-Caveat Lector- <A HREF="http://www.ctrl.org/"> </A> -Cui Bono?- WJPBR Email News List [EMAIL PROTECTED] Peace at any cost is a prelude to war! STRATFOR.COM Global Intelligence Update 16 March 2000 Warning: Civil War Could Resume Throughout Philippines Summary At a recent leadership conference in the southern Philippines, the Islamic Command Council (ICC) announced that it will resume its guerrilla war against the government after nearly four years of tenuous peace. By itself, this single organization cannot re-spark the country's dormant civil war. But there is widespread guerrilla dissatisfaction with the implementation of the 1996 peace accord. The country is also stressed by economic and political problems. The group's announcement appears to presage the return of full- scale civil war to the Philippines. Analysis On March 12, the Islamic Command Council (ICC) announced at a press conference in the southern province of Lano del Sur that it would resume its guerrilla war against the Philippine government. The council is a faction of the country's former rebel front, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). At the press conference, a spokesman for the group claimed that it comprised nearly 90 percent of the original 20,000-25,000 MNLF forces. About 100 heavily armed members appeared before the media. On an immediate level, the ICC is calling for an independent Islamic state in Mindanao. The group notes that that the Philippine government co-opted MNLF leader Nur Misuari, who signed a 1996 peace accord with the government putting an end to the civil war in exchange for autonomy - not independence - for the Moro people. At the conclusion of its leadership conference, an ICC spokesman warned that "aside from self-determination and the establishment of an Islamic state, the only way out here is through mutual destruction," according to the Manila Times. By itself, the ICC presents a limited military threat. But the announcement may trigger the resumption of a long-simmering conflict in the southern Philippines; dissatisfaction has risen among other former MNLF guerrillas because of the slow pace in which the peace accord has been implemented. Talks with other separatists have been stalemated. On many fronts, the 1996 peace accords appear to be failing. The government in Manila is striking an increasingly harder line, as well. Despite claiming thousands of members, the ICC has in fact been a small militant faction since 1995. Government estimates place membership in the low hundreds. The ICC split from the larger front in 1995 during the final stages of peace talks. While the MNLF, led by Misuari, pressed for peace, the ICC, led by Melham Alam - a former chief of staff under Misuari - rejected the government's offer of autonomy. In April 1995, the ICC and the Muslim terrorist group Abu Sayyaf attacked the predominantly Christian town of Ipil in Zamboanga Del Sur Province. More than 100 were left either dead or wounded. Misuari expelled Alam from the front after the attack. In 1996, Alam claimed that the ICC had 300 fighters trained in Afghanistan and Syria, plus 3,000 Muslim rebels. This small group, however, has a keen sense of timing. The group is stirring as another round of peace negotiations between the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) nears a June 30 deadline. Announced by President Joseph Estrada, the deadline calls for a working peace deal - or the launch of a full- scale military assault against the MILF. Some in the Philippine government and military are reportedly dissatisfied with Estrada's tough line, likening it to the activities of former President Ferdinand Marcos before declaring martial law in 1972. There is considerable concern about the balance of forces, in case it comes to renewed civil war. Government forces are stretched comparatively thin. Deployments in Mindanao include 35,000 soldiers and 35,000 paramilitary militia - the largest single deployment in the Philippines. There are calls for a further 15,000 members to be added to militia forces, known as the Citizen's Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU). The Philippine military includes only 74,000 army troops and 9,000 marines. In comparison, the MILF has about 15,000 fighters and government figures indicate that they have greater access to weapons with 11,350 firearms - up nearly fourfold since 1997. The MILF may also be able to count on other insurgent groups and former guerrillas who have since been brought into the armed forces - but whose loyalties are questionable. The list of other active insurgencies includes Abu Sayyaf, with 1,500 members and 500 weapons, the ICC and other former MNLF fighters, and the Communist New People's Army (NPA), with 10,600 members. Though they are not allied, these groups have been known to operate together. The single most important cause of unrest among the thousands of former Philippine insurgents is the slow place of implementing the four-year old peace accord. The process of integrating former guerrillas into the military and national police, as the accord demands, has been slow due to mistrust on both sides. In October 1999, 500 ex-MNLF soldiers left their military training facility, complaining that they were mistreated and inadequately paid. Straining the tenuous peace in the south, MNLF leaders also hold that the government has not fulfilled its part of the 1996 agreement, by failing to issue weapons to MNLF fighters who are now in government units. The government's reticence to arm the integrated former MNLF troops was justified in December 1999 when the first 1,000 ex-MNLF fighters promptly disappeared after being issued weapons. The military also has suspended the distribution of weapons to the remaining troops integrated into the armed forces. For the government, the question is clear. Where do the loyalties of these men lie? With the government or the Moro cause? In February, two former MNLF fighters-turned-government troops were found among six Muslim guerrillas killed in a clash between marines and the Abu Sayyaf on Jolo Island. Brig. Gen. Orlando Buenaventura, commander of the marines in the area, reportedly said that the military suspects "some MNLF integrees [sic] have been spying on us and telling the enemy about our anti-insurgency plans." He added, "We cannot trust them anymore." Guerrillas who have not entered the military present a clear threat. In January, 100 armed, former MNLF guerrillas occupied a port, demanding that the government hire them as security guards. Misuari himself has several times warned that if the peace process isn't accelerated, the MNLF may re-launch hostilities. Misuari himself has little desire to break off the peace process but he may have little choice if he wishes to remain in power. Muslim leaders have called for his replacement, claiming he has not fulfilled his role as governor of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindano. There has been little economic or social progress in the area since the peace accords. The chief active guerrilla group, the MILF, appears headed toward broader open conflict with the government. The MILF is building its membership. Estrada's June 30 deadline for peace is spurring this growth. The MILF is also capitalizing on the numerous rumors of an impending military coup against Estrada, recently announcing that it had captured three government agents who were part of a coup plot. Reportedly, the agents admitted to a plan that would have pressured Estrada into launching a full offensive against the MILF; Estrada would have then been relieved of his presidency. For the MILF such a scenario would serve several purposes: placing blame for attacks on the government, fueling rumors of a coup and engendering distrust between the military and government. These rumors also appear to be undermining confidence between the government and the armed forces. The tactic appears to be working. Armed Forces Chief Gen. Angelo Reyes has insisted that the armed forces remain loyal and warned, "We will not baby any coup plotters." Nevertheless, the government called in the navy's Vice Adm. Luisito Fernandez to account for the loyalty of the navy, reported the Manila Times. In addition, the military is increasingly active on the domestic front. Roles likely include stepped up surveillance. Each of the separatist groups will likely take advantage of this situation. The possibility of all-out civil war is growing, as are prospects for stepped up operations by the MILF, MNLF and Abu Sayyaf in the south, the Communist army in the central region and the north. The ICC's chief area of operation is the urban setting, quite possibly Manila itself. (c) 2000, Stratfor, Inc. http://www.stratfor.com/ **COPYRIGHT NOTICE** In accordance with Title 17 U. S. C. 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