---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2000 07:35:03 -0400
From: ML/NJ <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
I've had a look at the info posted on the Web.
I've never had any doubt that JFKjr flew beyond his capabilities
and so caused his own death, so I'm not surprised by the NTSB
conclusion.
But reading all (or a lot) of their material leads me to believe
that they sugar-coated some of the information so that JFKjr
wouldn't appear to have been a complete a$$#01e.
The following is taken directly from the report with my comments
in brackets.
PILOT INFORMATION
The pilot obtained his private pilot certificate for "airplane
single-engine land" in April 1998. He did not possess an
instrument rating. He received a "high performance airplane"
sign-off in his Cessna 182 in June 1998 and a "complex airplane"
sign-off in the accident airplane in May 1999. His most recent
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) second-class medical
certificate was issued on December 27, 1997, with no limitations.
["He received ... a 'complex airplane' sign-off in the accident
airplane in May 1999." This means he had virtually NO
PILOT-IN-COMMAND TIME IN THIS PLANE. The accident occurred on
July 20. He broke his ankle in a hang gliding accident on June
1.]
A copy of the pilot's logbook that covered from October 4, 1982,
to November 11, 1998, was provided to the Safety Board. The
pilot's most recent logbook was not located.
[What they're saying here is that they really don't know much
about his actual experience. Most of this is a guess. There was
no flying between 9/88 and 12/97 so the logbook they have really
only covers one year. Given the fact that he had only one solo
hour - inferred from info below - prior to abandoning flying in
1988, those hours before 12/97 probably weren't of much value to
him.}
The Board used the copied logbook, records
from training facilities, copies of flight instructors' logbooks,
and statements from instructors and pilots to estimate the
pilot's total flight experience. The pilot's estimated total
flight experience, excluding simulator training, was about 310
hours, of which 55 hours were at night. The pilot's estimated
experience flying without a certified flight instructor (CFI) on
board was about 72 hours.
[I think it pretty unusual to have only 72 hours PIC at 250
hours.]
The pilot's estimated flight time in the accident airplane was
about 36 hours, of which 9.4 hours were at night. Approximately 3
hours of that flight time was without a CFI on board, and about
0.8 hour of that time was flown at night, which included a night
landing.
[I'm not sure why the "estimated flight time" is as high as it is
given that they guess that he only had three hours PIC. I wonder
if they counted the last 1.5 hours as part of the three. Three
hours is about what he would log for a routine round trip between
CDW and MVY, but it's hard for me to believe that his first PIC
time wasn't local.]
In the 15 months before the accident, the pilot had flown about
35 flight legs either to or from the Essex County/Teterboro, New
Jersey, area and the Martha's Vineyard/Hyannis, Massachusetts,
area. The pilot flew over 17 of these legs without a CFI on
board, including at least 5 at night. The pilot's last known
flight in the accident airplane without a CFI on board was on May
28, 1999.
[Last, or only? This is almost two months before the accident.]
Pilot Training
On October 4, 1982, the pilot started receiving flight
instruction. Over the next 6 years, he flew with six different
CFIs. During this period, the pilot logged 47 hours, consisting
of 46 hours of dual instruction and 1 hour without a CFI on
board. The pilot made no entries in his logbook from September
1988 to December 1997.
[This is the "abandoned flying" that I made reference to above.]
In December 1997, the pilot enrolled in a training program at
Flight Safety International (FSI), Vero Beach, Florida, to obtain
his private pilot certificate. Between December 1997 and April
1998, the pilot flew about 53 hours, of which 43 were flown with
a CFI on board. The CFI who prepared the pilot for his private
pilot checkride stated that the pilot had "very good" flying
skills for his level of experience.
[They're sort of implying a period of continuous training here.
I wonder. Did JFKjr really spend four months in Vero Beach, or
two weeks? I thought when I got my "Private" that the
requirement was for 20 solo hours, so JFKjr's 10 or 11 strikes me
as odd. The instructor's statement is not very encouraging.
What is he going to say, "I signed him off because he was a
Kennedy."?]
On April 22, 1998, the pilot passed his private pilot flight
test. The designated pilot examiner who administered the
checkride stated that as part of the flight test, the pilot
conducted two unusual attitude recoveries. The pilot examiner
stated that in both cases, the pilot recovered the airplane while
wearing a hood and referencing the airplane's flight instruments.
After receiving his private pilot certificate, the pilot flew
solo in his Cessna 182 and received instruction in it by CFIs
local to New Jersey. He also received instruction at Million Air,
a flight school in New Jersey, and flew their airplanes. During
calendar year 1998, the pilot flew approximately 179 hours,
including about 65 hours without a CFI on board. On March 12,
1999, the pilot completed the FAA's written airplane instrument
examination and received a score of 78 percent.
[So they are estimating that he flew seven hours PIC during the
first six months of 1999. Lots of "weekend warriors" have low
times like this, but they don't fly PA-32's.]
On April 5, 1999, the pilot returned to FSI to begin an airplane
instrument rating course. During the instrument training, the
pilot satisfactorily completed the first 12 of 25 lesson plans.
The pilot's primary CFI during the instrument training stated
that the pilot's progression was normal and that he grasped all
of the basic skills needed to complete the course; however, the
CFI did recall the pilot having difficulty completing lesson 11,
which was designed to develop a student's knowledge of very high
frequency omnidirectional radio range (VOR) and nondirectional
beacon operations while working with ATC. It took the pilot four
attempts to complete lesson 11 satisfactorily. After two of the
attempts, the pilot took a 1-week break. After this break, the
pilot repeated lesson 11 two more times. The CFI stated that the
pilot's basic instrument flying skills and simulator work were
excellent. However, the CFI stated that the pilot had trouble
managing multiple tasks while flying, which he felt was normal
for the pilot's level of experience.
