from: http://www.citypaper.net/articles/072700/cs.cover1.shtml Click Here: <A HREF="http://www.citypaper.net/articles/072700/cs.cover1.shtml">The Dominican Connection</A> ----- Related articles: A Pattern Emerges �Jim Barry "We never asked anybody to do anything wrong" �Howard Altman July 27�August 3, 2000 cover story The Dominican Connection photo: Trevor DixonIn 1995 a local narcotics squad warned the CIA that a Dominican political party was raising campaign funds in Philadelphia through sales of heroin and coke. Now the investigators� careers are in ruins. What happened? by Howard Altman and Jim Barry First of a Two-Part Series October 20, 1995 was a big day in the lives of State Attorney General narcotics investigator John McLaughlin and his crew. That�s the day they stopped two Dominican nationals in North Philadelphia and began to learn how cocaine and heroin were being pumped into Philly to help fund a candidate for the presidency of the Dominican Republic. Eventually, McLaughlin and the other members of the Bureau of Narcotics Investigations and Drug Control (BNI) would learn how the DEA had its own investigations into similar drug-funded campaign financing operations in New York and New England. They would discover that the CIA was fully aware that the U.S.-embassy-backed candidate was suspected of drug smuggling. The BNI also would learn that some Dominican political party members under investigation for narco-trafficking and money laundering wound up contributing thousands at a September 1996 New York State Democratic Committee fundraiser attended by Al Gore. Then, two weeks after BNI�s thwarted attempt to seize more than a half-million dollars in allegedly drug-tainted campaign funds from the Dominican presidential candidate, who was on a fundraising trip to the States, federal and local prosecutors said they would no longer work with McLaughlin or his team. After uncovering the Dominican Connection, McLaughlin found that, like other officers around the country, there was a complete shutdown of his investigations by prosecutors, who accused him and his partners of lying and conducting illegal searches and seizures. Like other officers around the country who found their investigations thwarted after encountering Dominican drug dealers, McLaughlin and crew eventually sued law enforcement � in this case their employer, the State Attorney General�s Office, and their chief doubter, the U.S. Attorney�s Office. The suit was filed after two separate investigations � one by a top deputy AG and one a federal grand jury probe by the FBI� found McLaughlin and his squad guilty of no crimes or misconduct. The path finders: BNI narcotics investigator John "Sparky" McLaughlin in the Nissan Pathfinder his unit seized from a drug suspect.Earlier this month, a Third District Court of Appeals judge ruled that McLaughlin, Charlie Micewski and Dennis McKeefery � barring intervention by the U.S. Supreme Court � can have their day in court. What follows is a depiction of events leading up to that lawsuit pieced together from thousands of pages of federal and local court documents, internal memos from local, state and federal law enforcement agencies, confidential CIA, State Department and Interpol documents and McLaughlin�s personal diary. By the fall of �95, John "Sparky" McLaughlin had already had a very interesting career in law enforcement when he came upon two Dominican gentlemen standing near a blue Oldsmobile 88 outside of a tire store at the corner of American and Somerset, the crossroads of Philadelphia�s narcotics pipelines. The Bastard Squad�s organizational chart of PRD at the time of Pena Gomez� candidacy.The 42-year-old narcotics investigator for the State Attorney General�s Office had worked his way up from patrolman in the Philadelphia Police Department�s 17th District to Highway Patrol to the Bureau of Narcotics Investigation and Drug Control, which was always referred to simply as the BNI, because, face it, there�s not much you can do to control drugs. Those who knew McLaughlin say that the day he signed on with the bureau the gruff, fu-manchued ball buster was as happy as a cop can get. It did not take long for Sparky to get a reputation, both in the bureau and the barrio. McLaughlin and his longtime buddy Charlie Micewski, a tall, gaunt, balding version of Gary Cooper, made a formidable team. They became part of a unit that confiscated tens of millions of dollars worth of cheap, highly pure cocaine and heroin that was flooding into Philly from Colombia via the Dominican Republic. Day after day, hour after hour, they rode around North Philly and Kensington in a big blue Pathfinder seized from dealers, blaring Clapton�s "Cocaine" and Glenn Frey�s "Smuggler�s Blues" before making arrests. Working a dozen hours a day, sometimes more, McLaughlin was a fixture in the largely Latino community, where people called him Callahan because they couldn�t pronounce McLaughlin. For all the drugs and guns they seized, for all the dealers arrested, McLaughlin and the boys had their problems