paid to them. I am glad they are to be paid under the terms of the bill passed yesterday ..... The domestic problems of farm relief, of national defense. of destruction of industry by ruinous foreign competition, would be brought nearer to solution by such commercial alliances. The occupation of some paid Jeremiahs constantly prophesying war and woe would probably be rendered superfluous ..... Let us have done with vituperative attacks on nonexistent enemies we have read from time to time in the chemical trade journals and in the lay press of how wicked, designing, unashamed and dangerous were those corporations whose patents we confiscated for the benefit of a privileged few ..... European combinations in these industries provide additional products for farsighted Americans who have formed alliances with the possessors of the 'know how.' The question is shall we welcome alien industry and capital to our shores, in accordance with the traditional policy of our nation, or shall we lend ear to the affrighted clamor, denunciation and invective of a selfish minority? It is high time that we had an official expression of the administration's attitude in the interests of world peace and domestic prosperity. American capital is hesitant. American industrialists are reluctant to enter into agreements with other manufacturers to obtain for this country that which we have not, and which would be of benefit to us, so long as the newspapers are filled with vituperative abuse and vague suggestions of Sherman Act prosecutions. This address is important to this story because it records the beginning of the second postwar decade when Farben and its American stooges had decided that everything was under control, and therefore their plans for expansion could be more open, with safety to all concerned. The speech is also important because it is a condensation of substantially every false argument and sophistry of Farben propaganda. Copeland also, unwittingly, recorded officially the unheeded protests at Farben's comeback, and the unheeded demand for Sherman Act prosecutions. Copeland, in the name of the United States Senate, was bidding Farben welcome just as the Hoover subordinates, and Donovan, in the name of the executive branch of the government had extended a similar invitation a few days earlier, as related in Chapter via. >From its earliest days, the German dye trust has utilized the patent laws of the United States to obstruct, cripple or control our dye, drug, and chemical munitions industries. The president of the American Bayer company, acting on instructions from Berlin, persuaded the State Department to send our Commissioner of Patents as a delegate to the International Patent Convention in Stockholm prior to World War 1. The result was that our unsuspecting commissioner wound up as the guest of honor on Kaiser Wilhelm's yacht, and upon his return was in complete accord with the desires of his Teutonic hosts. As a result, the United States negotiated a new treaty with Germany which complied with the dye trust's wishes that the working of a patent in either country was sufficient to protect the inventor, or his assignee, in both countries. And the president of Bayer boasted openly of his smart trick in getting the Kaiser to help soften up our patent laws. Meanwhile Herman Metz turned up on the Congressional Committee on Patents. Metz was irritated at any attempt to interfere with the rights of his German friends to do as they pleased, saying: Legally there could be no reason at all why the Germans should not obtain a patent in this country for which a patent could be obtained, and do with that patent what they pleased. Again Metz declared that German patents: . . . . . have no value a ssuch[sic] except for the purpose of keeping out infringing products. They are simply clubs to keep out other manufacturers. After World War I, when tariff and embargo barred German imports, the dye trust began using its patents to implement the illegal tie-ups by which it reestablished itself in the United States. It is obvious that this reestablishment would not have been possible if our antitrust laws had been enforced. Nor would it have been possible had Congress interceded to prevent misuse of United States patents, especially those relating to the national defense. Can anyone doubt that Congress would have been compelled to take drastic steps had Mr. Teagle, or Mr. duPont, or Dr. Weiss, or even Herman Metz, ever protested to Congress or even to the public at the illegal agreements proposed by Farben. The fact is that they did neither. All through this second prewar period the public was largely uninformed, or greatly misinformed, about these Farben tie-ups. But the record proves that Congress had known for many years that the more important of the illegal agreements were in operation, and that others were in the making. Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives uncovered evidence of the dye trust's plans and agreements in almost every session of Congress from the end of World War I to the beginning of World War II. They also knew the identity and the activities of the horde of lobbyists who haunted the hallways of the Capitol and the bars and club-rooms of Washington in the interests of Farben and Farben's American partners. Despite this knowledge Congress did nothing until the 1941 and '42 exposures and prosecutions. Then loud were the lamentations of some of its members at the "surprising" revelations of what Farben had been doing to keep the United States disarmed. In order to comprehend the breadth and scope of the Farben pattern, we might examine some of the crocodile tears shed so publicly at not knowing things that had been blazoned on the records of Congress all along. It is necessary also to observe how these facts come to be on those records, and what influences may have caused them to be ignored. One member of the Senate who in 1942 appeared not to know anything about the Farben tie-ups in the United States was the Honorable Scott W. Lucas, Illinois Democrat, who was elected to Congress in 1934 and moved up to the Senate in 1938. In April, 1942, Senator Lucas, as a member of the Patents Committee, made some comments about the ignorance of official Washington regarding the activities of I.G. Farben. An official of the Justice Department had just testified that some of Farben's illegal affiliations had been secret until the Attorney General's office went into their files. Said Senator Lucas: But before the Attorney General's office went into the files to inspect these documents nobody in the government as I understand it, or in this country, knew anything about these international cartel arrangements ..... I am not condemning anyone particularly for what happened in the past, but I am speaking for the future. We all learn by experience. This country ought to have a right at least to examine and ascertain whether or not a contract of this kind, if it went into effect, would affect the life and security of the United States. Anxious as the Senator appears to have been to learn by experience, something must have caused him to conclude otherwise, because he was one of the five members of the Senate Patents Committee who later voted to prevent Senator Bone, its chairman, from continuing these hearings into Farben's agreements with Sterling, and the relations of the Sterling executives with subversive activities of their German partners. Senator Tom Connally, Texas Democrat, started as a Congress-man in 1917 and became a Senator in 1929. The Senator is re-puted to be a political colleague of former Governor William P. Hobby of Texas, who, with the late W. S. Farish, organized the Humble Oil Co., and sold control of that company to Standard. Senator Connally contributed a naive conclusion as to the inno-cence of all concerned about Farben's intentions. The Senator was a member of the Truman Committee which was examining Mr. Farish of Standard Oil in March 1942 at a closed hearing. When Mr. Farish appeared uncertain as to just what testimony he should give about Standard's relations with Farben, Senator Connally asked him: When you entered into these negotiations with Farben . . . in Germany . . . did you do it with any contemplation of war or of our becoming involved in war and needing these articles in the way that we now find ourselves needing them? Or was it simply a commercial business transaction that you were contemplating? Mr. Farish responded: It was always. Senator, on a commercial or business basis, and with only commercial objectives in mind ..... Senator Homer T. Bone, Washington Democrat, came to the Senate in 1932, and two years later sat through the lengthy hearings of the Senate Munitions Investigating Committee which went deep into the Farben activities. In 1942 Senator Bone, as Chairman of the Senate Patents Committee, investigated the activities of Farben for several months-until the aforementioned five members ganged up on him and refused to permit the investigation to be completed. At these 1942 hearings Senator Bone did recall that the subject was not a new one, but he also indicated an unfortunate lack of memory about the revelations before the Nye Munitions Committee and elsewhere concerning Farben . The Senator's comment was: I know little about I.G. Farbenindustrie in Germany because it is shrouded in mystery. I know back in 1934 and '35 when I served on the Senate Munitions Committee, we were not able to get anything definite out of Germany. There was great secrecy manifested even in some of our own departments At that time I was fearful that what our nationals were doing might be aiding in the rearmament of Germany, thus making her a menace to the world. Assistant Attorney General Thurman Arnold, while testifying before the Truman Committee in March, 1942, paid a peculiar tribute to his own belated investigation of the Farben tie-up arrangements, and put the entire blame for the continuance of these agreements on the lax enforcement of the anti-trust laws during the Hoover Republican administration from 1929 to 1933. For