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Research Note 5
November 1998
A Chronology of Middle East State Support for International
Terrorism, 1997:
A Supplement to the State Department's Patterns of Global Terrorism
By Eytan J. Fisch
[The opinions expressed herein are soley those of the author and
should not be construed as representing those of The Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, its Board of Trustees, or Board of
Advisors.]
The U.S. State Department currently lists five states in the Middle
East as sponsors of international terrorism: Iran, Iraq, Libya,
Syria, and Sudan. To be classified as a state sponsor, a state must
"support international terrorism either by engaging in terrorist
activity themselves or by providing arms, training, safehaven,
diplomatic facilities, financial backing, logistic and/or other
support to terrorists." The most recent State Department report,
Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1997, does not enumerate specific
actions by each state sponsor of terrorism explaining why it earned
them the designation. The following data on state- sponsorship of
terrorism in 1997 is offered as a complement to that report. It
provides details on the actions of four of the state sponsors: Iran,
Libya, Syria, and Sudan. Generally, only specific acts -- and not
ongoing behavior, such as provision of safe haven or permission to
use radio transmitters -- are enumerated here.
IRAN
The United States placed Iran on its list of state sponsors of international terrorism
in 1984. According to the State Department's Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1997
(subsequently referred to as Patterns 1997), the Unite
d States considered Iran to be the "most active state sponsor of terrorism in 1997" --
lending direct support to several international terrorist organizations in the form of
funds, weapons, and training.
In his January 1998 interview with CNN, Iranian president Muhammad Khatami said that
terrorism "should be condemned in all its forms and manifestations . . . terrorism is
useless anyway and we condemn it categorically." K
hatami also stated that "supporting peoples who fight for the liberation of their land
is not . . . supporting terrorism," though he agreed -- regarding the example of
terrorism against Israel -- that "killing innocent me
n and women who are not involved in confrontations is terrorism." This appears to be a
similar position to the one taken by his predecessor, former Iranian president 'Ali
Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. In a 1993 interview with
Time, Rafsanjani said "Iran has suffered from terrorism more than any other country.
We know that terrorism does not serve our interests, neither domestically nor
internationally." Then referring specifically to the acti
ons of Hizballah, Rafsanjani went on to say: "We have respect for Hizballah as it
concerns the liberation of their land occupied by Israel. But if Hizballah commits
terrorist acts, we do not accept that, and we condemn it
. . . We should all cooperate to prevent terrorism" (Time, 5/31/93).
Direct Iranian Government Participation in International Terrorism
In November 1997, Argentine security chiefs announced that there was compelling
evidence to investigate right-wing Argentine congressman and former army rebel Emilio
Morello as well as the Iranian cultural attach� in Buen
os Aires, Moshem Rabbani, in connection with the 1994 bombing of a Jewish center in
the Argentine capital that killed eighty-six people (Reuters,11/24/97). In May 1998,
Argentine authorities announced that they had proof
Iran masterminded both the bombing of the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires in 1992 and
the 1994 bombing of the Jewish Community Center. Argentina expelled seven officials of
the Iranian embassy and detained eight Iranian c
itizens living in the capital (Washington Post, 5/21/98).
In February 1997, on the eighth anniversary of the fatwa against Salman Rushdie,
Ayatollah Sanei, one of the most powerful members of the Iranian clergy, declared that
the fatwa still stands and that the bounty would be i
ncreased, at least temporarily, to $2.5 million (London Times, 2/13/97). On December
17, 1997, in an interview with Norwegian Channel 2 television, Iran's Foreign Ministry
spokesman affirmed that the fatwa against Salman
Rushdie was still in effect. As in the past, the Iranian government argued that the
fatwa was not a government action but is religiously binding, a position Foreign
Minister Kamal Kharrazi reiterated at the United Nations
(UN) in September 1998.
