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 The Atlantic Monthly | July/August 2001
Notes & Dispatches
PESHAWAR

The Counterterrorist Myth

A former CIA operative explains why the terrorist Usama bin Ladin has
little to fear from American intelligence
by Reuel Marc Gerecht
.....
he United States has spent billions of dollars on counterterrorism
since the U.S. embassy
 bombings in Tanzania and Kenya, in August of 1998. Tens of millions
have been spent on covert operations specifically targeting Usama bin
Ladin and his terrorist organization, al-Qa'ida. Senior U.S.
officials boldly claim�even after the suicide attack last October on
the USS Cole, in the port of Aden�that the Central Intelligence
Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation are clandestinely
"picking apart" bin Ladin's organization "limb by limb." But having
worked for the CIA for nearly nine years on Middle Eastern matters (I
left the Directorate of Operations because of frustration with the
Agency's many problems), I would argue that America's counte
rterrorism program in the Middle East and its environs is a myth.
Peshawar, the capital of Pakistan's Northwest Frontier, is on the cultural periphery 
of the Middle East. It is just down the Grand Trunk Road from the legendary Khyber 
Pass, the gateway to Afghanistan. Peshawar is where b
in Ladin cut his teeth in the Islamic jihad, when, in the mid-1980s, he became the 
financier and logistics man for the Maktab al-Khidamat, The Office of Services, an 
overt organization trying to recruit and aid Muslim, ch
iefly Arab, volunteers for the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan. The friendships 
and associations made in The Office of Services gave birth to the clandestine 
al-Qa'ida, The Base, whose explicit aim is to wage a jih
ad against the West, especially the United States.
According to Afghan contacts and Pakistani officials, bin Ladin's men regularly move 
through Peshawar and use it as a hub for phone, fax, and modem communication with the 
outside world. Members of the embassy-bombing team
s in Africa probably planned to flee back to Pakistan. Once there they would likely 
have made their way into bin Ladin's open arms through al-Qa'ida's numerous friends in 
Peshawar. Every tribe and region of Afghanistan is
 represented in this city, which is dominated by the Pathans, the pre-eminent tribe in 
the Northwest Frontier and southern Afghanistan. Peshawar is also a power base of the 
Taliban, Afghanistan's fundamentalist rulers. Kn
owing the city's ins and outs would be indispensable to any U.S. effort to capture or 
kill bin Ladin and his closest associates. Intelligence collection on al-Qa'ida can't 
be of much real value unless the agent network co
vers Peshawar.
During a recent visit, at sunset, when the city's cloistered alleys go black except 
for an occasional flashing neon sign, I would walk through Afghan neighborhoods. Even 
in the darkness I had a case officer's worst sensat
ion�eyes following me everywhere. To escape the crowds I would pop into carpet, 
copper, and jewelry shops and every cybercaf� I could find. These were poorly lit one- 
or two-room walk-ups where young men surfed Western po
rn. No matter where I went, the feeling never left me. I couldn't see how the CIA as 
it is today had any chance of running a successful counterterrorist operation against 
bin Ladin in Peshawar, the Dodge City of Central A
sia.
Westerners cannot visit the cinder-block, mud-brick side of the Muslim world�whence 
bin Ladin's foot soldiers mostly come�without announcing who they are. No case officer 
stationed in Pakistan can penetrate either the Afg
han communities in Peshawar or the Northwest Frontier's numerous religious schools, 
which feed manpower and ideas to bin Ladin and the Taliban, and seriously expect to 
gather useful information about radical Islamic terro
rism�let alone recruit foreign agents.
Even a Muslim CIA officer with native-language abilities (and the Agency, according to 
several active-duty case officers, has very few operatives from Middle Eastern 
backgrounds) could do little more in this environment t
han a blond, blue-eyed all-American. Case officers cannot long escape the embassies 
and consulates in which they serve. A U.S. official overseas, photographed and 
registered with the local intelligence and security servic
es, can't travel much, particularly in a police-rich country like Pakistan, without 
the "host" services' knowing about it. An officer who tries to go native, pretending 
to be a true-believing radical Muslim searching for
brothers in the cause, will make a fool of himself quickly.