[It's strange that they start talking about "lesson plans" here
instead of =hours=. Flying VOR's is something that one learns
while getting a "Private" license. It is true that learning to
fly AND talk to ATC is probably the thing that needs the most
getting used to during instrument training, but still this talk
about four attempts and a "1-week break" is odd.]
The pilot attended this training primarily on weekends. During
this training, the pilot accumulated 13.3 hours of flight time
with a CFI on board. In addition, the pilot logged 16.9 hours of
simulator time. The pilot departed from FSI for the last time on
April 24, 1999.
[Again the "primarily on weekends" statement is strange when
juxtaposed with the mention of a "1-week break." Simulator time
had been excluded previously, but is usually logged.]
The pilot continued to receive flight instruction from CFIs in
New Jersey in his newly purchased Piper Saratoga, the accident
airplane. One CFI flew with the pilot on three occasions. One of
the flights was on June 25, 1999, from CDW to MVY. The CFI stated
that the departure, en route, and descent portions of the flight
were executed in VMC, but an instrument approach was required
into MVY because of a 300-foot overcast ceiling. The CFI
requested an instrument flight rules (IFR) clearance and
demonstrated a coupled instrument landing system (ILS) approach
to runway 24.
["Coupled" means that an autopilot effectively flew the approach,
and the CFI operated the autopilot. I'm not sure why JFKjr
wouldn't have tried to stay on the glideslope if he was serious
about instrument training. The one thing most lacking in my own
instrument training was real Instrument Meteorological
Conditions. Maybe I had five minutes!]
The CFI stated that the pilot performed the landing, but he had
to assist with the rudders because of the pilot's injured ankle.
(For additional information about the pilot's ankle injury, see
Section, "Medical and Pathological Information.") The CFI stated
that the pilot's aeronautical abilities and his ability to handle
multiple tasks while flying were average for his level of
experience.
A second CFI flew with the pilot between May 1998 and July 1999.
This CFI accumulated 39 hours of flight time with the pilot,
including 21 hours of night flight and 0.9 hour flown in
instrument meteorological conditions (IMC). The pilot used this
CFI for instruction on cross-country flights and as a safety
pilot. On July 1, 1999, the CFI flew with the pilot in the
accident airplane to MVY. The flight was conducted at night, and
IMC prevailed at the airport. The CFI stated that, during the
flight, the pilot used and seemed competent with the autopilot.
The instructor added that during the flight the pilot was wearing
a nonplaster cast on his leg, which required the CFI to taxi the
airplane and assist the pilot with the landing.
[And if I had five minutes IMC during my instrument training, I
had significantly less time with an autopilot during that time.
Kennedy may have been logging this time, but it sounds like he
wasn't learning instrument flying and he wasn't the PIC.]
The CFI stated that the pilot had the ability to fly the airplane
without a visible horizon but may have had difficulty performing
additional tasks under such conditions. He also stated that the
pilot was not ready for an instrument evaluation as of July 1,
1999, and needed additional training. The CFI was not aware of
the pilot conducting any flight in the accident airplane without
an instructor on board. He also stated that he would not have
felt comfortable with the accident pilot conducting night flight
operations on a route similar to the one flown on, and in weather
conditions similar to those that existed on, the night of the
accident. The CFI further stated that he had talked to the pilot
on the day of the accident and offered to fly with him on the
accident flight. He stated that the accident pilot replied that
"he wanted to do it alone."
["The CFI was not aware of the pilot conducting any flight in the
accident airplane without an instructor on board." So where did
the estimate of three hours PIC above come from? There is no
logbook. Even three hours seems high now.]
A third CFI flew with the pilot between May 1998 and July 1999.
This CFI accumulated 57 hours of flight time with the pilot,
including 17 hours of night flight and 8 hours flown in IMC. The
pilot also used this instructor for instruction on cross-country
flights and as a safety pilot. This CFI had conducted a "complex
airplane" evaluation on the pilot and signed him off in the
accident airplane in May 1999. According to the CFI, on one or
two occasions, the airplane's autopilot turned to a heading other
than the one selected, which required the autopilot to be
disengaged and then reengaged. He stated that it seemed as if the
autopilot had independently changed from one navigation mode to
another. He also stated that he did not feel that the problem was
significant because it only happened once or twice.
The CFI had made six or seven flights to MVY with the pilot in
the accident airplane. The CFI stated that most of the flights
were conducted at night and that, during the flights, the pilot
did not have any trouble flying the airplane. The instructor
stated that the pilot was methodical about his flight planning
and that he was very cautious about his aviation decision-making.
The CFI stated that the pilot had the capability to conduct a
night flight to MVY as long as a visible horizon existed.
[Lots of instructors! I wonder why. And why are they reporting
the number of hours the CFI accumulated. I didn't even notice
this the first time I read it. These would seem like hours that
JFKjr logged, but maybe not.]
ML/NJ
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Kadosh, Kadosh, Kadosh, YHVH, TZEVAOT
FROM THE DESK OF: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
*Mike Spitzer* <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
~~~~~~~~ <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
The Best Way To Destroy Enemies Is To Change Them To Friends
Shalom, A Salaam Aleikum, and to all, A Good Day.
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