Statement by
Director of Central Intelligence
George J. Tenet
before the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
on the
"Worldwide Threat 2001: National Security in a Changing World"
(as prepared for delivery)
07 February 2001
As I reflect this year, Mr. Chairman, on the threats to American security,
what strikes me most forcefully is the accelerating pace of change in so many
arenas that affect our nation’s interests. Numerous examples come to mind:
new communications technology that enables the efforts of terrorists and
narcotraffickers as surely as it aids law enforcement and intelligence, rapid
global population growth that will create new strains in parts of the world
least able to cope, the weakening internal bonds in a number of states whose
cohesion can no longer be taken for granted, the breaking down of old
barriers to change in places like the Koreas and Iran, the accelerating
growth in missile capabilities in so many parts of the world—to name just a
few.
Never in my experience, Mr. Chairman, has American intelligence had to deal
with such a dynamic set of concerns affecting such a broad range of US
interests. Never have we had to deal with such a high quotient of
uncertainty. With so many things on our plate, it is important always to
establish priorities. For me, the highest priority must invariably be on
those things that threaten the lives of Americans or the physical security of
the United States. With that in mind, let me turn first to the challenges
posed by international terrorism.
TRANSNATIONAL ISSUES
We have made considerable progress on terrorism against US interests and
facilities, Mr. Chairman, but it persists. The most dramatic and recent
evidence, of course, is the loss of 17 of our men and women on the USS Cole
at the hands of terrorists.
The threat from terrorism is real, it is immediate, and it is evolving. State
sponsored terrorism appears to have declined over the past five years, but
transnational groups—with decentralized leadership that makes them harder to
identify and disrupt—are emerging. We are seeing fewer centrally controlled
operations, and more acts initiated and executed at lower levels.
Terrorists are also becoming more operationally adept and more technically
sophisticated in order to defeat counterterrorism measures. For example, as
we have increased security around government and military facilities,
terrorists are seeking out "softer" targets that provide opportunities for
mass casualties. Employing increasingly advanced devices and using strategies
such as simultaneous attacks, the number of people killed or injured in
international terrorist attacks rose dramatically in the 1990s, despite a
general decline in the number of incidents. Approximately one-third of these
incidents involved US interests.
Usama bin Ladin and his global network of lieutenants and associates remain
the most immediate and serious threat. Since 1998, Bin Ladin has declared all
US citizens legitimate targets of attack. As shown by the bombing of our
Embassies in Africa in 1998 and his Millennium plots last year, he is capable
of planning multiple attacks with little or no warning.
His organization is continuing to place emphasis on developing surrogates to
carry out attacks in an effort to avoid detection, blame, and retaliation. As
a result it is often difficult to attribute terrorist incidents to his group,
Al Qa’ida.
Beyond Bin Ladin, the terrorist threat to Israel and to participants in the
Middle East peace negotiations has increased in the midst of continuing
Palestinian-Israeli violence. Palestinian rejectionists—including HAMAS and
the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ)—have stepped up violent attacks against
Israeli interests since October. The terrorist threat to US interests,
because of our friendship with Israel has also increased.
At the same time, Islamic militancy is expanding, and the worldwide pool of
potential recruits for terrorist networks is growing. In central Asia, the
Middle East, and South Asia, Islamic terrorist organizations are trying to
attract new recruits, including under the banner of anti-Americanism.
International terrorist networks have used the explosion in information
technology to advance their capabilities. The same technologies that allow
individual consumers in the United States to search out and buy books in
Australia or India also enable terrorists to raise money, spread their dogma,
find recruits, and plan operations far afield. Some groups are acquiring
rudimentary cyberattack tools. Terrorist groups are actively searching the
internet to acquire information and capabilities for chemical, biological,
radiological, and even nuclear attacks. Many of the 29 officially designated
terrorist organizations have an interest in unconventional weapons, and Usama
bin Ladin in 1998 even declared their acquisition a "religious duty."
