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An Organizational Framework for Homeland Defense
TERRENCE KELLY
� 2001 Terrence Kelly
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>From Parameters, Autumn 2001, pp. 105-16.
Go to Autumn issue Table of Contents.
Go to Cumulative Article Index.
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One of the most difficult problems facing government
today is the question of how to organize to address
new threats to national security. Noteworthy among
these are threats from terrorism, proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, and attacks on our
critical infrastructures. Others include the
international drug trade, organized crime, and
assorted transnational threats. These are
nonconventional threats, and no single department or
agency of the federal government can address them
alone. They require coordinated policies, planning,
and execution by agencies that fall on both the
national security and domestic sides of the
government, and they often involve cooperation with
state and local governments, nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs), and the private sector as well.
Responses to them are crosscutting, involve
non-federal organizations, and draw on assets that are
already committed to other important missions. For the
federal government, this creates problems of issue
ownership ("turf"), and resource allocation--in both
the annual President's Budget Submission, and in the
congressional authorizations and appropriations
processes. A lot of people have given a lot of thought
to these issues, and it has become apparent that there
will be no simple organizational solution.
Another important aspect of this problem of organizing
for homeland defense is the difficult questions it
raises about the role of government in society. When
individual actors have the ability to launch
cyber-attacks that shut down major corporations (as in
February 2000) and madmen with modest assets can
culture and spread pathogens that have the potential
to kill thousands or even millions of citizens,[1]
government must carefully consider how it should
organize to address such potentially disastrous
threats. In this process, important tradeoffs must be
considered between catastrophic damage to the nation
and an expanded (and possibly more intrusive) role for
government. The prospect of an expanded government
intruding on its citizens' rights is of such major
importance that it must be addressed in full
partnership with the Congress and, to the greatest
extent possible, in open forums.
A Recommendation
A solution to this organizational issue can be based
loosely on the military combatant command model.[2] In
this model, the military's regional Commanders in
Chief (CINCs) conduct operations (warfighting,
peacekeeping, humanitarian operations) and report to
the Secretary of Defense and the President. The forces
they use to conduct these operations are raised,
trained, and supplied by the military services. Almost
all resources come through the military services as
well.[3] And while the CINCs do not "own" the forces
they use to conduct operations (these forces are
assigned to them by the Secretary of Defense for
specific missions), the CINCs have a loud voice in
setting the requirements that shape them. In fact, the
entire military model for the structuring and
equipping of forces is driven by the requirements set
by doctrine and warfighting demands. This model could
provide a framework for solving some of the most
pressing problems of organization and resource
allocation for homeland defense. The framework could
include:
The creation of a Homeland Defense Agency (HDA) with a
headquarters staff similar to that of a regional CINC.
The identification of government agencies that could
be permanently moved under the HDA without adversely
affecting their home agency.
The identification of government agencies that could
not be permanently moved under the HDA without
adversely affecting their home agency, and the
establishment of habitual, plan-driven relationships
with them to address specific homeland defense
missions.
The placement of the resource allocation decision
authority for homeland defense issues that span more
than one department or agency with the Vice President.
The elevation of the position of National Coordinator
for Security, Critical Infrastructure, and
Counterterrorism to Assistant to the President, and
the dual placement of this position under both the
Vice President and National Security Advisor.
The stipulation of specific engagement considerations.
The exact structure and missions of the Homeland
Defense Agency would depend on the outcome of the
debates on the larger issues concerning the role of
government in society. The goal here is simply to
recommend a framework, highlight important
considerations, and stimulate discussion.
Background
It is useful to note that "homeland defense" has
multiple meanings. In the context of this article, it
indicates defense against new and yet-unknown threats
that are not readily addressed by the existing
military structure. Missions such as national missile
defense, defeating traditional military forces that
might invade the nation, and defense against strategic
bombers would remain with the military. It will also
become apparent that some overlap with military
missions is unavoidable on issues such as
cyber-defense, but these are manageable.
