Mind Control in South Africa

     Dr Louis Pasques (see below) ran a "brainwashing" program in the '70s
(also see, Dr. JL van der Westhuizen and apparent German or
German-influenced work in social control), and familiar tactics (the CIA's
terrorism strategies in the Allend� overthrow; American military direction
in paramilitary control) recur and evolve, including mind control efforts.
These also include the intrusion of right-wing Christian organizations to
mobilize segments of the population against resistance. Excerpts from a 1996
ANC statement to the Truth and Reconciliarion Commission address the uses of
political mind control in South Africa, a handbook on military oppression
and a stark reflection of American abuses. � Alex Constantine

����������������������������������
African National Congress
Statement to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission
August 1996
African National Congress
Statement to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission
August 1996

[...]

3. The Historical and International Context

... The thirty years beginning with the Sharpeville shootings in March 1960
(followed by the banning of the ANC and other organisations and the State of
Emergency) up to the first democratic elections in April 1994, constitute an
identifiable historical period. It was during these three decades that
apartheid policies were most expansively and aggressively pursued; that the
South African state made a decisive shift towards more overtly authoritarian
forms of social control and political repression; and that massive
transgressions of basic human rights in South Africa became commonplace,
bringing international notoriety to apartheid South Africa.

[...]

In 1977, PW Botha (at the time Minister of Defence) mapped out the terrain
in which the NSMS would be operating when he introduced the Defence White
Paper: 

"The resolution of the conflict in the times in which we now live demands
inter-dependent and co-ordinated action in all fields: military,
psychological, economic, political, sociological, technological, diplomatic,
ideological, cultural, etcetera. We are today involved in a war whether we
like it or not. It is therefore essential that a total national strategy
(is) formulated at the highest level."
The National Security Management System (NSMS) was instituted in 1979 as the
instrument to co-ordinate all state actions and implement reforms in line
with "total strategy". Over the years the government had built a large
network of Security Police and upgraded the police force in general to deal
with mass protest. BOSS, the civilian intelligence agency, expanded its
operations. Torture, recruitment of activists, employment of agents
provocateurs, propaganda against anti-apartheid forces, and the employment
of vigilantes became the stock-in-trade. The NSMS aimed to achieve maximum
efficiency and co-ordination of all these methods, and drew in the
additional capacity of the SADF, particularly its intelligence wing.
The NSMS, and its later versions, were premised on the belief that it is
possible to manage change through the redefinition of political, military
and economic constructs in a manner to the advantage of those who hold the
levers of state power. The underlying conceptual framework of the NSMS was
that 80% of actions to contain the security threat should be political, and
only 20% military; it was believed that the majority of people were
politically neutral, and only a small radical elite of "agitators",
"communists" and "terrorists" existed, who should be killed. In this
scenario, there was nothing intrinsically wrong with the status quo. The
apartheid state sought to create political stability through limited reforms
to apartheid combined with a variety of measures to counter the influence of
pro-democracy groups and the liberation movement; these ranged from setting
up a range of "counter-organisations," to attempts to brainwash or
psychlogically influence target groups, to measures designed to defuse
material grievances by upgrading infrastructure and the provision of
services, particularly in those areas considered trouble spots or "oliekol"
(oil spot) townships.
This period saw the genesis of the trend towards increasingly sophisticated
covert operations, continuing into the 1990s, which included illegal methods
(even by the regime's own standards) to suppress and disrupt the resistance
movement. In addition to attempts to bolster the discredited bantustan and
community councillor systems in general, there were renewed attempts to find
or create "credible" alternatives to the ANC.
Such initiatives included psychological pressure and misinformation directed
at the leadership of Inkatha to drive them further away from the liberation
movement. These methods drew on theories developed on the basis of
experiences of other wars against national liberation movements, and from
methods to destroy dissent adopted by other right-wing regimes, particularly
in Latin America.
The NSMS became fully functional in the mid-1980s as the apartheid state
attempted to destroy the mass popular resistance which had taken root by
this time. As the crisis deepened, the intelligence services, particularly
Military Intelligence, increasingly assumed political influence and even
executive control over this shadow bureaucracy, which in some respects
duplicated the existing administration and displaced its decision-making
structures. The State Security Council (SSC), although technically a
committee of the cabinet, usurped many of the cabinet's executive functions.
The SSC effectively ran the country as a super-cabinet without any such
statutory power, giving credence to the notion that a creeping military coup
was taking place in South Africa.
The 1980s saw successive States of Emergency in which all resources of the
state were harnessed by the NSMS to smash new forms of popular resistance
that had emerged. The leadership of the UDF and its affiliates was
ruthlessly rounded up and restricted. Scores of thousands of people were
detained without trial; and many more were shot dead, maimed, whipped,
tear-gassed and baton-charged. Open political activity by legal
anti-apartheid groups became virtually impossible.
Besides the more conventional forms of state harassment and repressive laws,
anti-apartheid activists and organisations were increasingly subjected to
new terror tactics: "vigilante" groups which sought out and murdered
activists, or launched mass attacks on communities with the tacit or overt
support of the SAP; pseudo-revolutionary groups which sowed confusion and
death in communities; criminal gangs which appeared to operate above the law
as long as most of their victims were pro-democracy activists; assaults,
arson, slashed or over-inflated tyres, dead cats nailed to doors, bricks
crashing through windows, bombed and burgled offices, kidnappings,
increasing attacks on exiles and activists in neighbouring states, and the
ever-present threat of death as mysterious "hit squads" stepped up their
activities.
This extract from a paper titled Some Possibilities in Counter-Insurgency
Operations, written in 1977 by SADF officer and writer on military affairs,
Helmoed-Romer Heitman, is relevant; many tactics of this nature were adopted
against the ANC: 