Nevertheless, we and our Allies have scored some important successes against
terrorist groups and their plans, which I would like to discuss with you in
closed session later today. Here, in an open session, let me assure you that
the Intelligence Community has designed a robust counterterrorism program
that has preempted, disrupted, and defeated international terrorists and
their activities. In most instances, we have kept terrorists off-balance,
forcing them to worry about their own security and degrading their ability to
plan and conduct operations.
PROLIFERATION
I would like to turn now to proliferation. A variety of states and groups
continue to seek to acquire weapons of mass destruction and the means to
deliver them.
First, let me discuss the continuing and growing threat posed to us by ICBMs.
We continue to face ballistic missile threats from a variety of actors beyond
Russia and China--specifically, North Korea, probably Iran, and possibly
Iraq. In some cases, their programs are the result of indigenous
technological development, and in other cases, they are the beneficiaries of
direct foreign assistance. And while these emerging programs involve far
fewer missiles with less accuracy, yield, survivability, and reliability than
those we faced during the Cold War, they still pose a threat to US interests.
For example, more than two years ago North Korea tested a space launch
vehicle, the Taepo Dong-1, which it could theoretically convert into an ICBM.
This missile would be capable of delivering a small biological or chemical
weapon to the United States, although with significant targeting
inaccuracies. Moreover, North Korea has retained the ability to test its
follow-on Taepo Dong-2 missile, which could deliver a nuclear-sized payload
to the United States.
Iran has one of the largest and most capable ballistic missile programs in
the Middle East. Its public statements suggest that it plans to develop
longer-range rockets for use in a space-launch program, but Tehran could
follow the North Korean pattern and test an ICBM capable of delivering a
light payload to the United States in the next few years.
And given the likelihood that Iraq continues its missile development work,
we think that it too could develop an ICBM capability sometime in the next
decade assuming it received foreign assistance.
As worrying as the ICBM threat will be, Mr. Chairman, the threat to US
interests and forces from short- and medium-range ballistic missiles is here
and now. The proliferation of MRBMs—driven largely though not exclusively by
North Korean No Dong sales—is altering strategic balances in the Middle East
and Asia. These missiles include Iran’s Shahab-3, Pakistan’s Ghauri and the
Indian Agni II.
Mr. Chairman, I cannot underestimate the catalytic role that foreign
assistance has played in advancing these missile and WMD programs, shortening
their development times and aiding production. The three major suppliers of
missile or WMD-related technologies continue to be Russia, China, and North
Korea. Again, many details of their activities need to remain classified, but
let me quickly summarize the areas of our greatest concern.
Russian state-run defense and nuclear industries are still strapped for
funds, and Moscow looks to them to acquire badly needed foreign exchange
through exports. We remain concerned about the proliferation implications of
such sales in several areas.
Russian entities last year continued to supply a variety of ballistic
missile-related goods and technical know-how to countries such as Iran,
India, China, and Libya. Indeed, the transfer of ballistic missile technology
from Russia to Iran was substantial last year, and in our judgment will
continue to accelerate Iranian efforts to develop new missiles and to become
self-sufficient in production.
Russia also remained a key supplier for a variety of civilian Iranian
nuclear programs, which could be used to advance its weapons programs as well.
Russian entities are a significant source of dual-use biotechnology,
chemicals, production technology, and equipment for Iran. Russian biological
and chemical expertise is sought by Iranians and others seeking information
and training on BW and CW-agent production processes.
Chinese missile-related technical assistance to foreign countries also has
been significant over the years. Chinese help has enabled Pakistan to move
rapidly toward serial production of solid-propellant missiles. In addition to
Pakistan, firms in China provided missile-related items, raw materials, or
other help to several countries of proliferation concern, including Iran,
North Korea, and Libya.
Last November, the Chinese Foreign Ministry issued a statement that committed
China not to assist other countries in the development of ballistic missiles
that can be used to deliver nuclear weapons. Based on what we know about
China’s past proliferation behavior, Mr. Chairman, we are watching and
analyzing carefully for any sign that Chinese entities may be acting against
that commitment. We are worried, for example, that Pakistan’s continued
development of the two-stage Shaheen-II MRBM will require additional Chinese
assistance.