The current federal government policy center for
issues of homeland defense is the National Security
Council's National Coordinator for Security, Critical
Infrastructure, and Counterterrorism (hereinafter the
"National Coordinator"). Under the new NSC structure,
these issues fall under the National Preparedness and
Counter Terrorism Policy Coordination Committee. To
connect policy to resources, the Office of Management
and Budget established a "National Security Crosscut"
that uses NSC subgroups to look at cross-governmental
programs. It attempts to establish the requirements in
each field, coordinate programs across the government
to eliminate duplication and facilitate cooperation,
and recommend a portfolio of programs to supplement
those already ongoing in government that will fill the
identified gaps and shortfalls. This combination of
policy and coordination at the NSC, and budgeting (and
to a lesser extent management) at OMB, represents an
innovative attempt to avoid government by "czardoms,"
while integrating efforts across government.[4]
This model has had limited success because it suffers
from three major shortcomings. First, it relies on the
department and agency representatives serving on the
National Preparedness and Counter Terrorism Policy
Coordination Committee subgroups to check their
departmental affiliation at the door. For most this is
philosophically possible, but practically impossible.
These groups are good at recognizing what is in the
nation's best interest, but the process breaks down
when actual funding priorities are brought into
question. (One never hears an agency representative
say, "I think you should have my funding--your program
is more important than mine.") The members of these
groups are answerable to the senior leaders of their
departments or agencies, so they are understandably
hesitant to recommend programs or policies that will
not benefit or may even hurt their home agency. Agency
representatives simply cannot do that without either
consulting with their leaders (which is time-consuming
and strips the interagency character from the
resulting recommendations) or risking their careers.
The second major shortcoming of this process is that
it has no teeth. These groups do in fact succeed in
agreeing on recommendations for programs, but their
recommendations are frequently not implemented. This
is because the President's Budget Submission is
constructed in stovepipes--department by department
and agency by agency. To date, the policy process run
by the NSC has not regularly engaged the department
and agency leaders at the highest level to set
resource allocation priorities, and OMB has not
participated at a senior enough level to force these
program recommendations through budget channels. The
result is a lukewarm set of recommendations that has
no support where it counts, at the highest policy and
resource levels of the departments and agencies.
Despite these shortcomings, the process has had some
success in getting specific, high-profile initiatives
into the President's Budget Submission, usually
through direct intervention by the National
Coordinator. A third major shortcoming comes into play
here to kill many of these initiatives, however. This
is related to the stovepipes mentioned above, but is
physically located at the other end of Pennsylvania
Avenue. Just as in the executive branch, the House and
Senate appropriations committees view the world though
their individual stovepipes. These committees
understandably focus on the areas for which they are
responsible. Programs that require a broader
perspective--those that do not fall neatly in any one
of these stovepipes--tend to go wanting. The result is
that multi-agency programs that are important to the
nation and make it into the President's budget are
frequently not funded or are only partially funded by
the Congress.
Comparison of Options
This process clearly presents a difficult
organizational problem. The key people in both the
executive and legislative branches are, in general,
deeply committed to doing the right thing, but they
are hobbled by the difficulties of the process. A
different organizational solution is needed. Outlined
below are potential organizational solutions that
either require no significant changes in the structure
of the government, a major organizational change, or a
somewhat less drastic organizational change that would
largely mirror the military model mentioned above.
Solutions that would require only small changes to the
organization of the government can be viewed as
falling on a spectrum ranging from the traditional
government by departments and agencies to the creation
of one or more "czars" who have significant authority
over policies and budgets. Options on this spectrum
include some form of increased oversight and
participation by senior officials on the White House
Staff, or the creation of a Czar for Homeland Defense.
