-Caveat Lector-
December 26, 2000
Chinese espionage handbook details ease of swiping secrets
By Bill Gertz
THE WASHINGTON TIMES
China's government is engaged in large-scale science and
technology spying targeted primarily on gaining U.S. defense
secrets for military use, according to a translated Chinese
government manual.
The spying handbook was obtained by the Pentagon earlier this
year and reveals how Beijing gathers defense intelligence and has
been doing so aggressively for more than 30 years.
"A common saying has it that there are no walls which completely
block the wind, nor is absolute secrecy achievable," the book by
two Chinese intelligence specialists states.
"And invariably there will be numerous open situations in which
things are revealed, either in tangible or intangible form. By
picking here and there among the vast amount of public materials
and accumulating information a drop at a time, often it is
possible to basically reveal the outlines of some secret
intelligence, and this is particularly true in the case of
Western countries. Through probability analysis, in foreign
countries it is believed that 80 percent or more of intelligence
can be gotten through public materials."
The 250-page book, "Sources and Techniques of Obtaining National
Defense Science and Technology Intelligence," is not classified.
However, Pentagon officials said its contents provide new
insights on how China's government obtains secrets and
technology.
The book was written by Huo Zhongwen and Wang Zongxiao, 30-year
spy veterans who now teach intelligence at the China National
Defense, Science and Technology Information Center (DSTIC) in
Beijing.
The center coordinates sharing of technology from some 4,000
Chinese intelligence organizations.
"The Chinese do not spy as God intended it," said Paul Moore, a
former FBI intelligence analyst who specialized in Beijing spying
activities.
China uses a variety of collectors � students, business people,
scientists or visitors abroad � instead of relying on
professional intelligence officers working for the Ministry of
State Security or the People's Liberation Army Second Department,
he said.
Most often, Beijing's intelligence services do not pay cash for
secrets and expect people friendly to the Communist government,
many of whom are ethnic Chinese, to provide it free of charge,
Mr. Moore said during a recent speech.
The book describes Chinese information-gathering as a science.
"Consider information piece by piece; place an excessive,
one-sided emphasis on the absolute amount of the information
collected; gauge the quality of collection work solely on the
basis of the amount of information collected," it states.
The book contradicts official Chinese claims that its
high-technology weapons development is indigenous.
Beijing has dismissed U.S. government charges that its nuclear
weapons modernization program is based on stolen U.S. nuclear
weapons technology, most obtained from U.S. nuclear weapons
laboratories.
According to the spying manual, more than 80 percent of all
Chinese spying focuses on open-source material obtained from
government and private-sector information. The remaining 20
percent is gathered through illicit means, including eliciting
information from scientists at meetings, through documents
supplied by agents or through electronic eavesdropping.
Through negligence on the part of security review personnel,
valuable secrets can be obtained.
The book states that a "Top Secret" scientific report known as
"UCRL-4725 Weapons Development, June 1956" was mistakenly
declassified by Los Alamos National Laboratory. It became the
basis for Progressive magazine's 1979 article on the development
of a hydrogen bomb.
"This incident tells us that, on one hand, absolute secrecy is
not attainable, while on the other hand, there is a random
element involved in the discovery of secret intelligence sources,
and to turn this randomness into inevitability, it is necessary
that there be those who monitor some sectors and areas with
regularity and vigilance," the book states.
Among the best sources for national defense intelligence
material, the book lists publications from Congress, the National
Defense Technical Information Center and the National Technical
Information Service.
As for numerous reports produced by the Energy Department, the
Chinese view them as "a source of intelligence of great value."
Regarding clandestine spying, the report states: "It is also
necessary to stress that there is still 20 percent or less of our
intelligence that must come through the collection of information
using special means, such as reconnaissance satellites,
electronic eavesdropping and the activities of special agents
purchasing or stealing, etc."
Through direct contacts with scientists and other spying targets,
the report states that "this is the procedure commonly used for
collecting verbal information, but it is not limited to verbal
communications. Participation in consultative activities is also
a person-to-person exchange procedure for collecting
information."
The information is gathered from people and institutions,
including government agencies, research offices, corporate
enterprises, colleges and universities, libraries, and
information offices.
A report produced by the National Counterintelligence Center, an
interagency group based at CIA headquarters, called the Chinese
military and defense industry's use of unclassified information
"one of the most startling revelations" of the book.
The two-part report, issued in the center's June and September
newsletters, suggests the release of the spying manual, first
reported by Far Eastern Economic Review magazine, may have been a
mistake on the part of the secretive Chinese national security
bureaucracy.
A second theory is that "China's commitment to expropriating
foreign technology is so much a part of its [research and
development] culture that the book's authors simply took
acceptance of this behavior for granted," the report said.
The report described the book as extraordinary "detailed proof"
of China's efforts to obtain foreign defense technology "by the
people who helped build China's worldwide intelligence network."
"Incredible as it seems, this frank account of China's
long-standing program to siphon off Western military science and
technology, written as a textbook for PRC intelligence officers,
was sold openly in China for years," the report said. "But you
will not find the book in any bookstore or Chinese library
today."
The book "represents the first public acknowledgment by PRC
officials of China's program to collect secret and proprietary
information on foreign military hardware, especially that of the
United States," the report said.
Chinese defense technology spying increased during the 1960s when
the People's Republic of China (PRC) developed its nuclear
arsenal and then fell during the turmoil of the Cultural
Revolution when collected research material was put in warehouses
and "consumed by mice instead of humans," the book said.
Since 1978, high-technology spying grew sharply under China's
national development plan.
I.C. Smith, a retired FBI agent who specialized in Chinese
spying, said the FBI severely curtailed its counterspy efforts �
Chinese counterspying in particular � during the Clinton
administration.
"The shortsighted view of the PRC, a view held by those with
little intellectual capacity for counterintelligence, is that
China doesn't pose a threat," Mr. Smith said in an interview.
"After all, they aren't out there making dead drops,
communicating via shortwave radio, paying cash concealed in
hollow rocks, et cetera, as is the expected norm for the spy
business."
"This view became dominant in the FBI and even to a large extent,
the intelligence community, and this resulted in the FBI
essentially de-emphasizing counterintelligence, in general, and
the China [counterintelligence] program, in particular. This led
directly to the debacle of the Wen Ho Lee investigation," Mr.
Smith said.
Lee, the Los Alamos nuclear-weapons designer, was suspected of
passing nuclear warhead secrets to China. Earlier this year, he
pleaded guilty to lesser charges of mishandling classified data
on computer tapes that are missing and agreed to tell what he
knew to the FBI.
As part of the Lee investigation, FBI agents recently dug up
computer tapes from a Los Alamos landfill, but later determined
the tapes did not contain the secrets Lee took from the
laboratory.
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Kadosh, Kadosh, Kadosh, YHVH, TZEVAOT
FROM THE DESK OF:
*Michael Spitzer* <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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