-Caveat Lector- WJPBR Email News List [EMAIL PROTECTED] Peace at any cost is a Prelude to War! ARTICLE 5 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Navy: Former Radford Commander Battles to Save Reputation ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Ed.: CDR Chang continues to fight the military bureaucracy. Another commander hung out to dry to cover for deeper readiness problems, similar to the case of Airborne commander LTC Ellerbee. *********************************************************** By William H. McMichael, Navy Times Cmdr. Daniel Chang is fighting back. "It's a matter of honor," said his lawyer, Charles W. Gittins. "The Navy put him in a bad position. And then when it blew up ... they basically cut Danny loose. And then they rub his nose in it by releasing all this stuff that's not supposed to be public, to make the Navy look good." Chang was commander of the destroyer Radford when its bow was nearly sliced off Feb. 4, 1999, by a Saudi container ship. At the time, the Radford was circling a calibration buoy at night off the Virginia coast. Chang had left the ship in the hands of his officer of the deck and was in his sea cabin until seconds before the collision, which injured at least eight sailors and caused $23 million in damage to the Radford. Chang, who had been in command for about 100 days, testified during a civil trial on the matter that he inherited a woefully under trained crew with poor watch standing skills, and that he'd made this clear to the commander of his destroyer squadron. Watch standers failed to inform him of the approaching container ship, contrary to his standing orders. The situation seemed indicative of readiness woes shared by other Navy ships. But Chang was relieved of command. Ultimately, the court placed the bulk of the blame for the collision on the Saudi ship. Now assigned to the Regional Support Group, Norfolk Naval Station, Va., Chang has no shot at regaining that command or reversing the punishment handed down in a non-judicial hearing in April 1999. But he's not going away quietly. Instead, Chang is suing the Navy and 26 members of Congress for violating his federal Privacy Act rights by allegedly disclosing protected information about his punishment contained in his Official Military Personnel File. NJP hearings are held behind closed doors. In papers filed in U.S. District Court in Washington, D.C., Chang claims the disclosures damaged his reputation in the Navy and his community, causing him "mental distress, loss of employment opportunity outside the Navy, embarrassment and emotional trauma." He is seeking $1 million in actual damages from the Navy and the congressmen, and $1.35 million from Rep. James P. Moran, D-Va., for compensatory and punitive damages. Chang, on the advice of Gittins, is not commenting on the matter. But Gittins said that Chang has "an open-and-shut case." "You're not reading about the NJPs of the other captains ," said Gittins, a specialist in military law. The Navy and the members of Congress have filed a motion to dismiss on technical grounds. Chang's claim centers in part on a document titled "For Response to Query Only" generated by Surface Forces Atlantic to allow public affairs officers to respond to reporters' questions. The document spelled out the specific articles Chang and three other officers were guilty of violating as well as the type of administrative letter that was placed in Chang's personnel file. Some of the information ended up in the news. Chang did not give his permission "and would not have consented" to public release of the information, according to court documents. According to Gittins, constituents of Moran and other members of Congress "presently unknown to plaintiff" wrote and asked about Chang's case. Moran asked the Navy for more information. The Navy provided Moran with an "Information Paper" that summarized the case and the punishment taken against Chang. The U.S. government agrees that Moran requested the information but says it released the Information Paper only to those lawfully entitled to see it and seeks to have the lawsuit thrown out on those grounds. Gittins argues, however, that such material can be released only with the consent of the military member. In a separate filing to the court, Chang also claims the Navy has continued to violate his Privacy Act rights by way of an April 7, 2000, letter sent from the Office of the Secretary of the Navy to a "member of the public" that details the results of subsequent appeals of his NJP punishment. When Chang learned that Vice Adm. Henry Giffin III, the now-retired SurfLant commander, wanted to charge him with a violation of military law, he chose a hearing before him instead of a court-martial. "But that was with the proviso that ... it would be private," Gittins said. "That was one of the selling points that Admiral Giffin personally jawboned me about, sitting across his coffee table. "It's smarmy and it lacks integrity, the way they convinced Danny that if you take NJP, it'll be private, it'll be over quickly," Gittins added. "And then they go out and they release everything, like it was a public trial." =============================================================== ARTICLE 6 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Navy: The Reduction of US Navy Repair Capabilities ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Ed.: An important readiness factor - the ability to maintain your fighting ships when forward deployed. The writer recommends re-commissioning four tenders and rebuild several critical repair skills. *********************************************************** MRCS(SW) Lee Lawrence, USN (Ret.) Not many years ago, the US Navy was the leader in technical expertise in ship repair. WWII was a big stepping-stone, as several heavy repair ships (AR's) were commissioned. Destroyer tenders (AD's) became more capable of complex repairs, and with the submarine fleet, the submarine tender (AS) was commissioned. These ships provided the Navy with some highly mobile, technically diverse and flexible platforms, especially with the addition of nuclear power, new QA procedures and electronics capacity (2M). With the commissioning of the AD37 and AS36 class tenders from the 1970's thru the mid 1980's, and having several forward deployed tenders, the Navy was second to none in ensuring that the reliance on foreign yards was minimal. Since the draw down