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Click Here: <A
HREF="http://www.ctrl.org/MilleganStews/flapdoodlefactory.html";>flapdoodle
factory in the nation . . .</A>
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Millegan Stews
9/20/01

. . . quickly made the White House into the chief flapdoodle factory in the
nation . . .

An excerpt from:
America in Crisis
Daniel Aaron editor
Alfred Knopf �1952

The primary significance of the war for the psychic economy of the nineties
was that it served as an outlet for aggressive impulses while presenting
itself, quite truthfully, as an idealistic and humanitarian crusade. The
American public was not interested in the material gains of an intervention
in Cuba. It never dreamed that the war would lead to the taking of the
Philippines. Starting a war for a high-minded and altruistic purpose and then
transmuting it into a war for annexation was unthinkable; it would be, as
McKinley put it in a phrase that later came back to haunt him, "criminal
aggression."
. . .

The dynamic element in the movement for imperialism was a small group of
politicians, intellectuals, and publicists, including Senator Henry Cabot
Lodge, Theodore Roosevelt, John Hay, Senator Albert J. Beveridge, Whitelaw
Reid, editor of the New York Tribune, Albert Shaw, editor of the Review of
Reviews, Walter Hines Page, editor of the Atlantic Monthly, and Henry and
Brooks Adams.

They were much concerned that the United States expand its army and
particularly its navy; that it dig an isthmian canal; that it acquire the
naval bases and colonies in the Caribbean and the Pacific necessary to
protect such a canal; that it annex Hawaii and Samoa. At their most
aggressive, they also called for the annexation of Canada, . . .

The central figure in this group was Theodore Roosevelt, who more than any
other single man was responsible for our entry into the Philippines.
Throughout the 1890's Roosevelt had been eager for a war, whether it be with
Chile, Spain, or England. A war with Spain, he felt, would get us "a proper
navy and a good system of coast defenses," would free Cuba from Spain, and
would help to free America from European domination, would give "our people
... something to think of that isn't material gain," and would try "both the
army and navy in actual practice." Roosevelt feared that the United States
would grow heedless of its defense, take insufficient care to develop its
power, and become "an easy prey for any people which still retained those
most valuable of all qualities, the soldierly vir-tues ... .. All the great
masterful races have been fighting races," he argued. There were higher
virtues than those of peace and material comfort. "No triumph of peace is
quite so great as the supreme tri-umphs of war." Such was the philosophy of
the man who secured Commodore Dewey's appointment to the Far Eastern Squadron
and alerted him before the actual outbreak of hostilities to be pre-pared to
engage the Spanish fleet at Manila.

Our first step into the Philippines presented itself to us as a "defensive"
measure. Dewey's attack on the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay was made on the
assumption that the Spanish fleet, if unmolested, might cross the Pacific and
bombard the West Coast cities of the United States. I do not know whether
American officialdom was aware that this fleet was so decrepit that it could
hardly have gasped its way across the ocean. Next, Dewey's fleet seemed in
danger unless its security were underwritten by the dispatch of American
troops to Manila. To be sure, having accomplished his mission, Dewey could
have removed this "danger" simply by leaving Manila Bay. However, in war one
is always tempted to hold whatever gains have been made, and at Dewey's
request American troops were dispatched very promptly after the victory and
arrived at Manila in July 1898. Thus our second step into the Philippines was
again a "defensive" measure. The third step was the so-called "capture" of
Manila, which was actually carried out in cooperation with the Spaniards, who
were allowed to make a token resistance, . .

====

an excerpt from:
The Age of Excess
Ray GingerG1965
MacMillian

During the campaign [1896 Presidential] the monetary issues pushed foreign
policy into the shade, but the Republican platform did call for "continued
enlargement of the Navy," and the triumphant party did contain most of the
vociferous expansionists in the country. Also it brought in as Chief
Executive a man who had few ideas, read no books, never publicly disputed the
word of any American except for a few jibes at Democrats, and could be easily
pushed. William McKinley and Mark Hanna in 1894 went to their first football
game: Yale vs. Princeton. There Hanna overheard a question about his
companion: "Who is that distinguished-looking man�the one that looks like
Napoleon?" Perhaps never were appearances more misleading. Joseph Cannon once
remarked that McKinley kept his ear so close to the ground that he got it
full of grasshoppers.

But the overheard question does point to a significant craze of the
depression years�a Napoleon revival. Publication of books about his
personality spurted amazingly. Leading magazines competed in running serial
essays and picture biographies. Major responsibility for playing up
militarism must go to the Century Company and its magazine, which were
preoccupied first with military aspects of the Civil War and then with
Napoleon. Seemingly some Americans, overwhelmed by depression and by the
futility of government, longed for a man on horseback to guide them out of
the wilderness. As ex-Senator Ingalls put it in April 1896, "A man will come."

The hoped-for Hero was soon installed, at the urging of Senator Lodge, as
Assistant Secretary of the Navy. Theodore Roosevelt at various times had
lusted for war against Mexico, Chile, Britain, Spain, Germany, and any
European country with a colony in the the Amiericas. During the Venezuela
crisis he wrote to Lodge: "Let the fight come if it must. I don't care
whether our sea coast cities are bombarded or not; we would take Canada."
Early in 1897 he told the Naval War College: "All the great
masterful races have been fighting races. . . ." He rather depre-cated
success in commerce or finance; the warlike virtues were "higher things ...
than the soft and easy enjoyment of material comfort." As his mentor
Roosevelt had taken Captain Mahan,
whose "Preparedness for Naval War" appeared in Harper's New Monthly Magazine
in March 1897-

McKinley's mind at the time was on the tariff; his first act as President was
to call a special session of Congress to revise it. For) him the problem was
closely tied to Cuba. The Sugar Trust, an important source of campaign funds,
was forced to pay $3 to $4 more per ton for raw sugar from other sources as
imports from Cuba fell 75 per cent. The Trust had powerful friends in
Congress who might put forward their own Cuba policy. Also McKinley hoped to
get lower duties on raw sugar in order to strengthen the argument for raising
rates on other items.
. . .

�People turned from reality, as if they could not bear to admit to themselves
what the facts were. Monopoly, imperialism socialism�these were denials of a
creed that had been rooted in individual initiative, But it was dangerous to
diagnose them.

McKinley was prone to believe his own twaddle. As the American army, in spite
of its scorched-earth policy, was slow to subdue the Philippines, he went on
thinking that only a small minority of Filipinos were opposed to American
rule. He spoke of the need to "Christianize" them, even though nearly all
were Roman Catholics. He dreamed a house in the clouds and moved into it. He
even imagined that he could get the Senate to approve reciprocity treaties,
but of the seven he submitted to the Fifty-sixth Conarcss not one was
reported out of committee. On 5 September 1901 at the Pan-American Exposition
in Buffalo, just before he was shot down by Leon Czolgosz, the President told
a crowd of 50,000: "We must not repose in fancied security that we can
forever sell everything and buy little or nothing." But businessmen and their
political allies also had delusions, and they persisted in the one to which
McKinley referred.

Mark Hanna in 1900 had wanted a safe candidate for Vice-President, but the
President had ordered strict neutrality, know-ing that Roosevelt's military
glory had made him governor of New York and would go well in another
campaign. Matt Quay agreed. Thomas C. Platt, once more boss of New York,
wanted to get Roosevelt out of state politics. To Hanna's question, "Don't
any of you realize that there's only one Iife between that madman and the
Presidency?,� they were deaf. So at McKinley's death the Presidency went to a
man who called it a "bully pulpit" and preached from it. Roosevelt quickly
made the White House into the chief flapdoodle factory in the nation . . .



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