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The Thousand Conspiracy - Secret Germany Behind the Mask
Paul Winkler
Charles Scribner�s Sons�1943
New York
381 pps. � First Edition � Out-of-print
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"I know no way of judging the future but by the past."

    PATRICK HENRY
[Speech at the Virginia Assembly, May 17651

--[bookflaps]--

This amazing and engrossing book undertakes to show that Nazism should not be
regarded as simply the product of some "spontaneous, generation" of Adolf
Hitler's evil genius, since Hitler�s ideas had all. been voiced before in
Germany, but that there was a common inspiration of these ideas that had its
roots deep in German history.

Paul Winkler's researches show that these roots go back a millennium. The
book takes its title from the words of a deputy in the Bavarian Landtag who,
in 1921, when Hitler was still a nonentity, announced in the Parliament that
the sheaf of documents he held in his hand was evidence of a conspiracy going
back a thousand years, a conspiracy he intended to expose. A few days
afterwards, before his scheduled speech could be delivered, he was
assassinated, apparently by the very influences he was determined to unmask.
His murderers went unpunished; his evidence was never revealed. The secret
forces continued along their hidden way, and eighteen years later embarked
openly on world conquest.

The researches on which this book is based undoubtedly include the murdered
deputy's evidence, with much more of even greater importance. From Paul
Winkler's studies emerge the contours of a conspiracy, very old but very
real�a conspiracy whose existence, though fantastic at first thought, is the
only 'possible explanation of the present-day facts of Nazism. It is the
secret Germany of the "Prusso-Teutonics", whose roots reach back beyond the
days of the Crusades. This secret Germany has been obscured for long periods
of European history, but it has lived on continuously for centuries, always
rising to dominance again and consistently driving its people along paths
completely divergent from those taken by the other peoples of Western
Civilization.

Shedding new light on European history as it does, this is a book of the very
broadest significance. Its message must be grasped if we are to shape the
future.

About the Author

The first ambition of Paul Winkler, a European journalist who came to this
country in 1940, was to become a biologist. World War I put an end to that
for he realized that the period which followed it would be one of unrest and
he preferred writing and journalism to scientific isolation. The chief reason
for his preference was a desire to spread an understanding of vital problems
throughout a wide public. Soon after the war he founded a newspaper feature
syndicate which fifteen years later had grown to be Europe's largest. He was
also the second largest magazine publisher in France and he continued always
to write widely on the subjects which interested him. His
acquaintance with European statesmen was extensive and he acted as Eduoard
Herrioes adviser in press matters. When Germany turned Nazi in 1933, Paul
Winkler was not one of the many who believed Hider's Stormtroopers were an
entirely new phenomenon. He had been interested in Germany ever since the
last war and had spent several months in the Ruhr with the French army of
occupation. Hitler he remembered from his early days in Munich where he was a
correspondent for a time. He made several visits to Austria and watched the
first systematic steps toward Anschluss. In the ante-chambers of the League
of Nations and during its sessions he watched the Machiavellian maneuvers of
the German delegates. In 1935 he covered the Saar plebiscite. And the more he
saw of the present developments in Germany the more convinced Paul Winkler
became that the explanation of Hitler and the Nazis lay far behind the
Versailles Treaty. He turned to historical research and spent several years
working at the Sorbonne, of which he is a graduate, at the Bibliothique
Nationale and at the British Museum. His book was nearly completed when the
Germans invaded France and he was forced to destroy first, his notes, and
then his entire manuscript. After Mr. Winkler came to this country, he at
once began anew on "The Thousand Year Conspiracy: Secret Germany Behind the
Mask". He is now head of the Press Alliance, a newspaper syndicate very much
like the one he had in France.

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Foreword

This book attempts to contribute to the work of identification of the forces
behind Nazism. It results from research undertaken to substantiate this
hypothesis: that Nazism is not the product of some "spontaneous generation"
crystallized by Hitler's evil genius; and that it is not-as it has often been
described-simply a reaction to the harsh terms of the Versailles treaty;
finally, that Nazism does not derive from some basic trait of the German
character.

Chapter I is introductory: It presents a few characteristic quotations from
German writers of the past one hundred and fifty years. These passages, all
written by members of what may be called the Prussian School, are evidence
that Mein Kampf is merely a rehash of ideas frequently expressed before
Hitler voiced them. But what was the common inspiration of these earlier
authors? In seeking an answer to this question, we first perceive the
contours of the conspiracy�very old but very real. Its existence-fantastic,
at first thought -remains the only possible explanation of the facts.

Chapters II-VII are an attempt to retrace this centuriesold conspiracy, the
actual subject of this book. Chapters II and III examine in particular the
hidden forces responsible for the rise of Prussia and the Germany of Bismarck
and Wilhelm II. Chapter IV introduces the "Fehme," the blood tribunal of the
Middle Ages, into the picture. Chapters V, VI and VII show that Hitler's rise
to power would have been impossible had not Hitler placed himself and his
movement at the service of the Prusso-Teutonic forces.

