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Agency of Fear

Opiates and Political Power in America

By Edward Jay Epstein

Chapter 34 - Lost Horizons





The proposal for a new narcotics superagency was submitted to Congress on
March 28, 1973. Even though the House Committee on Government Operations
noted, "The plan was hastily formed.... Administration witnesses were able to
give the Sub-Committee only a bare outline of the proposed new organization
and its functions," Congress refused to block the reorganization plan which
purported to heighten the efficiency of the war against heroin. Accordingly,
Reorganization Plan Number Two automatically became effective sixty days
later, and the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) was created on July 1, 1973. The
Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, which itself had been created by
Reorganization Plan Number One, in 1967, was absorbed into the superagency,
along with the Office for Drug Abuse Law Enforcement and the Office of
National Narcotics Intelligence. In the process John Ingersoll's position as
director of the BNDD was abolished, and the directors of the two other
offices-Myles Ambrose and William Sullivan-resigned. Five hundred special
agents of the Customs Bureau were transferred to this new agency, which
employed. on paper, at least, more than four thousand agents and analysts and
resembled the FBI as a domestic law-enforcement agency. John R. Bartels, the
son of a federal judge who had been recommended for ODALE by Henry Petersen,
was now named acting director of this new conglomerate.

If the Watergate burglars had not been arrested and connected to the White
House strategists, the Drug Enforcement Agency might have served as the
strong Investigative arm for domestic surveillance that President Nixon had
long quested after. It had the authority to request wiretaps and no-knock
warrants, and to submit targets to the Internal Revenue Service; and, with
its contingent of former CIA and counterintelligence agents, it had the
talent to enter residences surreptitiously, gather intelligence on the
activities of other agencies of the government, and interrogate suspects.
Yet, despite these potential powers, the efforts of the White House
strategists had been effectively truncated by the Watergate exposures:
Ehrlichman and Krogh were directly implicated. in the operations of the
Plumbers; Sullivan had been involved in the administration's wiretapping
program; and Liddy and Hunt were in prison. The grand design could not be
realized, and DEA became simply a protean manifestation of the earlier
narcotics agencies.

Bartels soon found, however, that it was not an easy matter to turn this
superagency into a conventional narcotics police force. For one thing, when
the special offices created by executive order were collapsed into the new
agency, Bartels inherited some fifty-three former (or detached) CIA agents
and a dozen counterintelligence experts from the military or other
intelligence agencies-all of whom, under the original game plan, were
supposed to work on special projects designated by the White House
strategists. These high-level intelligence agents and analysts had a very
different approach to narcotics intelligence from that of the traditional
narcotics agent, who operated mainly by spreading "buy money" among his
contacts in the underworld until someone attempted to sell him a significant
quantity of narcotics. James Ludlum, a former CIA official who took over-the
Office of Strategic Services of the new drug agency, explained to me, "My
approach was not to arrest a few traffickers but to build the entire intellige
nce picture of what was going on in the drug world.... I wanted to identify
the modus operandi of the major heroin wholesalers, and this meant acquiring
a great deal of information which the drug agency did not possess about the
patterns of narcotic use." As Ludlum and the other former CIA agents began to
demand more definite data on the number of addicts in the United States,
their daily consumption habits, the way they routinely contacted dealers, and
the names and profiles of the major narcotics traffickers in the world, they
soon began stepping on the toes of the traditional narcotics agents. Colonel
Thomas Fox, the former chief of counterintelligence for the Defense
Intelligence Agency, recalled that "they did not seem to possess any
systematic intelligence about narcotics traffic," and the revelation of this
dearth of information raised embarrassing questions as to what the narcotics
agents had been pursuing over the last ten years-and it also raised tensions
between the conventional agents and the newer additions. The older agents
fought back: Lucien Conein, for example, who was supposed to head
"clandestine law enforcement" activities for the new agency, was given a
totally isolated office, without staff, and was named chief of overseas
narcotics intelligence. (As a friend and associate of E. Howard Hunt's,
Conein was also compromised by the Watergate disclosures.)

The integration of some five hundred agents from the Customs Bureau into DEA
also raised serious problems for Bartels. Many of the transferred inspectors
had been content working for the Bureau of Customs and resented being treated
as pawns in what they perceived to be I political game. They had formerly
received a large part of their information about narcotics smuggling from
their counterparts in the customs bureaus of other nations, according to
Eugene Rossides, and the bureaucratic transfer had deprived them of these
valuable sources of information. Also, they tended to be confused by the new
reporting procedures of the Drug Enforcement Agency. In order constantly to
expand the reported value of DEA seizures, they were instructed to
participate in as many foreign narcotics operations as possible, even if it
only meant supplying anonymous tips to the foreign police agencies. In
practice, this meant that whenever a police agency anywhere in the world
announced the seizure of an narcotics, the DEA agent in that country was
queried as to whether he participated in that operations if he answered
affirmatively, the seizure's street value in the United States was credited
to the total value seized by the DEA. One former customs inspector, who was
stationed in Rome, explained to me:

All they seemed to be interested in was statistics.... The three of us sat
around the office in Rome all day, looking through the daily newspapers for
any news of narcotics busts.... If there were any, we simply telexed
Washington that we had participated in the bust by supplying anonymous
information to the Italian police. Washington never questioned any of our
claims, and just kept sending us more and more buy money which we were
supposedly giving to our informants for the anonymous tips. The whole thing
was getting crazier and crazier, and finally I asked to be transferred back
to the Customs Bureau.

