an excerpt from: Treason's Peace Howard Watson Armbruster�1947 A Crossroads Press Book Beechurst Press New York 438 pps. -- First/Only Edition -- Out-of Print ----- CHAPTER XVII Alibis and Excuses FRANK A. HOWARD, who conducted so many of the negotiations with Farben, wrote his Standard Oil colleague E. J. Sadler, on February 6, 1940, that Germany's policy for fifteen years had been the exporting of patent rights, "resulting from their learning that, if they did not . . . secure their exploitation. abroad by appropriate deals, un-licensed competition would pirate the new processes, leaving the originators neither an export market nor anything to sell in the way of patent rights or technique." This comment illustrates the absurdity of the alibi that our industrialists entered into illegal agreements with Farben because they were farsighted and, had they not done so, the United States would not have derived the great benefits from the Farben patents covering dyes, drugs, explosives, magnesium alloys, rayon, synthetic rubber, plastics, etc. These disingenuous sophistries have been broadcast most assiduously by Farben's American cohorts since the exposure of the character of their agreements, and the resulting injury to our national defense. Possibly the most widely publicized of these excuses was the so-called official press release already discussed in Chapter IX which was prepared by Tommy Corcoran and issued over the signature of Attorney General Biddle. This remarkable apology for a convicted corporation contains these words: Under this agreement (with Farben) many new and important discoveries in the pharmaceutical field were disclosed to Winthrop Chemical, thus making them available to the United States. Another bit of excuse propaganda is found in one of the pamphlets distributed in 1942 by Standard Oil, quoting allegations made by its president, W. S. Farish: . . . whether (or not) the several contracts made with I.G. did or did not fall within the borders set by the patent statutes or the Sherman Act, they did inure greatly to the advance of American industry and, more than any one thing, have made possible our present war activities in aviation gaso-line, toluol and explosives, and in synthetic rubber itself. However, it is apparent that Farben's United States patents would have been valueless to the Germans had not agreements for their use�legal or illegal�been made with our industrialists. Otherwise, the patents could only have served as a means of preventing manufacture; and as such they would have constituted so glaring a repetition of German cartel practices prior to World War I that the inevitable result would have been a change in our patent laws. On the other hand, should Farben have refrained from taking out patents in this country, its new processes would have been available to our industries here as rapidly as they were revealed�when the patents were issued in Germany, and published. Farben's leaders knew all this, their American partners knew it, and the Government knew it. Nevertheless, the illegal unions were made and consummated. The Justice Department and the Congress twiddled its thumbs, and when our so-innocent industrialists asked for the know-bow on some of the more important German patents they were told that it was "Withheld for military reasons." One appeal to public opinion issued by DuPont on January 6, 1944, in part, was as follows: Surely it cannot be the policy of the Department of justice to attempt to prevent the continuance of such immensely beneficial arrangements which have been a common practice in American industry. This plea referred to the announcement that another antitrust action had been filed involving DuPont; in this instance with the British Imperial Chemical Industries and the DuPont subsidiary, Remington Arms, also named as defendants. This statement was cleverly phrased; it contained allegations that the agreements had never been concealed and that . . . copies have been in the possession of Governmental agencies for approximately 10 years. All this was unquestionably true. The same statement was repeated in DuPont's next annual report, but what may appear to have been an unfortunate omission, in each instance, was any mention of the fact that some of the restrictive agreements referred to in this antitrust action involved not only the British I.C.I. but also included tie-ups and financial partnerships with I.G. Farben subsidiaries making and distributing both commercial and military explosives. It was by repetitious publicity of this character that DuPont escaped much of the press criticism that was heaped upon some of the others who were not involved in as many court actions for conspiring with Farben as was this oldest and largest of American munition makers. DuPont's public relations, since 1936, were handled by Herbert Hoover's former White House Secretary, the late Theodore G. Joslin, until he died in April 1944. Mr. Joslin knew his way around Washington and Newspaper Row. His public relations department