In Chapters VIII, IX and X, the effort is made to search out behind the
specific subject-the "actual conspiracy"�its fundamental basis. Whatever may
have appeared earlier to be a fortuitous development now takes its proper
place within an evolution which derives from basic, organic causes. In these
chapters we seek the reasons why the Prusso-Teutonic forces have pursued
paths completely divergent from those taken by the other peoples of Western
civilization. Here we face the "forces behind the forces."

ix-x
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CHAPTER I

THE CONSPIRACY AND
ITS MIRROR

IN 1921Nazism was still in its infancy and rather harmless. During one of the
sessions of the Bavarian "Landtag" (Parliament), the Deputy Gareis, with a
heavy pile of documents in his hands, made a statement to the other Deputies
which none of them seemed able to understand: "I have here the evidence of a
thousand years' conspiracy-evidence which I shall present to you shortly."

A few days later Gareis was murdered. The criminal escaped punishment and the
incident was practically forgotten. The evidence to which Gareis had referred
was never revealed.

It was eighteen years after this, in 1939, that German military might began
its goose-stepping march across the borders of Poland, Norway, Holland,
Belgium, France, Yugoslavia, Greece. Today it is bent upon world conquest.

The forces which launched Germany on the path of conquest are those which
were behind the murder of the obscure Bavarian Deputy. Those responsible for
the conspiracy which Gareis mentioned decided-when he sought to unmask them
-to destroy him. It was these men-all members of the same conspiratorial
group-who, some eighteen years later, decided that the time was ripe to place
world mastery in German hands.

Hitler and Nazism had very little to do with this conspiracy, although they
occupy the present spotlight. This is not to suggest that Hitler and his
party have not been important factors in all the decisive actions for
which�during the last nine years -Germany has been responsible. But these men
are only tools in the hands of much more powerful forces. We shall have a
great deal to say later about these forces-the "PrussoTeutonic" groups and
organizations.

If we want to win this war we must see our enemy clearly -and we cannot cure
a sick world unless we understand the true nature of the disease. To destroy
the evil we must first identify it. And this will be of equal importance even
when the war is over and our problem is to win the peace.

The Forerunners of "Mein Kampf"

We intend to start this identification with the forerunners of Mein Kampf. We
cannot expect to locate the roots of the evil in the literary field. But
literature is a good mirror of much deeper currents.* [* All quotations in
this chapter from German and French authors are my own translations. Italics
are liberally used for the sake of emphasis. All italics are mine. P.W.]

The writings of Treitschke and von Bernhardi and of the other authors of the
Pan Germanic school were widely discussed in the United States and England
before and during the last World War. Their connection, however, with the
whole evolution of the Prussian idea-from the thirteenth century up to
Nazism-has in general not been sufficiently emphasized.

Mein Kampf is a significant work from many points of view, but this work and
its author, Hider, are not the source of all evil in present-day Germany. In
1913, more than ten years before the publication of this work, General von
Bernhardi, who had enormous influence on the army and the younger generation
of Germany, stated in his book, Our Future: "For us there are two
alternatives and no thirdworld dominion or ruin."

Surplus Population as a Springboard

In Germany and the Next War, published in 1912, General von Bernhardi had
this to say:

"Strong, healthy and flourishing nations constantly increase the number of
their population; consequently they will be faced, after a given moment, with
the necessity of extending their borders, of acquiring new land, in order to
settle the overflowing population. However, since the Earth is almost
completely settled by this time, acquisition of new land can be gained only
at the expense of its present occupants-that is through conquest-which
becomes a law of necessity.

"The right of conquest is universally recognized. At first this can be
effected through peaceful means; overpopulated countries pour out streams of
emigrants into other lands and territories. These emigrants, while submitting
to the laws of the new land, try to create favorable living conditions for
themselves to the detriment of the original inhabitants and in competition
with them. This means conquest.

"Finally, the right to conquer through war has always been recognized. When
an increasing population cannot acquire colonial lands from their primitive
and uncivilized occupants, and if it is nevertheless desirable to retain for
the State the surplus population which can no longer be supported, there is
only one thing left to do-self-preservation will force this nation to war and
to the conquest of foreign lands. Right no longer belongs to the possessor,
but rather to those who are victorious in war. . . .

". . . In such cases, right belongs to those who have strength either to
maintain or to conquer. Might is the highest law. Before its tribunal war is
the gauge of strength-war whose decisions are always biologically just since
they evolve from the very essence of all things. . . . Even from the point of
view of Christianity, one would come to the same conclusion. True Christian
morality is of course based on the creed of love: 'Love God above all, and
thy neighbor as thyself.' This law, however, can claim no validity insofar as
relations between nations are concerned, since, when applied to politics, it
would surely lead to a conflict of allegiances. For an individual to profess
love for another country would in most cases result in a negating of love for
the people of his own country. A political system based on such foundations
would surely be subject to the worst aberrations. Christian morality is
personal and social, and can never become a political reality. It strives to
develop the ethical personality, and to give it strength, so that this
personality can live altruistically, in the interests of a community."