however, the Navy has gone from 16 tenders to just four. Loss of Skills: Tenders were known for being able to fabricate or repair anything. Having craftsmen onboard such as welders, machinist, foundry techs, and mechanics of various types ensured just about anything could be repaired on short notice. Since the draw down, much in depth technical expertise has been lost quickly, and hired by civilian industry with excellent pay. Keep in mind it takes anywhere from 3 to 5 years to become a top welder, machinist or mechanic, and the training is ongoing. One indication of loss of talent was on my last deployment on an FFG-7. A globe valve needed to be lapped due to a seat cut. The only ones who could repair it was myself, a GSMC and a GSM1, both who were Machinist Mates on tenders at one time. The junior engineers didn't even know what lapping compound was for. What will continue to happen as time goes on is the skill levels will continue to diminish quickly, not just due to loss of skilled personnel, but the fact several rates have been eliminated or consolidated. Also, many senior repair technicians have retired early in the draw-down, the teachers of OJT, taking a tremendous amount of fleet knowledge away from the Navy. This is causing the Navy to outsource to a large degree. Then take into account the new ship classes (DDG-51 flight II/III, LHD 1 LSD 46) the Sailors don't have much experience working on. These platforms are very complex, I just hope the few tenders left in the fleet can work on them. And the "pull out and plug in" equipment concept will eventually catch up to the Navy as a readiness item. Having equipment on the shelf is very expensive, and this doesn't factor in shipping cost, and the readiness and monetary expense of not having the item ready. This may be expedient in peace time, but what will happen in a serious crisis or war? Over-reliance on Foreign Shipyards The Navy should have learned a lesson on this from the Philippine Government closing Subic Bay. The Navy relies on some foreign yards that do some shoddy work, or it is very expensive. Toulon, Haifa, and Bahrain come to mind. Toulon and Haifa are expensive, and the French need to be monitored closely. Bahrain has too many out-sourced shops whose standards are questionable at times, especially with pressure testing, flex hose manufacture and lagging. Plus Middle East politics as they are can deprive the Navy of Bahrain quickly. The best foreign yard now is Yokosuka, Japan. Guam is OK, but the island does need a backup due to the remoteness, and the damage it received in a typhoon a few years ago can happen again. Many other smaller yards in other countries simply don't have the capacity or the security clearances needed to work on Navy ships. Solution: I would tell senior leaders to re-commission at least four tenders, and put two on each coast, on a rotating deployment schedule. Place the tenders in the USNS fleet, having ship's company manned by civilians; the Repair personnel a mixture of Navy and civilian craftsman; the Repair Department run by Naval Officers. Then set about rebuilding the repair expertise. My guess is this would take 3 to 6 years to do. I think this would reduce reliance on foreign shipyards to a large degree, as availability is often on the whim of politics or war. Plus, you would have one repair standard, not foreign ones. The Navy needs to have this flexibility put back in the fleet, not just from a mobility stand point, but the Sailors who fix ships are not up to speed on the new ship classes in the fleet. An emergency or war is a hell of a way to catch back up. ============================================================ ARTICLE 7 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ USMC: Life in the Mass Production Scheme ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Ed.: Building hard-hitting fighting units requires exceptional people skills and time. ************************************************************ Captain A. McRae, USMC The "Replacement Depot" system of WWII and the individual rotation system that started in the second half of the Korean War and was used for most of the Second Indochina War were both based on the notion that a unit was little more than a management structure for organizing the work of individuals. The idea that a unit must be a social organization before it can become a fighting outfit- and idea associated with all first-class infantry in this century-could not compete with the convenience of treating men like spare parts. John English and Bruce Gudmundsson, On Infantry, 1994 ----------------------------------------------------------- The concept of readiness has been blown about in these past three months of the presidential election like a mobile home in an Arkansas tornado. One candidate says that we are ready to fight but acknowledges our lack of resources. Another says we are at our lowest point in quite some time, and we need to be built up once again. Both propose to solve all our problems by throwing more money into the system. Nobody questions the deeper problems that have beset this institution for quite some time. The solution wouldn't cost nearly as much as the proposed solutions: Stop treating men like mass-produced parts. It has been a matter of faith in the U.S. Military that common individual training will result in a universally well-trained force. It's almost like a recipe: give a young man X hours of rifle qualification, Y hours of organizational indoctrination, put him with Z unit that is composed of another 120 identically trained individuals, and boom!, you have a well-trained unit. If you send that unit to combat, simply rotate individuals back off the line and replace them with other individuals who are trained in the prescribed manner, and you can expect similar results. A corollary to this involves the leadership of fighting units. It goes something like this: Officers and Staff Non-Commissioned Officers need time with fighting units in order to have successful careers, therefore, in order to be fair to these individuals, we have created a system in which all of them can do their time in such a unit, and move on to bigger and better things. There is no logical conflict in doing so because these people receive identical training in tactics, administration, and leadership. Again, an individual with X and Y training will produce mathematically quantifiable results. Sounds good in