contributed numerous terse press handouts, and, along with DuPont's elaborate radio program, "Cavalcade of America" contributed effectively to the appeasement of public opinion. This publicity featured denials that duPont "ever has been a party to any cartel arrangement, using the term in its usually accepted sense," or that the company ever had "any connection with the German company (Farben) of a nature detrimental to the United States." These denials may be considered merely as expressions of opinion�with the duPont definitions of the words cart el and detrimental still at issue. However one of the duPont radio pleas incurred an official rebuke from the Federal Communications Commission, which, in a report issued in March 1946, criticized that company as using "its commercial advertising period" to "explain one side of a controversial issue." The comments which were thus criticized were sandwiched in with interesting references to "Better Things for Better Living Through Chemistry" in a broadcast in January, 1944, during a period in which some hostile press comments were appearing relating to court actions which involved Farben's ties with duPont. The broadcast was a vigorous protest that the duPont agreements with I.C.I. had been of great benefit to the American people and to the war effort. Also naming numerous products which, it was admitted, duPont chemists had improved but which "came originally from abroad." Again Farben was not named although vague references were made to continental European companies, and mention of synthetic nitrogen and ammonia, plastics, rayon, dyes and cellophane may have caused listeners to believe that many vital products which in reality had been made in this country since the days of the first world war were actually the result of the benevolences which I.C.I. and the unnamed European companies had contributed to America during the recent pre-war period. There was a defiant note of challenge in these duPont statements which ignored any suggestion that the benefits thus alleged could have been secured equally well without any questionable tie-ups with I.G. Farben. And little was said about those instances where, as will be revealed in the next chapter, the duPont company pleaded nolo contendere, or agreed to a consent decree in cases involving Farben tie-ups. >From across the Atlantic, Lord Harry McGowan, chairman of I. C. I. made several contributions to a friendly duPont press, with statements cabled through the press associations which termed such charges against his company "iniquitous.* The noble lord declared that the cooperation between I. C. I. and duPont had been beneficial to both the United States and Britain, and formed a good pattern for post-war international agreements. In debate in the English House of Lords, both Lord McGowan, and Lord Melchett, another I. C. I. director, on occasion shouted defiance at the United States Department of justice regarding the numerous instances in which I. C. I. was accused with duPont of tie-ups with Farben. Lord McGowan ridiculed as innuendo the news items which had appeared in the American press indicating improprieties in any such relationships. He boasted that I. C. I. "is. not indicted" for any breach of American law (which was hardly accurate) and had not "done anything to be ashamed of," (which, being a lord, may have been true). Finally he announced that it would be time enough for the House of Lords to ponder the matter of Farben when and if Parliament should enact legislation against such relations. Undoubtedly the news and editorial comment in the American press which stressed duPont's relations with our British allies, the I. C. I., rather than the tie-ups with the German enemy, I.G. Farben, tended to soften public opinion towards duPont. That company's greatest triumph in public relations belongs in the next chapter. In 1941, when Sterling began getting hostile criticism in the press, a public-relations firm with special training to correct just such unfortunate situations was engaged. Baldwin, Beech, & Mermey, of New York City, was given the task�a happy choice, as this was the outfit which had been selling the public the idea that a rejuvenated McKesson & Robbins, under many of the same old directors, was rid of all taint and odor of the fraud and criminal activities of its erstwhile guiding spirit, Donald (Musica) Coster. A glance at the earlier record of the firm of Baldwin, Beech, & Mermey indicates that its qualifications for the job were also well founded on experience which Mr. William Baldwin and Mr. Maurice Mermey had when they were retained in the late 20's to sweeten publicity in favor of a low tariff on sugar imports from Cuba. In this case the sweetening came from the Hershey Co., the Coca Cola Co., and an organization known as the American Bottlers Association. According to testimony given by Messrs. Baldwin and Mermey before the Caraway Lobby Committee in 1930, some rather weird methods were utilized in order to induce favorable publicity, called 