The cynical frankness of von Bernhardi is as great as Hitler's cynicism. Both
resort to hypocrisy when their deductions are too unpalatable for their
public. Both consider their special moral conception above discussion and
consequently do not discuss it.

It is evident from the General's text that he looks upon emigration of
surplus population only as a provisional remedy and that his solution
consists of perpetual conquest. He prefers conquest, which "preserves" the
surplus population "for the State"�and when he speaks of "State" he is
thinking, of course, of the German State. He does not explain what natural
law makes it necessary to preserve this surplus population for the State, nor
why it cannot be peaceably integrated with the populations of other nations
if there is no room left in the homeland. That "you wish to preserve them for
the State" is a premise which needs no justification for this preacher of
Germanism and Prussianism. "The very essence of the State is power," further
declares von Bernhardi and, quoting Treitschke, that other great theoretician
of German power, adds: "anyone not sufficiently virile to face this truth
squarely has no right to meddle with politics."

Not for a moment does von Bernhardi consider limiting the populations of
nations reproducing too rapidly. On the contrary, his point of departure is
that "strong, healthy, flourishing nations increase their numbers."

In this, the conclusion is implicit: the German people, obviously strong,
healthy and flourishing, will always have excess population, and consequently
will ceaselessly have to annex territory until they dominate the world.
"World dominion or ruin," the final tragic alternative of von Bernhardi's,
implies, of course, that if Germany does not succeed in dominating the world,
another country will perform this task, which awaits the strongest; and in
that case the Germans will go to their ruin. Facing this choice, which he
believes inevitable, his decision is made.* [*Note at this point what von
Bernhardi considered to be the first step toward world dominion: "In one way
or another we must settle with France in order that we can gain that military
freedom of action so necessary to our world politics. This is the first and
most necessary demand for healthy German politics, and since the traditional
French hatred for us can never be overcome through peaceful means, we must
conquer it by sheer force of arms. France must be so thoroughly beaten that sh
e will never be able to Stand in our way."]

War as a Necessity

Von Bernhardi's "indispensable" conquest can be accomplished only by war and
the General believed that war should be not a defensive but an offensive
operation-or rather, outright aggression. He cites the Prussian example as
proof of this:

"Indeed, the foundation for Prussia's strength was established by the Great
Elector ** through successful wars of his own choice. Frederick the Great
continued in the glorious tradition of his noble ancestor. . . . Of all the
wars through which he led his people not one was forced upon him; he never
tried to delay the start of any of these wars. In order to deprive his foe of
the advantage of the first movement he would take the initiative by attacking
so that he could assure himself the best chance of success. How successful he
was is well known. Had he lacked this heroic decisiveness, the entire
historical development of European nations, and of mankind, would have taken
a different turn." [** Friedrich Wilhelm (1640-88).]

Given such a state of mind the conclusions of present-day pacifists-to the
effect that "War doesn't pay," or "If the Treaty of Versailles had not been
so harsh, this war would never have broken out"�prove singularly impotent.

But General von Bernhardi did not invent anything himself. He only reduced to
a formula a mode of thought cherished by a series of German predecessors. A
century earlier Dietrich von Buclow (1757-1807), in Modern Methods of War, usi
ng a style cleverly veiling, by technical military terms, purposes none may
doubt, said: "If the amount of military resources must sooner or later decide
victory, it is obvious that little nations cannot succeed against the big
ones, better equipped with war materials. In ancient times courage and
discipline compensated for the inequalities of mass power among nations. . .
. Today, however, all moral strength, all individual military talent of the
small in number necessarily fails against the great. It is necessary, of
course, to make good use of your own superiority of numbers in accordance
with modern methods of war, but it remains certain that in modem battle the
weak have never conquered the strong unless the latter have made some
mistake. Besides, these modern methods of war have been developed only very
recently. We shall know better how to benefit from all these advantages in
the future.

"Great empires are not only wealthier. Their natural frontiers are more
extensive than those of small, neighboring states. It happens frequently that
a smaller state is completely enclosed within the borders of the larger one.
. . . What a double advantage for the latter!

"I refer here only to small adjoining states, for in the nature of things, it
is first necessary to attack one's neighbor before coming to more distant
States. If this rule is not observed countries separating two main
adversaries may declare them-selves either with or against the great empire.
Should they declare themselves against this power everything is changed,
since a coalition of little States is equivalent to one big State. Even in
such a case, however, the concentration of power and coercive means in the
hands of a single political body may still give the great power a military
advantage over any federa-tion of independent States."

Despite the reservations stated in these last lines, if leaders of all the
little States successively engulfed by Hitler had taken the trouble to reread
these words in time they might perhaps have been able to decide upon a common
course of action instead of maintaining an illusory neutrality until their
fall.

