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Number 88, October 1996
Islamic Radicalism in North Africa
Force Works, For Now
by William H. Lewis and Judith S. Yaphe
Conclusions
Islamists in the Arab states of North Africa are having little
success in gaining political power. This is due to repressive
security measures and popular despair over the violence on both
sides, especially in Algeria and Egypt. Islamists in Algeria lost the
presidential election held in November 1995, and the Muslim
Brotherhood in Egypt bowed to government tactics of arrests and a ban
on political activity in elections held last fall.
The governments of Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco have probably
reached a plateau in their use of intimidation tactics against
Islamist critics. They seem to lack the imagination or will to try
new, less dire strategies for dealing with opponents. As long as
coercion seems to work, they will have little incentive to reform.
As the more violent Islamic radical movements lose momentum, the risk
increases that they will carry their struggle abroad. Over the past
year, Egyptian diplomats in Europe and South Asia have been the
targets of terrorist attacks, and Algerian extremists have been
responsible for terrorism in France.
Except for Egypt, which receives nearly $2 billion in U.S. aid each
year, the United States has little economic investment and minimal
military or diplomatic commitments in the region. Governmental use of
repression poses a longer-term challenge to U.S. interests, however,
as it opposes a key traditional pillar of U.S. foreign policy: the
global promotion of democracy and human rights.
Background
Islamic radicalism in North Africa has three faces-a religious one
which seeks through personal piety, prayer, and preaching to make
society more "just"; a reformist one which calls for legitimate
political action using democratic, electoral means to change state
and society from within; and an extremist face, which believes that
only violent confrontation and destruction of the state can establish
a new Islamic world order. Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Libya, and
Egypt tend to regard the latter two as equally dangerous to regional
and regime stability. Their concerns about regional security, if
radical Islamists were to gain power, grew in 1991 when an Islamist
political party-the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS)- scored a major
election victory and appeared to be on the verge of gaining power in
Algeria.
Over the subsequent four years, Algeria's neighbors watched in growing horror while
the military-dominated Algerian government canceled elections, outlawed the FIS, and
the country slipped into the chaos of urban terroris
m and civil war. Determined not to repeat Algiers' mistake in allowing an Islamist
party access to the political process, Tunis, Rabat, and Cairo sought to eliminate the
opportunities for radical Islamist politicians to f
orce a confrontation with the government, legally or illegally. Even Libya's Muamar
Qadhafi, a long- time sponsor of Islamic "liberation" movements, was not immune from
Islamist-inspired opposition riots in several towns.
Their answer was similar to that of the Algerian government-exclusion from the
political process and containment through intimidation and force.
The Project
Regional specialists from the government, the academic community, and the private
sector met in March 1996 at National Defense University to discuss political,
economic, and social trends in the Arab countries of North Af
rica and those governments' efforts to contain troublesome Islamist critics. The
specialists focused on the situation in Algeria, Morocco, and Egypt, and the role
security forces play in regime preservation and policy man
agement.
Over the short term, regional governments have been successful in containing militant
Islamist factions. The "silent majority" of North Africans, however, has not been won
over by the Islamists or the government and in th
e longer term, will increasingly question the legitimacy of regimes unable to
ameliorate their countries' problems or end the civil strife. Regional specialists
identify the main problems as the absence of a competitive p
olitical arena, the need for an economic environment conducive to privatiza-tion,
investment, and economic growth, and the inability to meet the needs generated by
demographic growth with available resources. They agree t
hat prospects for political accommodation and peaceful change are bleak. One
specialist has observed that in the last half century not a single Arab state has
permitted the transfer of power to an opposition party through
fair and open elections.
Power remains-and will probably remain- concentrated in the state security apparatus
and its bureaucratic appendages, headed by the military, neither of which are prepared
to participate in the wholesale redistribution of
power. Recent developments-the November 1995 elections in Algeria and President
Liamine Zeroual's promise of parliamentary elections next year, and King Hassan's
announcement that he would allow greater local political a
utonomy-are tactical moves having only marginal impact. There are no sincere moves by
any North African government to bring Islamist-or indeed any-political opponents into
the mainstream. Many experts predict that support
for Islamist values and institutions will strengthen, with unknown consequences.
