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Peace at any cost is a Prelude to War!


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ARTICLE 06 – Feedback: Readers Respond to Hack Columns on U.S. Army, Marines
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I agree with David Hackworth that today's U.S. Army is bloated and redundant,
that its enlistment and training standards have been reduced to intolerable
levels and that the Army's new PR campaign rings hollow. However, there are
positions in his column (“The Marines Have Landed – Again,” Nov. 28) that I
find contradictory.

In the column, Hack lambastes the Army for being stuck in the Cold War
mindset and for being tied to “fleets of ships and planes to move them, and
it takes months to ... get to the battlefield, not to mention the massive
tax-dollar load to outfit and maintain it,” while he simultaneously praises
the USMC for being “flexible, agile, ready and deadly.” Then later in the
same column, he seems to criticize the Army for “forming light brigades
strikingly similar to USMC units" by ridding itself of heavy armor, which he
next suggests makes them vulnerable to Somalia-type operations.

What gives? Does Hack want an Army that has heavy armor or does he want one
that is “lighter, leaner” like the Marine Corps? It seems Hack is asking the
Army to be deployable like the Marines without exchanging the protection and
firepower of heavy armor. Unless there's some sort of miracle-chariot that
the Army should be using that provides M1-level armor protection and
firepower, but is light enough to be carried into battle by a Blackhawk
helicopter, then the Army is going to have to restructure its units and equip
them differently.


As for the heavy lift assets required for moving the Army, one should
remember that it is not the Marines – but rather the Navy – that is sailing
those large amphibious warfare ships. The whole reason the Marines are on
these Navy ships is so they can respond quickly to events throughout the
world. The Marines are the 911 police force of the nation, ready to react to
hostilities or disasters, courtesy of the U.S. Navy. The CONUS-bound Army is
stuck at home because most of it's former forward bases have been closed down
for lack of business in those areas and as a result must travel aboard Air
Force planes and Navy ships in order to respond to military crises. But Hack
critiques the Army for it's reliance on these heavy-lift assets, yet still
suggests the Army should somehow still manage to “get thar the fastest with
the mostest” without the use of those very assets. How then should the Army
attain this mobility without sacrificing its robustness?

It does not matter if you have a “flexible, agile, ready and deadly” U.S.
Army or an old hide-bound, Cold War Army: The Army will still need those
heavy-lift assets to perform its mission. Perhaps the topic of the Army’s
future force structure and deployment capabilities should be a topic for SFTT
members to address.

 -- Jason Iversen

Marines are Overexposed

In response to Hack’s column (“The Marines Have Landed – Again,” Nov. 28),
we have over 1,000 men in the middle of nowhere in southern Afghanistan
without proper overhead cover, others riding around in rubber tired LAV-I
armored cars just asking to roll over a mine or unexploded ordnance.

The U.S. Army is ready, but its senior leaders are not. We can fly an 82nd
Airborne paratrooper brigade cross-attached with a light-tracked M113A3 unit
from USAEUR into Afghanistan right now, with no train-up necessary. We did
the almost same thing two years ago for Kosovo, it was called Task Force
Hawk, remember?

But no one then hounded the Marines for why they couldn't get to the fight,
did we? No, we hounded TF Hawk for what it did once it was there: which was
little
because of the AH-64A Apache helicopters taking so long to get here, then
crashing during train-ups. Now we have Marines in Afghanistan doing nothing
in criminally deficient fighting positions without overhead cover and doing
nothing, and this is some kind of triumph?

The reason why the Army is not holding the airfield in southern Afghanistan
is because if they used pararoopers and M113A3s, the lie that the Army needs
to buy expensive and less-capable 19-ton LAV-IIIs for [Chief of Staff Gen.
Eric] Shinseki's rubber-tired armored car “transformation” would be revealed.

-- Mike Sparks, former Marine enlisted and officer



Army Too Soft on Recruits

In response to Hack’s column (“It’s Time to Set the U.S. Army Straight,”
Nov. 21), I remember when I first came in August 1960, the only promise was
that I was
going to catch hell during training at Fort Jackson and I did but it made me
an excellent soldier and person. I had a friend serving as a drill sergeant
who told me that the worst trainees today are coming from Fort Jackson and
the best from Fort Knox. His observation was that the new troopers cry about
anything to cause a change from the drill sergeant. With all the fuss about
caring, the drill sergeant has to ease up on them. The way the Army is doing
business since the VOLAR Army came into being is weakening the entire force.



I am a retired NCO and Vietnam veteran who passed on a master sergeant
promotion because I just could not stand it anymore. I have never seen so
many highly competent NCOs getting out because of the unnecessary things they
have to perform. It cost a heck of a lot of money to train one of ours but we
lose them as soon as a contractor convinces them that life out there is
better.

As long as the Army keeps promising college to recruits instead of hard,
rough training, all we are going to get is terminal soldiers, a commitment of
four or so years for so many years of college education.


-- Adolfo Cruz





Hack Is on Target

As to be expected, David Hackworth’s observations and comments are concise
and
on target (“It’s Time to Set the U.S. Army Straight,” Nov. 21). The Marines,
as usual, are doing an outstanding job wherever they go. Hopefully, and for
the grunts, more of the Army is becoming acclimated to the changes. For the
lives of the grunts, we can only hope that [Chief of Staff Gen. Eric
Shinseki] has had sufficient time to make sufficient of the much needed
changes.

I recently had a conversation with a West Point graduate from the late 50's
who served seven years then resigned to enter the private sector. He said the
Army was finally getting around changing its organization and formations,
much of which had not changed since Napoleon's time.