To get people to accept the idea of "perpetual war" (indispensable for the
achievement of perpetual conquest), philosophical, or at least biological,
arguments are needed. German science finds them, and demonstrates that the
state of war is but a process of natural selection, permitting the human race
to improve itself. Thus von Bernhardi states: "Without war, inferior or
degenerate races could easily pollute and weaken all healthy, vital elements
by their weedlike growth, and a general decline would be the result. 'War,'
says A. W. von Schlegel, 'is as necessary as the struggle of elements in
nature.�"

Heinrich von Treitschke (1834-1896), like von Bernhardi, had great influence
on the thinking of the generations of Germans immediately preceding Nazism.

Treitschke is a conspicuous example of what is known as "Prussianism." We
shall see later what significance the formation of "Prussianism" had in the
evolution of German thought. Specifically we shall see that "Prussianism" is
much less an ethnic reality than a special state of mind, a crystallization
of thought that has* developed over the course of centuries through some
remarkable process. Close examination of Prussianism will permit us to see
more clearly into numerous details of the German problem.

Treitschke, this typical Prussian, was not legitimately a Prussian at all.
Son of a Saxon general, descended on his father's side from a recently
Germanized Czech family (a fact he was reluctant to admit), Treitschke was
powerfully attracted to the Prussian way of thinking. This Prussian by
vocation deemed that only Prussia possessed the necessary strength to
dominate all the other German States and lead Germany toward the conquests he
so ardently desired.

Concerning the concept of war and its role in the existence of nations,
Treitschke preached thus to future generations:

"War is not only a practical necessity, but is also a theoretical necessity,
an exigency of logic. The concept of a State implies the concept of war,
since the essence of a State is power. The State is the people organized into
a sovereign power. . . .

"A State which renounces war and which in advance submits to an international
tribunal gives up this sovereign power, that is, its very self. Whoever
dreams of permanent peace asks for something not only unachievable but
absurd; he commits an error of elementary reasoning. . . .

"War, it is true, may alienate nations from one another and yet, to a certain
extent, it brings them closer together, by making them acquainted with their
own and their neighbors' resources. War as an intermediary among nations is
often more effective than universal trade. A nation which clings to the
visionary hope of everlasting peace will inevitably end in decay within its
haughty isolation. History builds and destroys tirelessly; never weary, she
exhumes humanity's divine treasures from the ruins of ancient worlds in order
to restore them to a new world. To whoever may believe in this perpetual
growth, in the eternal youth of our race, it is quite evident that war is an
inevitable necessity.

"That war should be forever banished from the earth is not only an absurd
hope but profoundly immoral. If it were ever realized, we should witness
atrophy of many essential, sublime forces in the human soul, and
transformation of the terrestrial sphere into a vast temple of selfishness .
. .

"On the other hand, the State has the right to consider itself an end, since
it contains the essential conditions for prosperous social life . . .

"Every people, and particularly one of high cultural development, runs the
risk, during a long period of peace, of degenerating into egotism. Such a
race should consider a great and righteous war which fate may send them as a
favor, but the more the comfortable habits of social existence have crept
into their spirit, the rougher the counter-blow may seem.

"I have said 'fate may send them a war,' because the reason the value of this
cruel remedy is so rarely appreciated is that no doctor among mankind dares
prescribe war as a beneficial potion for a sick people.

"As soon as a nation hears the echo of this cry of alarm: 'The State is in
peril-our existence is threatened!' then awakens the highest virtue, courage
of sacrifice which may never be so freely or widely displayed in times of
peace. . . .

"Among the thousands of men engaging in battle, blindly obeying the will of
'All,' each is aware how little his life is worth compared to the glory of
the State; each feels himself hemmed in by profound forces which dominate
him. From this, in every important war, will spring deep religious feelings,
and the sublime spectacle, incomprehensible to pure reason, of enemy armies,
praying to the same God for victory.

"The grandeur of war is to be found in these acts considered shocking by a
debilitated civilization.

"Men who have never done each other any harm, who accord one another the high
esteem one owes his chivalrous enemies, kill each other. They sacrifice in
this line of duty not only their lives, but what is infinitely more painful,
natural sentiment, the instinctive love for humanity, and horror of blood.
The insignificant self, with all its noble and base instincts, must sink into
the will of the 'All.'

"I ask of whoever may find this barbaric: why, then, has no great beneficial
idea of political or religious freedom ever been accepted by men without
christening by blood? And why has war been, in every age, the favorite theme
of the arts?"

The cynicism of Treitschke's reasoning is remarkable: war, in itself, is a
blessing, but it would be dangerous to confess it to the people (". . . the
reason the value of this remedy is so rarely appreciated is that no doctor
among mankind dares to prescribe war as a beneficial potion for a sick
people"). Instead of such a frank admission the cry of alarm is sounded: "The
State is in peril�our existence is threatened," and people rush into war with
enthusiasm.

It would be an illusion to believe that Treitschke speaks in the abstract, or
that his purpose is to develop theories to benefit humanity. Reasoning in
this manner, he hopes to benefit only his own people ("our race," as he has
already expressed it), whose fate alone concerns him: "To whoever may believe
in this perpetual growth, in the eternal youth of our race, it is quite
evident that war is an inevitable necessity." This was written in 1869.