Abdolhassem Mesbahi, a former high-ranking Iranian security official, who had
testified in court that Tehran's leaders had ordered political killings in Germany and
who served as a key witness in the 1996 Mykonos trial, s
aid that Ayatollah Khomeini personally ordered the bombing of Pan Am 103. Mesbahi had
no personal knowledge of or involvement in the attack but was rather stating what he
had heard from others in Iran's Intelligence Minis
try. The information was given to German prosecutors who began an investigation (Iran
Times, 7/11/97).
In June 1997, Swiss lawmakers accused the Iranian government of involvement in the
1990 assassination of Kazem Rajavi, a senior member of the Iranian opposition group,
Mujahedin-e-Khalq, stating that there was ten times m
ore evidence than in the Mykonos case (Associated Press (AP), 6/13/97).
In the ongoing investigation of the al-Khobar bombing in Saudi Arabia in 1996, U.S.
and Saudi intelligence authorities reportedly linked Brig. Ahmad Sherifi, a senior
Iranian intelligence officer and a top officer in Iran
's Revolutionary Guards, to a group of Shi'a Muslims suspected of blowing up the
American military compound. Sherifi had met with Hani Abd Rahim Sayegh, a Saudi Shi'a
arrested in Canada in connection with the bombing, abo
ut two years prior to the bombing (Washington Post, 4/13/97). Yet, subsequent
investigation was unable to provide compelling confirmation of these reports.
There were some reports of Iranian involvement in the November 12 shooting deaths of
four American oil workers in the port city of Karachi. Police in Pakistan detained
eight Iranians for questioning in the murders (Pinker
ton's Global Intelligence Services, 12/9/97). Yet, allegations of Iranian involvement
were not proven.
Coordinating Radical Islamic Movements
An October 1997 meeting at Iranian intelligence service headquarters brought together
several terrorist organizations and Iranian officials. According to an Arab press
report, Iranian officials who were present included:
General Mohsen Reza'i, former commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
(IRGC) who is now in charge of the reorganization of Iran's security apparatus;
General Yahya Rahim Safavi, head of the IRGC; Information Mi
nister Qorban 'Ali Najaf 'Abadi; former minister 'Ali Falahyan; Mohammed Mohammadi
Rayshahri, special adviser to Iran's supreme leader Ali Khamene'i; and Hoseyn Shaykh
ol-Eslam, former assistant foreign minister. Represen
tatives from terrorist groups included: Ahmed Jibril, head of the Popular Front for
the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC); Abdullah Ramadan Shallah,
secretary general of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ); 'A
bd-al-Hadi Hammadi, head of security for Lebanese Hizballah; 'Imad Mughniyah,
supervisor of Hizballah in the West Bank and Gaza; a delegate from Gama'at al-
Islamiyaa in Egypt; and three representatives of Hizballah group
s in the Gulf monarchies. The Arab press report said that Reza'i informed the
participants that Iran would double the amount of material and logistical support for
those organizations engaged in "defending the revolution"
and then laid out a plan for action on all fronts. Potential targets specified
included: U.S. military targets in Kuwait and Bahrain, American interests in several
Arab countries, Israeli interests, and Turkish diplomati
c missions (al-Watan al-'Arabi, 10/ 14/97).
Another conference in late 1997 in Qom is said to have been attendend by the Supreme
Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, Kurdistan's Workers' Party (PKK), the Algerian
Armed Islamic Group (GIA), Moroccan fundamentalis
ts, the Armenian Secret Army, and the Greek 17 November Movement (al-Watan al-'Arabi,
11/21/97).
Palestinian Islamic Jihad
Connections between Iran and the PIJ remained strong. According to Pentagon
intelligence sources cited by the Washington Times, PIJ accelerated in 1997 its
preparations for terrorist attacks in Israel. This planning appea
rs to have been in response to pressure from the Iranian government on the PIJ to
carry out more attacks inside Israel. According to a former CIA official, PIJ may be
preparing for attempted assassinations of high-ranking
PA officials (Washington Times, 6/2/97). According to Ha'aretz, Iran and PIJ reached
an agreement whereby PIJ would receive a bonus payment for each terrorist attack
launched against Israel (Ha'aretz, 7/31/97). Iran also
held a ceremony at Tehran University to commemorate the second anniversary of the
death of former PIJ leader Fathi al- Shaqaqi. Attending the meeting were the Syrian
and Lebanese ambassadors to Tehran as well as Hamas's
and PIJ's representatives in Iran, Abu Hamdan and Abu Jihad, respectively (IRNA,
11/3/97).