"Operations can include the sabotage/doctoring of discovered arms or supply
caches. The resultant difficulties will sap confidence and morale as well as
creating distrust between the insurgency and its suppliers. (...) They could
range from doctored foodstuffs, via mixing petrol with paraffin for lamps
and tampering with medical supplies, to the placing of instant detonation
fuses in, for example, every tenth hand grenade. The preference here would
be the inflicting of illness or injury, not death, the former having the
added advantage of sapping morale and straining logistics.
"The intelligence services can also create some havoc by the supplying of
false information, particularly the type to create mistrust. Thus a leader
of the insurgency could be made to appear as a police informer (..) Further,
some extra-legal operations may prove beneficial both in eliminating certain
key members of the insurgency and in sowing suspicion. Needless to say, such
operations would need to be well-disguised."
If resistance took on a mass character in the 1980s, so did repression and
the deliberate flouting of human rights by the security forces and their
masters.

[...]

The SSC was served by a Secretariat consisting of around 100 full-time staff
seconded from various state departments. This Secretariat was divided into
four branches: the Strategy branch, the Strategic Communications Branch, the
National Intelligence Interpretation Branch, and an Administration Branch.
The activities of this SSC Secretariat, particularly the Strategic
Communications Branch, are of particular importance to investigations into
gross human rights abuses in the 1980s and 1990s. The Strategic
Communications branch, according to a former SAP officer who was seconded to
this structure, was tasked with working out a total package of strategy
alternatives in response to requests coming from Ministries, government
departments, or JMCs. Such strategies could include tactics such as
assassinations, attacks on neighbouring countries, economic sabotage,
campaigns of character defamation, setting up front companies, propaganda
campaigns - in general, the entire gamut of what have come to be known as
"dirty tricks" operations. Such plans would be passed up the chain of
command to the SSC which would select the appropriate strategy.
Implementation would be carried out at the level of the Strategic
Communications Branch, or sent down the NSMS chain for implementation at
other levels, and any group, institution or individual considered
appropriate could be drawn in to implement such plans. Every government
department had "stratkom" committees, at times called "nodal points" or
"special services."
Examples of work of this nature include the establishment of a network of
state agents in the media, the diversion of trade union subscription
payments into a private bank account, in order to disrupt the activities of
the union and sow suspicion the members and the leadership, exploding a bomb
outside a cinema showing a film about Steve Biko, followed by the use of
agents in the media to implicate the AWB. Other operations were far more
elaborate, crossed international borders and continued over an extended
period of time. According to former SAP officer John Horak, who served on
structures of this nature, stratkom operations, most simply expressed, aim
to "rout the enemies of the government" and "give the government the space
to do what it wants to do." Stratkom operations rest on the "principle" that
it is perceptions, rather than the truth, which matter.
At the level of the SSC the actual operational details of any project were
not discussed, specifically in order to make it technically true for
political officials to deny all knowledge of many of these covert actions.
Under the overall direction of the SSC, thirteen Interdepartmental
Committees co-ordinated the activities of relevant government departments.
At a regional and local level it co-ordinated the work of 10 Joint
Management Centres (JMCs) the boundaries of which coincided with the 10
Regional SADF Commands (and one other JMC for the Walvis Bay military area);
60 sub-JMCs with their boundaries corresponding to those of the SAP
Districts, and over 350 mini JMCs existing at municipal / SADF Commando area
level. 
This singular network of JMC structures was tasked with the co-ordination of
"social upliftment", security and intelligence-gathering functions. Every
JMC structure consisted of four committees: welfare intelligence security
and communications - more accurately, disinformation and propaganda.
Government departments at all levels, parastatals, and business
representatives were drawn into the network, and "community liaison forums"
were set up in an attempt to extend the network to grassroots level.
The SSC therefore controlled a totalitarian national network which reached
into every part of the country, identifying anti-apartheid activities,
formulating a continuous national security profile, and making decisions on
action at national and local levels which could then be implemented by the
formal law enforcement structures backed by legislation, or by other
structures acting covertly. As Max Coleman of the Human Rights Commission
put it, "here we encounter, not acts of Parliament, no laws nor promulgated
regulations, but centres of control receiving information, making decisions
and issuing instructions. All without any constitutional status, but
nevertheless supported by secret budgets and resources with no public
accountability."
With the declaration of the first State of Emergency, the National Joint
Management Centre (NJMC), chaired by the Deputy Minister of Law and Order,
took over as the nerve centre for macro co-ordination of all welfare and
security policies. Located in the Office of the State President, the NJMC
was tasked with the executive co-ordination of the implementation of SSC
decisions, and managed the Emergency on a day-to-day basis. Roelf Meyer took
over this post from Adriaan Vlok at the beginning of December 1985.
By mid-1986 the State Security Council and the NJMC formed the apex of state
power. These committees and their subsidiary network of co-ordinated
structures that made up the NSMS bordered on constituting a separate arm of
government, and became the vanguard of state action.

