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The Truth About North Korea's Missile Program
05 March 2001
Summary
Despite occasional signals to the contrary, North Korea continues to try to
develop long-range missiles. But the regime of Kim Jong Il finds the path to
a significant breakthrough blocked – not by U.S. efforts, but notably by the
Chinese and Russian governments. The North Korean missile program is in fact
primitive and unlikely to pose a threat to the United States anytime soon.
Washington has apparently overstated the North's capabilities in the quest
for a national missile defense.
Analysis
In recent months, North Korea has signaled it would curtail ballistic missile
development after sending ripples of fear throughout East Asia with its 1998
missile test. Caught by surprise, Washington seized on that test to redouble
efforts to build a national missile defense.
Late last year, Pyongyang told Russian President Vladimir Putin it might halt
development altogether in return for commercial space-launch capabilities. In
December, the regime pledged not to test fire another long-range weapon, like
the three-stage Taepo Dong-1 that flew over Japan in 1998. In February,
Pyongyang issued a veiled threat, saying stalled talks might force it to
abandon its pledge.
Reliable intelligence indicates the regime is, in fact, struggling to develop
its missile program. North Korea continues to assist other nations – most
notably Iran, Pakistan and Syria – by sharing propulsion and staging
technology that can add range to these nations’ missiles; in exchange,
Pyongyang receives hard currency and access to certain technology. In North
Korea itself, the focus has shifted away from live tests to laboratory and
theoretical work aimed at increasing accuracy.
But the North finds itself stalled in making any significant breakthroughs.
The program is chiefly hampered, not by U.S. pressure, but by the
unwillingness of the Chinese and Russian governments to significantly advance
Pyongyang’s knowledge. Both Beijing and Moscow are withholding valuable
technology. Contrary to Central Intelligence Agency projections, the North is
not gaining significant Chinese or Russian technology.
Even if the regime chose to launch a long-range missile today, it would have
great difficulty in doing so because the entire inventory of long-range
missiles in North Korea appears to be composed of as few as one or two
weapons. The true state of the program appears starkly primitive and
incapable of a significant breakthrough as long as China and Russia refuse to
provide significant assistance. Another test launch is unlikely. And while
the North won’t abandon the program, the American fear of a surprise strike
– with little or no warning – is unfounded at the present time.
Up Close: The North’s Missile Program
North Korea’s armed forces – under the guise of a civilian agency – continue
research and development efforts, as opposed to active testing.
The missile program is politically important. The regime continues the
program instead of shelving it, because the program has helped extract
concessions from the United States and others, while increasing the North’s
military capabilities and gaining it hard currency.
The pursuit of these political goals, however, mitigates the chances of a new
missile test anytime soon. Such a launch would threaten engagement with South
Korea’s government, which is pursuing its “sunshine” policy. And a launch
would risk sorely needed foreign investment and aid. South Korean companies,
despite a downturn, pledged to invest in North Korea in everything from
tourism to heavy manufacturing.
Given the value of the program in its current state of hibernation, the
North’s research efforts increasingly focus on improving the accuracy of
long-range missiles. The lack of accuracy is the Achilles’ heel of the
North’s program, which has overcome other obstacles such as devising
primitive multi-stage vehicles and increasing range. Laboratory research is
largely theoretical, involving physics calculations and mathematical
estimates that are apparently sub-critical efforts.
Much of Washington’s case for a national missile defense in recent years has
rested on North Korea. The 1998 test flight forced the Clinton administration
to become more aggressive on national missile defense; the findings of the
Rumsfeld Commission six weeks earlier had warned the CIA could not predict a
sudden technological breakthrough. And late last year, advocates of a
land-based national missile defense discounted the U.S. Navy’s ability to
shoot down missiles rising out of the North’s mountainous geography..
But even the intended aim point of the 1998 test remains a mystery to foreign
intelligence agencies, underscoring problems with hitting a target precisely.