Increased participation by senior members of the White
House staff--primarily the NSC (in the person of the
National Coordinator) and OMB--would go a long way
toward addressing the first two major shortcomings
listed above. This does not come without a cost,
however. Neither of these offices has the staff or
resources to do this task well. Furthermore,
structural changes would be required in each. This
effort would require the elevation of the National
Coordinator to at least the rank of Deputy Assistant
to the President (roughly equivalent to a Deputy
Department Secretary). OMB would need to give this
mission to a new or existing Deputy Director (along
with the associated resources) to provide the "teeth"
for the effort. Both offices would need to be staffed
appropriately. In addition to the political appearance
problem of expanding the White House staff, this also
would bring up the much more important issue of limits
on the authority of White House staff officials. Put
bluntly, giving a White House staffer not subject to
congressional oversight operational or
near-operational responsibilities is a non-starter.
Furthermore, these solutions do not address the third
shortcoming mentioned above. Congressional oversight
and funding would retain their current form and
continue to provide significant drawbacks.
The creation of a Homeland Defense Office and Director
in the White House staff (the czar model) shares this
last problem as well. Furthermore, government by
czardom is not a popular notion, and for good reasons.
Czars have no line responsibility, but have a vote on
agencies' policies and budgets. Czars, while often
confirmed by the Senate, typically do not fall
squarely under the oversight of any single committee.
The current congressional problems would continue to
exist. Furthermore, government by czardom is not a
well-thought-out management concept, but rather an
attempt to make a cumbersome system more efficient. To
date it has arguably had limited success. Other
permutations of this type could be explored, but all
would share these same drawbacks. Rather than
tinkering around the edges of the organizational
issue, it would be better to fix it.
A frequently mentioned but more drastic solution would
be the creation of a Department of Homeland
Defense.[5] This would involve moving assets that are
critical to homeland defense out of their current
organizations (e.g., the Federal Emergency Management
Agency, the National Guard, Coast Guard, elements of
the FBI), and placing them in this new department.
Creating a Department of Homeland Defense would help
solve all three shortcomings described above. It would
establish a dedicated center of gravity for these
issues with the ability to craft crosscutting policies
and programs that address national rather than
departmental issues. It would have a dedicated place
in the President's Budget Submission like all other
departments and agencies. And, because this would be a
major part of the governmental structure, it would
necessarily fall under the existing or some new
committee structure on Capitol Hill. The responsible
committees would then have to address these
crosscutting policy and resource issues, thus
establishing a "home" for homeland defense in the
Congress.
But this option also would create as many problems as
it would solve. Moving the aforementioned parts of
existing government structures that address these
threats into a new department would entail splitting
up and damaging such critical bodies as the FBI (for
example, moving its counterterrorism assets), the
Department of Transportation (moving the Coast Guard),
the Department of Defense (moving the National Guard),
the Secret Service (moving some of its financial
crimes assets), and the list goes on. This would not
only cause significant internal upheaval in these
departments and agencies, but it also would hurt their
ability to perform their current jobs, since these
pieces are not distinct and separate from the missions
of their parent organizations. This could be mitigated
by the duplication of these elements, but that would
be prohibitively expensive and create new turf wars.
In short, the creation of a Department of Homeland
Defense would be a drastic step that would likely hurt
the government's ability to perform other critical
missions as much as it might help with homeland
defense.
Fortunately, there is a reasonable solution short of
creating a Department of Homeland Defense: the
creation of Homeland Defense Agency (HDA) with a
Senate-confirmed Director of cabinet rank. This agency
would be modeled after the headquarters of the
military's regional CINCs. It would consist of a staff
that plans for operations in these specific areas,
advises on policy issues, and controls operations when
needed (analogous to the staffs of the CINCs). As
recommended by the US Commission for National
Security/21st Century, the Homeland Defense Agency
should be built upon the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA). It should absorb the FBI's National
Infrastructure Protection Center, the Commerce
Department's Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office,
and the Justice Department's National Defense
Preparedness Office. This would give it a core of
operational and policy-support capabilities not firmly
embedded in existing agencies, and improve
coordination between these offices. And while no
exhaustive list of assets that should be moved into
the HDA can be finalized without significant
cross-governmental analysis, it is clear that it
should absorb no asset that is integral to existing
and continuing departments or agencies and their
missions.
