Well after reading this I remember it was not Arab or Egyptian or Iranian or Palestinian Planes who tried to sink the USS Liberty - it was Israeli planes for which we paid.....they could have been forgiven had it not been for the fact they new it was a US ship, and they napalmed our men on deck for over 45 minutes - burning them alive and bombing them - and we give them billions of dollars without which of course, they would be so much "trailer trasher" as Joshua2 would call them living off the kindness of others but returning the kindness like Albright returned the kidness of the Serbs. So Joshua2 - the symbols of Capitalism, the World Trade Center for biblical purposes called "the towers" have been destroyed and the voice of Karl Marx is heard in the land - pass that onto your little Marxist friends unless they are sitlll spying on Militia for ADL... Saba Note: Iran planed to blow up White House using Kamakaze pilots in 1995......planes in Florida is where these pilots trained who left little arabic books in car with little red arrows? I agree with Edward - blow up the whole god damned bunch and let us get our oil in Alaska going for we are going into a new age and do not need this Zionist garbage....20,000 dead.....but who is the enemy? REMEMBER THE USS LIBERTY AND THEN DECIDE. | Thu 13/09/2001 � ��� �Feature��Search the webBall bearings laid on RDX plastic explosives in suicide kit Suicide Terrorism: Emerging Global Patterns By Rohan Gunaratna Introduction: In suicide terrorism, the aim of the psychologically- and physically-war trained terrorist is to die while destroying the "enemy" target. Suicide as used in the appellation "suicide terrorism" does not imply suicide as a psychological or pathological situation or condition. Suicide terrorism is different from high-risk military operations where death is not certain and the perpetrator may survive the operation. In the spectrum of political violence, from the perspective of the perpetrator, suicide terrorism is the most violent form of expression. Sri Lankan Context: Of the contemporary guerrilla and terrorist groups engaged in suicide operations, the LTTE has conducted the largest number of attacks. The LTTE has a special organisation called Black Tigers, exclusively for cadres who volunteer to conduct suicide operations. On Black Tiger day, Monday July 5, 1999, the LTTE erected a monument to commemorate the Black Tigers in Puthukuthirippu in the Wanni. The LTTE issued a statement from its Political Head Quarters in Mallavi, Wanni, that it had conducted 147 suicide operations since 1987. However, this number did not include the suicide attacks carried out by the LTTE against civilians. The LTTE code prevents claiming attacks on non-military personnel such as Rajiv Gandhi, the former Prime Minister of India, Ranasinghe Premadasa, the President of Sri Lanka, Ranjan Wijeratne, the Sri Lankan Minister of State for Defence, and Gamini Dissanayake, Sri Lankan Presidential candidate of the United National Party. By adopting such a position, the LTTE seeks to project to the international community that it is a liberation movement that targets only military personnel and not a terrorist group. The LTTE suicide bomber is motivated by his or her politico-social environment as well as by the indoctrination carried out by the LTTE. The LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran states: "With perseverance and sacrifice, Tamil Eelam can be achieved in 100 years. But if we conduct Black Tiger operations, we can shorten the suffering of the people and achieve Tamil Eelam in a shorter period of time. The first LTTE suicide operation was conducted on July 5, 1987, to stall the advance of the Sri Lankan military to capture Jaffna town. An LTTE driver Wasanthan alias Captain Millar volunteered to drive a vehicle full of explosives into the makeshift army camp in Nelliaddy. Although the suicide operation was not the reason to abort the mission to capture Jaffna, the LTTE propaganda claimed that Captain Millar's success of killing 40 soldiers in Nelliaddy frustrated the intentions of the government to recapture the heartland of the Tamils. The LTTE did not conduct suicide operations during the IPKF period but initiated a series of suicide attacks with the political assassination of Ranjan Wijeatne and Rajiv Gandhi in March and May 1991. These off the battlefield strikes were developed in Eelam War III, when the LTTE integrated suicide bombers into their land and sea fighting forces. As the Sri Lankan case demonstrates, suicide terrorism is driven not only by religious but ethnic nationalism. In the long term a higher number of ethnic communities are at risk of experiencing conflicts driven by ethnic nationalism. By understanding both the contexts and the vulnerabilities of groups to use suicide terrorism, the threat can be addressed proactively and comprehensively. The LTTE used suicide bombers to destroy the Joint Operations Command, the nerve centre of the Sri Lankan security forces; the Central Bank; the World Trade Centre; the sacred Temple of the Tooth Relic, the most hallowed Buddhist shrine in the world; and the oil storage installations in Kolonnawa. The LTTE also used suicide bombers to kill the navy chief Admiral Clancy Fernando, a Brigade commander of the Jaffna peninsula Brigadier Larry Wijeratne, and several others at the forefront of counter-insurgency operations. For instance, Chief Inspector Nilabdeen, the head of the anti-terrorism unit, in a suburban police station escaped with injuries but Razeek, a former Tamil militant integrated to the army, was killed in May 1999. In most cases, the suicide bombers have succeeded in reaching its target due to LTTE infiltration or thorough reconnaissance. Security designed to deceive the LTTE rather than harden the protection of the target has guaranteed security saving the lives of several VIPs. Further, sound and timely intelligence has disrupted several LTTE cells in the south. President Chandrika Kumaratunge survived more than one attempt to assassinate her