The opinions of Treitschke and von Bernhardi are not isolated phenomena, but
derive from distant sources. And if we admit that Mein Kampf merely outlines
clearly the objectives of a certain Germany, without adding anything really
new, it is interesting to note that Hitler's spiritual ancestors were in turn
descended from a long line of thinkers of similar leanings.

It was a mistake on the part of the Western world not to attach in time
sufficient importance to this type of thoughtwhich was in violent
contradiction to the basic ideas of Western civilization. Doubtless people
were lulled by the illusion that such thinking represented purely theoretical
fantasies of

a few German scholars. They were not able to see that actually such thoughts
were extremely significant manifestations of a state of mind having its roots
in the distant past; and that these manifestations might in turn result in a
very particular and very dangerous way of thinking in future German
generations.

Later we shall discuss the early, fundamental causes of German
aggressiveness. For the moment let us review briefly more recent spiritual
ancestors of Hitler, contemporaries and predccessors of Treitschke and von
Bernhardi.

Starvation as a Springboard

Friedrich List (1789-1864), along with several minor economists active around
1840, was responsible for formulating the principal theories on which
present-day German economic conquest is based.

After emigrating to Pennsylvania and becoming an American citizen, List was
concerned only with Germany's greatness. He returned to Germany in 1840 to
publish there his principal work, in which he outlined the basis for his Natio
nal System of Political Economy. Violently opposed to the principle of free
trade because it gives the same advantages to weak as to strong nations, he
would welcome its use without reservation within the continent of Europe,
once the continent were dominated by Berlin; and he had high hopes that this
would be achieved as soon as possible. So far as his own age was concerned,
however, he was an extreme protectionist and advocated development of new
industry in Germany-through high protective tariffs raised against
competition of foreign countries. He took into full account the risk of
losing Germany's foreign markets, since protectionism always provokes
reprisals. His remedy is simple: stimulate tremendous expansion of Germany,
including conquest of Europe, acquisition of colonies in Australia, New
Zealand, India and the Americas. Then Germany would no longer have to fear
that she might lack foreign markets in a protectionist world.

According to List a nation must conquer all countries lying in its sphere of
economic action-by degrees, but steadily; and this sphere of action is
defined as every territory which may serve as outlet, or which contains raw
materials the nation may need. In the long run this becomes perpetual
conquest, for eventually every foreign country, however distant, represents a
potential export market, or is a producer of useful raw materials. In the
ideas of List, we find the economic basis for General von Bernhardi's thesis:
"For us there are two alternatives 'and no third-world dominion or ruin." And
here too is to be found the complete outline of Germany's recent and present
economic attitude-the old thesis, slightly improved upon by Dr. Schacht.

The process is simple. Schacht's Germany settled into a system of the most
absolute protectionism, the system so dear to List. This was accomplished
through methods more modem and effective than tariffs. Germany was the first
country, after the World War, to return to exchange control, adopting it not
because of any financial need, but deliberately, in order to create a system o
f total protectionism. The old-fashioned protectionist use of high tariffs to
discourage imports becomes outdated. Imports are now made practically
impossible: the State releases no currency to private business to cover cost
of imports purchased abroad, with the single exception of certain raw
materials or tools considered by the State to be absolutely indispensable. As
in all systems of protectionism, the population of the country whose
production is thus "protected" must suffer: and their suffering becomes more
acute the more the system is improved. Soon the world is accused of starving
the German people, and of withholding raw materials necessary to German
industries. (No mention is made of the fact that these materials had been
available to Germany in a world of free exchange-the system she was the first
to deviate from and that her importers, on a free monetary market, could have
obtained the necessary funds to pay for any quantity of raw materials.)
Germany is pictured as "deprived of her place in the sun." Thus a favorable
psychological atmosphere is created within the country and abroad as well, to
prepare for world conquest "by degrees, yet steadily," as outlined by List.
The achievement of List's plan for the future is considerably advanced by the
repetition of the specious statement to the German people: "Poor Germany must
starve unless she succeeds in dominating the other nations."

List bolsters the self-confidence of his compatriots by asserting that a
specific determinism demands supremacy of the German race. According to him,
the Latin races, under French influence, and the Slavic nations led by
Russia, have not the power for domination. Germanic races, among which he
included Anglo-Saxons and Germans, possess this power to the greatest extent.
Of the two, his choice is simple: Germany must supplant England; build a
powerful fleet, extend her colonizing to all corners of the world; and
finally unite all other Europeans against English supremacy, so that she can
direct the destiny of the world.

Charles Andler, a French author, summed up certain ideas of List in his work,
The Origins of Pan-Germanism, published in 1915: * [* Charles Andler, Les
origines du Pan-Germanisme, Paris, 1915]

"It is necessary to organize continental Europe against England. Napoleon I,
a great strategist, also knew the methods of economic hegemony. His
continental system, which met with opposition even from countries which might
have profited from such an arrangement, should be revived, but, this time,
not as an instrument of Napoleonic domination. The idea of uniting Europe in
a closed trade bloc is no longer shocking if Germany assumes domination over
such a bloc-and not France. Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, willingly or by
force, will enter this 'Customs Federation.' Austria is assumed to be won
over at the outset. Even France, if she gets rid of her notions of military
conquest, will not be excluded. The first steps the Confederation would take
to assure unity of thought and action would be to establish a joint
representative body, as well as to organize a common fleet. But of course,
both the headquarters of the Federation and its parliamentary seat would be
in Germany.