as well. A number of their cases were overturned because judges didn�t believe them, or defense attorneys raised enough doubts about the context of he-said-she-said situations narcotics officers wind up in. It was an interesting career indeed. And it would only get more so on October 20, 1995. The more busts McLaughlin and the BNI made, the more investigators discovered that Dominicans were gaining a larger share of Philly�s coke and heroin distribution. And that many of the dealers were in this country illegally. Which is why, on this day, McLaughlin and Micewski were traveling around the barrio with Special Agent Barry Steward of the INS. What sparked Sparky�s interest, according to BNI investigative files and McLaughlin�s personal diaries obtained by City Paper, were the Dominicans and the car. As Dominican drug trafficking organizations gained a greater share of the coke and heroin distribution market, the Olds 88 was becoming the trafficking vehicle of choice, because the big hulking cars could be easily fitted with secret compartments used to smuggle dope into Philly. Suspicious of both the car and its former occupants, McLaughlin, who was parked around the corner, radioed Harry Fernandez, a bilingual Philadelphia Housing Authority cop on loan to BNI, and told him to take a walk and listen to what the Dominican gentlemen were saying. Fernandez, nicknamed Pineapple by BNI members, ambled over, listened a bit and reported back. "Spark, they are real nervous," said Fernandez. "They�re saying they hope you don�t stop them because the one guy is illegal." That�s all McLaughlin needed to hear. He and Steward walked over to the Dominicans. "Hola, amigos," said McLaughlin. "Tiene su identification?" There was no reply. "Baaaary, they don�t want to play," McLaughlin whined, in mock annoyance. "That�s because you spoke to him in Spanish, Spark," said Steward. "Watch this." Steward turned to the Dominicans and spoke very bluntly in English. "I�m from Immigration and Naturalization and you�re on a plane in the next 24 hours if you don�t give me some ID." With that, Daniel Croussett reached into the Olds and produced his alien registration card. Life of the party: PRD director of communications and public relations Daniel Croussett, identified by the Bastard Squad as the local PRD member "responsible for collecting funds for the campaign of Jose Pena Gomez." Croussett was never charged with any crimes in the BNI investigation."See, Spark, I spoke the universal language, AIRPLANE," said Steward. Jose Primivito Liriano-Ortega, who was in this country illegally, was not nearly as lucky as Croussett � who has been suspected of, but never charged with, involvement in drug trafficking. As Steward, also known as the "Stew-man" to McLaughlin, worked his cell phone making arrangements for Mr. Liriano-Ortega�s one-way trip back home, McLaughlin asked Fernandez about the meaning of a pile of papers marked Triunfo �96 he found in the front seat of the Olds. "All I can make out are bits and pieces," McLaughlin said to Fernandez. "Something about the Revolutionary Dominican Party." McLaughlin told Fernandez to question Croussett. Croussett told Fernandez that the documents belong to a "political party back in the DR and they�re running Jose Francisco Pena-Gomez for president in the elections in May." After Fernandez explained the document�s significance, McLaughlin cuffed Liriano-Ortega, put him in the car and drove off. Later that day, Liriano-Ortega was deported via an airplane out of Newark, headed for Santo Domingo. It was the end of the line for Liriano-Ortega. But the beginning of a big mess for McLaughlin�s team, whom a supervisor would later dub "The Bastard Squad." Triunfo �96 was essentially a guide for "organizing an estimated 1.2 million Dominicans who presently reside outside The Dominican Republic to overthrow the present regime in the elections scheduled for May 1996," according to a supplement report McLaughlin filed in January 1996. Armed with this knowledge, McLaughlin called for two of his better informants, "6�s" and "P-Man." "I�m going to see what they know about this Revolutionary Dominican Party," McLaughlin said to his partner, Dennis McKeefery, whose brush-cut hair went nicely with his crisp, military demeanor. "You know, this guy we stopped, Daniel Croussett, is the brother of Carmen Croussett. We pinched her on October 3 in possession of 86 grams of cocaine and over 4,000 crack vials." McLaughlin set up a meeting between "6�s" and Wilson Prichett, a short, reedy man who spoke in a nervous staccato. Prichett was a former State Department field observer and Operations Officer for the Central Intelligence Agency hired by the BNI to serve as an intelligence analyst. If anyone could figure out the meaning of Triunfo �96, it was Prichett. ===== Haul of a good time: Drugs, weapons and cash seized by the Bastard Squad.In 1995 a local narcotics squad warned the CIA that a Dominican political party was raising campaign funds in Philadelphia through sales of heroin and coke. Now the