-Caveat Lector- WJPBR Email News List [EMAIL PROTECTED] Peace at any cost is a Prelude to War! ARTICLE 4 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ U.S. Navy Gulf Commander Seeks Reserve Units to Protect Ports ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Ed.: A little more "mission creep" before Christmas. It was only a matter of time before the Navy would call the Coast Guard to protect their rears. This had not made the major news yet. From: Top World News, 21 Nov 2000 *********************************************************** By Tony Capaccio Washington, Nov. 17 (Bloomberg) -- The U.S. Navy's top commander in the Persian Gulf has asked for a small contingent of Navy and Coast Guard reservists to provide port security in the region for about six months, according to military officials. Vice Admiral Charles Moore asked for about 100 reservists to deploy by December 1 to Bahrain, headquarters of the U.S. 5th Fleet. Reservists traditionally perform this mission, and Moore asked for a unit that could be equipped with gear such as new Coast Guard 25-foot armed patrol boats and heat-seeking radar to spot swimmers and small boats. Terrorists in a small boat attacked the destroyer USS Cole in the Yemeni port of Aden on Oct. 12, killing 17 sailors. U.S. installations in the region, including, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait, were placed on highest alert after the attack. Deploying a specialized reserve unit would be the most visible step the Pentagon has taken to beef up security. Pentagon spokesman Adm. Craig Quigley declined to comment on Moore's request. The Pentagon doesn't discuss such requests but routinely announces when a formal deployment order is signed, he said. The Joint Chiefs of Staff this week decided that the Coast Guard is best equipped to undertake the mission. Coast Guard headquarters in Washington could receive formal orders to mobilize reserves as early as today. Volunteers, most of whom work in law enforcement, would likely come from specialized port security units located in St. Petersburg, Florida; Gulfport, Mississippi, Fort Eustis, Va., San Pedro, California and Port Clinton, Ohio, officials said. The Coast Guard also would supply two or three of the armed patrol boats and communications gear. Navy Wants Permanent Force The unit could be deployed by C-130 cargo aircraft to any port in the Middle East. The Navy has included funding, starting in fiscal 2003, to pay for a standing force of port security specialists that would obviate the need to call up reservists, said a Navy official. Moore said the mission could last about six months and he asked that reservists be called up involuntarily if necessary under a presidential order that has been in place since the 1991 Persian Gulf War. The port security role wouldn't be a new one for the Coast Guard. President George Bush called up 550 Coast Guard reservists to protect military cargo during the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Meanwhile, the FBI and Navy continue to investigate how the attack on the Cole unfolded, who is responsible and whether there's anything the Cole's commanders and crew could have done to stop the attack. Separately, an independent Pentagon panel chaired by a retired Navy admiral and Army general are examining Pentagon policy for protecting U.S. vessels, troops and aircraft transiting to their final destinations. =========================================================== ARTICLE 5 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The Interim US Army Brigade - Interim at Best? ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Ed.: An interesting and important discussion is developing. I was happy to hear from several senior personnel who are defending the program and are trying to emphasize a different perspective. I am committed to presenting both sides to spur the discussion. So far, 75% of readers are concerned, vs. 25% of readers who are convinced it's the way of the future. Please keep the comments coming. ********************************************************* Light - A More Capable Future ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Fellow Soldiers, I read the essay on the "weird" IBCT and really have to comment. Unfortunately, ARMY Times has turned this into a contest between wheels and tracks, and putting troopers into harms' way in less capable vehicles. As a beacon showing how we, in the Army, are not getting out the message properly I am glad the disgruntled captain wrote. The truth, if we are interested in the truth, is different. The interim force serves two purposes; it meets the near term strategic requirement for infantry heavy forces with more staying power than light forces AND serves as our bridge to the objective force. Here at Lewis, hard working fellow soldiers, not f*&^ing idiot Communists, out to destroy the Army, are working every day to prove and improve how to fight in an information environment. I could write more, as more needs to be written, but before we write the "truth" we all need, as professionals, to hear both sides of the argument. There is a dialectic involved in finding the path of virtue. Just because I work here and have the privilege of being a colonel does not mean I am a mindless automaton or a "perfumed prince," as anyone who knows me will tell you. This is the most exciting effort the Army has done in years. We are transforming ourselves without Congress forcing it and absent an immediate, looming threat. Check out Army history, last time we went from "square" divisions to triangular, and developed airborne and armored forces, we were facing a very potent Axis threat. No personal attacks, just reasoned debate which is what we need in the force. Kevin Benson, Colonel of Cavalry =========================================================== Letters of Concern ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Is The New Concept Really That Capable? ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Since the 1920s, with the writings of Fuller and Liddell Hart, and the 1940s, with the tactical victories of Guderian, Rommel and Patton, the elements of successful mobile warfare have been clear. The Desert War only proved the ongoing truth of the doctrines of Fuller and Liddell Hart. 1. The first requirement for a mobile force is firepower. As I understand it, this mobile brigade will have very little firepower. It seems that the idea is that ground troops are to locate, with the new increased MI capability, the enemy troops and then occupy ground in front of them until air forces can smash them up. There's very little smash-'em-up capability in these brigades themselves. 2. Mobility. The mobile force should be able to move quickly across all terrain to engade and destroy the enemy. From the first moment I heard that the Defense Department was going to phase out tracked vehicles in favor of wheeled vehicles, I was alarmed. Wheeled vehicles have inherent limitations, both on soft ground and in step situations, where a wheeled vehicle will be stopped by an obstacle over which a tracked vehicle can climb. The problems described with the LAV III in gravel confirm my apprehensions. 3. Armor--The vehicles must be able to withstand and survive a direct hit, at least from the front. These vehicles provide little or no protection against anything but small arms fire and shrapnel bursts. As a 10-year MI veteran, I also question the makeup of these MI companies. They're going to have all these nice gizmos. What happens when the enemy develops ECM (electronic countermeasures) to jam the controls of these UAV's? Are women going to be assigned to interrogation positions in these companies, accompanying line troops on reconnaissance patrols and interrogating new captives at the front? Is the MI company to accompany the rest of its battalion to the forward positions that that battalion will necessarily occupy? Combat intelligence personnel are the first in and the last out. Are women going to be put in these positions? Remember, though our function is one entirely permissible under the laws of war, enemies are only to likely to take the position that MI personnel are spies, and therefore subject to torture and execution. Intelligence personnel at the front will be, as they have been in every war, expected to carry their weapons and engage in combat if they encounter the enemy. These are combat positions, not support or service support positions. The current doctrine seems to be a cocktail of liberal social experimentation and Democratic efforts to shift funds from defense to social programs. It should be rejected and a new combat structure developed in its place. I will have suggestions in that regard another time. Kenneth Howes, formerly SSG 96C3LGM, 04C3LSC ----------------------------------------------------------- The Other Guys Will Still Have Tanks ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ By An Old Cavalry Scout Sergeant Having just read "Army Times" and the decision to go to the LAV III and use the 105mm old M1 tank gun system on a wheeled chassis, is a big mistake. Per the article, GEN Shinseki wants to eliminate tracked tanks (the M1 series) by around 2010. If so, what will we have in the inventory to take on any tracked foe in the world? The Russians are still building T-80s and now T-90s. The use of the LAV III in the anti-armor role uses only the TOW and Javelin anti-tank HEAT round type systems. Many other nations are going to reactive armor to counter this threat. A 120mm sabot round is probably the only thing that is going to defeat other tanks. Although the French AMX 30 turret is mounted on one of their wheeled vehicles (forget the type), and the Italian Centauro has both a tracked and wheeled variants, I can't see us, the greatest nation in the world, back sliding into a less capable morass. This is a dollar issue that we'll pay for in lives. Let's have a couple medium Brigades, but still retain the Heavy Divisions for when things really get tough. By the way, it only takes 12 days to ship a Heavy Brigade from the USA to Saudi Arabia, which happened during Desert Storm, so what are we really saving? We still don't have the airlift capability to do what GEN Shinseki is attempting to move by air. The boats are going to win the race in the end. =========================================================== ARTICLE 6 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Military Absentee Voting ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Ed.: This proves the point of my recent article. 