Hizballah
Over the years, Iran has had a hand in many of Hizballah's actions. Patterns 1997
states that Hizballah is "closely allied with, and often directed by Iran." Whether or
not Hizballah guerrilla activities in southern Leban
on are deemed to be terrorist actions may be disputed by some. Southern Lebanon aside,
Hizballah has attempted terrorist attacks inside Israel. In 1997, one such operation
was revealed when Israeli police arrested a Germa
n citizen, Joseph Smirak, on suspicion of perpetrating a suicide attack in Israel.
Smirak had been trained by Hizballah for two months in Lebanon in the use of arms and
explosives and entered Israel in November, where he
filmed various public locations and prepared a video explaining his motivation for a
suicide attack (Deutsche Presse-Agentur 12/24/97).
According to the Kuwaiti newspaper al-Ra'i al-'Am, sources close to Hizballah told the
newspaper that the security command of Lebanese Hizballah was reorganizing its
security set-up under the supervision of Amad Marnia, w
ho lives in Tehran. The person coordinating the restructuring reportedly serves as the
man in charge of security at the Iranian embassy in Beirut (Middle East News Agency,
1/26/97).
Iran's weapons shipments to Hizballah were plentiful in 1997. The type of weapons
shipped were more technologically advanced than before. In the first four months of
the year, thirty-seven jumbo flights from Iran carrying
weapons landed in Syria destined for Hizballah. (AP, 5/15/97). In September, IDF
spokesman Brig. Gen. Oded Ben-Ami announced that Hizballah received a shipment of new
Katyusha rockets from Iran. The new missiles had a ra
nge of twenty- five miles, compared to the thirteen-mile range of the missiles used by
Hizballah up to that point (Jerusalem Post, 9/21/97). In late November, Israel said
that mortar bombs from Iran were used in shellings
that killed eight civilians in south Lebanon. The shells had "the official Iranian
military factory" written on them (Reuters, 11/28/97).
Iranian Attacks on Opposition Groups Located Outside Iran
Patterns 1997 states that at least thirteen assassinations took place in 1997 for
which Iranian agents were responsible. All of these appear to have been killings of
Iranian dissidents. According to an Associated Press re
port, eight Iranian dissidents were murdered abroad in the five months between
President Khatami's August inauguration and the beginning of 1998 (AP, 1/9/98).
Many of the attacks by Iranian agents occurred against opposition bases in Iraq. There
are several active Iranian opposition organizations, including Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MEK)
and the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI)
. The Mujahedin is listed by the U.S. government as a foreign terrorist organization.
Numerous clashes between the Mujahedin and Iranian forces occurred when the Mujahedin
crossed into Iran or conducted operations from wi
thin Iranian territory. It is therefore not apparent whether these attacks should be
considered terroristic or part of an ongoing armed conflict; the answer for each
episode depends on whether innocent civilians were targ
eted. That said, the attacks were as follows:
Mujahedin-e-Khalq: On January 8, 1997, the Baghdad headquarters of the MEK was hit by
mortar shells (Reuters, 1/8/97). In July, the MEK announced that Iranian agents
attacked their military training camp in Kut, Iraq, wit
h ten mini-katyusha rockets (Reuters, 7/ 29/97). In late September, Iranian warplanes
crossed into Iraq and bombed two MEK bases, reportedly injuring two Iraqi civilians
(AP, 9/29/97). On October 5, 1997, two members of t
he MEK were killed by Iranian agents in the region of Dyala, Iraq. According to the
MEK, one of their members was killed in an ambush by Iranian agents near Baquba, Iraq
(Press Release: People's Mojahedin of Iran, 10/26/9
7).