some reason he did not mention that this lax enforcement continued right on from 1933 to 1941 during the Democratic administration, Mr. Arnold's comment in part was that: The cost of preventing such cartel restrictions in the future is eternal vigilance and the existence of a wide-awake investigating agency to enforce the Sherman Act. Had there been such an agency operating in 1929, had this conduct been actually hazardous at that time, these arrangements would never have been contemplated. But from 1929 to 1933 business men felt safe from discovery. In view of these and other Senatorial-Congressional expressions of ignorance about what Farben was up to, it is of interest here to refer to some of the extensive evidence available, from 1919 to 1939, to members of the House and Senate. This consideration is warranted in order to understand the precise detail with which the Congress of the United States first explored and recorded the activities and purposes of the German dye-trust leaders, then ignored its own findings and finally, when disaster had arrived, began pitifully weeping "we didn't know." It is for the reader to decide from these facts whether the representatives of the American people were dolts or knave�or an unhappy combination of both. During the decade that followed the close of the first World War, the German Dye Trust was the subject of many hours of discussion and thousands of pages of testimony before committees of the Senate and House. Later hearings brought out more facts about Farben; about its lobby and campaign contributions; about its industrial tie-ups and subsidiaries; and about its propaganda and its expenditures for espionage and other subversive activities. >From 1919 to 1922 there were a number of hearings before the committees of the House and Senate which recorded the testimony of a great number of witnesses who argued whether high tariff duties or an absolute embargo would best protect the new American dye industry from the threat of German imports. At these hearings there was very little left unsaid about what Farben's predecessors in I.G. Dyes would do to this country's new chemical industry if they were given the opportunity; or of the probability of another war of conquest, if and when Germany got the chance. When the next war did start more than a dozen members of the Senate, and several times that many members of the House, still occupied the same positions at Washington as they had during those early hearings at which the records and plans of the German dye trust were spread upon the Congressional records. A number of these legislators were members of the committees that held the hearings. Coming down to the 1934-1936 period when further hearings delved deep into Farben's consummated plans, we find that an actual majority of the members of both chambers were still representing their constituents when the last war began. It would appear from the record, therefore, that the failure of Congress to act has not been due to lack of ample information about Farben, nor to lack of repeated warnings as to what disaster that neglect might bring about. There were many charges and countercharges against lobbyists and German agents at those early hearings. Francis P. Garvan, among others, made definite charges that the German dye trust had attempted to influence legislation in the past and was still doing so at the very time that Senator King and his campaignfund contributor, Herman Metz, were denouncing everyone who wished to protect America's new chemical industry. Garvan accused Metz of standing on the floor of Congress, as representative of the German I.G., shaking his fist at American manufacturers in the gallery and exclaiming, "I got you licked�I got you licked." "And then," said Garvan, "we were like the blind beggar at the gate in Kipling's story, 'I cannot see my enemy but I can hear his footfalls.'" In another of, the Senate hearings in 1920, before the Finance Committee, Mr. Irenee duPont, president of the duPont Company, made the rather remarkable request that in addition to embargo and high tariff to keep out Getman dyes, Congress might well pass legislation which would authorize some government official to set aside the Sherman Act as it applied to the dye industry, if, in the opinion of the official, it became necessary for the dye manufacturers to get together on short notice to exchange information. Congress did not then pass such a law, but Mr. duPont had little cause to complain about any enforcement of the Sherman Act until Thurman Arnold got busy after World War 11 had started. Then duPont and all the other leading American dyestuff makers were indicted for conspiring with I.G. Farben, and the Congress kindly did permit the Attorney General to waive or suspend prosecution of all concerned on the pretext that prosecution would interfere with the war effort. The case finally ended when duPont, among others, pleaded nolo contendere and took a fine. But that belongs in another part of this story. There was much testimony in these