concept, but it is maddening in practice. In the first instance mentioned above, it is insane to assume that people can be arbitrarily assigned to units as replacements without first training extensively with that group of people. Anyone who has trained fighting men will tell you that shaping a team is a long and difficult process without constant changes in personnel, and is damn near impossible if the personnel situation is in a state of constant flux. The Marine Corps has attempted to address this issue in its infantry battalions by leaving a full rifle squad (minus team/squad leaders) together throughout recruit and initial MOS training, and then marrying them up with their leadership once that unit is assigned out to a fleet battalion. This practice at least recognizes the fact that a rifle squad is a "social organization". However, these squads generally break up after their initial deployment, and the effect that was sought never really comes to fruition. In the second instance, the issue of leadership within a fighting unit, the rotation of unit leadership has most battalions chasing their tails. Witness: one junior officer, in his initial three year tour, will serve as a rifle platoon commander for 6-18 months, serve as an executive officer or heavy weapons platoon commander for another 6-18 months, maybe do some time on the battalion staff for bad behavior, and is quickly sent back to middle America as a recruiter, inspector-instructor, or recruit series commander. At each stage, by the time the individual has a firm grasp of the proper way to carry out his duties, he is given another job. The story is the same for company commanders: maybe a year in command, and then off to a staff assignment. The most criminal tale is that of the SNCO. Leaving these experienced men with a unit for an extended period of time is crucial to forming a viable, combat-ready team. Yet we kick them from platoon to platoon, from company to company, throughout their assignment to a battalion. The solution is as simple on paper, and is as difficult in practice, as the problem itself. I confess my inability to foresee its long-term manpower ramifications. However, making the screening of combat leaders more discriminating, thus having fewer leaders to rotate, and "locking" a unit together for a period of years, rather than months, would increase the ability of these battalions to close with and destroy the enemy. Furthermore, this creates an atmosphere that is conducive to professionalism and less prone to ticket punching. Dealing with this one issue in an honest and forthright manner would solve a host of problems that face us right now. Unfortunately, it involves a gratuitous amount of change, and is therefore doomed never to make it past the bureaucracy. ========================================================= ARTICLE 8 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ USMC: Marine Warriors treated like Children ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Ed: This is exactly what I talked about last week. Treat our warriors like grown-ups and hold them responsible. Micro-control and communist policies won't make them grow or keep them in. *********************************************************** By a disappointed Marine Sergeant I am a Sergeant in the Marine Corps and wanted to tell you something that I witnessed recently. You wouldn't believe what's going on in Okinawa to degrade our troops there. My wife and I just returned from there on leave (she is Okinawan and we were visiting her family) and were flabbergasted at some of the policies in place. As a result of the incidents that occurred just before the G-8 summit, Sergeants and Corporals cannot purchase more than a 12-pack of beer per day and cannot buy either wine or hard liquor. Lance Corporals and below can only purchase a 6-pack per day. No one can be in any establishment that serves alcohol after midnight (I asked the question about being in a convenience store - my friends that I spoke to said that this question had come up repeatedly but that none of the brass had a good answer). General Krulak often spoke of the "strategic corporal" virtually deciding national policy in the streets of some far off land, yet our troops are not even trusted with a bit of booze. Here is the real kicker. Not knowing of the policy, I tried to buy a couple of bottles of wine to give to my in-laws for various dinners we had planned. The lady behind the counter at the base package store told me that I couldn't purchase wine, but that my wife could. Not believing what I heard, I asked her to repeat herself. Again she stated that I, a 29 year-old Sergeant, could not purchase wine but that my wife could. It appears that spouses are more highly trusted than our Marine NCOs. *COPYRIGHT NOTICE** In accordance with Title 17 U. S. C. Section 107, any copyrighted work in this message is distributed under fair use without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the included information for nonprofit research and educational purposes only.[Ref. http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml ] Want to be on our lists? Write at [EMAIL PROTECTED] for a menu of our lists! ****************************************************************************** ******************* A vote for Bush or Gore is a vote to continue Clinton policies! A vote for Buchanan is a vote to continue America! Therefore a vote for Gore or Bush is a wasted vote for America! Don't waste your vote! Vote for Patrick Buchanan! Today, candor compels us to admit that our vaunted two-party system is a snare and a delusion, a fraud upon the nation. Our two parties have become nothing but two wings of the same bird of prey... Patrick Buchanan <A HREF="http://www.ctrl.org/">www.ctrl.org</A> DECLARATION & DISCLAIMER ========== CTRL is a discussion & informational exchange list. Proselytizing propagandic screeds are unwelcomed. Substance�not soap-boxing�please! These are sordid matters and 'conspiracy theory'�with its many half-truths, mis- directions and outright frauds�is used politically by different groups with major and minor effects spread throughout the spectrum of time and thought. That being said, CTRLgives no endorsement to the validity of posts, and always suggests to readers; be wary of what you read. CTRL gives no credence to Holocaust denial and nazi's need not apply. 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