Rather than tearing the guts out of several
departments and agencies, assets needed for homeland
defense would be assigned to the HDA for the conduct
of training and operations in accordance with fixed
plans, just as the military services assign forces to
the CINCs to perform their missions.[6] Note that
these would be formally identified assets and people,
dedicated by the departments and agencies for specific
missions. For example, a plan to counter bio-terrorism
might call upon identified and dedicated personnel and
organizations from the FBI (counterterrorism
specialists), the Centers for Disease Control
(pathologists and epidemiologists), the Customs
Service, and so forth. The National Security Council
would still oversee policy in these areas, but the HDA
staff would play a major role in creating and
recommending policy and strategy. This, too, closely
mirrors the current military model, where policy is
largely the domain of the senior civilian leaders in
the Department of Defense and the NSC, but the
military staffs and commanders play an active role in
identifying requirements, advising on capabilities and
limitations, and recommending options. Furthermore,
homeland defense policy should be addressed in the
President's annual National Security Strategy. And
just as the military builds the National Military
Strategy from the National Security Strategy, so too
would a Homeland Defense Strategy be built to
articulate the matching of ends, ways, and means in
this domain. This system would result in the
development of a cohesive policy and a responsive
operational capability for homeland defense.
Policy, Strategy, and Criteria for Operations
As currently structured, the responsibility for
developing homeland defense policy and strategy falls
to the National Coordinator. This has significant
benefits. This strategy necessarily involves multiple
agencies across government, and the NSC is well-suited
to coordinate it. This process also provides access to
the President. There are other considerations,
however, that must be addressed. The following
discussion on operations and resources extends the
analogy of the Homeland Defense Agency to military
combatant commands, and it yields insights that need
to be considered in determining who should be
responsible for formulating homeland defense strategy.
As the CINCs are charged with developing the plans to
meet the requirements of the National Security
Strategy and National Military Strategy, so too should
the Director of the Homeland Defense Agency be charged
with developing plans and proposing a Homeland Defense
Strategy. These homeland defense plans would draw on
the assets and resources identified by various
departments and agencies as discussed above. The
Homeland Defense Agency would also need to conduct
periodic training with the dedicated people and
organizations from other agencies to ensure its
ability to execute the homeland defense plans. These
training exercises would engage the dedicated assets
and help identify resource requirements. This would
also help build the "command relationships" necessary
for efficient execution in times of emergency.
Using this model, the Director of the Homeland Defense
Agency would identify requirements for programs and
capabilities to both OMB and the departments and
agencies directly supporting the homeland defense plan
for inclusion in the President's Budget Submission.
Unlike the current system, the Director of the HDA
would be there to champion these requests. Yet
ultimately there would need to be a single office,
short of the presidency, where competing resource
demands between the HDA and the supporting departments
and agencies could be adjudicated. Since this issue
goes to the heart of defending the nation from
potentially serious attack, and since significant
operational and resource issues are involved, this
responsibility ought to be vested in an official on
the National Security Council who is senior to the
department and agency heads that must cooperate. Short
of creating a super-secretary who would sit over
several departments and agencies, this leaves but one
choice, the Vice President. And given that the Vice
President would be the final arbiter of operational
and resource issues for the HDA and associated
departments and agencies, he or she should also play a
major role in approving policy and strategy. To
facilitate policy and strategy formulation, the
National Coordinator should be dual-hatted under the
NSC and the Vice President and elevated to the rank of
Assistant to the President. This would give the
position the access needed for success. It would also
strongly link HDA policy to both the national security
policy center, the NSC, and its proposed resource
decisionmaking authority (and statutory NSC member),
the Vice President.
As discussed for the Department of Homeland Defense,
the Homeland Defense Agency would require
congressional oversight and funding, and so would fall
under some new or existing committees. These
committees would necessarily assume policy
responsibility for this cross-governmental issue for
the legislative branch. Appropriations might still be
spread across the subcommittees that fund the HDA and
the associated departments and agencies, but with the
oversight committee as designated interlocutor, more
attention and focus would exist on the Hill for this
important issue.