The test launch captured the world’s attention, with the missile flying over
Japan. But the flight of the Taepo Dong-1 appears to have been errant. If it
were intended to launch a satellite into orbit, as the regime claimed, the
eastward flight path would not have been necessary. A 1994 test of the
intermediate range No Dong missile showed similar problems.
The more advanced three-stage Taepo Dong-2 exists largely on paper. The
missile was designed to have a solid fuel engine in its third stage, in order
to dramatically extend its range to nearly 2,200 miles. Because of a variety
of challenges – likely a lack of funding – not even the CIA expects the
missile to be ready for prime time until 2020 without considerable outside
assistance. More recent research indicates the agency probably is correct and
success soon is unlikely.
Hunting for technical clues to its problems as well as hard currency,
Pyongyang continues to transfer technology and otherwise aid missile programs
in Pakistan, Syria and Iran. While North Korea offers assistance in extending
the range of missiles, it probably is using these programs as a cover to gain
access to guidance technology, particularly from Iran.
Iran probably has advanced its own program to the point where it develops
many components indigenously. Tehran could be providing North Korea with
technology and a location for covert missile research and development. This
linkage has not escaped the U.S. government. In December, Washington imposed
sanctions against the North Korean firm of Changgwang Sinyong Corp. for
exporting unspecified missile technology to Iran, according to the Federal
Register.
Outside Help Drying Up
Without substantial outside assistance, North Korea will be unable to jump to
the next level in missile technology: the ability to launch a three-stage
vehicle with a high degree of confidence in the warhead striking the intended
target. The foreign help that once flowed into North Korea shows signs of
drying up.
While on tour in Russia recently, U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld
publicly criticized the Russian government for continuing to assist North
Korea’s missile program. Foreign knowledge and components – particularly
from Russia and China – have been vital to the development of SCUD missile
technology that is the foundation of Pyongyang’s missile program.
But technological assistance from Russia and China appears to be
significantly decreasing and there are reasons to believe this trend will
continue. Russian and Chinese advisors in North Korea directly assist the
missile program, according to sources.
Moscow and Beijing, however, have significantly curtailed the transfer of
critical technology, although they are certain to remain involved in the
North Korean program. China has begun to establish an export control system
to ensure it doesn't provide missile and other components to countries no
longer in its interest to assist, including North Korea. Both governments
fear an arms race in Asia. And both governments are acting out of concern
that North Korea is providing an easy justification for the U.S. drive to
build a national missile defense that would undercut the remaining Chinese
and Russian strategic arsenals.
Russia and China have placed North Korea’s missile program behind immediate
national interests. Russia, in particular, is pursuing an economic
relationship with South Korea. And China’s leaders worry the North’s program
can be used to justify an arms buildup in Japan.
Russia and China therefore will continue to contain the North’s program,
while maintaining just enough ties to control indigenous efforts. For
example, each will keep the flow of technology down but keep personnel in
the North to monitor and influence the program’s direction.
Next in North Korea
The reverberations from the 1998 missile test helped set the stage for the
Stalinist nation’s growing acceptance by the international community.
Pyongyang used the threat of its missiles and promises to scale back
development to position itself in negotiations with its neighbors and the
United States.
Now, North Korea is highly unlikely to conduct another ballistic missile
test. The Foreign Ministry recently announced that while it promised not to
fire a missile during talks, it couldn’t continue “to do so indefinitely.”
Though widely seen as a threat to launch a missile, the statement reflects
the basic strategy. A veiled threat is valuable for gaining concessions.
From a technical standpoint, North Korea is unprepared to carry through with
even this veiled threat. The military faces severe technical challenges and a
paucity of missile parts and components in the inventory with which to
conduct more long-range tests. In addition to its usefulness as a trump card,
low-level research is likely to continue not only to develop better weapons
systems for the North Korean military but also for export.
Due to primitive technology and limited assistance from Russia and China,
however, the program is unlikely to advance significantly anytime soon.