'legitimate news," some of which might indicate animosity in Cuba towards the United States. Commenting on the evidence, Senator Robinson accused Baldwin and Mermey of: Arranging to have cartoons published in these Latin-American newspapers, inflaming the sentiment against the United States. (Farben would have liked that as much as the sugar people.) So on the record, Baldwin, Beech & Mermey was well qualified to inject some sweetness and light into the sourness of the Sterling reputation. Its task was not an easy one, and, unhappily, news items continued to come out of Washington which were reminders of the close personal relations, between the Sterling executives and the leaders of Farben. However, the agile press agents got to work and Sterling soon got some publicity which paid unqualified tribute to its reformation and to its executive personnel, especially Messrs. McClintock, Rogers, and James Hill, Jr., who represented the old regime as well as the new. Two New York publications which gave space to favorable mention of Sterling (in February 1942) were The American Business Survey, a sheet devoted to articles praising various companies and individuals, and Printers Ink, long established organ of the advertising and publishing business. The articles in both of these publications praised the new Sterling set up. Pr inters Ink also praised its past and, rather oddly, appeared to credit Sterling with having secured for the medical profession such remedies as Salvarsan, Novocain and Luminal, all of which, it may be recalled, were introduced in the United States long before Sterling supposedly had any tie-ups with the Germans. American Business Survey talked about the "Monroe Doctrine puissant" and "cultural coordination" between the United States and Latin Americans induced by Sterling's anti-German drug drive. It was pretty bad. Reprints from both of these publications were distributed gratis, and with apparent liberality, but as none of the dodgers were handed to me, I called at the office of The American Business Survey to secure a copy. Only one individual was visible in the office�a zealous gent who wanted to quote me prices on lots of a hundred or more. I got my copy, thanked him, and left. A few weeks later the Federal Trade Commission lit on the interesting "Survey' publication as a fake. Another disingenuous publicity stunt by which Sterling attempted to live down its Farben relations was the free distribution through druggists and doctors of thousands of copies of a booklet entitled "Footprints of the Trojan Horse," which was originally published as a warning against fifth-column activities in the United States. This time it was handed out in the name of "The Bayer Company, Inc., makers of Bayer Aspirin." It was a strange book for Sterling to circulate in the year 1942. When the adverse publicity of 1941 got under way, the trade and industrial press did everything in its power to convince the public that Sterling, Standard Oil, and other Farben affiliates had done nothing wrong in making tie-ups with the Germans, and that in any event the results had been beneficial to the United States. This was merely following the line of indirect apology that for many years had been held to in such journals as Chem ical and Metallurgical Engineering, the McGraw Hill publication long accepted as authoritative in the industries. For example, back in May 1929, this publication had lauded the formation of the American I.G. Chemical Corp., and belittled its critics as hysterical. Again, in April 1942 its editorial made the preposterous accusation that it was Thurman Arnold's prosecution of Farben affiliates that had obstructed our national defense supplies of magnesium, Buna rubber, and other strategic materials. In normal news channels Sterling fared a bit better than Standard Oil, possibly because it escaped the Truman and Bone Committee inquiries.. These inquiries went sufficiently deep into Standard's relations with Farben to cause -its president, at that time, the late W. S. Farish, to attempt a public defense before both committees. Much of Mr. Farish's testimony was devoted to denials of the accusations that Standard had delayed synthetic rubber production in this country. This allegation, he stated before the Truman Committee, "has not a shadow of foundation." However, Mr. Farish appeared unable to explain, even to his own satisfaction, the long delay in getting the Buna program started. "I don't know what has caused the delay" he said at one point. In the ensuing discussion of the delayed rubber program, Senator Connally, old Texas colleague of Mr. Farish, contributed this gem of official explanation and foresight: We were hopeful that we wouldn't lose the Dutch East Indies and hopeful that we wouldn't lose Malaya . . . Who-ever, if any one, did it (caused the delay) was probably act-ing through motives they thought were wise and good mo-tives. Before the Bone Committee, Mr. Farish assumed an aggressive attitude and denounced the case which had been presented