investigators� careers are in ruins. What happened? by Howard Altman and Jim Barry First of a Two-Part Series On Oct. 26, 1995, Wilson Prichett wrote a confidential memo to John Sunderhauf, regional director of the BNI Philly office, about the PRD. The memo stated that the BNI officers had stumbled onto something big. Too big for them to handle by themselves. "A recent incident has political implications which go far beyond Region IX�s responsibilities for investigation of narcotics trafficking," Prichett wrote. Prichett wanted Sunderhauf to know the significance of the PRD and the Triunfo �96 document obtained by McLaughlin. "�it should be noted that the plan sets up a highly centralized, well disciplined political organization with a �Security� Bureau consisting of an �Intelligence� Department and a �Control of Events� Department." The plan, wrote Prichett, "indicates special interest in recruiting 300,000 Dominican voters in the U.S., which would include a substantial number in Philadelphia-Camden. Although it speaks at this point only to legal political activity, the P.R.D. Organization could readily be adapted to support a violent revolution in the Dominican Republic." A revolution was only the beginning of Prichett�s concerns. "PRD," he wrote, "could also use its U.S. branches, such as the Philadelphia-Camden Section, to raise campaign money by intensifying the present high level of Dominican activity in drug trafficking." Prichett based his analysis on linking the dots between the man found with the PRD pamphlet, Daniel Croussett � a high-ranking official in the local PRD chapter � and his sister, Carmen, who was "allegedly a principal dealer for �a major Dominican distributor of heroin and cocaine. According to Prichett�s memo, a confidential informant "reported that� organization brings kilos of narcotics from New York to Philadelphia several times a week in cars with concealed compartments. Daniel Croussett�s car had such a compartment, which was empty at the time he was stopped." Prichett then advised Sunderhauf to see if they could get Carmen Croussett to dime out the PRD by providing "information on the PRD�s activities, and especially whether she could provide the true names and addresses of Dominican members in this area. That would be invaluable in screening them for either past drug activity or illegal alien status." [The DA�s office dropped charges on May 28, 1996.] The former CIA agent then closed out his letter by offering to go Sunderhauf one better in the effort to get some outside help. By this point, Sunderhauf wanted to bring the FBI in "if the PRD is felt to be a threat to U.S. internal security." Prichett had another idea. "Since U.S. national security interests in the Caribbean area may also be involved, [the State Attorney General�s office] may feel it is appropriate to also brief the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA may already be aware of and have a covert interest in the PRD). I can provide an appropriate contact point if that would be useful." Five days later, on Halloween 1995, BNI Regional Director John Sunderhauf fired off a short memo of his own, marked "Confidential" to his boss, Richard P. Miller, deputy bureau director of the BNI. "As you will see, it appears this organization has an agenda to overthrow the Dominican Republic�s Government and it also appears that this organization is utilizing funds from illegal drug distribution to support its activities. "I would recommend the Intelligent Unit get involved and the appropriate Federal Agency/s be notified about these documents." For BNI, it was hurry up and wait. Meanwhile, The Bastard Squad continued acting on tips fed to them by "6�s." Haul of a good time: Drugs, weapons and cash seized by the Bastard Squad.On Nov. 2, 1995, "6�s" provided a tip about an �84 Olds parked on the 2900 block of North Ella Street that was used by Dominicans to store drugs and money. A consent search led to a hit by the K-9 dog Hans, who found a secret compartment in the driver�s side rear armrest that contained nearly $6,000. Four days later, the squad struck again, arresting Ramon Croussett, Daniel and Carmen�s brother, with an ounce of coke and nearly $3,000 in cash. On Nov. 13, 1995, Wilson Prichett sat down once again with BNI and "6�s." With Prichett sitting in the lieutenant�s office at the Essington Avenue headquarters, McLaughlin questioned the informant "6�s." "Hola, Callahan," said the informant. "Como esta?" Speaking via Harry Fernandez, McLaughlin asked "6�s" what he knew about the PRD. "You know about that too, Callahan?" the informant said, somewhat surprised. "If Pena gets in, they gonna make it cheaper than it is now. Manteca [street slang for heroin] is $100 to $110 a gram out of New York. If Pena gets in, it will be $30 a gram for Dominicans." The same economics held for cocaine, said "6�s." The informant then told McLaughlin about money being collected for the PRD. "What money?" asked McLaughlin. "From the corners, for the campaign," said "6�s." "All the owners of the drug