In Pakistan, where the government's Inter-Services Intelligence Agency and the ruling 
army are competent and tough, the CIA can do little if these institutions are against 
it. And they are against it. Where the Taliban an
d Usama bin Ladin are concerned, Pakistan and the United States aren't allies. 
Relations between the two countries have been poor for years, owing to American 
opposition to Pakistan's successful nuclear-weapons program an
d, more recently, Islamabad's backing of Muslim Kashmiri separatists. Bin Ladin's 
presence in Afghanistan as a "guest" of the Pakistani-backed Taliban has injected even 
more distrust and suspicion into the relationship.
In other words, American intelligence has not gained and will not gain Pakistan's 
assistance in its pursuit of bin Ladin. The only effective way to run offensive 
counterterrorist operations against Islamic radicals in mor
e or less hostile territory is with "non-official-cover" officers�operatives who are 
in no way openly attached to the U.S. government. Imagine James Bond minus the 
gadgets, the women, the Walther PPK, and the Aston Martin
. But as of late 1999 no program to insert NOCs into an Islamic fundamentalist 
organization abroad had been implemented, according to one such officer who has served 
in the Middle East. "NOCs haven't really changed at all
 since the Cold War," he told me recently. "We're still a group of fake businessmen 
who live in big houses overseas. We don't go to mosques and pray."
A former senior Near East Division operative says, "The CIA probably doesn't have a 
single truly qualified Arabic-speaking officer of Middle Eastern background who can 
play a believable Muslim fundamentalist who would vol
unteer to spend years of his life with shitty food and no women in the mountains of 
Afghanistan. For Christ's sake, most case officers live in the suburbs of Virginia. We 
don't do that kind of thing." A younger case offic
er boils the problem down even further: "Operations that include diarrhea as a way of 
life don't happen."
Behind-the-lines counterterrorism operations are just too dangerous for CIA officers 
to participate in directly. When I was in the Directorate of Operations, the Agency 
would deploy a small army of officers for a meeting
with a possibly dangerous foreigner if he couldn't be met in the safety of a U.S. 
embassy or consulate. Officers still in the clandestine service say that the Agency's 
risk-averse, bureaucratic nature�which mirrors, of co
urse, the growing physical risk-aversion of American society�has only gotten worse.
 few miles from Peshawar's central bazaar, near the old Cantonment, where redcoats 
once drilled and where the U.S. consulate can be found, is the American Club, a 
traditional hangout for international-aid workers, diploma
ts, journalists, and spooks. Worn-out Western travelers often stop here on the way 
from Afghanistan to decompress; one can buy a drink, watch videos, order a steak. 
Security warnings from the American embassy are posted o
n the club's hallway bulletin board.
The bulletins I saw last December advised U.S. officials and their families to stay 
away from crowds, mosques, and anyplace else devout Pakistanis and Afghans might 
gather. The U.S. embassy in Islamabad, a fortress surrou
nded by roadblocks, Pakistani soldiers, and walls topped with security cameras and 
razor wire, strongly recommended a low profile�essentially life within the 
Westernized, high-walled Cantonment area or other spots where d
iplomats are unlikely to bump into fundamentalists.
Such warnings accurately reflect the mentality inside both the Department of State and 
the CIA. Individual officers may venture out, but their curiosity isn't encouraged or 
rewarded. Unless one of bin Ladin's foot soldier
s walks through the door of a U.S. consulate or embassy, the odds that a CIA 
counterterrorist officer will ever see one are extremely poor.
The Directorate of Operations' history of success has done little to prepare the CIA 
for its confrontation with radical Islamic terrorism. Perhaps the DO's most memorable 
victory was against militant Palestinian groups in
 the 1970s and 1980s. The CIA could find common ground with Palestinian militants, who 
often drink, womanize, and spend time in nice hotels in pleasant, comfortable 
countries. Still, its "penetrations" of the PLO�delightf
ully and kindly rendered in David Ignatius's novel Agents of Innocence (1987)�were 
essentially emissaries from Yasir Arafat to the U.S. government.