On the nuclear front, Chinese entities have provided extensive support in the
past to Pakistan’s safeguarded and unsafeguarded nuclear programs. In May
1996, Beijing pledged that it would not provide assistance to unsafeguarded
nuclear facilities in Pakistan; we cannot yet be certain, however, that
contacts have ended. With regard to Iran, China confirmed that work
associated with two nuclear projects would continue until the projects were
completed. Again, as with Russian help, our concern is that Iran could use
the expertise and technology it gets—even if the cooperation appears
civilian—for its weapons program.
With regard to North Korea, our main concern is P’yongyang’s continued
exports of ballistic missile-related equipment and missile components,
materials, and technical expertise. North Korean customers are countries in
the Middle East, South Asia, and North Africa. P’yongyang attaches a high
priority to the development and sale of ballistic missiles, equipment, and
related technology because these sales are a major source of hard currency.
Mr. Chairman, the missile and WMD proliferation problem continues to change
in ways that make it harder to monitor and control, increasing the risk of
substantial surprise. Among these developments are greater proficiency in the
use of denial and deception and the growing availability of dual-use
technologies—not just for missiles, but for chemical and biological agents as
well. There is also great potential of "secondary proliferation" from
maturing state-sponsored programs such as those in Pakistan, Iran, and India.
Add to this group the private companies, scientists, and engineers in Russia,
China, and India who may be increasing their involvement in these activities,
taking advantage of weak or unenforceable national export controls and the
growing availability of technologies. These trends have continued and, in
some cases, have accelerated over the past year.
INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND SPACE
Mr. Chairman, I want to reemphasize the concerns I raised last year about our
nation’s vulnerability to attacks on our critical information infrastructure.
No country in the world rivals the US in its reliance, dependence, and
dominance of information systems. The great advantage we derive from this
also presents us with unique vulnerabilities.
Indeed, computer-based information operations could provide our adversaries
with an asymmetric response to US military superiority by giving them the
potential to degrade or circumvent our advantage in conventional military
power.
Attacks on our military, economic, or telecommunications infrastructure can
be launched from anywhere in the world, and they can be used to transport the
problems of a distant conflict directly to America’s heartland.
Likewise, our adversaries well understand US strategic dependence on access
to space. Operations to disrupt, degrade, or defeat US space assets will be
attractive options for those seeking to counter US strategic military
superiority. Moreover, we know that foreign countries are interested in or
experimenting with a variety of technologies that could be used to develop
counterspace capabilities.
Mr. Chairman, we are in a race with technology itself. We are creating
relations with the private sector and academia to help us keep pace with
ever-changing technology. Last year I established the Information Operations
Center within CIA to bring together our best and brightest to ensure that we
had a strategy for dealing with the cyber threat.
Along with partners in the Departments of Justice, Energy, and Defense we
will work diligently to protect critical US information assets. Let me also
say that we must view our space systems and capabilities as part of the same
critical infrastructure that needs protection.
NARCOTICS
Mr. Chairman, drug traffickers are also making themselves more capable and
efficient. The growing diversification of trafficking organizations—with
smaller groups interacting with one another to transfer cocaine from source
to market—and the diversification of routes and methods pose major challenges
for our counterdrug programs. Changing production patterns and the
development of new markets will make further headway against the drug trade
difficult.
Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru continue to supply all of the cocaine consumed
worldwide including in the United States. Colombia is the linchpin of the
global cocaine industry as it is home to the largest coca-growing,
coca-processing, and trafficking operations in the world. With regard to
heroin, nearly all of the world's opium production is concentrated in
Afghanistan and Burma. Production in Afghanistan has been exploding,
accounting for 72 percent of illicit global opium production in 2000.
The drug threat is increasingly intertwined with other threats. For example,
the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, wh