corners give lots of money so Pena can buy votes in the DR. Each vote will cost about $30 so the more money they collect, the better chance for the PRD to win in the May elections." Later that day, FBI agents Thomas Dowd and James Sweeney had separate meetings with Prichett and Sunderhauf. The results were the same. The FBI told both that investigating the PRD was not their job. But Prichett had a plan. If the FBI wasn�t interested in foreign politicos raising campaign cash by selling dope to Philly junkies, Prichett knew who would be. On Dec. 7, 1995, he called a 1-800 number, which linked to CIA�s local headquarters, which used a post office box in Narberth. Prichett asked CIA Agent David Lawrence for assistance. "� we are facing a serious development which would appear to fall in your area of interest," according to Prichett�s written notes of that conversation, obtained by City Paper. Prichett went on to tell Lawrence about how much influence Dominicans were gaining in U.S. drug trafficking. "In Baltimore, they dominate in heroin-cocaine and hashish. In Philadelphia alone we have identified 22 drug corners controlled by the D�s." The next day, Dec. 8, Lawrence called back, according to Prichett�s notes and said that an agent named Victoria Naylor would call over a secure line and then meet the BNI agents at 9 a.m. Monday, Dec. 11, 1995. On Dec. 11, 1995, Victoria Naylor arrived in the Essington Avenue offices of BNI, where she asked for and received the PRD strategy plan. Before leaving, she told Prichett, Sunderhauf and the Bastard Squad that the CIA station in Santo Domingo wanted to open up a liaison. In handwritten notes, Prichett wrote that he "stressed social impact on US if DRP gains control." The next day, Prichett wrote a memo to Sunderhauf, warning the BNI boss about "the serious impact of availability" of cheap Dominican-distributed coke and heroin and explaining the CIA�s interest. "The Agency has an active counter-intelligence program going in the area of narcotics trafficking and coordinates with the DEA in operations outside the U.S.," he wrote. "They indicated that they might request us to submit a number of questions to our informants and you agreed to cooperate with them. I will keep you closely advised of any future contacts." They�re having a party: Former PRD party headquarters at 416 E. Allegheny.About the same time Sunderhauf was reading Prichett�s memo about CIA interest in Philadelphia drug dealers, McLaughlin�s crew followed a blue Subaru station wagon to Daniel Croussett�s house on the 5000 block of Whitaker Avenue. Inside the car, they found a secret compartment containing more than 1,000 crack vials, $20,000 worth of "Extra Power" brand heroin, $2,000 worth of coke, and $6,000 worth of crack. According to McLaughlin�s supplemental report filed Jan. 29, 1996, Alejandro Lopez, Amalio DeJesus and Ricardo Pascaul were all arrested and Daniel Croussett consented to a search of his house. Inside the houses, McLaughlin, Micewski, Steward and Fernandez found $1,247 in cash and an ID for Croussett�s sister, Carmen, who was living in a front bedroom. In Daniel Croussett�s bedroom, according to McLaughlin�s supplemental report, the BNI investigators found "Items from the PRD that included names of Registered Militants of the party." McLaughlin ran a small sample of those names through police computers. The PRD membership list contained the names of several drug dealers and suspected illegal aliens. Among those names, Angel Manuel Rodon Almonte, a 25-year-old living on Hilton Street, was twice arrested for narcotics violations. (The DA�s office dropped charges on April 25, 1996.) Moises Jaques, a 39-year-old living on Wyoming Avenue, would prove especially interesting to investigators. Jaques had two immigration warrants outstanding and had been arrested in New Jersey, Rhode Island and Massachusetts on drug charges. Jaques is still at large. The address and phone number Mr. Jaques gave on his party form was for a bus company called Juan Express, which authorities would later state was instrumental in transporting dope-carrying Dominicans from New York and Worcester to Philly. With drugs and campaign literature found at the same location and with that campaign literature containing the names of drug dealers and illegal aliens, McLaughlin knew he was on the right trail. With a member of the political party having drug connections in New Jersey and New England, The Bastard Squad began to suspect that if this is going on in Philly, it must be going on elsewhere in the States. ===== July 27�August 3, 2000 cover story The Dominican Connection, part 3 Just say no mas: Convicted drug dealer Bernardo Paez came to Philly to urge PRD members to sell drugs for Pena Gomez, according to BNI.In 1995 a local narcotics squad warned the CIA that a Dominican political party was raising campaign funds in Philadelphia through sales of heroin and coke. Now the investigators� careers are in ruins. What happened? by Howard Altman and Jim Barry First of a Two-Part Series On Jan. 13, 