http://www.public-i.org/story_01_062701.htm



CIA Gave at Least $10 Million 
To Peru’s Ex-Spymaster Montesinos

By Angel Paez

The Central Intelligence Agency gave ex-Peruvian spymaster Vladimiro
Montesinos at least $10 million in cash over the last decade, as well as
high-tech surveillance equipment that he used against his political
opponents, the Center for Public Integrity has learned.

Montesinos, who now faces trial on murder, arms and drug trafficking charges,
among others, had founded and personally controlled a counter-drug unit
within Peru’s National Intelligence Service, known by its Spanish acronym
SIN. 

It was to that Narcotics Intelligence Division, known as DIN, that the CIA
directed at least $10 million in cash payments from 1990 until September
2000, U.S. officials told the Center’s International Consortium of
Investigative Journalists. Most of the money was to have financed
intelligence activities in the drug war, though officials acknowledged a
small part was for antiterrorist activities. 

The CIA knew the money was going directly to Montesinos and had receipts for
the payments, the sources said. “It was an agency-to-agency relationship,”
said one U.S. official, speaking on condition of anonymity in Lima, the
capital, “with Vladimiro Montesinos as the intermediary. . . . Montesinos had
the money under his control.” 

The new information on Montesinos is part of an extensive soon-to-be-released
report by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists on U.S.
aid to Latin America. The material on Montesinos is based on multiple
interviews with U.S. and Peruvian officials.
A CIA spokesman in Washington refused to confirm or deny that the agency had
helped fund DIN, and that part of those funds went into Montesino’s pockets.

However, an intelligence official who asked not to be further identified
confirmed that Montesinos had pocketed some, but not most, of the funds. He
said that the CIA had been fully aware that Montesino was involved in corrupt
deals and that the CIA had briefed the National Security Council, State
Department and Pentagon about the alleged corruption. He said the agencies
directed the CIA to continue to work with Montesinos because he was Peru’s
designated chief of counternarcotics and the only game in town.

Montesinos disappeared in October as the regime of Peruvian President Alberto
Fujimori collapsed under wide-ranging corruption allegations and was seized
in Venezuela on Saturday night, June 23. Montesinos was returned to Peru on
June 25 to face an array of government charges. 

U.S. shrugged off reports
Over the years, the United States accumulated plenty of evidence of
corruption, human rights abuses and other anti-democratic actions by
Montesinos, but it shrugged off the reports because Montesinos – the
unofficial head of the National Intelligence Service – was a CIA asset deemed
key to Washington’s drug war in the Andes. 

But the final blow appeared to be Montesinos double-dealing in Colombia. In
what is surely among the most embarrassing turns in post-Cold War U.S.
foreign policy, Montesinos used his CIA-backed position of influence to get
rich and to betray his benefactors. He arranged an arms deal that sent at
least 10,000 AK-47 assault rifles from Jordan to Colombia’s leftist FARC
guerrillas, collectively public enemy number one in the U.S. war on drugs in
Latin America and the main target of Washington’s $1.3 billion
counternarcotics aid package to Colombia.

Montesinos had long been fingered as corrupted by drug money, although many
of the earlier claims that surfaced came from arrested drug dealers. But by
1997, the State Department began to document Montesinos’ questionable
activities in its annual human rights reports. The Senate Appropriations
Committee noted in 1999 that it had “repeatedly expressed concern about U.S.
support for the Peruvian National Intelligence Service” and requested that it
“be consulted prior to any decision to provide assistance to the SIN."

Diversion of funds no surprise
The CIA suspected that Montesinos was involved in some illegal activities and
was not surprised when informed of the diversion of funds, U.S. sources said.
It continued doing business with him “because he solved problems, including
problems he created himself,” one U.S. source told ICIJ. 

The U.S. Embassy has provided Peru’s anti-corruption prosecutor with detailed
information about the CIA’s payments to Montesinos in response to the
Peruvian government’s wide-ranging investigations into Montesinos’
malfeasance. The prosecutor, Ana Cecilia Magallanes, has told U.S. officials
that she has documents showing the diversion of SIN money, including the CIA
payments, toward illegal activities. Sources would not elaborate on what
those activities included, but the prosecutor said it did not appear that
those monies were diverted into Montesinos’ personal accounts. 

However, Peruvian prosecutors also allege that Montesinos collaborated with
drug traffickers, who paid him and his associates protection money. After 10
years as the power behind Fujimori, Montesinos had at least $264 million
deposited in foreign bank accounts in Switzerland, the United States, the
Cayman Islands and other nations, Peru's equivalent of attorney general,
Nelly Calderon Navarro, announced in June.

According to U.S. embassy officials in Lima interviewed by ICIJ, the SIN’s
narcotics intelligence unit was funded and assisted by both the CIA and the
State Department’s Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement.
The State Department’s share included $36,000 in 1996, $150,000 in 1997 and
$25,000 in 1998, according to U.S. Embassy officials. In 1999, State withheld
aid to the SIN because of congressional anger about reports that Montesinos
was using the unit to gather intelligence on the regime’s political opponents.


Three separate Peruvian military intelligence sources told ICIJ that
surveillance equipment provided by the CIA for use in the drug war was
instead used by the SIN to intercept the conversations of opposition
political figures, journalists, businessmen and military officers suspected
of disloyalty to the Fujimori regime. “Intelligence services” were sold to
wealthy individuals, corporations or influential officers. A buyer could pay
$1,000 to $2,500 per week to receive intercepts from the tapping of a single
phone. Or, the military intelligence sources said, the wealthy buyers could
pay spies to gather other information about individuals of their choosing.


Support began in 1970s
The CIA began supporting Montesinos in the mid-1970s when he, as a
middle-ranking Peruvian army officer, came to Washington on an unauthorized
visit and handed over documents concerning Soviet arms deals with Peru. When
the CIA learned of Montesinos’ double-dealing with Colombia’s FARC
guerrillas, according to U.S. and Peruvian sources, it decided to try to
bring him down. 

The demise began with the mysterious release of a videotape showing
Montesinos paying a $15,000 bribe to an opposition politician in September
2000. Hundreds of videotapes subsequently made public showed Montesinos and
his subordinates paying off politicians, businessmen and journalists. Former
military officers and civilian officials have since come forward to provide
court testimony about the regime’s involvement in bribery, arms and drug
trafficking, and human rights violations including torture, espionage,
extortion of political opponents and harassment of the press. 

Peruvian military sources, speaking on condition of anonymity, told ICIJ that
they believed that the CIA leaked some of the videotapes showing Montesinos’
dirty deals. 

Fujimori, who was re-elected president in June 2000 and amended the Peruvian
constitution in order to retain the office for nearly three presidential
terms, fled to Japan, where he resigned from office on Nov. 20, 2000. 


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