against Standard as "one sided." Senator Bone retorted hotly that he was fed up with that kind of defense from big outfits like Standard. When Mr. Farish alleged that Standard's relationship with Farben was severed by the so-called Hague agreement in 1939, be was forced to admit that there was still in existence a carry-over understanding subject to later adjustment (which means, of course, after the war). Mr. Farish then started to enlarge upon the thesis that "All of you know now of the enormous advantages to the public Of our contracts with I.G. Farben." Challenged on this one by Mr. Creekmore Fath, Mr. Farish replied plaintively, "We are human beings. In 1927 we could not foresee 1942." So it was made to appear that the master minds running the world's largest industrial organization, with agents in every country, never even suspected that a war was in the making. As examples of the enormous advantages to America that had been brought about by the Farben partnership agreements, Mr. Farish listed the original process for producing 100 percent octane gasoline; the method of making synthetic toluol, the basic ingredient of TNT; and Paratone, an improvement in lubricating oils for planes, tanks and ships. These generous tokens of Farben's. esteem sounded good to some of the Senators-until three of Mr. Farish's assistants gave their testimony. It then appeared that the products named by Standard's president bad been perfected not by Farben, but by Standard Oil's own research men. An item of rather unfavorable publicity also developed when Professor Hunter, of the justice Department, told the Bone Committee that five Standard officials had made deliberate misstatements. Some of the discussion that followed was so heated that it was expunged from the record. Standard's efforts before the Senate Committees to excuse or vindicate its relations with Farben were supplemented with numerous press releases and circulars�the latter distributed from filling stations and at employes' meetings. Informal talks before gatherings of all-kinds were also in order. Robert Haslam, elected vice-president of Standard Oil and in charge of public relations, contributed vigorous articles and letters to the press defending his company's relations with Farben against what he termed sensational, unsubstantiated charges which painted a false and distorted picture. One Haslam article, which appeared in the Petroleum Times of London, England, on December 25, 1943, struck fire in an unexpected quarter-no other than the headquarters of Farben at Frankfurt, Germany (although this effect was not known in the United States until the war ended). Mr. Haslam alleged in this article that secrets brought to America from Germany had turned into mighty weapons against Germany. He then mentioned the same three developments which had been cited by Mr. Farish before the Bone Committee; high octane gasoline; toluol; and Paratone as having been secured from Farben. Apparently he did not remember that he was one of the three Standard scientists who, to the Senate Committee, had indicated opinions that Standard, rather than Farben, had actually developed these processes. Mr. Haslam's article likewise indicated that America got Buna rubber from Farben. It did not take long for the Haslam alibi to get through to Germany, whereupon Farben's chief counsel, Dr. August von Knieriem, put his own experts to work picking flaws in the Haslarn thesis�with counter-claims that it was Farben and not Standard, that had all the best of it in the pre-war horse trading. Many valuable contributions, said the Farben boys, were received as result of their contracts with the Americans-including lead-tetra-ethyl (gasoline); polymerization; improved lubricants; and finally, that it was through friendly relations with Standard that Farben had purchased large reserve stocks of aviation gasoline and lubricating oils for the German government just before the war. As for Iso-octane, said the Farben experts, Standards research men bad recognized that long before they had any knowledge of the Farben process�and it was Farben that got the best of the exchange of ideas on that item. And regarding toluol, the report went on, Mr. Haslam's talk of a miracle was all bunk. According to the Frankfurt technicians, Standard did not use Farben's process as it already had all the toluol methods it needed. On Oppanol, or Paratone, again it was Standard's improvements that helped Farben. The retort on Buna rubber was emphatic�Farben didn't give Standard anything important to war economy, and whatever may have been revealed in the patents America could have procured without any agreements-as enemy patents in war time. Altogether, the Farben boys appeared to have shot Mr. Haslam's alibi and that of Mr. Farish full of holes. It will be recalled, too, that in Chapter XIV, Farben's Dr. Loehr admitted that his company had undermined the military potential of the United States through its connections with Standard. However, the Haslam-Farish versions had wide