1996, McLaughlin�s suspicions about the PDR�s involvement in other jurisdictions were confirmed by a call from DEA agent Matt Hackett, who told McLaughlin that DEA investigators in Worcester, MA, had been tracking the connection between the PDR and drug dealing in New England. Among the information McLaughlin received from DEA agents in Massachusetts was a copy of an April 19, 1995 confidential telex, from George Festa, special agent in charge of the DEA office in Boston to DEA Headquarters in Washington, D.C. and the American Embassy in Santo Domingo. The subject of Festa�s telex was a man named Bernardo Paez, a Dominican national who had "numerous drug distribution convictions in New York and at one time during the late 1980s was considered to be one of the upper echelon Dominican distributors of cocaine and heroin in the city of Worcester." Paez, however, was no ordinary drug dealer. In his telex, Festa wrote that, according to Worcester police, "Paez is the head of the Dominican Revolutionary Party.� Worcester police further advised us that this Worcester headquarters for the DRP is the hub for all Dominican business owners and large scale narcotic distributors in New England. Meetings are held once a week." Party members, according to Festa, discussed "pricing controls on narcotics to be distributed.� The DRP has been in existence in Worcester for approximately two years." Upon receiving the information about Paez, McLaughlin asked Steward to find out Paez�s immigration status. Steward found that there was an active warrant for Paez�s deportation. As McLaughlin�s probe into the PRD expanded, the CIA was showing increasing interest. On Jan. 17, 1996, CIA agent Victoria Naylor called BNI intelligence analyst Wilson Prichett, according to a handwritten, confidential memo from Prichett to BNI supervisor John Sunderhauf. "She is arranging for an Intelligence officer from their Caribbean Desk to come up � probably next week � and give us a briefing on the Dominican Revolutionary Party. Before this, they want to run a quick preliminary security check on those who will attend the briefing. They need name � DOB and where � and SSN. "Who do you want to attend? I will collect the data and fax it to them." On the same day, Sunderhauf received a memo from Larry Leightley, CIA chief of station in Santo Domingo. The two-paged memo, marked "confidential" and typed in all caps, thanked Sunderhauf for providing details of the BNI investigation and offered some information the CIA had on the PRD and Dominican drug traffickers. "DEA Santo Domingo information confirms that the Dominicans in the Philadelphia area are part of the New York- Boston network," Leightley wrote, adding that "there is no information suggesting that Dominicans in Philadelphia deal directly with drug transportation groups in the Dominican Republic. The Philadelphia groups have all their contacts directly with Dominicans in New York and Boston and receive the drugs from and send the sale proceeds to the New York area." Leightley�s memo then shifted to the PRD and its presidential candidate, Jose Francisco Pena Gomez. "It is important to note that Pena Gomez and the PRD in 1995 are considered mainstream in the political spectrum," Leightley wrote. "Pena currently leads in the polls and has a better than even chance of being elected the next President of the Dominican Republic in May 1996 elections. He and his PRD ideology pose no specific problems for U.S. foreign policy and, in fact, Pena was widely seen as the �U.S. Embassy�s candidate� in the 1994 elections given the embassy�s strong role in pressuring for free and fair elections and Pena�s role as opposition challenger." Leightley went on to say that on Dec. 11, 1995, Undersecretary of State Alex Watson had a lengthy meeting with Pena Gomez, whom Leightley stated "is a well-respected political leader in the Caribbean." Leightley wrote that Pena Gomez�s political opponents had been spreading rumors about his involvement in narco-trafficking, but that neither the CIA nor the Embassy could confirm those rumors. "We are very interested in receiving any information that would provide evidence that the PRD and/or Pena Gomez is knowingly receiving drug proceeds from the U.S.," Leightley wrote. Five days after Leightley�s letter to Sunderhauf, McLaughlin sent "P-Man" to a meeting at the local PRD headquarters at 416 E. Allegheny. According to McLaughlin�s supplemental report filed Jan. 29, 1996, Bernardo Paez � who was under investigation by DEA and local police in Worcester for running drug deals out of the Worcester PRD headquarters � was the keynote speaker, according to "P-Man," who wore a body wire while attending the meeting. In his report, McLaughlin wrote the purpose of the 90-minute meeting "was to raise $2,500 from each member attending to give to Dominican Presidential candidate Jose Pena Gomez when he comes to Philadelphia on or around Feb. 1, 1996. Discussed further was the $300,000 assessed to the Philadelphia/Camden Chapter of the PRD which was needed by the end of