-Caveat Lector-
http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/nuclear.html
What If The Terrorists Go Nuclear?
Sept. 26, 2001
As the United States proceeds with its war on terrorism, one of the darkest
clouds hanging over the campaign is the question of whether the
perpetrators of the Sept. 11 horrors could strike again, this time with
nuclear weapons.
It seems doubtful that U.S. intelligence can definitively answer this
question. Absent perfect foresight, one can nonetheless outline some of the
plausible threats and identify the range of U.S. responses that could
reduce the exposure of citizens and troops to nuclear attack.
Threat Scenarios
A Dirty Bomb
The most accessible nuclear device for any terrorist would be a
radiological dispersion bomb. This so-called 'dirty bomb' would consist of
waste by-products from nuclear reactors wrapped in conventional explosives,
which upon detonation would spew deadly radioactive particles into the
environment. This is an expedient weapon, in that radioactive waste
material is relatively easy to obtain. Radioactive waste is widely found
throughout the world, and in general is not as well guarded as actual
nuclear weapons.
In the United States, radioactive waste is located at more than 70
commercial nuclear power sites. Enormous quantities also exist overseas -
in Europe and Japan in particular. Tons of wastes are transported long
distances, including between continents (Japan to Europe and back).
In Russia, security for nuclear waste is especially poor, and the potential
for diversion and actual use by Islamic radicals has been shown to be very
real indeed. In 1996, Islamic rebels from the break-away province of
Chechnya planted such a device in Moscow's Izmailovo park to demonstrate
Russia's vulnerability. This dirty bomb consisted of a deadly brew of
dynamite and one of the highly radioactive by-products of nuclear fission -
Cesium 137.
Such gamma-ray emitting bombs would not kill quite as many people as died
on Sept. 11. A worst-case calculation for an explosion in downtown
Manhattan during noontime: more than 2,000 deaths and many thousands more
suffering from radiation poisoning. Treatment of those exposed would be
greatly hampered by inadequate medical facilities and training. The United
States has only a single hospital emergency room dedicated to treating
patients exposed to radiation hazards, at Oak Ridge, Tenn.
A credible threat to explode such a bomb in a U.S. city could have a
powerful impact on the conduct of U.S. foreign and military policy, and
could possibly have a paralyzing effect. Not only would the potential loss
of life be significant, but also the prospect of mass evacuation of dense
urban centers would loom large in the minds of policy-makers.
Attack on Nuclear Power Plants
A terrorist attack on a commercial nuclear power plant with a commercial
jet or heavy munitions could have a similar affect to a radiological bomb.
If such an attack were to cause either a meltdown of the reactor core
(similar to the Chernobyl disaster), or a dispersal of the spent fuel waste
on the site, extensive casualties could be expected. In such an instance,
the power plant would be the source of the radiological contamination, and
the plane or armament would be the explosive mechanism for spreading lethal
radiation over large areas.
Diversion of Nuclear Material or Weapons
The threat from radiological dispersion dims in comparison to the
possibility that terrorists could build or obtain an actual atomic bomb. An
explosion of even low yield could kill hundreds of thousands of people. A
relatively small bomb, say 15-kilotons, detonated in Manhattan could
immediately kill upwards of 100,000 inhabitants, followed by a comparable
number of deaths in the lingering aftermath.
Fortunately, bomb-grade nuclear fissile material (highly enriched uranium
or plutonium) is relatively heavily guarded in most, if not all, nuclear
weapon states.
Nonetheless, the possibility of diversion remains. Massive quantities of
fissile material exist around the world. Sophisticated terrorists could
fairly readily design and fabricate a workable atomic bomb once they manage
to acquire the precious deadly ingredients (the Hiroshima bomb which used a
simple gun-barrel design is the prime example).
Russia
A primary source of diverted weapons or material could be Russia. No
Russian bombs have been officially reported missing, and Russian
authorities maintain that no nuclear material has been lost. Rather, the
outstanding question is whether a bomb, or fissile material in sufficient
quantity to make one, has disappeared without Moscow's knowledge. While few
outside observers dispute this, none are privy to the raw data that could
validate or refute the Russian claim.
One concern long has been the allegations voiced by the former chairman of
Russia's Security Council, Gen. Alexander Lebed. After conducting an
exhaustive inventory of Russian nuclear weapons in the 1990s, he found that
50 or more "suitcase" nuclear bombs had vanished from the Russian arsenal.