Kurdish Opposition Groups: In early April, according to the KDPI, sixty members of the
organization were hospitalized after Iranian agents attempted to poison members with
thallium (Agence France Presse, 4/7/ 97). On June
3, 1997, a member of the KDPI was reportedly murdered in the Khalkan region of Iraq,
and the next day, a bomb blew up underneath a vehicle of the Khabat organization, a
dissident Iranian Kurdish group, in Solaymania, Ira
q (National Council of Resistance (NCR) Press Release, 6/5/97). On August 15, 1997, an
Iraqi civilian and two members of the KDPI were killed in Sulaymania, Iraq, in an
attack by Iranian representatives (NCR Press Release
, 8/15/97). On August 19, a bus carrying members of KDPI was attacked by Iranian
agents when traveling near Dokan, Iraq. Three members of KDPI were killed. On October
18, Iranian agents attacked a vehicle of a dissident I
ranian Kurdish group in Iraqi Kurdistan, killing one (Pinkerton's Global Intelligence
Services, 10/22/97). On December 3, 1997, Iranian agents killed Seyyed Jamal
Nikjouyan, a member of the KDPI (NCR Press Release, 12/5/9
7). Iran also assassinated five members of the KDPI on December 8, 1997, near the
Iraqi towns of Doukan and Kouysaneq (Pinkerton's Global Intelligence Services,
12/10/97).
SYRIA
Syria, one of the countries that was placed on the original list of state sponsors of
international terrorism in 1979, is the only state sponsor of terror with which the
United States maintains a resident ambassador. Furt
hermore, compared to the actions taken against the other four Middle Eastern terrorist
states, only minimal U.S. sanctions were imposed on Syria, namely prohibition of U.S.
economic assistance and military sales, controls
on dual-use equipment which could support terrorism or military activities, and
prohibitions of support for multilateral economic assistance.
According to Patterns 1997, "there is no evidence that Syrian officials have been
directly involved in planning or executing international terrorist attacks since
1986." Syrian support for international terrorism can be b
roken down into several areas of involvement: as a safehaven, conduit, and facilitator
for coordinating terrorism; as a base for the issuing of terrorist propaganda; and as
a base for operations of the PKK, a terrorist gr
oup directly launching attacks from Syrian soil.
Syria as a Safehaven, Conduit, and Facilitator
Syria's primary contribution to international terrorism is the fact that it serves as
a safehaven for several terrorist organizations -- allowing them to live and work out
of Syria. Patterns 1997 notes that "several radic
al terrorist groups maintain training camps or other facilities on Syrian territory .
. . (and that Syria) grants a wide variety of terrorist groups basing privileges or
refuge in areas of Lebanon's Bekaa Valley under Syr
ian control."
Of the terrorist groups based in Syria, Hizballah is the most active in Lebanon,
predominantly in the Bekaa Valley and southern Lebanon. Iran's support for Hizballah
is made easier by Syrian compliance. Weapons shipments
from Iran to Hizballah via Syria have provided Hizballah with much of its firepower
which it uses against Israeli forces in the security zone in southern Lebanon. As
described above, such shipments continued in 1997.
According to al-Ittihad, during Syrian president Hafiz al- Asad's brief July trip to
Tehran, Syria agreed to support Hamas and PIJ in carrying out operations inside
Israel. The sources also said that all the members of th
e Hizballah Central Shura Council led by Hasan Nasrallah were in Tehran before
President Asad's visit (Abu Dhabi al-Ittihad, 8/4/97).
Israel stated that it suspected suicide bombers responsible for attacks in Jerusalem
acted on orders from members of Hamas living in Damascus (Reuters, 9/30/97).
Specifically cited was a September 4 meeting, just hours af
ter the Jerusalem bombing on that same day, by leaders of several radical Palestinian
groups, the first time in months that a meeting of this kind was permitted. At the
meeting, Hamas was congratulated by the others for i
ts "good work" with the Jerusalem bombings (Christian Science Monitor, 9/ 24/97).