"At once the sharing of common commercial advantages would begin. List
proposes something like a cooperative league of nations, in which all profits
would be distributed in proportion to investments. European vitality,
intelligence and order would put the Far East to good use. Oriental ports
would become 'Free cities' where European agents would deal with native
authorities in the capacity of advisors duly accredited and diplomatically
protected. Austria would extend its borders to the Red Sea and the Persian
Gulf. A German navy would be built up. Prussian colonies would be established
in Australia and New Zealand, where England has firmly planted her flag but
has failed to exploit resources. How could England resist all the navies and
the concentrated economic power of a united Central Europe?

"Since Germany possesses a greater stock of vital energy and superior
economic ability to that of any other nation one may guess which nation would
be likely to benefit most from this association,�an association which was to
be based on the principle of equal privilege for all members."

Various firsthand reports have given us a fairly accurate picture of the
manner in which Nazi Germany is applying the principle of "economic
collaboration" to the "occupied" countries, and how, through her agents, she
has seized control of all the great industries of France, Belgium and
Holland. We have also seen how she has allowed the whole of her economic
policy to be dictated by Dr. Schacht. All this indicates clearly that Hitler
is merely applying the century-old theories of List in the economic sphere.

The Origin of the "Lebensraum" Theory

Ernst-Moritz Arndt (1769-1860) as early as 1803, in his work Germania and
Europe, expressed political ideas based on the "right of the strongest,"
highly significant for the future. He believed that each nation owed it to
itself to take advantage of every opportunity for imposing its will. Nations
which allow such an opportunity to slip by deserve spoliation by their
neighbors. "A State," says Arndt, "must first have a stable foundation,
geographically speaking, and develop further according to rules of chance,
and by virtue of its own character. The only restrictions laid down for the
State are those of climate and surrounding territories. Yes, each State has
the right to make strong representations to its neighbors, should the latter
unjustly seize air and light necessary to its growth and development."

Arndt expresses himself "euphemistically" about a point of view which might
appear too brutally direct to a section of the public. Hitler, who commits
the gravest injustices in the name of "justice" and "equality of rights," has
drawn excellent inspiration from Arndt's methods. His "Lebensraum" is a mask
for the simple will-to-conquer, as was Arndt's "right (for each State) to
make strong representations to its neighbors should the latter unjustly seize
air and light necessary to its growth and development." It is evident too
that in speaking of 44 each State" Arndt had Germany, and particularly
Prussia, in mind.

We shall see what a great influence the Teutonic Knights of the thirteenth,
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries had on the evolution of the Germany we
know. It is natural for a man who thinks like Arndt to say that because
Poland did not manage to put to rout or destroy the Teutonic Knights, she no
longer had the right to exist. This is the theory that "since you once were
weak enough to grant your enemy his life, you must permit him to kill you
now."

"Poland did not realize," Arndt says, "that her duty as a nation was first of
all to defend her coast line and drive the Teutonic Knights away from it.

"This negligence spelled death for Poland.

"When in the eighteenth century Prussia and Russia seized Poland's entire
maritime domain, it meant that Poland no longer existed. With no outlet to
the sea, surrounded by powerful neighbors and having no implements of higher
culture, nor any natural frontiers for defense, it was impossible for her
ever to become anything. Sooner or later she must disappear . . .

"According to our conception of things, small nations must disappear because
geographically they rarely possess the means for subsistence.

"The natural frontiers of Poland were assaulted by Prussia, Courland and
Livonia; and this injury was certainly the main cause of Poland's final
political death."

And Arndt adds:

"Today Holland constitutes the most glaring violation of Germany's natural
frontier."* [* The following words, no less significant, are quoted from
another work of Arndt, Spirit of the Times (Geist der Zeit): ". . . Let us
declare a sweeping, merciless war against France so that our mighty efforts
may carry us beyond the Rhine. And let us not return our swords to their
sheaths until all German speaking peoples, those of Alsace, Lorraine,
Luxembourg and Flanders, have been emancipated and restored to the German
Empire. Here is the task and the goal. And if we should fail to liberate
them, if in spite of all our efforts we should not realize this goal we may
as well not undertake anything else, for in vain will God have offered his
treasures to the Germans, only to take them back because we are too lazy to
enjoy them."]