February for the final meeting in New York, where Jose Pena Gomez will collect all monies for the campaign. Paez, wrote McLaughlin, "told the meeting that Gomez himself sent a message to the members to be careful not to be caught with drugs on their person or in their care between now and the May election in the Dominican Republic since it may hurt the party and cause it to be investigated. He did not, however, urge them to stop selling drugs." Paez did, however, point out the benefits of drug sales. "A discussion ensued on the difficulty party members [who] did not sell drugs would have in contributing the $2,500 required," McLaughlin wrote. "In the case of drug traffickers there would be no problem raising the funds." Paez, according to the report, "stated that Gomez would carry back the funds collected by February 1st to the Dominican Republic with the remainder and larger portion of the funds to be collected at the �Grand Reunion� to be held in New York at the end of February 1996. "Paez reminded the congregation that the incentive for contributing was that if Gomez won in May 1996, he would facilitate the flow of drugs into the U.S. and reduce their cost." News of Pena Gomez�s impending visit to Philadelphia, combined with headlines at the time that Colombian President Ernesto Samper had used drug money to help finance his campaign, weighed heavily on the mind of BNI Regional Director John Sunderhauf. On Jan. 29, 1996, Sunderhauf fired off a memo, marked "Confidential" to Leightley, apprising the agency of "P-Man"�s surveillance and asking for guidance. In essence, Sunderhauf told Leightley that a major PRD party member, with a history of drug arrests and reputed to be a large-scale dealer in Worcester by the DEA, was in town on behalf of Pena Gomez. Sunderhauf also warned Leightley that party members would ship old cars back home to transport "militantes around the country for political activities. The plan called for concealing 5 or 6 guns under the engine covers of these cars for use in case trouble breaks out. [Paez] stressed the need for secrecy, since the current President would seize the cars on the dock if he found out." "P-Man"�s report had Sunderhauf concerned about the impending visit of Pena Gomez in just three days. "In the light of the 1 February visit of Gomez to Philadelphia we urgently need to hear from you whether any appropriate action on our part is requested in support of U.S. Foreign policy objectives," Sunderhauf wrote. "The current revelation that President Samper of Colombia had knowingly used drug money in his political campaign, suggests that appropriate action may be warranted." Sometime in the last days of January 1996, BNI investigators began working on a bold plan of "appropriate action"; nabbing Pena Gomez upon his visit to the states and seizing the campaign funds as proceeds of illegal drug transactions. Such a move would have wide ramifications. On Jan. 30, BNI�s intelligence analyst Wilson Prichett sent a handwritten note to Sunderhauf about what the BNI could expect if it grabbed money from someone seeking the highest office in a foreign land. "Our contact in the Agency answered our two questions after consulting Washington by phone," Prichett wrote Sunderhauf. The answer to the first question, "Does Pena Gomez have diplomatic immunity?," was as follows: Free to go: Pedro Corporan, a Washington Heights, NY businessman and PRD party leader suspected by the DEA of providing drugs to the infamous Jheri Curl gang. Corporan was never charged with any crimes in that investigation."They reported that he is not accredited to the State Dept. as an official of the Govt. and therefore does not have diplomatic immunity," Prichett wrote. "However, that being said, these �banana republics� issue diplomatic passports freely to citizens and he would probably �wave it around and raise hell� if he is carrying one." Sunderhauf�s second question was, "If, �with probable cause� he were stopped while in this country, what would be the political ramifications?" Prichett responded by saying that the CIA "replied that [Pena Gomez] is a VIP � he only lost the last election through fraud and is probably going to be the next President of the D.R.! If he is stopped and the charge did not stick it would �probably adversely affect U.S.-D.R. relations.� [The CIA said], if we are considering the possibility of stopping him, we had better clear it with the State Dept. first. We would have to do this through the local office of DEA." On Jan. 31, 1996 � the day after Prichett�s memo to Sunderhauf about seizing Pena Gomez�s cash � Leightley sent a memo to Sunderhauf with a little more explanation of the current status of the candidate and his party in the Dominican Republic. Leightley explained that Dominicans in the United States are playing a vital role in the May 1996 election. "Pena continues to lead in most of the local election polls and his Dominican Revolutionary Party has an even chance of winning the presidency.