early hearings which gave unmistakable warning of what the German dye trust might do when the next war should come. Here, again, it was Francis Garvin who put those warnings into pungent, dramatic form which, it is hoped, some members of the Senate may now recall with shame. Time and again Garvan denounced the German dye leaders as a menace to the peace of the world�in the future as in the past. For example, in 1920 he warned the Senate Finance Committee: Industrial Germany waged this war; and industrial Germany was the first to see defeat, and forced the military peace in order that with her industrial equipment intact she might continue that same�war by intensified and concentrated economic measures. It was Germany's chemical supremacy that gave her confidence in her avaricious dream of world empire, it was Germany's chemical supremacy that enabled her to wage four years of pitiless warfare, and it is Germany's chemical supremacy upon which she relies to maintain the war. Another emphatic warning was sounded to members of the Senate by Dr. C. J. Thatcher, one of the smaller dye manufacturers, when he told that same Senate Committee: "No matter what importers or their friends of Germany may say . . . The ruthless war for chemical domination by Germany, started at least�as early as 1880 was not ended by the Armistice or by the Treaty of Versailles .....any treaty, law, or other provision which a German can by any means avoid in the warfare for industrial chemical su-premacy is, just as in actual warfare, 'a mere scrap of paper.'" Rear Admiral Ralph Earle, Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance of the Navy Department, also gave the Senate some words of advice at that time which were complacently forgotten. In discussing the need for encouraging and protecting our coal-tar industry as a vital measure of national defense, Admiral Earle said, in part: During the war we used as much toluol as could be obtained, but the production of that material was not sufficient . . . . .Time is a very important element . . . . in reference to war from the standpoint of national de-fense we do not think we ought to be put in that position again. The admiral also advised the committee that the production of synthetic drugs from coal tar should be encouraged through protection of the industry, as coming under the general head of preparedness. Another unmistakable warning is to be found in the report of a Senate Finance Subcommittee in 1920, which said, in part: One who has read the story of the German Government in the United States just prior to the war, knows that the chemical industry in this country which was under the control of the German Government was the center of espionage, German propaganda, and direct government activities. They prevented the use of coal-tar products in the munitions industry ..... We know what Germany will do to regain her hold on the industry in this country. We know that she will resort to state and cartel combinations, trade export premiums, dumping. bribery, espionage and propaganda. She did this before, and she will do it again. In 1930 the records of the Senate Lobby Committee were embellished with a detailed history of the I.G. Farbenindustrie which was presented by Senator Arthur R. Robinson of Indiana. This document had been filed by the American I.G. Chemical Corp. with the New York Stock Exchange, and it included much information regarding the enormous size and growth of Farben; its huge production of synthetic nitrogen and its other products. The 1929 agreement between Farben and Standard Oil was described, and the negotiations for later tie-ups were mentioned. Senator Robinson's minority report, with which Senator Caraway, its chairman, and other members of the committee declined to be identified, summed up the status of the American I.G. as a subsidiary of the German I.G., and the detailed recital in these hearings that Farben had become far stronger in the United States than prior to the first World War was sufficient to warn any member of the Senate or House that the menace to American industry and to national security was already a very real one. Additional detailed data about Farben went into the record in 1931 when the late Representative Louis T. McFadden of Pennsylvania, testifying before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency on the nomination of Eugene Meyer to the Federal Reserve Board, inserted several lengthy documents describing the German chemical trust and its American I.G. subsidiary. McFadden commented that the "queer purpose" of the latter was to buy up American companies dealing in chemical and allied products. Mr. Meyer was not accused of participation in Farben's subsidiary, but this record made much additional data about Farben available to members of the House and Senate-had they been interested. The Senate Special Committee to investigate the munitions industry was appointed in 1934, under the chairmanship of Gerald P. Nye, Republican isolationist and pacifist from North Dakota. The other members