circulation in the United States, and the Farben retorts did not. The result of Standard's publicity was a lessening of criticism. Other things, however, may have contributed. It was stated by Walter Winchell that in May 1942 a news broadcaster for CBS had been effectively silenced on the Truman and Bone Committees exposes. This man had included in the script of his broadcast mention of the accusations that Standard intended to resume ties with Farben when the war ended. The CBS censor killed the item and, it was reported, told the radio newsmen to "go easy on Standard, you know we carry plenty of their business." Harry S Truman, while still a Senator, paralleled that revealing incident with a public accusation that Standard, with huge government contracts, was advertising at taxpayer's expense to counteract the fact that its tie-ups with Farben had materially retarded the development of synthetic rubber in America. The 1942 and 1943 stockholder's meetings of Standard at Flemington, N. J., were the occasions of spirited defense speeches by its executives. At both of these meetings a committee of minority stockholders, ably led by one William Floyd, II, and his attorney, Amos S. Basel, proposed queries and resolutions which appeared to embarrass mightily the Standard defenders. At the 1942 meeting Messrs. Floyd and Basel attempted in vain to put through a resolution requiring the Standard executives to answer "fully and adequately" the Senate Committee accusations. At the 1943 and 1944 meetings they tried again, unsuccessfully, to get Standard on record that it would not resume cartel relations with I.G. Farben after the war, unless the Government should desire it to do so. At the 1943 meeting President Ralph Gallagher, who had succeeded to that office at the death of Mr. Farish, made the fantastic assertion that Standard "never had any cartel agreement with I.G. Farben." He then declined to reply to a question as to whether or not the Farben contracts would come into existence again when the war was over. Senator Kilgore, on the morning of the 1944 meeting, issued a statement at Washington calling attention to Standard's reluctance to make any commitment on post-war cartels. At the meeting Mr. Basel, raising his voice above the uproar which arose whenever he pressed the Standard-Farben issue, quoted the substance of the Kilgore remarks. Whereupon Mr. Haslam, his ire aroused, demanded that Mr. Basel read the entire statement. "I will," replied the speaker, "if these people will keep quiet." The claque, for once, subsided. James Gerard, Ambassador to Germany in the first World War and financier of the Democratic National Committee, defended Standard's leaders at all of these meetings. In 1942 Gerard quoted Leviticus about the priest and the goat. In 1943 Mr. Gerard's contribution was of more serious import. Said he: I can assure you that some of us who are thinking over what is to happen after the war are contemplating universal cartels, and it may be that our own government will tell or even order our management to join some international cartel. At the 1943 Standard Oil meeting, approval was voted to a proposal of the directors to transfer permanently to the United States all of the Buna rubber patents. There were, of course, certain provisions, but it was good publicity' only a comparatively few people knew that under the terms of the 1942 consent decrees Standard had already been forced to throw open its Buna patents, and that the Alien Property Custodian had already seized title to all of the Farben United States patents which allegedly had been transferred to Standard-after the war started. While I did not attend the 1943 meeting, I did go to the one in 1942�as proxy for a stockholder, and asked just one question: Mr. Farish, would you or the other officers of the company desire to state to this meeting the date when you first -became convinced or suspicious that the activities of the German I.G. Farben in its relationship to Standard Oil of New Jersey were hostile to the national security of the United States? Mr. Farish, after some quibbling, declined to reply. "I don't think the question is proper," he said. So this challenge, which must go pretty close to the root of the matter, remains unanswered by Standard. Neither does it appear that the executives of duPont, Alcoa, Sterling' or any of the other Farben affiliates have ever stated the date when they first suspected that Farben's intentions might be hostile to the national security of their country. And yet this might seem to be a fair question-one which any man would desire to answer. pps. 313-324 ----- Aloha, He'Ping, Om, Shalom, Salaam. Em Hotep, Peace Be, All My Relations. Omnia Bona Bonis, Adieu, Adios, Aloha. Amen. Roads End <A HREF="http://www.ctrl.org/">www.ctrl.org</A> DECLARATION & DISCLAIMER ========== CTRL is a discussion & informational exchange list. Proselytizing propagandic screeds are unwelcomed. Substance�not soap-boxing�please! 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