� Pena, like his two principal opponents � frequently travels to the U.S. to meet supporters in New York and other cities on the Eastern Seaboard to solicit funds for his campaign. Dominicans in the U.S. are big contributors to the campaigns of their favorite party in the DOMREP." The key information the CIA was seeking, wrote Leightley, "is whether or not Pena actually knows of or condones the fact his supporters in Philadelphia are narcotics traffickers. Pena is attacked in the local press frequently on this issue and he is very sensitive to the danger these allegations pose to his presidential hopes. He frequently challenges his local critics to produce evidence of their claims. They have been unable to do so thus far; we know, however, that the Dominican Drug Control Directorate has photographs of Pena in the company of known narcotics traffickers. Although we do not believe Pena would actually carry USD70,000 in cash back with him, there are individuals working for him who would not hesitate to carry the cash." Leightley also noted that there was a concern violence might break out during the election and a prognostication (dead on, as it would turn out) that Pena Gomez would win the first round of the election, only to lose the final round. "This information is intriguing and we remain very interested in any additional information your office develops from its contacts." In an effort to develop more contacts, McLaughlin requested authorization for "P-Man" to wear a transmitting device at PRD headquarters on Allegheny Avenue the following day. ===== cover story The Dominican Connection, part 4 Lock, stock and dozens of loaded barrels: A cache of weapons from suspected drug dealers.In 1995 a local narcotics squad warned the CIA that a Dominican political party was raising campaign funds in Philadelphia through sales of heroin and coke. Now the investigators� careers are in ruins. What happened? by Howard Altman and Jim Barry Feb. 1, 1996. "P-Man", wearing a body recorder, transmitter and receiver, attended the PRD meeting and, at the end of two hours of general conversation, recorded one party member stress the importance of keeping drug deals on the sly. "We need to keep those rumors down," said an unknown speaker. "Once President Pena Gomez wins the election, it doesn�t matter about the rumors. We have to keep rumors from coming out to protect Pena Gomez." A bit later, the conversation picked up by the recorder strapped to "P-Man"�s body must have made the informant just a little nervous. "Members should denounce rumors and be careful of people making links to the party and taking pictures and making recordings connected to drug trafficking." Two weeks later, "P-Man" returned to PRD headquarters and discovered two major new wrinkles in the case. Pena Gomez was currently in Miami, traveling with five to six bodyguards, according to a memo filed the next day by McLaughlin. And a PRD mahaff from New York was at the meeting, with news that Pena Gomez was looking to take home more than a half million dollars at a big New York fundraising event called "The Grand Reunion." "Fiquito Vasquez, who identified himself as the coordinator from New York� stated that Pena Gomez is going to be traveling to the different local chapters of the PRD on the East Coast between the 1st and 4th of March and will be at the Concord Hotel the night of March 4th, 1996, where $550,000 will be given to Pena Gomez from the funds collected. Pena Gomez will leave for the Dominican Republic on March 5th, 1996." The presence of Fiquito Vasquez in Philadelphia meant that the PRD�s fundraising efforts extended beyond Philadelphia and Worcester. McLaughlin contacted DEA officials in New York, who visited Philly on Feb. 28, 1996 to share information and coordinate efforts to stop the PRD�s alleged drug smuggling operations. DEA special agents Richard Mulholland, John Powell from New York and Matt Hackett from the Philadelphia office met with McLaughlin and Sunderhauf at 1 p.m. at BNI headquarters on Essington Avenue. New York DEA agents were brought up to speed about visits by Bernardo Paez and Fiquito Vasquez to Philadelphia, urging PRD members to raise money and avoid getting caught selling drugs. In a March 7, 1996 memo, New York DEA agent Mulholland outlined his view of the significance of BNI�s findings. "U.S. sources are looking for a connection between Pena Gomez and the monies obtained from drug sales by PRD members," wrote Mulholland. "Current U.S. policy favors democratic elections and has no objections to a presidential win by Pena Gomez and the PRD. If solid connections can link Pena Gomez to the illegal money, this would impact the position of support for Pena Gomez taken by the U.S. Government. The American Embassy indicated to BNI that the Dominican Drug Control Directorate has photographed Pena Gomez in the company of known narcotics traffickers." By early March, the BNI learned that Pena Gomez had twice changed his plans, that local party officials had not raised enough money, so he was putting off his trip until the end of the month. In New York, DEA