-Caveat Lector-
>From Science Daily
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2001/01/010118064816.htm
Source: Stanford University (http://www.stanford.edu)
Date: Posted 1/19/2001
Biological Warfare Emerges As 21st-Century Threat
Why is biophysicist Steven Block so concerned about smallpox?
After all, more than 20 years have passed since the World Health
Organization (WHO) announced the eradication of this highly
contagious and incurable disease.
"Simply put, smallpox represents a direct threat to the entire
world," says Block, a professor of biological sciences and
applied physics, who joined the Stanford faculty from Princeton
in 1999.
He points out that, although the disease has been eliminated in
the wild, frozen stocks of smallpox virus are still maintained by
the governments of the United States and Russia.
If rogue politicians or terrorists were to get hold of the
remaining supplies, "the consequences could be disastrous," he
warns.
But Block is haunted by more than the threat of a smallpox
attack.
He points to some two dozen conventional biological agents --
including anthrax, Ebola and typhus -- plus an unknown number of
genetically engineered organisms that terrorists could unleash on
an unsuspecting public.
"We're tempted to say that nobody in their right mind would ever
use these things," he says, "but not everybody is in their right
mind!"
Block paints a disturbing picture of the international
bioterrorist threat in an article published in the Jan./Feb.
issue of American Scientist magazine.
His expertise in biological warfare stems from his work with
JASON, an organization of primarily academic scientists who
dedicate a portion of their time to solving national security
problems. Members of JASON often serve as consultants to the
Defense Department and other U.S. agencies
"In my opinion," he writes, "the terrorist threat is very real,
and it's about to get worse."
Block argues that the United States and other developed countries
should be doing more to prevent the spread of biological
weaponry. He saves his harshest criticism for his fellow
biologists, most of whom have remained silent on the issue.
"Where are the biological scientists willing to go on the record
about bioweapons?" he asks.
Anthrax
Biological weapons are "the poor man's atom bomb," writes Block
in American Scientist.
He argues that bioweapons offer terrorist groups and "rogue
states" (such as Iraq and North Korea) an affordable way to
counter the overwhelming military superiority of the United
States and other nuclear powers.
The agent of choice for most biological warfare programs, writes
Block, is anthrax. Anthrax bacteria produce extremely lethal
spores, and breathing in large numbers can lead to inhalation
anthrax --- a disease that usually is fatal unless treated with
large doses of a penicillin-type antibiotic immediately after
exposure.
Anthrax spores are easy to produce and can remain viable for more
than 100 years if kept dry and out of direct sunlight.
Their long shelf life makes them "well suited to weaponization in
a device that can deliver a widespread aerosol," Block notes.
Anthrax also is relatively easy and safe to handle. "Anthrax is
not very communicable," he writes, "thereby reducing the risk
that it will spread beyond the intended target. Moreover, a
well-established vaccine exists that can prevent the onset of the
disease, allowing it to be used safely by the aggressor."
"Black biology"
If anthrax, smallpox and other "conventional" biological agents
aren't frightening enough, Block also raises the specter of
"black biology" --- a shadowy science in which microorganisms are
genetically engineered for the sole purpose of creating novel
weapons of terror.
"The idea that anybody can brew this stuff in their garage vastly
overstates the case," he says, "but any technology that can be
used to insert genes into DNA can be used for either good or
bad."
Block points out that genetic maps of deadly viruses, bacteria
and other microorganisms already are widely available in the
public domain. Any scientist bent on destruction could use this
information to attempt to clone extremely virulent strains of
bacteria and viruses, Block contends.
He notes that there are plenty of underpaid microbiologists in
the world who might be eager to work for unscrupulous clients to
produce incurable "designer diseases," such as
penicillin-resistant anthrax, or "stealth viruses" that infect
the host but remain silent until activated by some external
trigger.
History lessons
Biological warfare is as old as civilization, observes Block, but
it was international revulsion over the widespread use of
poisonous mustard gas during World War I that finally led to a
1925 treaty banning bioweapons during future wars.
During World War II, the Japanese military killed thousands of
Chinese prisoners by subjecting them to experimental doses of
anthrax, cholera, plague and other pathogens.
After World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union
launched full-scale bioweapons programs, which included the
development of aerosol sprays capable of delivering bacterial and
viral agents by plane or ballistic missile.
"Both sides also stockpiled plenty of anthrax," adds Block.
In 1969, President Richard Nixon issued an executive order
unilaterally and unconditionally ending America's bioweapons
program, and all U.S. stockpiles were destroyed by 1972.