Developing criteria for the use of the HDA is also a
critical issue. It is important to mention that
barring unforeseeable changes in law, the Director
could not have command authority over US military
forces, and probably would not have directive
authority over some other government agencies such as
the FBI. He or she could, however, assign them
missions and, in conjunction with the Secretary of
Defense and the Attorney General (and perhaps other
cabinet members), supervise their performance. Firm
recommendations on the details of such arrangements
must await the answers to the questions about the role
of government in society alluded to in the
introduction, but a few observations and
considerations for employment of the Homeland Defense
Agency are in order.[7]
The first is the connection between our national
interests and HDA operations. Key here are the issues
of civil and privacy rights, as well as relations with
our allies and other major powers. These must be
balanced with the level and immediacy of the threat of
attack. To avoid major pitfalls, political goals and
boundaries must be clearly understood by the HDA
Director and key leaders. This would include
consideration of the international effects of
operations (e.g., regarding the pursuit of terrorists
or cyber-villains across international boundaries),
and the wisdom and necessity of conducting operations
in conjunction with allies. The need to observe
treaties and other bilateral or multilateral
agreements also falls in this category. In the cyber
case in particular, the deliberations would include a
cost-benefit analysis of the economic, national
security, and political ramifications of deterring an
attack or punishing an attacker.
A review of existing policy and careful consideration
of new proposals to align options for HDA operations
with policy and strategy are also in order. Planning
options must be weighed against operational
capabilities, and the deterrent and antagonizing
effects of specific operations considered. Allied
cooperation would once again be important due to the
international nature of these problems.
Another critical consideration is the balance between
resources and operations. Sufficient resources will
not exist to analyze and handle all situations, so
clear guidelines and priorities must be in place to
guide action. Finally, public and congressional
opinion must be considered. This is not just to avoid
embarrassing political altercations and news reports,
but to forge a national consensus for long-term
efforts that will increase the safety of the nation.
Government, Society, and New Security Institutions
The Homeland Defense Agency option has shortcomings as
well, not the least of which is the cultural
adjustment needed across government to make such an
effort work. The military went through this change
after the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act
became law in 1986, and the Defense Department emerged
stronger. Similar benefit may accrue to the
departments and agencies that work with the HDA. Yet
there are valid concerns about the role of government
in addressing these issues. Note that these
shortcomings are not unique to the HDA--they would be
shared by any comprehensive solution. Among these are
such fundamental questions as the role of government
in society and our people's expectations of privacy.
It would be premature to propose solutions to any of
these issues without full and open debate. Yet some
fundamental observations and questions can be
addressed here.
Underlying this discussion is a trend indicating that
the know-how, technology, and ultimately the ability
to create significant or even catastrophic damage is
increasingly in the hands of greater numbers of
people, while far fewer people are needed to cause
this damage.[8] There is little doubt that a
knowledgeable hacker with a cheap personal computer
can inflict millions if not billions of dollars of
damage to businesses on the internet, and a lunatic
with modest resources may be able to create and spread
dangerous pathogens. Note as well that Western
societies are founded on the fundamental philosophical
principle that all power comes from the people, who
cede portions of it (and therefore some of their
freedoms) to government so that it can ensure their
safety, welfare, and potential for prosperity. These
two observations suggest that new, nontraditional
threats pose risks to all societies of a magnitude
heretofore unknown, and that solutions may require the
ceding of additional liberties. There is a point
beyond which most individuals would not willingly cede
more power and freedoms to the government. For each
individual, however, this is a fuzzy line, and for
society as a whole it presents a very difficult
question. It may be closely linked to related
questions, such as the magnitude and imminence of a
threat and the need to identify and defeat it. The
relative roles of private entities and government must
also be considered. Answers to these issues are not
clear, but they will both enable and bound the actions
of the HDA. In considering them, it is necessary to
examine some fundamental values and trade-offs, and to
ask important questions.