special agent Richard Mulholland wrote a memo on March 14 outlining that Bernardo Paez, the New England PRD chapter leader, Pedro Corporan, who had given $2 million in drug money to a DEA undercover sting operation and Daniel Croussett, the Philly PRD party official, were among the targets of a massive combined DEA-BNI investigation. The investigation�s objectives, according to Mulholland, included additional surveillance and the purchase and seizure of "large amounts of heroin in order to identify the sources of supply and distribution networks that are used to fund the PRD and the presidential campaign of Pena Gomez." Meanwhile, BNI officers continued working the streets, taking nearly $130,000 worth of heroin from a house on the 1200 block of Luzerne Street on March 4. Two weeks later, a confidential informant delivered a list of local party members to the BNI. One week after the squad was given those names, the CIA paid a visit to Essington Ave. Gucci, gucci goo: Illegal drugs wrapped in designer logo.On March 27, 1996, CIA agent David Lawrence visited Essington Avenue to speak with BNI regional director John Sunderhauf, McLaughlin and Micewski. Lawrence wanted the tapes made by the Bastard Squad�s informants of meetings at which PRD members discussed drug sales. Lawrence, according to McLaughlin�s diary, also wanted the return of Leightley�s memo of Jan. 31, wherein the CIA agent discussed the current status of the Dominican election. Lawrence, according to McLaughlin�s diary, told Sunderhauf that the BNI was not supposed to have that memo. Lawrence had one more, very ominous request. The CIA wanted biographical information on the Bastard Squad�s informants. Fearing for the lives of their informants, McLaughlin and Micewski refused to give the CIA that information. For the Bastard Squad, a very strange day was about to get stranger. With CIA agent Lawrence in the room, McLaughlin received a call from DEA in New York. Head north quickly, said the DEA, and bring your confidential informants. Pena Gomez was coming to town. En route to New York, McLaughlin was paged by Special Agent Don Hanson of DEA in New York. The Bastard Squad was to go directly to Kennedy International Airport and await the arrival of Pena Gomez. When they got there, the BNI investigators and their coterie of informants were surprised to learn they would not have access to the candidate. Someone had called in a last-minute death threat against Pena Gomez, which meant that the New York City Police Department�s visiting dignitary unit had Pena Gomez�s arrival at Kennedy cordoned off. DEA agents, posing as photographers, tried to get some surveillance photos of Pena Gomez, but were too far away, so they shut down the operation for the night in anticipation of seizing the campaign funds the following night at the fundraising event, "The Grand Reunion," to be held at the Concord Hotel. The candidate: The late Jose Francisco Pena Gomez.The next morning, March 28, Assistant U.S. Attorneys Bob Buhler and Guy Petrillo, also chief of narcotics for the Southern District of New York, interviewed the Bastard Squad�s informants. That afternoon, McLaughlin and his crew were taken by DEA agents to DEA headquarters, where they were introduced to undercover agents. Together, the investigators from New York and Philly devised a plan to seize Pena Gomez�s campaign funds. At 8:30 p.m., Pena Gomez arrived at PRD headquarters in New York. Within 20 minutes, the BNI informant arrived and quickly left, telling the DEA undercover agents that they would have no trouble gaining access to the meeting. At 10:15 p.m., the BNI�s confidential informant reported that the Philadelphia chapter of the PRD brought $10,000 to the fundraising event. The informant observed "approximately 50 people standing in line and 30 of these people were carrying bags that contained currency. Different chapters were called into a side room where they turned in their money," according to a memo filed by McLaughlin on April 1, 1996. By now, the Bastard Squad was ready to move in and seize the money. But at the last minute, plans changed and DEA told McLaughlin, whose agents did not have jurisdiction in New York, that Pena Gomez was to be allowed to leave the country with the money. That was only the beginning of the bad news for the Bastard Squad. Two weeks later, U.S. Attorney Michael Stiles met with state Attorney General Tom Corbett � McLaughlin�s boss. The U.S. Attorney�s Office would no longer take BNI cases investigated by Sparky McLaughlin, Charlie Micewski and Dennis McKeefery. The District Attorney�s Office quickly followed suit. And, though they continued to probe Pena Gomez and the PRD, the Bastard Squad was essentially out of business, no longer allowed to work the streets as narcotics investigators. Next week: Why did prosecutors shut down the Bastard Squad? Why did Lynne Abraham's office in essence hand out "Get Out of Jail Free" cards to dozens of Dominicans with prior drug-dealing convictions? 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