The prevailing judgment among Western experts is that Russia may have lost
track of the paper trail for any number of bombs, but that the bombs
themselves probably have been dismantled or tucked away in storage, rather
than having been stolen. The infamous Russian accounting system using hand
receipts stored in shoe boxes provides ample grist for this theory.
While there is no reason to doubt the sincerity of the Russian military and
civilian leaders who have shouldered the custodial duties for Russian
nuclear weapons, it is nonetheless possible that Russian nuclear security
has been compromised from the inside without detection.
As noted, such a bomb could be transported to the United States inside one
of the countless containers arriving at American ports every day. This
avenue seems especially easy to arrange by bin Laden's al Qaeda network,
which has extensive business connections around the world. Such a container
could accommodate a good-sized atomic bomb, which could be unloaded and
carted off in a small truck or van to any destination in the lower 48
states. Indeed, once unloaded from a ship, one of Russia's 'missing'
suitcase bombs, which are thought to weigh some 60 pounds and measure the
size of a small refrigerator, practically could be carried as a back-pack
by a strong person.
Disconcertingly, it is conceivable that Russia may have built even smaller
bombs, comparable to the truly attach�-class atomic bomb secretly built by
the United States in the late 1970s. This U.S. bomb design was so compact
and lightweight that it could have been covertly transported as innocent
hand-luggage by any reasonably strong individual. In fact, a replica - with
proxy nuclear material and conventional explosives in place of the real
stuff - was disguised as a briefcase, and actually hand-carried on
commercial airline flights from California to Washington in the early
1980s.
Pakistan
Another potential source of diversion is the Pakistani nuclear arsenal,
estimated to number around 30-50 atomic bombs with explosive yields ranging
from 1 to 15 kilotons. The weapons are probably assembled at Wah (50 miles
from Afghanistan), and are stored primarily at Sargodha near a missile
complex close to the border with India and only about 250 miles from
Afghanistan. Pakistan's military government is walking a tightrope between
pressure from the Bush administration on one side and anti-American Islamic
militants on the other. Growing street opposition from the latter could
certainly de-stabilize or even topple the regime, and in the midst of such
dissolution, the weakening of nuclear security would inevitably occur. The
ranks of government and military personnel are also fairly riddled with
sympathizers of the radical Islamic faction, posing a distinct risk of
insiders colluding to spirit away a bomb or two for bin Laden or other
terrorists.
In any case, control over Pakistan's arsenal could all too readily buckle
in a serious crisis inside the country. Pakistani weapons are believed to
lack sophisticated locks and other safeguards to prevent their unauthorized
use.
Loose nukes in the region would have unpredictable consequences, almost all
of which would militate against the U.S. cause, not to mention the safety
of U.S. forces dispatched there.
U.S. Responses
With such a panoply of possible threats, there are a number of actions that
could be taken in the near term to shore up nuclear security.
Pakistan
The Pakistani situation, in particular, deserves careful monitoring - using
surveillance and intelligence assets in the region. The U.S. government
could urge Pakistani authorities to further consolidate and/or disable
their nuclear devices, and beef up security around storage sites - and even
offer security equipment and guards. In fact, the U.S. government should be
prepared to provide arsenal security even without Islamabad's permission if
emergency circumstances dictate.
The U.S. government also could begin drawing up contingency plans to
'rescue' the arsenal if the need arises. U.S. Special Operations forces
should be kept on high alert for quick, covert insertion to the sites to
disable or even re-locate weapons to prevent their capture by unauthorized
persons. It must be noted, however, that inserting commandoes on short
notice to gain control over the arsenal would put them in considerable
jeopardy, and disarming the weapons could be dangerous indeed. Pakistani
weapons are believed to have quite primitive safety devices - they almost
certainly lack the "one-point" safety design of U.S. weapons - which means
that a Pakistani nuclear weapon could more easily detonate if subjected to
conventional firefights between soldiers using grenades or similar
munitions.
Therefore, it would be highly desirable for nuclear experts from the
Department of Energy to accompany any military troops in such a scenario.
DoE nuclear response teams, known as Nuclear Emergency Search Teams (NEST),
are formed in a crisis from nearly 1,000 highly trained and knowledgeable
individuals, and could be dispatched to the region to assist in locating
and disarming any weapons. The teams and their equipment, some on alert
staging out of Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada, know the design of
Pakistani weapons (based on defector reports), and could x-ray the weapons
and devise a disabling procedure on the spot. Compared to the military's
commandoes, these experienced civilian teams would stand a better chance of
blowing up the triggering mechanisms on Pakistani weapons without causing
the bomb to go off.