-----

*    Outdoor political gatherings were banned and literally thousands of
indoor gatherings were banned. Funerals were restricted. Such gatherings
were frequently dispersed by violent means on the grounds that they were
illegal.

In addition, "legal" measures were at times used for political reasons to
deliberately disrupt attempts to halt violence, particularly in
KwaZulu-Natal. On the eve of peace talks between the UDF and Inkatha in
mid-1989, Adriaan Vlok tightened restrictions on key UDF negotiators -
effectively placing them under house arrest - thereby disrupting the
process. According to lawyers acting for the UDF and Cosatu at this time,
this was the seventh occasion since November 1987 on which Vlok had acted at
crucial moments to derail peace moves in the region.
4.7.3 Informal repression and counter-mobilisation: surrogates,
"vigilantes", hit squads, and "stratkom" operations
Under the States of Emergency in the 1980s, the government placed bans on
every conceivable form of political protest, including work stayaways. In
addition to these "lawful" repressive measures, a range of covert activities
were conducted by the state or its proxies against the democratic
opposition.

4.7.3.1 Theories of counter-revolutionary warfare

It is worth revisiting the theories of counter-revolutionary warfare which
underpinned state violence and covert activities in the 1980s and 1990s. The
counter-revolutionary warfare tactics implemented during the 1980s were
adopted from the writings of various Western military strategists; one of
the most favoured for his "practical" approach was the American Vietnam
veteran, Col. JJ McCuen, whose recommendations for the implementation of
counter-revolutionary warfare tactics were used as the basis for a handbook
titled The Art of Counter-Revolutionary Warfare, which was distributed
amongst state officials. In essence, the tactics adopted were "hard"
security measures against political opponents of the state, combined with
WHAM ("Winning Hearts and Minds") tactics aimed at defusing political
grievances and promoting right-wing ideologies among the general population.
French theorist Andre Baufr's maxim that "wars are not won on the
battlefield, but in the minds of men" was a guiding principle.
The manual contained the following framework for the implementation of WHAM
tactics:
In order to ensure that "radical" movements cannot root themselves amongst
the people, the following steps are to be taken:

[...]

3.2.1 "Self-defence" - this is "the most important part of
counter-organisation of the masses."
The recruitment of "local militia" must be undertaken with the help of local
leaders. These militia must be armed and form "the bridge between the
administration and the masses"; they


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