of that committee were Walter F. George, Georgia; Bennett C. Clark, Missouri; Homer T. Bone, Washington; James P. Pope, Idaho; Democrats, and A. H. Vandenberg, Michigan; and W. Warren Barbour, New Jersey, Republicans. Six of the seven were still members of the Senate in 1941 when Germany declared war on this country, and when revelations of the subversive activities of I.G. Farben's affiliates had attracted so much public notice that the Senate began a new series of investigations to rediscover, amid loud protestations of surprise and indignation, many of the very same facts about Farben which the Nye Committee had recorded back in 1934. In general the public has accepted those expressions of surprise as genuine and it is, therefore, necessary to go into some detail in discussing how voluminous were those revelations of 1934. The Nye Committee delved into all kinds of munitions and implements of war. Farben's tie-ups not only were discussed generally as a menace to world peace and to the national security of the United States; they were presented in great detail in charts and lists of companies and products showing that the Farben agreements at that time in the United States covered explosives and ammunition, dyestuffs, drugs, photographic materials, rayon, magnesiurn alloys, synthetic oil products, miscellaneous chemicals and insecticides; also that products on which possible arrangements were contemplated included synthetic nitrogen, synthetic rubber, and plastics. it might be remarked here that this list of chemical-munitions is almost identical to the products I had listed as under the control or influence of Farben in the diagramatic chart which I had sent to the members of the Senate and House of Representatives in 1931. Copies of that chart, like so many other documents of mine, stirred up the usual tempest in the waste baskets of Washington. However, this time, three years later, they dug out the facts themselves and put them in the record and on large elaborate charts of their own devising. Among the most important contributions which the Nye Committee hearings recorded and which both the committee and the Senate thereupon promptly ignored, were the proofs which indicated plainly that Farben and the Hitler government were on extremely close terms, and that the rearming of Germany and preparations for war were proceeding at an alarming rate. In one instance while Lammot duPont was testifying, Senator Clark, Missouri Democrat and isolationist, queried him on the possibility that secret and patented explosive formulas which duPont had turned over to Farben for commercial uses might be utilized for military purposes. The Senator asked the witness: There would be nothing to prevent them from taking those processes and using them in the manufacture of war explosives, would there? Mr. duPont apparently had no answer to that. Repeated warnings that Germany was rearming included advice from duPont's Paris representative in 1932 and 1933 that the Nazis were armed with American machine guns, and that a regular business had been established (not by duPont) of bootlegging weapons from this country to Germany. >From another duPont foreign relations representative came the advice in March 1932 that: It is a matter of common knowledge in Germany that I.G. Farben is financing Hitler . . . . There seems to be no doubt whatsoever that Dr. Schmitz is at least personally a large contributor to the Nazi party. ,This was supplemented by a later report from the duPont London office which stated: Dr. Bosch spends practically all of his time between his dwelling in Heidelberg and the government offices in Berlin, thus leaving little, if any, time for the affairs of the I.G. Farbenindustrie. Limitations of space permits inclusion here of only these few bits of the very complete evidence assembled by the Nye Committee relative to the rearming of Germany, and Farben's part in it. The Nye Committee charts and lists also showed many companies in Belgium, France, Holland, Italy and other countries that were tied to Farben. Thus pictured graphically, Farben was revealed as the greatest aggregation of industrial strength and military preparedness ever assembled under the direction or influence of a single small group of men. Readers of this book may wonder why the proven propensities of relatively small makers of munitions to bribe and corrupt government officials merely to sell them guns and powder did not suggest to the Senators that the greatest munition makers of all time, self-designated supermen and self-eIected for world conquest, would not hesitate to utilize bribery and corruption on a huge scale to accomplish their aims among the officials of our own government. Perhaps the title of this chapter should be, "Facts of Life that a Prewar Senator Ought to Have Known." The Nye Committee spent many days and recorded many pages with testimony about scheming lobbyists who worked against disarmament and bribed officials of foreign governments in the interest of builders of warships and war weapons; it