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>From spiked! (URL @ bottom)


}}}>Begin
Column
16 November 2001
How did we get from Manhattan to Kabul?
by Mick Hume
Suddenly, it seems, all of the doubts about the war in Afghanistan
are supposed to have disappeared. Since the Taliban fled Kabul, we
have been told that the American strategy has been 'spectacularly
vindicated'. What's more, after the trauma of 11 September, we are
assured that the USA and the rest of the West have emerged stronger
and more united.
Not quite. Helping the Northern Alliance and other Afghan factions to
chase away the Taliban is one thing. Many have rightly noted that it
will be much more difficult to sort out the subsequent chaos in
Afghanistan. More strikingly, the war has done nothing to 'sort out'
the problems of fear, insecurity, fragmentation and alienation within
American and Western societies - which was the primary aim of
Washington's response to 11 September.
It beggars belief to suggest that the defeat of the Taliban now vindicates Western 
strategy. We at spiked opposed this war, but we never doubted that the power of the 
US-led coalition could blow away a ragtag, stateless f
orce like the Taliban, which eventually left Kabul the same way it entered the city in 
1996 - without a fight. The only serious doubts seemed to exist in the minds of 
Western leaders, whose uncertainty about their own aut
hority found reflection in the continual overestimation of the opposition, and 
reluctance to take decisive military action themselves.
The short-term military outcome within Afghanistan may not have been in much doubt. 
But important doubts remain regarding broader political questions. For instance:
Exactly what 'strategy' is it that has been vindicated? From the start, the 
American-led intervention in Afghanistan has appeared aimless and confused, uncertain 
about any clear, strategic goals.
What has any of this to do with 11 September? After all, the terrorists who attacked 
New York and Washington did not come from Afghanistan; they were largely made in the 
West. How did we get from the destruction in Manhat
tan to the bombing of Kabul and Kandahar and the Balkanisation of Afghanistan?
How has the West been strengthened by this experience? For now, US president George W 
Bush is riding high in the polls, and UK prime minister Tony Blair can strut about the 
world stage playing his favourite game of buildi
ng other people's nations. But beyond that, the crisis has confirmed rather than 
resolved the problems that lie barely beneath the surface of our societies: the 
elite's loss of nerve; the uncertainty about what we stand f
or; the inability to hold the line or act decisively; the all-consuming atmosphere of 
fear and confusion.
Remember how all of this began, after the devastating terrorist attacks of 11 
September, with a disoriented President Bush emerging from his bunker first to swear 
that America would get 'those folks' responsible, and then
 to announce that the USA was 'at war' with persons unknown. The unusual step of first 
declaring war, and then looking for somebody to fight a war against, set the tone for 
a campaign where war aims seem to have been made
 up as we go along, with the script being repeatedly rewritten.
Osama bin Laden, said to be the leader of the al-Qaeda terrorist network, was soon put 
in the frame, followed by the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, after it refused 
Anglo-American demands to arrest and extradite bin Laden
 on the basis of evidence that it was not allowed to see. (This always seemed one of 
the Taliban's more reasonable attitudes.) But even once the war against the Taliban 
had begun, American policy still appeared inconsiste
nt and lacking direction.
Josie Appleton has already detailed the many shifts in the coalition's attitude 
towards the Northern Alliance and the issue of nation-building in Afghanistan (1). It 
was as if, after four weeks of indecision following 11
September, the US and UK governments finally tried to appear decisive by beginning the 
bombing, and then declared a war to overthrow the Taliban as justification for the 
action.
Even then, the main concern of the coalition often seemed to be to limit the damaging 
propaganda consequences of the military action. Western leaders were at such pains to 
explain who they were not at war with - the Islam
ic world, the Afghan people - that the question of what they were fighting for 
remained unclear. Instead we were treated to the spectacle of battle-hardened US 
commanders talking like cultural studies professors, explaini
ng to a bemused media that the war was against 'a concept' rather than a country.
The lack of strategic clarity about how they got into this war, and how they might get 
out of it, led many in the West to exaggerate the logistical difficulties of the 
campaign and to reinvent their opponents as a major f
orce. Even the day before the Taliban regime collapsed, the talk among Western war 
leaders was of the Northern Alliance and US airforce keeping the Taliban pinned down 
until the spring, when a proper offensive could begin
. Since then, they have been desperately playing catch-up as Afghanistan is carved 
into pieces. Or was a Balkan-style fragmentation of the country part of this 
spectacularly vindicated strategy all along?
At the time of writing confusion reigns, not only in Kabul and Kandahar, but in 
Western capitals. One moment we are assured that the net is closing around bin Laden, 
the next that he has probably escaped. One day the word
 is that he will be assassinated, the next that he will eventually be brought to trial.
While the American airforce batters the retreating Taliban stragglers from on high, 
the Bush administration insists that American troops will not go in to reconstruct 
Afghanistan. A defence department official with respon
sibility for 'relief and peacekeeping issues' says that the dubious forces of the 
Northern Alliance can be left to provide 'security' in the areas it now controls (2).
Tony Blair, meanwhile, has pledged thousands of British troops to an Afghan mission. 
Blair seems to be the one statesman who believes his rhetoric about rebuilding the 
world in his own image. There is no reason why the re
st of us should join him on such a dangerous crusade.
So much for the great victory in Afghanistan. But remember, changing the clique of 
warlords atop that ruined country was never supposed to be the goal of the Bush-Blair 
war on terrorism. It was meant to be an effective re
sponse to 11 September. Less than a fortnight after those terrorist attacks, US 
defence secretary Donald Rumsfeld outlined Washington's aims in sweeping terms:

'The ultimate victory in this war is when everyone who wants to can do what every one 
of us did today, that is get up, let your children go to school, go out of the house 
and not in fear, stand here on a sidewalk and not
worry about a truck bomb driving into us.' (3)
>From this Western viewpoint, the war has been more of a failure than in Afghanistan. 
>But then, how could it be otherwise? The terrorists who carried out the attacks on 
>America did not come from Kabul. Their zealotry was n
ot forged in the caves of southern Afghanistan. Many of them were effectively made in 
the West, where they lived and studied and then moved in the circles of contemporary 
exile politics. Their outlook was arguably shaped
more by the experience of identity politics in the West than by Islamic fundamentalism 
in the East. Their nihilistic fanaticism was moulded in the context of widespread 
alienation in our societies which, as Michael Fitzpa
trick has previously argued on spiked, provides fertile ground for the growth of all 
manner of irrational fundamentalism (4). No amount of military action in Afghanistan 
could solve that problem.
Since 11 September, many in the West have been in a kind of denial, refusing fully to 
face up to the home-grown character of the problem. Instead, the Bush administration 
took America off to Afghanistan in search, not jus
t of bin Laden, but of itself. It hoped to find a new sense of purpose and mission for 
both the government and the nation, which could replicate the powerful sense of 
'Manifest Destiny' with which the USA had entered the
twentieth century. In effect, as we suggested on spiked, Bush was seeking to export 
America's internal malaise on to Afghan soil, in the same way that his predecessors 
tried, through the war on drugs, to externalise the c
risis of America's inner cities on to the coca fields of Colombia. Blair rushed to 
join him in an effort to boost the moral authority of his exhausted-looking government.
This focus on the home front has provided the central aim of the war. It helped to 
explain why the campaign in Afghanistan itself so often lacked direction; the purpose 
was to be seen to act decisively in order to galvani
se a domestic and global audience, rather than pursuing any clear strategic goals on 
the ground. And it is by these criteria that the war has most clearly failed.
There have certainly been a lot of flags flying in America since 11 September. But the 
angry, defensive response to the terrorist outrages should not be mistaken for the 
confident patriotism of the past (5). If anything,
the crisis has left America more fragmented, fearful and inward-looking than ever. The 
all-pervasive anthrax scare has become a powerful metaphor for the newly globalised 
culture of fear. Many in America have been far mor
e concerned about acquiring an antidote to the hypothetical possibility of anthrax 
infection, than about the real issues of how the USA should wage war in Afghanistan. 
(In Britain, too, it was notable that even when an ac
tual Irish republican bomb went off in Birmingham on 3 November, much of the panic 
that followed centred on rumours that a white powder had been released.)
Bush's claim that America has become more united and stronger is refuted by everything 
from the mountains of unopened mail in the capital of the Western world, to the scenes 
of heroic firefighters fighting with policemen
at Ground Zero, to the national wave of fear and paranoia sparked by the latest tragic 
plane crash in New York. Post-11 September, many in America complain of feeling 
permanently ill - perhaps the clearest symptom of how
American society as a whole is ailing and vulnerable today.
In recent weeks, we have noted on spiked how a mood of something
approaching moral defeatism seemed to have settled over the Western
elite. This week's displays of short-term triumphalism cannot stem
the underlying corrosion of self-confidence and authority in the
West. Throughout, Washington and Whitehall have remained reluctant to
send their forces in to fight a war in which they claimed that our
very civilisation was on the line. And there has been no wave of
public enthusiasm for signing up to fight, even among the angry youth
of America.
The West's inability to hold the line and fight for its own
principles has been a hallmark of this crisis, most clearly
illustrated by the desperate attempt to accommodate to Islam. In
American cities, many of the ubiquitous Stars-and-Stripes flags were
accompanied by signs announcing a 'Hate-free zone'. This must be the
first war in which everybody from governments downwards have
considered it illegitimate to hate the enemy (6).
Even for those of us who have been opposed to the war all along,
these developments raise troubling questions. As we have noted, what
does it say of our society that it cannot offer people anything
bigger than themselves that they deem worth fighting and possibly
dying for? Indeed, many in the anti-war movement appear to have been
infected by the general mood of powerlessness and loss of principle,
content with making woolly requests to the government not to do
anything hasty (7).
While Afghanistan comes apart again, the West stands revealed as a
society that stands for little or nothing, infected by fear and
depression, fighting destructive wars by proxy as a form of therapy.
As a former UK prime minister said of victory in a another foreign
war, don't ask questions, 'Just rejoice'.
Mick Hume is editor of spiked.
Read on:
spiked-issue: After 11 September
(1) Our boys in Kabul, by Josie Appleton
(2) 'Allies building force to keep order in a vacuum', New York
Times, 16 November 2001
(3) Cited in the Daily Telegraph, 24 September 2001
(4) Blair's gospel of despair, by Michael Fitzpatrick
(5) See Fear under the flag, by Helen Searls
(6) See A war that nobody wants to fight, by Mick Hume
(7) See The piece movement, by Brendan O'Neill


Reprinted from :
http://www.spiked-online.com/Articles/00000002D2D5.htm

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