Other terrorist groups mentioned in Patterns 1997 that are reputed to have training
bases or headquarters in Syria or in the Syrian-controlled Bekaa Valley include
PFLP-GC, PFLP, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (DFLP), and the Abu Nidal Organization.
Syria as a Base for Terrorist Propaganda
Damascus is a haven for groups issuing claims for attacks and threats of new attacks,
for organizing meetings and rallies, and for circulating general propaganda from
terrorist organizations. In January, at the start of R
amadan, representatives of Hizballah, the PIJ, and Hamas spoke at a rally in Damascus
marking the first anniversary of the death of Hamas leader Yahya Ayyash, renewing
their threats of suicide bombings in Israel (Pinkerto
n's Global Intelligence Services, 1/13/97). In October, PIJ leader Ramadan Shalah
addressed by telephone from Damascus a PIJ rally in Gaza to mark the anniversary of
the assassination of Fathi al-Shaqaqi (Jerusalem Post,
10/ 24/97). A month later, the Hamas military command in Damascus threatened new
terror attacks on Israel (Jerusalem Report, 11/13/97).
Syria as a Base for the PKK
A major source of contention between Turkey and neighboring Syria has been Syrian
operational support for the terrorist actions of the PKK. The focus of PKK attacks is
southeastern Turkey where the PKK seeks to establish
an independent Kurdish state. According to Patterns 1997, the PKK continues to receive
"safehaven and modest aid from Syria, Iraq, and Iran." On May 21, Turkey accused these
countries of sheltering PKK fighters (Middle Ea
st Economic Digest, 5/25/97). In September, Turkey's president S�leyman Demirel
accused Syria of backing the PKK against Turkey (Mideast Mirror, 9/16/97). At the end
of the year, Turkish television said five armed men wer
e killed in a gunfight with security forces as they tried to cross the border from
Syria (BBC News, 12/21/97).
SUDAN
Sudan has been on the list of state sponsors of international terrorism since August
1993. From 1993 through mid-1997, Sudan faced few U.S sanctions, much like Syria. On
November 3, President Clinton issued Executive Orde
r 13067, which blocked all Sudanese assets in the United States and prohibited trade
with Sudan except the import of gum arabic.
Sudan provides training ground for several of the world's international terrorist
organizations. While the Sudanese government has been accused by several neighboring
countries of sponsoring violent revolutionary movement
s -- including insurgent groups in Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda, and Tunisia -- it has
also been very active in providing "refuge, logistical support such as training
facilities, travel documents, and weapons to a variety of
radical terrorist organizations" (Statement by George E. Moose, Assistant Secretary
of State for African Affairs, before the Senate Subcommittee on Africa, 5/15/97). As
of 1997, Sudan provided a safehaven for three terro
rists wanted in connection with the assassination attempt of Egyptian president Hosni
Mubarak in 1995 as well as terrorists from organizations including Gama'at
al-Islamiyya, GIA, Hizballah, the PIJ, the Abu Nidal Organiz
ation, and Hamas. Furthermore, Patterns 1997 states that Sudan has also "condoned many
of the objectionable activities of Iran, such as funneling assistance to terrorist and
radical Islamic groups operating in and transit
ing through Sudan."
In January 1997, al-Ahram reported that Egyptian state security police arrested five
terrorists who came from Sudan after having trained in camps near Khartoum (Cairo
MENA, 1/27/97). Shortly thereafter, Sudanese oppositio
n leader Brig. Gen. 'Abd-al-'Aziz Khalid 'Uthman was noted as saying that his men
found training camps where Iranian experts trained Sudanese in the areas of state
security, intelligence and civil defense (Al-Akhbar, 2/19
/97).
The Egyptian government claimed that at least twenty international training camps
exist in Sudan, seventeen of which are believed to be directly administered by the
Sudanese government with the intention of training Musli
m militants. One camp was reported to specialize in the training of individuals with
the purpose of assassinating heads of state and other high-ranking political and
governmental officials (Jane's Intelligence Review, 3/1
/97).