also, unjustly, grouped with such sordid individuals various American scientists of the most distinguished character, like Dr. Charles H. Herty and Dr. Edgar Fahs Smith, beloved provost of the University of Pennsylvania and president of the American Chemical Society, whose attainments were recognized the world over and whose probity not even a Senate Committee could attack. However, no attempt was made to record on the pages of these hearings the names and activities of the lobbyists who were haunting the capital in the interest of I.G. Farben, and who were on the payroll of certain of its American affiliates. The committee report on chemical munitions came in 1936 after long and painful consideration of the evidence. Its recommendations were tortured and ponderous, they appeared to ignore the significance of the Farben tie-ups in the United States, but did not hesitate to condemn practices of lobbying and of bribery which "tends to rob the governments concerned of the inability to work freely for peace." The issue to these Senators was our disarmament-not Farben's rearmament. The committee apparently was obsessed with the thought that war could be prevented by government ownership of the chemical industry. However, it finally recorded its dilemma: The committee recognizes the difficult problems involved in the control of the chemical industry in view of the extent of its peacetime activities. With this profound thought, the members of the Nye Committee allowed the visible intrigues of Farben to rest in peace until after a new war had begun. While the Nye Committee was fumbling with Farben's war chemicals, a committee on the other side of the capital was bringing to light some other Farben activities of an equally dangerous but more insidious character-propaganda. In March 1934 a special committee was appointed in the House of Representatives, to investigate foreign propaganda and other subversive activities. This was the origin of what later became famous, or perhaps only notorious, as the Dies Committee. Its Chairman, in 1934, was the Honorable John W. McCormack, of Massachusetts. Samuel Dickstein, New York; Carl M. Weideman, Michigan; Charles Kramer, California; Thomas A. Jenkins, Ohio; J. Will Taylor, Tennessee, and U. S. Guyer, Kansas, were the original members. Among the witnesses examined by the McCormack Committee were Mr. Ivy L. Lee, the famous public relations counsel, his partner Burnham Carter, and one Dudley Pittenger, bookkeeper for the Lee firm. The testimony of Lee and his associates revealed that the firm had been employed by the American I.G. ever since the latter was organized in 1929, and that in 1933, when Hider became Chancellor, the German I.G. also retained Lee to give advice as to how to improve relations between Germany and the United States. Some of Mr. Lee's testimony was confusing. For instance, his annual retainer from Farben was $25,000 paid in odd sums by the Swiss I.G. and the American I.G., yet he paid his own expenses, and these appeared to include the $33,000 a year which he paid to his son to stay in Berlin and study the German mind. The Lee bookkeeper could throw no light on the discrepancy between the $25,000 which the firm received from Farben and the $33,000 which it paid out to keep its mind reader in Germany. Mr. Pittenger knew of no other work which young Lee was doing in Germany except on the Farben account. Mr. Ivy Lee's testimony on his relations with the Hitler government were also confusing. At the start of the examination he stated positively that he had no contract with the German Government and that his arrangement was solely with the I.G. However, Mr. Lee did get around a bit, and found time to advise the Nazi big shots on their propaganda. Testified Mr. Lee: I first talked, of course, with my friends in the I.G. They all sympathized with my advice and they asked me if I would repeat that advice to different officers of the government. So, Dr. Ilgner introduced me to various ministers. He went with me to see Goebbels, the Minister of Propaganda; Von Papen, the Vice Chancellor; Von Neurath, the Foreign Minister; Schmidt, the Minister of Economics ..... In explaining that his Farben contract was made within two or three months after Hitler's advent as head of the government, Mr. Lee also stated: At that time I did not contact any government officials except Hitler himself. They were anxious for me to meet him, just as a personal matter, to size him up. I had a half hour's talk with Hitler asked him some questions about his policies, told him I would like better to understand him if I could, and he made me quite a speech. When asked whether it had occurred to him that because of the contract with the German I.G. he was acting at least indirectly in behalf of the German government, Mr. Lee replied in the negative. Mr. Lee's partner, Mr. Carter, appeared to differ on the purpose of the contract. He testified that sending advice to the German firm was, in a sense, advising the German Government; and stated: The contract was