One such question involves the role of the
intelligence community in tracking the perpetrators of
homeland threats. Without good intelligence,
government cannot know the magnitude and imminence of
the threat and will be poorly postured to identify and
defeat it. But strict prohibitions exist on the
latitude of the military and CIA to collect
intelligence on US citizens, and indeed on anyone
within US borders. This is the domain of the FBI and
Justice Department, under the oversight of the courts.
Yet our increasingly global existence, where travel is
relatively easy and communications are instantaneous
and without boundaries, puts a real strain on the
ability of the intelligence community to quickly
develop and disseminate the intelligence it might need
to stop a terrorist, weapons of mass destruction, or a
cyber-attack. To what extent are US restrictions
against domestic intelligence collection still
sensible? What level of threat would warrant
overturning them? Do the mechanisms currently being
developed to streamline intelligence-sharing make
these restrictions moot or alter these considerations?
Do we need a thorough review of the legal and logical
questions associated with intelligence matters in the
21st century?
A second consideration involves the role of the
military. The Posse Comitatus Act was passed after the
Civil War in a congressional compromise to get Union
soldiers out of the business of performing government
functions in the South during Reconstruction.[9] Yet
in the areas of terrorism, weapons of mass
destruction, and cyber-attacks, the military possesses
significant capabilities and brings to bear important
resources for monitoring, tracking, locating, and
potentially retaliating against attackers. This is
particularly noteworthy in the cyber domain, where
military skills are several years ahead of the rest of
the government (though not the private sector) and
where military cyber-intervention would be much less
intrusive than in the more physically based domains of
terrorists and weapons of mass destruction. Is Posse
Comitatus still appropriate? What are the societal and
political ramifications of changing or rescinding it?
In the context of each of these new threats, what is
the "battlefield"? What should be the role of the
National Guard in homeland defense? What would be the
effect on other core military missions?
Another issue involves the nature of cyberspace and
privacy rights. This is a two-edged sword. In order to
protect private information, institutions must be able
to identify intruders. Recent pieces of legislation,
such as the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act and the Gramm, Leach, Bliley Act,
address this issue by setting the groundwork for
holding corporations responsible for safeguarding the
health and financial information, respectively, of
their clients. Yet to do this they must construct
significant cyber protections, and this may require
collecting information about people using their
systems. This raises significant privacy concerns.
Furthermore, this issue is even more sensitive when it
is government collecting this information. People are
rightly concerned about the ability of the government
to amass and misuse encyclopedic information on its
citizens. The potential for abuse is significant and
must be guarded against. What level of monitoring
should be allowed by private firms and the government?
Can information be collected and abuses prevented?
Should institutions be held responsible for
safeguarding private information if they are denied
the tools with which to do it? What are the
trade-offs?
A fourth concern again involves the nature of
cyberspace, and the fact that to do almost anything on
the internet requires using intermediate nodes spread
around the globe. This raises important legal, policy,
and ethical questions about a government's use of the
internet to track domestic and international
malefactors. For example, during the recent
Israeli-Palestinian dispute, it was reported that an
American corporation providing internet service to the
Israeli government was contractually bound to help
defend the networks from attacks by Palestinian
sympathizers--and that US supporters of both sides had
used facilities at their American business worksites
to launch attacks on their opponent's systems. The
international governmental and corporate liability
questions implied by these reports are uncharted
territory in which proactive, well-thought-out policy
and legislation is needed before a crisis occurs.
Related to the global nature of the internet and the
speed of operations in cyberspace are questions of
jurisdiction and due process. Hunting down hackers or
other malicious actors on the internet currently
requires warrants in all jurisdictions through which
the attack passed, and cooperation with foreign
governments when the path is international (which is
almost always the case). Should there be "national
warrants," as the Justice Department has called for,
to speed this process within the United States? Should
we sign treaties that permit us access to other
nations' infrastructures for this purpose, with the
understanding that such treaties would give other
governments (or multinational organizations such as
the UN) access to our infrastructures as well? What is
to be gained and what rights would be lost should such
policies be adopted?
