from: http://www.francona.com/ Click Here: <A HREF=3D"http://www.francona.com/">http://www.francona.com/</A= > ----- September 1999=20 Rick Francona=20 American intelligence officer=20 =91I took no joy in the destruction of Iraq=92 US Air Force intelligence officer Rick Francona=91s fluent Arabic led him to= =20 Baghdad as the point man for American support of Iraq during its war with=20 Iran.=A0 His linguistic knowledge later led him to serve as General=20 Schwarzkopf=92s personal interpreter during both the Desert Shield and Deser= t=20 Storm operations. His newly published account of that turbulent period, Ally= =20 to Adversary, is the story of how Iraq, a virtual US ally during its long wa= r=20 with Iran, came to be America=92s foe.=A0 The now retired officer spoke with= =20 Arabies TRENDS=92 Rory Mulholland. =20 =95=A0 While you were based in Baghdad you made friends with many Iraqi=20 officers.=A0 How did you feel when Allied planes began bombing Iraq during=20 Desert Storm?=20 I was disappointed by the abrupt ending of the relationship between the Iraq= i=20 and American armed forces.=A0 Soon after the Iranian acceptance of the Unite= d=20 Nations resolution ending the war in August of 1988, the Iraqis made it clea= r=20 we had nothing more to discuss.=A0 On the other hand, many US policy-makers=20 were glad to see the relationship end, not wanting to be associated any=20 longer with a nation that had used chemical weapons, not only against its=20 enemies, but against its own Kurdish population as well.=20 Over the next two years, I watched with sadness as the relations between Ira= q=20 and the United States continued on a downward spiral.=A0 I felt a sense of=20 dread at the vitriolic rhetoric aimed at Kuwait and Israel in the summer of=20 1990, and observed in disbelief the invasion of Kuwait.=A0 When Desert Storm= =20 opened in January 1991 with the massive air attacks on Baghdad, I knew the=20 military intelligence compound, where I had met with my Iraqi colleagues in=20 1988, was on the target list.=A0 The entire compound was virtually destroyed= in=20 a series of air and missile attacks.=A0 I understood the military decision,=20= but=20 also felt remorse at the certain loss of life among the Iraqi officers,=20 colleagues I had come to know, like and respect.=A0 I took no joy in the=20 destruction.=20 =95=A0 The fact that your book was published by the Naval Institute Press le= ads=20 one to wonder whether your account is a sanitized one.=A0 Did you, or were y= ou=20 obliged to, leave things out?=20 All US intelligence officers, military and civilian, Defense Department or=20 CIA, must sign a secrecy agreement as a condition of access to certain types= =20 of information.=A0 As a former intelligence officer, I submitted the manuscr= ipt=20 to the DOD for a security review as required by the secrecy agreement.=A0 Th= is=20 was required by the agreement, not the publisher.=A0 While the Naval Institu= te=20 Press is affiliated with the Navy, it is an independent, non-profit=20 organization.=A0 That said, the Press was adamant that we follow the letter=20= of=20 the law on the security review.=A0 The review process, with appeals, took ov= er=20 a year to complete.=A0 In the end, I had to remove about 20 pages, mostly=20 dealing with specifics of intelligence operations. =20 =95=A0 Leonard H. Perroots, the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency=20= from=20 1987 to 1989, writes in the introduction that your book counters the myth of= =20 a =93colossal intelligence failure=94 during Desert Storm, but that you=20 nevertheless =93expose the weaknesses of inadequate human intelligence asset= s=20 to complement other intelligence systems. =20 This may seem like a contradiction, but it really is not.=A0 Intelligence=20 consists of technical disciplines and human intelligence.=A0 Overall, lookin= g=20 at the entire intelligence community and its support to the decision-makers=20 in Washington and senior military commanders, it was excellent.=A0 Never bef= ore=20 have we had the quality and quantity of information that we had in Desert=20 Storm.=A0 Most of that information was derived from what we Americans do=20 best=97technology.=A0 Our satellite and electronic intelligence capabilities= are=20 unmatched.=A0 However, we were hindered by the lack of well-placed =93human=20 assets=94 =97 spies, if you will.=A0 While we had excellent information on t= he=20 location and strength of Iraqi forces, we did not know what was going on in=20 Saddam Hussein=92s inner circle. =20 In the intelligence business you work in two areas: capabilities and=20 intentions.=A0 I would say we were excellent at the former, yet only mediocr= e=20 at best on the latter.=A0 For example, after Iraqi forces had seized Kuwait,= we=20 saw reinforcements pour into the country, and no sign of a pullout of the=20 elite Republican Guard.=A0 While we could easily determine that Saddam Husse= in=20 possessed the capability to invade Saudi Arabia, we did not have well-placed= =20 human sources in Baghdad to tell us if he was actually going to continue=20 south into kingdom.