Difficulties with fundamentalism and mud-brick neighborhoods aside, the CIA has 
stubbornly refused to develop cadres of operatives specializing in one or two 
countries. Throughout the Soviet-Afghan war (1979-1989) the DO
never developed a team of Afghan experts. The first case officer in Afghanistan to 
have some proficiency in an Afghan language didn't arrive until 1987, just a year and 
a half before the war's end. Robert Baer, one of the
 most talented Middle East case officers of the past twenty years (and the only 
operative in the 1980s to collect consistently first-rate intelligence on the Lebanese 
Hizbollah and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad), suggeste
d to headquarters in the early 1990s that the CIA might want to collect intelligence 
on Afghanistan from the neighboring Central Asian republics of the former Soviet Union.
Headquarters' reply: Too dangerous, and why bother? The Cold War there was over with 
the Soviet withdrawal in 1989. Afghanistan was too far away, internecine warfare was 
seen as endemic, and radical Islam was an abstract
idea. Afghanistan has since become the brain center and training
ground for Islamic terrorism against the United States, yet the CIA's
clandestine service still usually keeps officers on the Afghan
account no more than two or three years.
Until October of 1999 no CIA official visited Ahmad Shah Mas'ud in
Afghanistan. Mas'ud is the ruler of northeastern Afghanistan and the
leader of the only force still fighting the Taliban. He was the most
accomplished commander of the anti-Soviet mujahideen guerrillas; his
army now daily confronts Arab military units that are under the
banner of bin Ladin, yet no CIA case officer has yet debriefed
Mas'ud's soldiers on the front lines or the Pakistani, Afghan,
Chinese-Turkoman, and Arab holy warriors they've captured.
The CIA's Counterterrorism Center, which now has hundreds of
employees from numerous government agencies, was the creation of
Duane "Dewey" Clarridge, an extraordinarily energetic bureaucrat-
spook. In less than a year in the mid-1980s Clarridge converted a
three-man operation confined to one room with one TV set broadcasting
CNN into a staff that rivaled the clandestine service's Near East
Division for primacy in counterterrorist operations. Yet the
Counterterrorism Center didn't alter the CIA's methods overseas at
all. "We didn't really think about the details of operations�how we
would penetrate this or that group," a former senior counterterrorist
official says. "Victory for us meant that we stopped [Thomas] Twetten
[the chief of the clandestine service's Near East Division] from
walking all over us." In my years inside the CIA, I never once heard
case officers overseas or back at headquarters discuss the ABCs of a
recruitment operation against any Middle Eastern target that took a
case officer far off the diplomatic and business-conference circuits.
Long-term seeding operations simply didn't occur.
George Tenet, who became the director of the CIA in 1997, has
repeatedly described America's counterterrorist program as "robust"
and in most cases successful at keeping bin Ladin's terrorists "off-
balance" and anxious about their own security. The Clinton
Administration's senior director for counterterrorism on the National
Security Council, Richard Clarke, who has continued as the
counterterrorist czar in the Bush Administration, is sure that bin
Ladin and his men stay awake at night "around the campfire" in
Afghanistan, "worried stiff about who we're going to get next."
If we are going to defeat Usama bin Ladin, we need to openly side
with Ahmad Shah Mas'ud, who still has a decent chance of fracturing
the tribal coalition behind Taliban power. That, more effectively
than any clandestine counterterrorist program in the Middle East,
might eventually force al-Qa'ida's leader to flee Afghanistan, where
U.S. and allied intelligence and military forces cannot reach him.
Until then, I don't think Usama bin Ladin and his allies will be
losing much sleep around the campfire.
 Links referenced within this article
Agents of Innocence
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ISBN=0393317382/theatlanticmonthA/
Find this article at:
http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/2001/07/gerecht.htm


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