an advisory one whereby we were to report to them concerning American opinion in regard to Germany. The general purpose of the contract being to pro-mote better understanding between the Germans and Ameri-can people. The reluctance of Mr. Lee to admit that he had been hired to advise the Nazi Government on how to win the friendship of the United States is understandable, especially after examining some of the recommendations which his firm sent to Farben. The following memorandum was identified by Mr. Carter as having been supplied by the Lee firm�a sort of press release which, it was recommended, should be broadcast to the world by some responsible German official: Questions have been raised concerning the status of Germany's so-called "storm troops." These number about 2,500,000 men between the ages of 18 and 60, physically well trained and disciplined, but not armed, not prepared for war and organized only for the purpose of preventing for all time the return of the Communistic peril. In view of the misunderstanding in regard to these civil forces, however, Germany is willing to permit an investigation into their character by such international arms control organization as is eventually established. According to Mr. Carter. the Lee advice also recommended that Joachim von Ribbentrop undertake a definite campaign to clarify the American mind on the disarmament question, first by a series of press conferences, then by radio broadcasts to the American people, and, finally, by articles in important American publications. Mr. Lee finally conceded that his intention was that these suggestions should ultimately be considered by the officials of the German Government, and while he was not making the suggestions for dissemination in this country, they were for the benefit of the whole world, including the United States. One point was apparently lost sight of by all concerned. The question was not asked, nor was information volunteered, as to whether or not what Mr. Lee was actually doing, as a hired Farben publicity agent, was to outline highfalutin speeches for Nazi officials to send back to America, regardless of whether or not they were truthful, in order to make the American people less suspicious of the real objective of I.G. Farben. Mr. Lee appeared unable to agree with members of the committee as to just what kind of material came under the classification of propaganda. Asked whether he ever received any propaganda material from Germany he replied: It is a question of what you, call propaganda. We have mreceived an immense amount of literature . . . . books and pamphlets and newspaper clippings and documents, world without end. Congressman Dickstein questioned Mr. Lee about one particular lot which he described as a "tremendous quantity of propaganda, shipped from Germany on the steamship Bremen, addressed to Ivy Lee & Co., New York." Mr. Lee could not remember that particular shipment. The committee heard many other witnesses in the course of its 1934 hearings on un-American activities, some of whom could also have been tied into the Farben propaganda machine without difficulty if the committee had been so minded. However, this testimony of Ivy Lee and his colleagues was so definitely related to Farben and Farben's part in the rearming of Germany, that it must be considered in all its sinister significance along with similar evidence uncovered during that same period by the Senate Munitions Committee. Appeals which I made to Chairman McCormack and other members of his committee to unmask fully this "German I.G. control of American affairs," and my offers of evidence pertaining to same, were brushed aside as out of order. It was also in 1934 that the Hon. James F. Byrnes, who was to go from the Senate to the Supreme Court and then become postwar Secretary of State, ignored my offer of pertinent data relating to the unsenatorial activities of his colleague, Dr. Copeland. And, over the next several years similar rebuffs were received from the Senate Lobby Investigating Committees headed by Hon. Hugo L. Black, who was also to move on to a seat on the High Court. In April 1935 every member of the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States received a brief, in the form of a printed thesis prepared by Francis P. Garvan, protesting against the extension of reciprocal trade treaties to Switzerland. This brief had been prepared in 1934 and was submitted in behalf of "Chemistry in the United States." Mr. Garvan's authorization to present it came from the Chemical Foundation and several of the other important organizations which represented the chemical industry of this country. It was also sent to Cabinet members, officers of executive departments and others. This brief faced all concerned with a powerful and unanswerable indictment of the policy of governmental inaction in ignoring the dangers to our economic security and national defense which was apparent in the penetration of our industries by I.G. Farben, and the latter's identification with Hitler and the Nazi