The charges of corruption and "papering the record" by disgruntled employees,
and their demands to be transferred back to their former agencies, strained
relations within the new agency. These charges also fueled a war of leaks
between DEA and rival agencies within the administration, which in turn led
to reports widely circulated in the press that DEA was seizing far less
narcotics coming into the United States than its predecessors-the Bureau of
Customs, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the Bureau of
Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs.

In reality, the task of intercepting narcotics had been unintentionally
complicated by the maneuvers of the White House strategists in 1971. The
temporary suppression of the Turkish poppy fields may have succeeded in
disrupting the normal channels for distributing heroin, but it also brought
many new entrepreneurs into the heroin business, and it thoroughly confused
the surveillance procedures of the BNDD (which had formerly focused its
attention on a few cities such as Istanbul, Marseilles, and Montreal).
Moreover, when Turkey resumed the cultivation of poppies, the distribution
channels for heroin had been so dispersed and fragmented that it was
impossible to check or even roughly estimate the flow of the narcotic into
the United States. Mexico had now become a major supplier of "brown" heroin
(a discoloration caused by the laboratory process rather than the quality of
the opium), and illicit networks had grown up in Afghanistan, India,
Pakistan, and Southeast Asia. DEA could report higher seizures on paper, in
terms of the street value of drugs seized in other countries, but this had
little effect on the narcotics traffic in the United States.

Furthermore, methadone, the synthetic variant of heroin, was now freely
available from hundreds of federally financed clinics around the country.
This narcotic was spreading from urban centers to small towns, which
traditionally had no narcotics problem or narcotics police. Not only was it
harder to police heroin and methadone, but the unfavorable publicity which
had emanated from the illegal raids conducted by ODALE raised serious
questions in the Department of Justice about how drug agents were to proceed
with searches and arrests. Formerly, narcotics agents had acted without much
inhibition in breaking into a house or rousing a sleeping informant at four
A.M. to question him roughly-. now they realized that they might be suspended
or indicted for what once had been standard operating procedure.

As the heroin supply became more difficult to intercept, DEA officials
focused on heavy users of cocaine and hashish, who for a number of reasons
were more easily identified and arrested. Cocaine and hashish, however, had
not been connected in the public mind with causing crime or even being highly
addictive, and public interest in the activities of the new agency waned-at
least as it was measured in the media.

In 1974 dissension within the superagency reached the boiling point. Bartels
had been unable to name a deputy director for fear that he would offend the
old guard-the agents that had joined the old Federal Bureau of Narcotics and
had been subsequently transferred to the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous
Drugs, then the Office of Drug Abuse Law Enforcement, and finally the Drug
Enforcement Agency. When Bartels attempted to introduce some "rationality"
into what was largely a "statistics-jimmying operation," according to one of
his staff assistants, "the old guard rebelled." A DEA inspector planted a
story with Jack Anderson accusing Vincent S. Promuto, a public-relations
assistant to Bartels, of associating with dubious characters. Then other
stories were leaked to the press charging that Promuto had Introduced Bartels
to a cocktail waitress in Las Vegas-a charge which had no apparent basis in
fact. The press campaign against Bartels and Promuto by the old guard seemed
to be little more than what a decade earlier would have been called "guilt by
association." But in the Watergate atmosphere that saturated Washington,
D.C., in 1974, the failure by Bartels to investigate these charges was
escalated into the charge of a cover-up. Senator Henry Jackson then began
investigating these charges, and rebellious officials in the Drug Enforcement
Agency began feeding him new morsels.

When it became abundantly clear to the Ford White House, in May, 1975, that
Bartels could not control his agency, he was induced to resign and was
replaced by Henry Dogin, a lawyer in the Department of Justice. Six months
later, Dogin was replaced by Peter B. Bensinger, a political appointee from
Chicago. As one executive in DEA commented, "This was nothing more than a
power play-the bureaucrats in the drug agency simply destroy anyone who tries
to control them, and they use the press as their messenger boys in the
battle." He then added, "The heroin problem remains more or less
constant-there are no fewer addicts than there were in 1969-all that changes
is the way the information about them is manipulated"

-----
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