=A0 Since this was a coalition effort, there was a lot of= =20 intelligence sharing that took place.=A0 That process was centered in the=20 Coalition Coordination, Communications, and Integration Center in Riyadh. =20 While we have for years had intelligence arrangements with the NATO=20 countries, and here I am speaking primarily of the United Kingdom and France= ,=20 this was the first in-depth exposure we had to Saudi intelligence.=A0 As wit= h=20 many Middle East nations, the intelligence apparatus is more focused on=20 regime protection and counter-intelligence rather than the acquisition of=20 information on foreign military capabilities and intentions. =20 =95=A0 You also served as the personal interpreter for General Schwarzkopf.= =A0 What=20 did you make of the man? =20 To me, General Schwarzkopf was always fair.=A0 You have to understand that h= e=20 was a four-star general, the commander in chief of deployed US forces.=A0 I=20= was=20 at that time a major. I performed a specific function for him. He made it=20 clear what he expected, and I delivered. I have seen him be pretty intense=20 with senior staff officers. He had a reputation for having a bad temper.=20 Fortunately, I was never the target of it. As for his relations with the Ara= b=20 officers and leaders =97 they loved him. He was what they needed at the time= : a=20 tough, imposing American general who exuded confidence and competence. =20 =95=A0 Can you tell us briefly about your =91=91no-nonsense=92=92 words to t= he the Iraqi=20 generals in the meeting at Safwan after Baghdad=92s defeat and how they came= to=20 be broadcast on CNN?=20 Humorous as I look back, but not my finest hour.=A0 We had arrived at Safwan= =20 early that morning via helicopter from Kuwait City.=A0 The flight over the=20 fields of hundreds of burning oil wells was sobering.=A0 At about 11:30 a.m.= , I=20 was told to report to General Schwarzkopf immediately.=A0 I saw an obviously= =20 irritated General Schwarzkopf awaiting the Iraqi delegation.=A0 General Khal= id=20 had not yet arrived and Schwarzkopf was growing impatient.=A0 He looked at m= e,=20 and said, =91OK, Rick, here=92s how I want this to go.=A0 When the Iraqis ar= rive, I=20 want you to go out there and find out who is in charge and have him get out=20 of his vehicle.=A0 Then I want you to point to me and explain to him that I=20= am=20 unarmed and that everyone will be searched before entering the tent.=A0 I wi= ll=20 remove my weapons at that time.=A0 Escort him over here and we will begin.= =92=20 As I walked out, I saw the Iraqi vehicle moving toward me.=A0 I waved to the= =20 Iraqi driver to stop, and walked over to the passenger side, where I saw Lt.= =20 Gen. Sultan Hashim Ahmad Al-Jabburi.=A0 I opened his door several inches and= =20 said in standard Arabic, =91Good morning, sir.=A0 I am Major Francona from=20 General Schwarzkopf=92s staff.=A0 If you will step out of the car, I will ta= ke=20 you to meet the general and we can begin.=92=20 I was not aware of anything else going on around me.=A0 Unknown to me, a CNN= =20 crew had just trained a long-distance parabolic microphone on me and now had= =20 my voice live, but had just missed my polite greeting to General Sultan=20 Hashim.=A0 The Iraqi general merely glared at me.=A0 So here I am, standing=20 unarmed beside an Iraqi army jeep, two Iraqi generals within three feet, an=20 already irritated General Schwarzkopf was waiting for me, and the world=20 watching on CNN.=A0 I was getting concerned and a bit agitated.=A0 I had not= used=20 any Arabic words that could have been misunderstood.=A0 It had already been=20= a=20 long day, it was far from over, and I already had a splitting headache.=A0 I= =20 leaned closer and gruffly said the Arabic slang equivalent of, =91Get out of= =20 the car, jerk.=92=A0 To my surprise, and relief, he smirked, pushed open the= door=20 and got out.=20 As we walked to where General Schwarzkopf was standing, the Iraqi asked me,=20 =91So, which one is Schwarzkopf?=92=A0 I was somewhat surprised, since I ass= umed=20 that anyone who was vaguely aware of recent events in the Middle East would=20 have recognized the imposing figure with four stars on his hat.=20 =95=A0 What do you do to keep busy in your retirement? =20 I am so busy in retirement that I am not sure how I ever had time to work!= =A0=20 Right now almost everything I do is related to publicizing the book.=A0 I sp= eak=20 to local civic groups, professional associations, colleges and universities=20 and do book signings.=A0 This fall, I will be traveling across the country o= n a=20 book promotion tour.=A0 I am also the editor for Middle East politics for an= =20 e-zine, Suite101.com.=A0 Additionally, I serve on my city=92s planning commi= ssion=20 and on the county board that reviews local government handling of child=20 welfare cases. ----- Aloha, He'Ping, Om, Shalom, Salaam. 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