Defense Will Not Win a War

It is not only the political and economic ideas of "New" Germany which were
expressed much earlier. In the realm of military tactics also, all the German
principles now described as "new" were discussed in detail over thirty years
ago by General von Bernhardi. Dietrich von Buelow, of whom we have already
spoken (and who died in 1807) had this to say in his Spirit of Modern Warfare:

"We must fight only offensive wars. In a defensive war all positions and all
parallel marches are useless: they will never suffice as a wall against the
enemy, as we shall soon clearly realize. Regardless of how strong or well
protected or how well chosen any position may be which you defend against
frontal attack, you will be expelled from it by the enemy. He will quickly
achieve this result by attacks on your flank, especially if his forces are
greater.

"I must boldly assert-although this principle may be new -that defensive wars
should never be waged: as soon as possible the role of aggressor should be
assumed, and operations conducted against the enemy's flank and rear."

Von Buelow also clearly formulated the ideas underlying the penetration-now a
sad reality-by the Fifth Column into democratic countries, including creation
of "economic allies" in enemy countries in the persons of a few great
industrialists to whom economic advantages are promised. This system gave
Germany excellent results in the conquest of France, and before America's
entry into the war she tried to employ similar methods in the United States
as well. In the writings of von Buelow are anticipated all the advantages
which Germany's masters later gained in several countries by carrying on a
campaign of corruption of the enemy at home.

"Insofar as everything has its price," says von Buelow, "the amount of money
available is also a decisive factor. Greed for gain is so irresistible that
one may buy materials of war even in enemy countries when they are not
available at home . . . to say nothing of the advantage possessed by the
wealthier for succeeding in their purposes through bribery and corruption. On
this subject Montecuccoli has already said: 'To wage war, three things are
necessary. . . . Money, Money, and Money."'

The "Ideal Prussian"

In reviewing briefly the theories of a few German writers of the past 150
years, we wished merely to emphasize that ideas generally attributed to
Hitler and Nazism originate from much earlier sources. For these very writers
(and we might have cited many more at the risk of becoming repetitious) have
only formulated principles underlying a curious "cultural trend," generally
described as "Prussianism," but never clearly defined. Taken individually,
such texts, frequently cited before the World War, were regarded as
characteristic fantasies of slight significance, springing from that
"Prussian insolence" about which nothing could be done. Related to each
other, and related chiefly to the future (which has since become the present)
and the past, those texts assume new significance, and we are obliged to
attribute equal, if not greater, importance to them than to Mein Kampf.

We will frequently deal with the origins and purposes of "Prussianism" in
this book. We attribute to this word a meaning much wider and reaching much
further back in time than that of most writers-for whom Frederick 11, King of
Prussia, is the prototype, if not the actual founder of Prussianism.
Frederick 11, while in many ways an extremely interesting personality, and
one of the most important forces in the rise of Prussia, was, however, only
one of many in a long line of men formed by the Prussian school. Besides,
this close friend of Voltaire was much too strongly tinged with
humanitarianism to be considered an ideal representative of the school which
is fundamentally opposed to humanitarian ideas. That a number of his actions
can be explained only by the inspiration he received from the Prussian
tradition does not alter this fact.

Frederick II was unquestionably a great Prussian, but an imperfect Prussian,
much as was Bismarck, that other great Prussian, who has often mistakenly
been described as the greatest Prussian statesman of modern times-mistakenly
because, even though Bismarck did render tremendous service to the Prussian
cause, his attitude did not always please the high priests of Prussianism.
Having conquered France, he attempted to live at peace with her. He limited
Germanic ambitions in the Balkans. He opposed his own country's tendencies
toward colonial expansion. Although many of his acts were in harmony with the
purest precepts of the Prussianism of Arndt, List, and von Buelow, Bismarck
retained a certain restraint and a trace of respect for Christian ethics�the
opposite of Teutonic ethics (as described by several authors quoted). Thus
Bismarck cannot be considered an ideal Prussian.

This ideal Prussian, this man of "Prussian dreams" (which, in previous
centuries, would have been called "Teutonic dreams") does exist, however, and
is none other than Hitler. Here one must search for the secret of his success
among his compatriots, who, for centuries have been awaiting a kind of
Teutonic Messiah, who would ruthlessly achieve an ideal definitely opposed to
conceptions of Christian and humanitarian morality.

Constantin Frantz, German writer of the nineteenth century, refers in one of
his books to a little known work by Bollmann entitled Justification of
Machiavellism. He says:

"The contents of this book are worthy of its title. What Machiavelli once
claimed for Italy is applied here to Germany. The writer considers all small
political parties powerless; and he hopes for an armed reformer who, with
blood and iron, shall unite Germany, and to whom anything shall be permitted
provided he attain the proposed goal. Powerful and of irresistible
attraction, this man will know how to accomplish such a task."

Frantz tries hard to apply this prophetic description to Bismarck, but does
not Hitler fit this picture much more accurately than Bismarck? Besides, the
ideal of a man devoting himself exclusively to the Gennan cause, to whom "anyt
hing shall be permitted," is much older than Bollmann's prediction, and even
older than the "Prince" of Machiavelli, to whom Bollmann and Frantz credited
this figure. This is the "man" of whom Heine spoke (see pages 337-40): "the
man whom the German people await, the man who will bring to them the life and
happiness they have so long hoped for in their dreams." This is a purely
Teutonic conception, as we shall see, at least 700 years old. In the course
of centuries it has had numerous ramifications, so that it has become rooted
in the spirit and subconscious mind of the German people. Later it was
considered a Prussian conception. Small wonder, then, that Hitler in his
uncompromising brutal attitude of the "savage ideal" should have evoked such
response in the hearts of the Germans.