Following the Mubarak assassination attempt, Sudan announced that it had closed the
Afghan and Arab training camps. However, in mid-1997, sources noted that all but one
of the camps were relocated, with the one taken over
by the Sudanese Popular Defense Forces (al-Watan al-'Arabi, 8/9/97).
Information emerged in 1998 about Sudanese involvement with Saudi-born terrorist
financier Osama Bin Laden. Although Bin Laden was told to leave Sudan in 1996, his
terrorist Al Qaeda group retained an active presence in t
he country. According to a September 14, 1998 complaint requesting a warrant for
extradition from Germany of Al Qaeda lieutenant Mamdouh Mahmud Salim, during the
period 1992-1996 while Bin Laden lived in Sudan, al Qaeda a
nd the Sudanese government worked closely together on training and arming terrorists.
The FBI complaint stated that al Qaeda "agreed to put aside its differences with Shi'a
Muslim terrorist organizations, including the Go
vernment of Iran and its affiliated terrrorist group Hizballah, to cooperate against
the perceived common enemy, the United States and its allies," and that al Qaeda,
Iran, and Sudan formed a "tripartite arrangement . . .
to work together against the United States, Israel, and the West." It is unclear,
however, if Bin Laden had a disguised financial interest in the pharmaceutical factory
that the United States hit with cruise missiles in
August 1998. The United States argued the factory was being used to produce chemical
weapons, possibly for terrorist use.
LIBYA
Libya was one of the original countries placed on the U.S. list of state sponsors of
international terrorism in 1979. According to Patterns 1997, Libya continued to
provide support to several radical Palestinian groups, i
ncluding the Abu Nidal Organization, the PFLP-GC, and the PIJ. Foreign concern with
Libya as a state sponsor of international terrorism is largely because of Libya's
involvement in two terrorist attacks nearly a decade ag
o: the bombings of Pan Am flight 103 in 1988 and UTA flight 772 in 1989.
During 1997, Libya refused to turn over the two Libyan agents indicted for the Pan Am
103 bombing. The Libyan government proposed to resolve the crisis between it and the
United Nations by turning over the Libyan agents t
o be tried under Scottish law in a neutral setting like the Netherlands. Although
Britain and the United States agreed to this proposal in August 1998, Libya has not
yet handed over the suspects.
In addition, in January 1998, French officials ended their investigation of the UTA
772 bombing and concluded that Qaddafi's brother-in-law, Muhammad al- Sanusi was the
mastermind behind the attack. Six Libyans in total w
ill be tried in absentia by a French criminal court in 1998 or 1999.
In another decade-old incident, Musbah Abulgasem Eter, wanted in connection with the
1986 bombing of a Berlin discotheque, was arrested in Italy for extradition to
Germany. Eter, a former member of the Libyan secret servi
ce, was detained in Rome as a result of a police phone tap in Germany, which traced
calls to and from pubic phones in a Rome neighborhood known as the "African quarter."
Three other people, two Libyans and an Italian, wer
e also arrested and charged with aiding and abetting Eter (Pinkerton's Global
Intelligence Services, 8/29/97).
Libya's main support for current terrorism is financial. Brig. Gen. Abu-Bakr Yunus,
commander-in-chief of the Libyan Armed Forces, voiced Libya's commitment to support
the Palestinian opposition factions. Palestinian sour
ces noted that PFLP and DFLP have not received any financial aid from Libya since
1982. Meanwhile, other factions, such as Fatah the Uprising, PFLP-GC, and the Popular
Struggle Front, are still receiving about $50 million
annually, less than they used to receive in the 1980s (Amman al-Dustur, 6/3/97).
In addition, Libya continues to attack Libyan dissidents abroad. According to Libyan
sources abroad, a bomb blew up at a residence of Libyan dissident Abdelmunem
al-Houni's in Egypt. It is believed that Libyan government
agents were behind the explosion. Egyptian authorities denied that the explosion was a
bomb, instead saying that it was a gas pipe explosion (Libya: News and Views, 5/16/97).
Eytan Fisch was a 1997-1998 research assistant at The Washington Institute.
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