government. The reciprocal trade-treaty statute, authorizing the President to enter into foreign trade agreements, had been passed by Congress in June 1924, and among the first countries to ask for the advantages in reduced tariff rates to be derived from such a treaty was Switzerland, where the chemical industry was completely dominated by Farben. In his brief, Mr. Garvan paid his respects to those who were attempting to breach the tariff walls that protected our chemical industries from a renewal of dumping by Farben through its backdoor in Switzerland, and castigated them with these words: I say it with all solemnity�that this industry is as sacred to the American people as the grave of the Unknown Soldier, and only a traitor or a fool dare touch it. Of Farben's ties with Hitler he said: ..... the chemical industry is under the direct supervision and control of a Minister of Industry who in turn is subject to the absolute will and word of Adolph Hitler, the Fuehrer. Therefore, in all dealings with the Swiss chemical industry, the actual partner and active member of the European dye cartel which is dominated and controlled by the German I.G., you are dealing with Adolph Hitler. Garvan sketched the history of what the German dye trust, its Herman Metz, and its spies, had done before and during World War I; his own early fight against them, and the efforts of the Wilson Administration to aid in the development and protection of a coal-tar chemical industry in America. His paper made clear the vital importance of an independent and powerful chemical industry for the United States, in peace and in war; and he came back time after time to what Farben bad done and was still doing with the aid of its many new industrial patents, its I.G. subsidiaries, and its literary Ivy Lees. In one respect Garvan's brief was prophetic, although he was mistaken in the optimism on which his forecast was predicated. He warned of the time when our supply of natural rubber might be cut off by Japan, but he erred in a belief that the development of our chemical industry was a guarantee that we would have a substitute sufficient for our needs when that time should come. The contemptuous response of Congress to the Garvan brief might be observed in the adoption of a reciprocal treaty with Switzerland in 1936, and subsequent reductions in the duties on coal tar and other chemical products from that country. In 1943, after Congress had again "found out" about Farben and Farben's war, a clause was actually inserted in the renewal of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act which purported to deprive cartels of any benefit from such treaties. As confirmation of his own warning, Mr. Garvan quoted in his brief from the then-scorned statesman of another nation who was also attempting, in vain, to arouse his fellow countrymen and the world to what was con-ling. The man who, six years later-when he was called upon almost too late, was to win immortal fame as the inspired defender of human dignity and liberty against the Nazi brutality which Farben had planned and armed. Garvan�s quotation was from a debate in the English House of Commons in 1934, in which Winston Churchill had said: The great new fact that is riveting the attention of every country in Europe and the world is that Germany is rearming. This fact throws everything else in the background. Her factories are working under practically war conditions. Germany is rearming on land, to some extent on sea; and what concerns us most, in the air. The most dangerous attack is the incendiary bomb ..... Ten days of intensive bombing of London would kill or maim thirty or forty thousand people . . . . We must face this peril where we stand; we cannot move away from it. I hope the Government will not neglect the scientific aspect of protec-tion of the population', but pending some new discovery, the only practical measure for certain defense is being able to inflict as much damage on the enemy as he can inflict. That procedure, might, in practice, give complete immunity. This historic premonition and warning from England's future Prime Minister went unheeded, and in America as in the British Empire, professonal[sic] politicians took refuge beneath a shabby umbrella covered with the flimsy fabric of pacifism, and refused to act on the evidence under their noses of what Germany, and Farben, were again preparing to do. pps. 181-201 ----- Aloha, He'Ping, Om, Shalom, Salaam. Em Hotep, Peace Be, All My Relations. Omnia Bona Bonis, Adieu, Adios, Aloha. Amen. Roads End <A HREF="http://www.ctrl.org/">www.ctrl.org</A> DECLARATION & DISCLAIMER ========== CTRL is a discussion & informational exchange list. Proselytizing propagandic screeds are not allowed. Substance�not soap-boxing! These are sordid matters and 'conspiracy theory'�with its many half-truths, misdirections and outright frauds�is used politically by different groups with major and minor effects spread throughout the spectrum of time and thought. 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