In my experience as a JCS “purple suiter” in the late 1960s, the Army and
Navy – while composed of many fine men and officers, and in services of great
and often times hoary traditions – appeared to be near ramrod rigid in their
thinking. The Marines were at least always willing to listen. Having grown up
in the Air Force from 50's to 70's where change was the norm, it was an
illuminating, and at times near mind-boggling experience to encounter some
the traditional thinking in the Army and Navy.

I think is both rewarding and challenging to see the deployment and
engagement of the UAVs (Predator and Global Hawk) and the good
sense of someone to use “things” instead of grunts. Eventually, to take
Osama bin Laden from the scene, a bunch of GI boots are going to have to
go on the ground and destroy the evil. Our best hope is that when they
do, the grunts are well-trained and equipped for the task at hand.


-- Col. Bob Daniels USAF (Ret)

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ARTICLE 07 – Feedback: One Guardsman’s Mobilization Tale
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As an NCO in a National Guard Infantry unit with over 13 years of service, I
am writing in response to the request by DefenseWatch responses on how
military training and operations have changed since the Sept. 11 terrorist
attacks.

Like many Americans on Sept. 11, I sat dumb-founded in front of a television
as I watched the aftermath of the attacks on the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon, and the failed attempt that ended in Pennsylvania. I thought that
at a minimum my Guard unit would be called up for security duty somewhere in
our state. As news reports began to state that National Guard and Reserve
units around the country were being called up, I decided I'd phone my unit
and find out what, if anything, was going on. It was the first of three calls
I'd make that day, always getting the same answers – “We haven't heard
anything yet ....  Thanks for the call .…  We'll let you know …. ”

Sept. 15-16 was our scheduled drill weekend, so I arrived over an hour early
in the hopes of finding out what our mission might be in order to get things
rolling for my men. I was somewhat dumbfounded to hear that nothing had come
down from “higher” as of yet. Except for a few troops at the front gate
half-heartedly checking ID's, it seemed it would be a normal drill weekend.

It wasn't until late in the day on Sunday that word started to circulate that
people would be needed to help guard all armories as well as an Army Aviation
Support Facility (AASF) in the state. By the end of that day I and four other
Guardsmen were told to report to our HQ armory the next morning and prepare
for travel to our state headquarters where we would receive a full day of
training in preparation for guarding the AASF.

Upon arrival at the headquarters on Monday, Sept. 17th, we received four
hours of training from troops of our battalion who had recently returned from
a peacekeeping mission overseas. During the training, we were told we would
all qualify with 9mm pistols and that would be our weapon for the guard duty.
But later that night, we were told it would be a day or so before the pistols
would be issued due to ammo shortages and logistical reasons. The message
finally came down that our uniform would include kevlar, flak vest, LBV and
riot batons. But pistols – it was decided by “higher” – would not be
issued.

The first few days were somewhat intense: eight hours on the front gate,
eight hours on roving patrols and eight hours off. We settled into our
routine, but changes began coming in: Our shifts were changed to 12 hours on,
12 hours off, the number of men per team shrank from four to three, then to
two. The military van we were given for travel from HQ to the AASF was taken
away, so we were forced to drive our own vehicles. Even the MRE rations we
were given for the first few days ran out and we were told to “live off the
local economy and you'll be reimbursed.”

When I questioned the officer in charge how we were to defend ourselves or
the AASF in case of an emergency with only riot batons (I had to interrupt
the movie or video game he was watching on his laptop) I was given advice
such as “work with what we have” or “throw the baton and run.”

I was proud to serve my country and my state in such a stressful and
unknowing time. However, it was very difficult to feel I was doing much good
when the people we were guarding asked us how much we could do in the event
of an actual attack with only riot batons and flashlights.  I began to wonder
about my own safety and that of the troops under my command.

-- A Concerned Guard NCO


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ARTICLE 08 – Medal of Honor Recipient – ROEDER, ROBERT E., Capt. USA
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Rank and organization: Captain, U.S. Army, Company G, 350th Infantry, 88th
Infantry Division.

Place and date: Mt. Battaglia, Italy, 27-28 September 1944.

Entered service at: Summit Station, Pa. Birth: Summit Station, Pa.

G.O. No.: 31, 17 April 1945.

Citation: for conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at risk of life above and
beyond the call of duty. Capt. Roeder commanded his company in defense of the
strategic Mount Battaglia. Shortly after the company had occupied the hill,
the Germans launched the first of a series of determined counterattacks to
regain this dominating height.

Completely exposed to ceaseless enemy artillery and small-arms fire, Capt.
Roeder constantly circulated among his men, encouraging them and directing
their defense against the persistent enemy. During the sixth counterattack,
the enemy, by using flamethrowers and taking advantage of the fog, succeeded
in overrunning the position.

Capt. Roeder led his men in a fierce battle at close quarters, to repulse the
attack w  ith heavy losses to the Germans. The following morning, while the
company was engaged in repulsing an enemy counterattack in force, Capt.
Roeder was seriously wounded and rendered unconscious by shell fragments. He
was carried to the company command post, where he regained consciousness.

Refusing medical treatment, he insisted on rejoining his men. Although in a
weakened condition, Capt. Roeder dragged himself to the door of the command
post and, picking up a rifle, braced himself in a sitting position. He began
firing his weapon, shouted words of encouragement, and issued orders to his
men. He personally killed two Germans before he himself was killed instantly
by an exploding shell.

Through Capt. Roeder's able and intrepid leadership his men held Mount
Battaglia against the aggressive and fanatical enemy attempts to retake this
important and strategic height. His valorous performance is exemplary of the
fighting spirit of the U.S. Army.



Editor’s Note: If you know of any MOH recipient who is hospitalized or has
passed away recently, please email DefenseWatch Deputy Editor J. David
Galland at [EMAIL PROTECTED]





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