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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ARTICLE 01 – Oh No, Not the ‘Tuesday Lunch Bunch’ Again! ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ By Paul Connors Why don’t we just call it Vietnam Redux? It’s happening again, and this time the stakes are higher. The methods are the same though, and they include micromanagement from the highest levels in the military and civilian chains of command. According to a major investigative report in The Washington Post on Nov. 18 (“Target Approval Delays Cost Air Force Key Hits”), as many as ten times in the last six weeks, the Air Force had senior Taliban and Al Qaeda leaders in their bombsights but couldn’t get permission to fire in time to effectively take them out of the picture. Senior Air Force officials have stated that the problems in decapitating the Taliban and Al Qaeda leadership stemmed from an extraordinarily cumbersome approval process that stretches from the theater of operations all the way back to Office of the Secretary of Defense at the Pentagon. Does this sound familiar? Doesn’t it recall President Lyndon B. Johnson’s infamous “Tuesday lunch bunch” meetings where he personally selected bombing targets for the Air Force and Navy during the Vietnam War? Air Force commanders in the theater were quoted in one news report as saying, “We knew we had some of the big boys.” But, one official added, “The process is so slow that, by the time we got clearances and everybody had put in their two cents, we called it (the mission) off.” Some Air Force officers even argued that the effect of the slow decisions had prolonged the war. They further added that U.S. Special Operations troops now needed to conduct their searches for terrorist leaders on the ground and at great personal risk when the key enemy leaders could have been killed earlier from the air. The officials lamented the tampering in operational planning and mission conduct by politicians and appointees thousands of miles from the fighting. One Air Force four-star general actually blamed some of the problems on the micromanagement of the war by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and his advisers at the Pentagon. The general said, “The execution of the war was military amateur hour.” He added, “The worst thing is the lack of trust at senior leadership levels.” He did not mean the military’s senior leadership, he was specifically referring to the civilian hierarchy within the Defense Department. Despite what would appear to be a repeat of many of the problems faced by senior Air Force and Navy commanders during the Vietnam War, the current generation of Air Force leaders seems to face most of their frustrations in getting approval for air strikes from U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) headquarters. CENTCOM, which is run by Army General Tommy Franks, would seem to be a “black hole” when it comes to air mission taskings and approvals for targeting. Air Force Lt. Gen. Charles Wald, who until recently was air commander for the current campaign, reportedly complained about the clearance and approval process to Franks more than a dozen times since the military campaign began on Oct 7. General Wald was explicit and blunt when he told his superiors in the Air Force that he never received a response from General Franks. What added to an already difficult campaign plan was that CENTCOM, which has its headquarters at MacDill AFB, Fla., retained for itself the authority to clear attacks against sensitive targets, rather than delegating that authority to commanders based at Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia. Although many have questioned Air Force assertions that campaigns can now be won from the air with minimal need for ground troops, the Air Force described CENTCOM as a bottleneck. Every significant target would require either CENTCOM approval or clearance by more senior officials in Washington. One Air Force officer described the delays and obfuscations as almost too numerous to count. He also added, “Imagine you have a target in sight, you have to wake up people in the middle of the night and they say, ‘uhhh.’ ” Another officer’s comments were more succinct. He stated, “It’s a scandal.” General Franks appears to the Air Force and other observers to be far too cautious. Like many who grew up in the politically charged atmosphere of the Vietnam War and its aftermath, he wants to be absolutely certain of each move before he makes it. As his less-than-stellar predecessors before him did, Franks seeks to dodge any blame for mistakes that “might” occur and manipulates the outcome so that none will on his watch. A recent example of Franks’ lack of decisiveness and wanting conclusive proof arose when a viable target was identified and pinpointed by real-time imagery from a drone reconnaissance aircraft. The Air Force operations center in Saudi Arabia called for a quick strike against the target but was overridden by officers in Tampa advising Franks who asked for a second source of data. The Air Force planners in Saudi Arabia were beside themselves. One officer offered this comment, “It’s kind of ridiculous when you have a live feed from the ‘Predator’ and the intel guys say, ‘We need independent verification.’ ” When President Bush was elected and picked his advisers, many in the military breathed a sigh of relief because they thought the meddling by the amateurs (from the Clinton years) was behind them. But it would seem that political propinquity and sycophancy know no party boundaries and the disease of civilian micromanagement has carried over into the new administration. Let’s face it: This war is not the Vietnam War and it isn’t Operation Desert Storm. Vietnam was unpopular and raised the level of discord in America to previously unseen levels. The Gulf War had the backing of most of the American people and it was fought and won swiftly. This conflict, which could very well be one that will determine our future as a free nation, is being hampered by the same lackluster amateurishness that has haunted the American military since the days of LBJ. When will the politicians learn? When it comes to warfare, the generals and the admirals are our supposed experts. Let them do their jobs and finish off the enemy wherever and whenever they are found. Quick and aggressive action is much more likely to achieve a desirable outcome than the waffling of bureaucrats and politicians far from the action. The message we should be sending here is, “Lead, follow or get the hell out of the way.” To General Franks and his advisers at CENTCOM I can only say, “Shame on you. You are military and should know better!” To Secretary Rumsfeld I offer this advice: Try trusting your field commanders. They’re the ones with the training and expertise to handle warfare. Also, trust is a two-way street; if you want the commanders to trust you, you have to trust them. Paul Connors is DefenseWatch Air Force Editor. Table of Contents ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ARTICLE 02 – ON THE RECORD: Rumsfeld Response to Targeting Controversy ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The following are excerpts of a press briefing by Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld at the Pentagon on Monday, Nov. 19, 2001. Q: If we are to believe The Washington Post, some of these critics are right here in this building. Could I just get your reaction to the Post story of yesterday, which said that red tape was in some cases preventing effective targeting? And apparently, one anonymous four-star general accused you of micromanaging the war. Rumsfeld: I – when [Central Command Commander] General [Tommy] Franks was here, he responded to that question. He was asked if he was getting targeting advice, I believe, from the Pentagon, and he allowed as how he was not. And I intervened and pointed out that, in fact, he was – that we were encouraging him to attack the enemy vigorously. … But the – think about what takes place. What takes place is, the president says, “Go after terrorists.” I sit down with the defense establishment, and a plan is developed. And we – General Franks is in charge of that. And he then presents that plan to me, and we talk about it with the advice of the chiefs and the chairman and the vice chairman, and then, at some point, we present it to the National Security Council and the president. He then goes off and implements that plan. … And he then goes out and makes a series of very tough calls – he and the people under him. And I delegate to him the authority to strike targets, and he does. He goes and uses that delegation of authority, makes his judgments. And he has to balance the question of doing the maximum amount to kill people on the ground, who might be part of the al Qaeda and Taliban leadership, against trying to avoid so much collateral damage and blowing up of mosques and the like that he ends up creating a feeling against the United States and the coalition forces on the ground in Afghanistan, and/or spreads the conflict to other countries by virtue of the seeming lack of interest in the extent to which collateral damage is imposed on the people on the ground. So he makes a series of judgments. Now then you're going to have a bunch of people around the site who aren't the CINC (commander-in-chief), and they're going to look at it. And they're going to say, “Well, gee, if I'd been doing it, I would have done this. I would have done more of that or a little less of this, or I would have done it faster or slower.” There has never been a conflict where people didn't sit down and say, “Gee, the CINC should have done this,” or “the CINC should have done that.” And my attitude is, Tommy Franks is doing a darn good job, and I think most of the people in this building believe that. And the fact that there are one or two anonymous people who seem to at some point have observed something that they might have done differently ought not to surprise you at all …. Q: Mr. Secretary, could I follow up on Jamie's initial question? Were there any instances where the U.S. held its fire, where they had al Qaeda or Taliban leadership in its sights and held its fire for fear of collateral damage? Or, if indeed they got Taliban or al Qaeda leadership in their sight, would the U.S. be told to hold its fire, for fear of collateral damage? Rumsfeld: Look, those are decisions that are made by the CINC and the people under the CINC. And I am sure there are instances where a target was sighted, and it was thought that it would be a good target, but the only weapon available was one that was indiscriminate and would have caused considerable collateral damage, and that they made a judgment that they would wait until the people moved and go after them somewhere else. I suspect that's the case. I'm quite sure that's the case. And those are the kinds of judgments they make all day long. Pilots make those decisions. … Q: But then isn't it understandable that some might think, then, that they are fighting this war with one hand tied behind their backs? Rumsfeld: Certainly not. In any war, people have made exactly those same kinds of judgments, and nobody's generally felt that – there's certainly no one in Washington holding anyone's hands behind their back; I can tell you that – not the president and not this person. The – but we – In no conflict have we just gone in and indiscriminately bombed cities because we thought that was a nice thing to do that day. We have a goal. The goal is to get that [al Qaeda] leadership. We're trying to get them, and we're pursuing them, and we make calculations about what the cost-benefit ratio is. What do you gain by hitting a location … what do you gain by hitting that location if in the process you're going to blow up three hospitals and four orphanages and three schools to get four people? (Transcript prepared by The Federal News Service Inc., and released by the Defense Department.) *COPYRIGHT NOTICE** In accordance with Title 17 U. S. C. Section 107, any copyrighted work in this message is distributed under fair use without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the included information for nonprofit research and educational purposes only.[Ref. http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml ] Want to be on our lists? 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