when the LTTE operations leader was arrested in Colombo; a reconnaissance team member was arrested in Vavuniya; and when a lorry laden with explosive blew up prematurely in Galle on December 8, 1997. Similarly two attempts to kill General Ratwatte were foiled, when the suicide bomber with a cart of coconuts prematurely blew up in Torrington on August 7, 1995, and a bus meant for his vehicle while on the road to parliament blew up in Maradana on March 5, 1998. suicide kit detonators and wireing Global Context: The number of groups engaged in suicide operations have increased from the 1980s to the 1990s. The 1990s witnessed suicide strikes by Hamas and Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) in Israel; Hezballah in Lebanon, Israel, Panama and Argentina; Groupe Islamique Armee (Armed Islamic Group: GIA) in Algeria; PKK in Turkey and Iraq; al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group: IG) of Egypt in Pakistan and Croatia; and LTTE in Sri Lanka and India. The 1980s witnessed suicide strikes by Hezballah, al-Da'aw (Islamic Action), al-Amal, Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party, Ba'ath Party, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) in Lebanon and Kuwait, and by the LTTE in Sri Lanka. The concept of suicide terrorism was acquired by emulation or by the transfer of technology through group-to-group contact. The groups currently engaged in suicide terrorism has political, military and financial links with several other groups. As more guerrilla and terrorist groups are suicide-capable in the 1990s than in the 1980s, it is likely that the threat of suicide terrorism will continue into the next century. Most suicide attacks in the 1980s were in pre-existing theaters of conflict but their range of operation increased into neighboring countries in the 1990s. For instance, a female suicide bomber of the LTTE assassinated the former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in Tamil Nadu state, India in May 1991. Hamas commenced their suicide bomb campaign in Israel in October 1993, after an abortive attack in June 1988. A Hezballah suicide bomb destroyed the Israeli Embassy and the Jewish Community Center in Buenos Aires, Argentina, in March 1992 and July 1994, respectively; and a mid-air explosion on board an aircraft killed the suicide bomber and 20 others in Panama in July 1994. An affiliate of IG of Egypt conducted suicide strikes on the Police HQ in Rijeka, Croatia and the Egyptian Embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan, in October and November 1995 respectively. The LTTE, Hezballah, Hamas and the PKK institutionalized the indoctrination and physical training of its volunteers to enhance the efficiency and endurance of the bomber. The threat of suicide bombings, previously confined to the Middle East and to South Asia, is likely to spread to other areas with domestic governments increasingly denying their territories for use by these groups. North American and Western European security and intelligence agencies assess suicide terrorism as a threat to Western security. . Post-Cold war regional conflicts are witnessing both enhanced migration of displaced persons and their sustenance by fledgling Diaspora and ethnic communities. Under the cover of such communities, the potential for a guerrilla/terrorist group to employ a bomber to engage in long-range surveillance and strike a target in an "enemy" country, is increasingly. The increase in potential for groups to penetrate and operate far away from theaters of conflict can have implications for states hosting migrant communities as well as states intervening in conflict. Suicide strikes have serious implications. Suicide attacks led to the withdrawal of the Multi-National Peacekeeping Force after Hezballah concurrently destroyed the headquarters of the US marines and the French paratroopers in Lebanon in October 1983; pre-empted the reintroduction of the Indian Peacekeeping Force to Sri Lanka after the LTTE assassinated the architect of the Indo-Lanka Peace Accord Rajiv Gandhi in India in May 1991; and temporarily stalled the peace process in the Middle East after Hamas targeted civilians in Israel throughout the 1990s. One suicide bomber can have a profound effect on the political, military and economic contexts, especially in peace building situations. After the conflict-ravaged Jaffna peninsula held by the LTTE was recovered by the military in 1995, the ambitious rehabilitation and reconstruction program was disrupted by a lone suicide bomber assassinating the Town Commandant Brigadier Ananda Hamangoda (posthumously promoted Major General). Even for states with sophisticated military and intelligence apparatus, suicide terrorism is hard to combat. Counter-measures: The defense research by Israel, Sri Lanka, India and Turkey, states affected by suicide terrorism, has led to the development of human intelligence capability and other technical counter-measures. But, there is no security or technical cooperation between the most affected states - Israel and Sri Lanka. Although there is security and intelligence cooperation between India and Sri Lanka, Israel and India, Israel and Turkey, there is lack of technical cooperation. Non-commercial, indigenously-developed electronic warfare counter-measures against terrorism is rarely shared even among friendly states. Current research by governments are largely confined to technically preventing or protecting land or sea targets against suicide attacks. After nearly two decades of suicide terrorism, systematic research examining this phenomenon evades both the scholar and analyst due to lack of intensive research into group dynamics as well as the political, military and socio-economic contexts that spawn and sustain suicide terrorism. For instance, widespread poverty and underdevelopment exist in West Bank, Gaza, Lebanon, southeastern Turkey, and northeastern Sri Lanka, the recruiting ground of a bulk of the suicide bombers. Dan Setton (director), 'Suicide Bombers: Secrets of the