99% of the junior officers, performing the additional duty of voting assistance officer, are trying and did try to do the right thing. The breakdown wasn't in the military Mr. Cohen! ********************************************************* Junior Navy Officer Hello from one of our deployed ships. I just wanted to drop you a note letting you know you are right on about the problems faced by the junior sailors and the junior officers serving as voting assistance officers. Many of the requests that I sent in for my division were never processed, thus my sailors never even got a ballot for the Democrats to ignore. I personally went over every application we sent in, using the provided guide to ENSURE there were absolutely no problems on our end. One of my biggest difficulties was convincing my young sailors that their vote did count, and it was truly worth the effort to get their vote in while we were out at sea. The Democrats in Florida have now made me look like a liar and a fool in front of my sailors. I guess I was wrong, and they were right. The sailors' vote really didn't count. And when it comes to this pregnant chad issue, if the land locked civilians cared enough about their vote, they would have checked it themselves. Many of my sailors brought their ballot to me, to make sure everything was done right, and one of the things we did was make sure all the punches were clear. Thanks for sticking up for us, its people like you that make serving worthwhile. =============================================================== ARTICLE 7 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Navy: Carrier Escorts Need Escorts ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Ed.: A relevant issue after the Cole incident. How to protect our ships close-in, but especially in port. Carlton offers some common sense solutions. Let's hear your comments. Carlton Meyer is a former Marine Corps officer and editor of a military Internet publication "G2mil" at www.G2mil.com. *********************************************************** By Carlton Meyer The U.S. military is once again studying "force protection" in the aftermath of the attack on the USS COLE. They will discover the obvious, large ships are very vulnerable to attack when sailing close to shore among the variety of small craft found throughout the world. No matter what weapons are mounted topside, no matter what warnings are given over loud speakers, small craft will approach U.S. Navy ships because they are curious or defiant. If our Navy established a policy of blasting all suspicious boats, dozens of people would be killed every week and U.S. Navy ships would be banned from every port and coastal waterway in the world. Keeping ships away from shore seems like the easy solution. However, why deploy ships overseas to "show the flag" and intervene ashore if ships remain hidden at sea? Operating in the Persian Gulf and crossing the Suez Canal expose Navy ships from shore attack, so will the Navy withdraw from these areas? Persian Gulf blockade operations are especially dangerous since U.S. Navy ships seek out suspicious boats, which could carry explosives or open fire with heavy machine guns The only way to protect large ships from small boats is to launch small boats to serve as escorts. Every U.S. Navy ship must carry at least two fast boats with machine guns mounted, which can be hoisted over the side, or launched from well decks of amphibious ships. Whenever a ship approaches a port or crowded coastal area, these boats would be launched to intercept any approaching boats. Even boats presumed friendly would be checked for explosives and credentials. This low-tech idea will not excite the Navy, especially since the Navy scrapped all its "brown water" small patrol boats after the Vietnam War. However, commercial-type boats could be purchased and outfitted quickly. Meanwhile, the Navy could embark the 32 Marine Corps Riverine Assault Craft (RAC) on deploying ships. These 35-foot shallow draft boats belong to the Camp Lejeune based Small Craft Company. Each speedy boat can mount two 50 caliber machine guns, two 7.62mm machine guns, and carry up to 15 passengers. They would also prove valuable supporting special operations, shore evacuations, sea rescue, and amphibious operations. Small boat operations have never appealed to blue water navies, however, the Navy needs to purchase a few hundred small boats as soon as possible to protect the fleet in coastal areas. The attack on the USS Cole was not sophisticated, yet the ship was almost sunk. Even while ships are in foreign ports, these boats should remain manned and in the water on guard duty. The Navy should not wait until trained commandos in scuba gear sink a U.S. warship. The 1991 Persian Gulf war alerted the Navy to the danger of sea mines, hopefully, the USS Cole attack will reveal the need for small boats to escort warships. *COPYRIGHT NOTICE** In accordance with Title 17 U. S. C. Section 107, any copyrighted work in this message is distributed under fair use without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the included information for nonprofit research and educational purposes only.[Ref. http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml ] Want to be on our lists? Write at [EMAIL PROTECTED] for a menu of our lists! <A HREF="http://www.ctrl.org/">www.ctrl.org</A> DECLARATION & DISCLAIMER ========== CTRL is a discussion & informational exchange list. Proselytizing propagandic screeds are unwelcomed. Substance�not soap-boxing�please! 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