Information sharing is another critical issue for the
pursuit of international malefactors. Private-sector
organizations may have information that would benefit
the government's efforts to pursue, arrest, and
prosecute terrorists or cyber-villains, but may be
hesitant to share it with government for fear that
proprietary information could be exposed through
Freedom of Information Act requests.[10] Information
sharing is also encouraged between private
corporations to increase overall security, but this
raises concerns for anti-competitive behavior.
Finally, information sharing brings the possibility of
lawsuits for failure of due diligence. Are legislative
or regulatory changes needed to address such concerns?
These are but a few of the tough questions that must
be asked and answered in order to craft an effective
organization and associated policy for dealing with
these new threats.
Conclusion
A few points are clear. First, the federal government,
at both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue, is poorly
organized to facilitate a national defense against
these new threats to national security. Attempts to
adjust the current architecture to meet these new
challenges have been remarkable for their limited
success in the face of severe obstacles, but have
still fallen short. A Homeland Defense Agency, modeled
roughly after the military's combatant command
structure, is needed to orchestrate efforts across
government, while at the same time minimally
detracting from the other requirements of the affected
departments and agencies. A reorganization of the
White House Staff is needed to ensure proper policy
and strategy oversight. This can be accomplished by
placing the current National Coordinator under both
the NSC and the Vice President, and elevating the
position to the rank of Assistant to the President.
Finally, the role of the Homeland Defense Agency will
depend upon the resolution of significant policy,
legal, and value discussions that go straight to the
heart of the role of government in our society. In the
face of these new and potentially catastrophic
threats, it is important to advance these efforts and
discussions.
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NOTES
1. For example, the US Commission on National
Security/21st Century states in Road Map for National
Security: Imperative for Change, p. 4: "A few people
with as little as $50,000 investment may manage to
produce and spread a genetically-altered pathogen."
Internet, www.nssg.gov, accessed 13 June 2001.
2. Special thanks to Dr. Vigdor Teplitz, who first
suggested looking at the "CINC model" for this
problem.
3. A notable exception is Special Forces Command. The
focus in this article is on the more usual model used
by the geographic CINCs.
4. The Director of the Office of Drug Control Policy
is the best current example of an issue-area czar.
5. The third report of the US Commission on National
Security/21st Century, Road Map for National Security:
Imperative for Change, recommends this approach. The
Commission's ideas for a National Homeland Security
Agency (NHSA) are compelling, but see the drawbacks
identified below.
6. The forces used by the CINCs to conduct operations
actually belong to the Army, Navy, Air Force, and
Marine Corps. They are aligned against specific
operation plans devised by the CINCs for the execution
of their responsibilities, and allocated to the
combatant commands by the Secretary of Defense.
7. These are based on the framework presented by John
Collins in "Military Intervention: A Checklist of Key
Considerations," Parameters, 25 (Winter 1995-1996),
53-58.
8. Keith Gardner, "Toxic Knowledge," unpublished paper
from the Deputy Assistant Secretary General for
Scientific & Environmental Affairs, NATO Headquarters.
9. 18 US Code, Section 1385.
10. Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests allow
citizens to get information held by the government and
are a key component of an open, "transparent" system
of government.
-------------------------------------------------------
Lieutenant Colonel Terrence Kelly, Ph.D., is the
Senior National Security Officer in the White House
Office of Science and Technology Policy. He served in
the 82d Airborne Division, the 8th Infantry Division,
on the Army Staff (ODCSOPS), on the faculty of the US
Military Academy, and more recently as a White House
Fellow, with Army Legislative Affairs, and as Chief of
Staff of the interagency Critical Infrastructure
Assurance Office. He has a Ph.D. in mathematics and an
M.S. in computer and systems engineering from
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, and he is a 1982
graduate of the US Military Academy.
__________________________________________________
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