Shaheed," Cinemax Reel Life film, April 1998 states: "...Hamas extremists continue to preach their version of patriotism among the desperate and the poor." Instead of regulating the environmental factors and group dynamics, states respond differently to the threat. For instance, Israel responds reactively to the effects of suicide terrorism by destroying the homes of the suicide bombers and prosecuting potential suicide bombers. As a result suicide attacks have become more ruthless (targeting civilian targets), deceptive (using deep penetration) and daring (attacking multiple targets). As suicide attacks are planned and executed by compartmentalized cells, even a pragmatic military response of infiltration or "hardening" likely targets by stepping up protection, fails to guarantee security and offers no long-term solution. The extant criminal justice and prisons system offers neither deterrence nor rehabilitation to a politically-motivated potential bomber. In Sri Lanka and in other states, the effectiveness of the state response to suicide terrorism has not been assessed. Similarly, no analysis has been conducted on the differing trends in the use of suicide terrorism. By comparing the evolution in technology, training and operational doctrine against state response over nearly two decades, likely trends can be identified. There is a paucity of research on suicide terrorism both in the open and classified literature. Research on suicide terrorism has been confined to the Middle East. The exception has been the Indian forensic specialist P. Chandra Sekharan who scientifically proved that it was the suicide bomber Thenmuli Rajaratnam alias Dhanu who assassinated Rajiv Gandhi. Except for the Chandra Sekharan study, and another one study tracing the roots of the phenomenon in the Indian Ocean region, suicide terrorism as a political and a social phenomena has not been researched in Asia. Law enforcement reports analyze the threat, suicide devices, logistics and support network, modus operandii, and identifies potential bombers, their ideologues and device designers. By acquiring and comparatively analyzing a wide-range of data, a deeper understanding of the distinction between suicide and non-suicide terrorism is essential to evolve solutions to suicide terrorism. The underlying factors and conditions that drive suicide terrorism can help formulate long range policies to break the cycle of violence. Both as a political and social phenomenon as well as a security threat, suicide terrorism is one of the least studied problems. suicide kit straps to secure explosives under breasts of female suicide cadre. Conclusions: The suicide culture of post-modern guerrilla and terrorist groups is not monolithic. For instance, there are distinctions between the LTTE and Hamas suicide attacks. While all the LTTE suicide attacks were aimed at destroying a political, military, economic or religio-cultural target, the other groups used it as a tool of terror. For instance, a young female member of the PKK wearing a black religious veil killed herself and injured 14 others on July 5, 1999. Seconds before detonating the explosives strapped to her body outside a police station in Turkey's southern city of Adana, she made a victory sign. Other than the tradition land and sea suicide operations, the world is likely to witness a third form. In addition to several unsuccessful aerial suicide attacks and one successful aerial suicide attack in the Middle East, there is evidence that both the LTTE and Middle Eastern groups are attempting to develop an aerial borned human Improvised Explosive Device. For instance, Jack Anderson reported in the Washington Post on June 23 1989 that he was warned that Iranian Kamikaze terrorists may be planning to dive an explosives-rigged plane into the White House. Anderson quoted Houshang Mortezai, a veteran pilot whom Anderson said defected to US intelligence, as saying "I was selected along with 32 other pilots to undergo ttraiing in Won San, North Korea, during 1982." Anderson said they were traied in single-engine Swiss Pilatus planes. "We hedge hopped, touching tree branches and flew under bridges. They had us do the most unbelievable somersaults." Aderson reported that: "US intelligence confirmed that a Swiss compay deliverd about 80 Pilatus PC-7 aircraft to Iran for crop dusting." Terrorist/guerrilla ideologues and leaders indoctrinate potential suicide bombers by manipulating religious or ethnic sentiments. Through formal and informal education (especially using media), a norm/ethic can be built against the misrepresentation of religion or ethnicity to advance political objectives. Identifying and remedying the specific grievances and aspirations of potential bombers could dampen their susceptibilities to recruitment for suicide missions. Long-range policies can be formulated to build societal resistance against forms of violence such as suicide terrorism. In the next decade, suicide terrorism is likely to proliferate from conflict-ridden countries into neighboring countries and even to distant theaters. Preliminary evidence indicate the conventional military reprisals of the state to aggravate the problem and create more potential bombers. Neither Sri Lanka nor Israel, the most affected countries, have militarily reduced the scale of suicide terrorism. After analyzing the distinction between suicide and non-suicide terrorism, militaries should incorporate non-military strategies aimed at regulating suicide terrorism to their counter-terrorism doctrines. The traditional concepts of deterrence has failed to work against groups that have graduated into the stage of adopting suicide terrorism as a weapon of war. A new military and security doctrine is essential to regulate the threat of suicide terrorism. Rohan Gunaratna, British Chevening Scholar in International Relations, University of St. Andrews, Scotland is author "Sri Lanka's Ethnic Crisis and National Security." Copyright �1999 Colombo Chronicle. �� �In:�
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