Another option for response in a crisis would be for such a joint
military-civilian insertion mission to link up with a Russian counterpart
to conduct search and disable missions together in the region. The mutual
benefits would be considerable, and such a joint U.S.-Russian operation
would have lasting positive effects on future cooperation.
Russia
Joint operations between Russia and the United States could also be
undertaken inside Russia itself to deal with a nuclear crisis. Russia's
crack Alpha commando unit could work closely with U.S. Special Operations
forces, augmented with a bilateral NEST group to respond to emergencies
requiring the securing and disposing of real or dirty nuclear bombs.
Tactical operational cooperation could be further enhanced by breaking new
ground in intelligence sharing.
The likelihood that the Russian mafia would be involved in aiding
terrorists in any theft of atomic or radiological bombs suggests that joint
intelligence should also focus on criminal organizations in Russia. This is
primarily a mission for the FBI/CIA and its Russian counterparts, but some
joint military intelligence could also be necessary in emergency tactical
situations.
The pivotal role of Russia in the arena of 'loose nukes' and terrorism
highlights the wisdom of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program
undertaken by the United States during the past decade. Popularly known as
the Nunn-Lugar program, after its original congressional sponsors, this
effort has significantly strengthened the security of Russian nuclear
weapons and fissile materials, as well as throughout the former Soviet
Union.
However, there is a long way to go to bring Russian nuclear security up to
international standards. Much more effort and resources need to be devoted
to securing Russian nuclear weapons in storage at 123 sites in Russia, and
nuclear waste that could be fashioned into radiological bombs. The reach of
Nunn-Lugar has been limited, in part because of disagreements between the
parties about access to facilities and sites. It is now clear that Russia
and the United States should work harder to overcome their differences and
press ahead with the Nunn-Lugar agenda. A long list of priorities for the
future can be drawn from some excellent studies of the program's strengths
and weaknesses; for example, several recent efforts by the Russian American
Nuclear Security Advisory Council (RANSAC).
Within the United States
The first steps to mitigate the possibility of nuclear terrorism would be
serious and rapid effort to build intelligence capabilities that might warn
of a potential attack, and as explained above, to take actions aimed at
shoring up possible sources of nuclear material.
In the meantime, increased monitoring at ports also must be considered,
despite the fact that to do so could have negative ramifications on
international trade. Inspection of containers up to now has been rather
cursory, and infrequent. This should change, just as already the U.S.
government and airlines are scrambling to beef up airline and airport
security.
Some of the additional security measures would include those exported to
Russia under the Nunn-Lugar program. A prime example is the transfer of
nuclear materials detectors to Russia, which were then emplaced at
strategic border crossings, ports and airports to detect diversion. The
U.S. government might consider the use of such equipment at similar
American locations, particularly ports, as a method to detect and intercept
materials being smuggled into the country.
In addition, there are a number of methods to increase security around
nuclear power plants that already are being discussed by U.S. authorities
and nuclear plant operators, such as expanding the perimeters of restricted
airspace. Such measures should be implemented as rapidly as possible.
Finally, NEST operations would go into effect if a credible threat of a
dirty bomb or a full-fledged nuclear weapon were to manifest itself. If the
information available would allow the U.S. teams to locate the city
affected, hundreds of team members would fan out along a matrix of the
threat region to detect the bomb. Carrying gamma- and neutron-detectors
inside carrying cases to preserve secrecy, the NEST members would cover the
suspect area on foot, in vans and helicopters - going in and out of
buildings hoping to register the tell-tale signals of a hidden bomb. Once
found, the bomb is x-rayed, "sniffed" and otherwise analyzed to determine
its characteristics.
Obviously, intelligence that helps localize the bomb is the main key to
success. Just as obviously, intelligence of such quality is seldom
available - as proven on Sept. 11. Such a search could be truly looking for
a needle in a haystack, as detection normally would succeed only if the
detectors come within a few feet or so of the hidden bomb.
Disabling a bomb is easy by comparison. A radiological bomb might be
surrounded by a tent enclosure several tens of feet in height and width,
then filled with a special foam to contain the deadly radioactive material
(such as Cesium 137) if the bomb explodes during further defusing attempts.
For a nuclear device, a set of options for disabling the weapon are
available including using explosives to wreck the bomb's wiring to prevent
the triggering of the nuclear detonators.
Because of the difficulty inherent in finding a nuclear weapon once it
entered the country, near-term U.S. response efforts would be best focused
on prevention and intervention to secure possible sources of nuclear
terrorism.
By Dr. Bruce G. Blair
CDI President
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FROM THE DESK OF:
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