That same year, 160 nations signed a treaty banning all use of
biological and chemical weapons; 143 countries eventually
ratified the treaty, including the United States, Russia, Iraq,
Iran, Libya and North Korea.
Failed treaty
Despite its noble intentions, says Block, the 1972 treaty lacks
any significant provisions for enforcement or verification. As a
result, a number of signatories to the treaty have maintained
active bioweapons programs.
"I'm fairly confident that the U.S. has stopped producing
biological weapons," he says, "but the Soviet Union carried out
ultra-secret bioweapons work right up until it collapsed in
1990."
In 1979, 100 people and countless livestock died following the
accidental release of anthrax spores from a bioweapons plant in
the Russian city of Sverdlovsk --- one of 40 such facilities that
operated in the former Soviet Union.
Russia's dismal economic situation raises the question of how
out-of-work bioweapons scientists are managing to find gainful
employment now, observes Block.
"Some experts contend that a low but significant level of
bioresearch still exists today," he adds.
Block's ultimate nightmare is that terrorists somehow could get
access to the smallpox viruses being kept on ice in Russia -- a
fear bolstered by the testimony of a former official in the
Russian biowarfare program, who claimed that smallpox-based
weapons were being manufactured there as recently as 1992.
Iraq also has violated the 1972 bioweapons treaty by
mass-producing weapons-grade anthrax and conducting research on a
wide variety of other biological agents. Details of the Iraqi
bioweaponry program only came to light in the aftermath of the
1991 Gulf War.
All told, Block estimates that about a dozen countries are
believed to have active bioweapons programs.
Terrorist threat
Although Block is concerned about the bioweapons buildup in Iraq
and other nations, he believes a greater threat comes from
terrorist groups willing to risk an out-of-control epidemic and
eager to suffer casualties for the good of "the cause."
A recent example was the 1995 sarin gas attack inside the Tokyo
subway by the Japanese apocalyptic cult Aum Shinrikyo. The widely
publicized assault, which killed 13 people and hospitalized
thousands, had been preceded by a series of failed botulism and
anthrax assaults near the Imperial Palace, a Tokyo airport and
two U.S. military bases.
"Groups like Aum Shinrikyo are willing to use biological agents
inefficiently just for the terror and propaganda value," Block
contends.
Solutions
During fiscal year 2000, the Clinton administration allocated
$1.4 billion to combat both biological and chemical warfare -- a
good beginning but not enough, according to Block, who believes
more should be spent beefing up America's anti-terrorist
intelligence effort and its emergency response capability.
Block also supports the development of high-tech devices capable
of instantaneously detecting lethal bacteria and viruses in the
environment, and he encourages the production and stockpiling of
new vaccines -- a hot-button issue in Washington, D.C., these
days.
The anthrax vaccine has stirred the most controversy. The U.S.
military wants to inoculate all 2.4 million active and reserve
troops, but no one knows if the current vaccine will provide
immunity against inhalation anthrax -- the type commonly used in
bioweapons.
As for smallpox, routine vaccinations in the United States ended
in 1980, the year the virus was officially eradicated, so few
Americans still have immunity today. The Centers for Disease
Control will make 40 million new doses of the vaccine available
beginning in 2004, but critics say that, in the event of a
multi-city terrorist attack, hundreds of millions of doses will
be needed to prevent the often-fatal disease from spreading
throughout the country.
On the diplomatic front, Block argues in favor of strengthening
the 1972 bioweapons treaty --- "giving it some 'teeth,'" he says,
by requiring reciprocal international inspections to assure
treaty compliance.
"Embarrassingly," he notes, "the United States itself has
steadfastly resisted certain attempts to establish provisions for
inspections" -- in part to protect the interests of large
American pharmaceutical and biotech companies against industrial
espionage.
He also makes a strong plea to his fellow biologists to break
their silence and take a stand against the proliferation of
biological weapons.
"Some folks simply do not take the threat seriously," he
observes, "but they should. Others worry about provoking a
widespread public backlash against biotechnology in general that
might have a chilling effect on their own legitimate biological
research."
None of these excuses stands up to close scrutiny, Block
contends, adding that the time to act is now before disaster
strikes.
"We should not have to wait for the biological equivalent of
Hiroshima to rally our defenses," he concludes.
The original news release can be found at:
http://www.stanford.edu/dept/news/report/news/january17/bioterror-117.html
Note: This story has been adapted from a news release issued by Stanford
University for journalists and other members of the public. If you wish to
quote from any part of this story, please credit Stanford University as the
original source. You may also wish to include the following link in any
citation:
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2001/01/010118064816.htm
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