Source: "Subject: CIA Activities in Chile"
September 18, 2000 © CIA (Publication from its official website.)
http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/chile/
"At the direction of the White House and interagency policy coordination
committees, CIA undertook the covert activities described below. There were
sustained propaganda efforts, including financial support for major news
media, against Allende and other Marxists. Political action projects
supported selected parties before and after the 1964 elections and after
Allende’s 1970 election.
In April 1962, the “5412 Panel Special Group”—a sub-cabinet body charged
with reviewing proposed covert actions—approved a proposal to carry out a
program of covert financial assistance to the Christian Democratic Party
(PDC) to support the 1964 Presidential candidacy of Eduardo Frei.
Also in 1962, the CIA began supporting a civic action group that undertook
various propaganda activities, including distributing posters and leaflets.
In December 1963, the 5412 Group agreed to provide a one-time payment to the
Democratic Front, a coalition of three moderate to conservative parties, in
support of the Front’s Presidential campaign.
In April 1964, the 5412 Group approved a propaganda and political action
program for the upcoming September 1964 Presidential election.
In May 1964, following the dissolution of the Democratic Front, the “303
Committee,” successor to the 5412 Group, agreed to give the Radical Party
additional covert assistance.
In February 1965, the 303 Committee approved a proposal to give covert
assistance to selected candidates in upcoming Congressional elections.
In 1967, the CIA set up a propaganda mechanism for making placements in radio
and news media.
In July 1968, the 303 Committee approved a political action program to
support individual moderate candidates running in the 1969 Congressional
elections.
As a result of 1968 propaganda activities, in 1969 the “40 Committee”
(successor to the 303 Committee) approved the establishment of a propaganda
workshop.
In the run up to the 1970 Presidential elections, the 40 Committee directed
CIA to carry out “spoiling operations” to prevent an Allende victory.
As part of a “Track I” strategy to block Allende from taking office after
the 4 September election, CIA sought to influence a Congressional run-off
vote required by the Constitution because Allende did not win an absolute
majority.
As part of a “Track II” strategy, CIA was directed to seek to instigate a
coup to prevent Allende from taking office (see discussion below).
While Allende was in office, the 40 Committee approved the redirection of
“Track I” operations that—combined with a renewed effort to support the PDC
in 1971 and a project to provide support to the National Party and Democratic
Radical Party in 1972—funneled millions of dollars to strengthen opposition
political parties. CIA also provided assistance to militant right-wing
groups to undermine the President and create a tense environment. Support
for Coup in 1970. Under “Track II” of the strategy, CIA sought to instigate
a coup to prevent Allende from taking office after he won a plurality in the
4 September election and before, as Constitutionally required because he did
not win an absolute majority, the Chilean Congress reaffirmed his victory.
CIA was working with three different groups of plotters. All three groups
made it clear that any coup would require the kidnapping of Army Commander
Rene Schneider, who felt deeply that the Constitution required that the Army
allow Allende to assume power. CIA agreed with that assessment. Although
CIA provided weapons to one of the groups, we have found no information that
the plotters’ or CIA’s intention was for the general to be killed. Contact
with one group of plotters was dropped early on because of its extremist
tendencies. CIA provided tear gas, submachine-guns and ammunition to the
second group. The third group attempted to kidnap Schneider, mortally
wounding him in the attack. CIA had previously encouraged this group to
launch a coup but withdrew support four days before the attack because, in
CIA’s assessment, the group could not carry it out successfully."