Prussians by Adoption

The fact that Hider is not Prussian by birth does not prevent his being the
"ideal Prussian." The most ardent Prussians were not born in Prussia, for
Prussianism is first of all a state of mind and a special way of thinking
shaped over centuries, and to which men of diverse origins have felt strongly
attracted. We have seen that Treitschke, that fervent Prussian, was by birth
part Saxon and part Czech. Fichte, who placed his philosophy at the service
of Prussianism, also came from Saxony. Hegel, another great philosopher who
recognized his "ideal State" in Prussia, was south-German by birth, and
Houston Chamberlain, famous theorist of the Prussian school, was of English
origin.

Hitler's Prussian inclinations were not restricted to the realm of theory. He
opened the way to power for himself in 1932 and 1933 when, with the help of
von Papen, he concluded an effective alliance with the powerful Prussian
forces directing Germany's affairs under various guises. From that time on
this agitator, who had until then been taken seriously only in internal
German politics, became a veritable world threat.

While Nazism, as a truly demagogic movement in its early days in Munich, was
making noisy attacks on all existing power, including the power of Berlin, it
provided a certain spiritual nourishment to thousands of frustrated German
souls, who appreciated such talk. But from the day when Hitler concluded his
alliance with the Prussian Junker leaders, Nazism became a front for
Prussianism and entered into systematic planning for conquest of world power.
>From that time on, Nazism became a most threatening reality for all other
countries. We must, however, never forget the forces hiding behind this
movement, forces which we shall attempt to expose.

Prussia Ueber Alles

Christianity, and humanitarianism which it inspires, believe in the supremacy
of the human personality and the "Rights of Man." All Western ethics are
based on this belief. Prussianism, however, admits only the supremacy of the
State, to which it demands absolute submission of the individual, at the
expense of his liberty, his private interests and his personal well being.
General von Bernhardi summarized this idea thus: "There is, as Fichte has
taught us, but one virtue, to forget about oneself as a person; and but one
vice; to think of oneself. In the final analysis, the State is bearer of all
culture, and as such she has the right to claim for herself the individual
strength of her citizens."

According to the Prussian theory, the State itself is nothing but power, and
the individual must do everything to contribute toward the infinite increase
of this power. No attempt is made to define the State, nor to explain why it
has the right to this absolute submission of its citizens. The theory is
offered as a sort of dogma, belief in which forms the very essence of
Prussian welfare.

      States are forged by the fire and blood of wars of conquest. Great and
powerful countries gain possession of the weak, and these weak countries can
only disappear. War, consequently, is not only inevitable, but forms the very
basis of the State's ethics. For specialists in Prussian theology the
validity of reasons for which wars are waged does not matter. They readily
admit that wars waged by Prussian kings may have had no legal bases. What
matters is that these wars contributed to territorial gains and increased
Prussian power. Christian morality, fundamental to legal concept, may be
tolerated for private relationships, and for maintaining social equilibrium,
but as for the State itself, the latter determines its own ethical laws.

Under the cloak of this "ethics of the State," everything which according to
traditional moral conceptions would be severely condemned, is excusable and
even laudable if it is done in the interests of the State: broken pledges,
alliances and friendships negated, treaties disregarded, and whatever is
considered a "lie" by ordinary human beings. The entire technique later
applied by Hitler, which is ably analyzed by Francis Hackett and by Raoul de
Roussy de Sales in their works based on Mein Kampf and Hitler's speeches, had
already been outlined by this school of thought.

    The evidence offered by authors of the Prussian school to support their
contention that Prussia, more than any other country, merits such an
impressive future is extremely vague. Often the evidence is of a cultural
nature; they attempt to demonstrate that Prussia (or "Germany," understood as
a Ger-many dominated by Prussia) could contribute much more to world
civilization than any other country. But most often, instead of proof, a sort
of "realistic philosophy" is suggested as sufficient: Prussia has known how
to extend her domain through victorious wars at the expense of other nations;
therefore she seems to have been chosen by Providence to continue in this
direction. And since, in the final reckoning, a single State is destined to
dominate all the others, these German thinkers (expressing an entirely
personal point of view, and vouchsafing no explanation) conclude that it may
just as well be a German state which assumes this role. But, they say,
Prussia alone has shown throughout history that she has the strength or, if
one prefers, the ruthlessness to bend other German people to her will.

"Let us, then, rally round her flag," say Fichte, Treitschke and all the
other super-Prussians born in different parts of Germany. ("Let us ally
ourselves with her," says Hitler.) "Let us," they agree, "help her seize
power in Germany, and this Prussianized Germany will one day succeed in
conquering the world."

pps. 3 -25
-----
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All My Relations.
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Amen.
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