The Islamists' Search for Electoral Justice:
the Algerian Model
Islamic radicals and the military-controlled government have been on a collision
course since the government canceled the second round of elections in early 1992. The
first round of elections in December 1991 had been cal
led by then President Chadli Bendjedid as an experiment in multiparty democracy. It
culminated in a clear-cut victory for the ISF. The military forced Bendjedid to
resign, canceled the results of the December election, an
d formed a 5-man collective body to govern in Bendjedid's place. The
cancellation-provoked out of fear of a second Islamist victory-triggered escalating
violence. Islamic radicals began targeting foreign workers, as well
as women, intellectuals, and government bureaucrats. The government declared a State
of Emergency in February 1992 enhancing the powers of the security forces and in
January 1994 appointed Liamine Zeroual president. In mo
re than four years of virtual civil war, at least 50,000 civilians, militants, and
military personnel have been killed. Neither the government nor the radical Islamists
has been able to attract broad support among the Alg
erian population or deal a knockout blow to the other.
The goal of the Algerian military is to eliminate the Islamic radicals, introduce
economic reform, and use dialogue with non-violent Islamists to marginalize the FIS
and other opposition parties. Zeroual was elected Presi
dent in what the regime describes as a large turnout in elections held in November
1995. This enhanced the regime's legitimacy and reinforced the generals' commitment to
their strategy of eradication of the insurgents. Ze
roual also offered to open dialogue with some Islamists-not the FIS-but there probably
will be no concessions to the Islamists to broker peace, and the violence will likely
continue. The larger than anticipated turn-out i
n the election, the militants' inability to disrupt them, and the oppositions' failure
to sway the voters has strengthened the government's hand. Experts caution, however,
that the large turnout and favorable vote is less
an endorsement of government policies than a sign of general public weariness with
militant-government violence. While the United States has few assets in Algeria, U.S.
facilities have been attacked twice by Islamic mili
tants and American citizens are at risk from terrorist attacks. U.S. forces could be
in danger while evacuating U.S. and other foreign nationals from Algeria should the
conflict widen.
Haunted by Algeria
Political leaders in Cairo, Rabat, and Tunis have watched the Algerian situation
deteriorate into virtual civil war. Each government has Islamist parties which are
seeking entry into the political process by becoming legi
timate parties, running candidates in elections, and holding government office. And,
each has evolved a similar strategy to deny the Islamists legitimacy. They endeavor to
be seen as supporting Islam by sponsoring non-vio
lent, local religious institutions, most of which are on a government dole. These
governments also rely on some degree of intimidation or outright repression. The
measures range from social and economic ostracism to arres
t, interrogation, exile, and, in Algeria, execution of suspected members of radical
Islamist groups.
Egypt. President Mubarak's most serious political challenge comes from the Muslim
Brotherhood, the oldest and most mainstream Islamist organization in the Middle East.
Brotherhood members have won control of many of Egypt
's professional and trade associations and held seats in Parliament by running on
legal parties' tickets. In order to protect its property and standing in Egypt, the
increasingly popular organization has not openly challe
nged government restrictions on its activities.
The Brotherhood's threat to Mubarak is long-term. Smaller, violent groups pose the
greatest danger to Egypt's immediate security. The Gamaat al-Islamiya and groups
falling under the Islamic Jihad umbrella have been respon
sible for most terrorism in Egypt, from Anwar Sadat's assassination in 1981 to recent
attacks on foreign tourists. For all the publicity their operations have garnered,
however, the militant Islamist factions have not won
the hearts or minds of the Egyptian people, who resent the danger and loss of
economic well-being caused by the violence.
Mubarak uses several methods to deal with his Islamist critics and opponents. He
allows traditional Islamic clerics and scholars a wide role in interpreting Egyptian
law and restricting press, media, the arts, academic sc
holarship, and even personal relationships. Cairo is also belatedly trying to
establish social welfare programs to rival the Brotherhood's humanitarian activities.
Cairo's efforts this summer to reassert a leadership role
among the Arab states following the election of a right-wing government in Israel are
also intended to boost the regime's Islamic legitimacy. In June, Cairo hosted the
first Pan-Arab summit since 1990 to try to create a
common Arab strategy to deal with the Israeli government's opposition to continuing
the peace process.
However, Mubarak also regards the Brotherhood as being in league with radical
Islamists and shows no interest in opening the political system to even non-violent
members of the Brotherhood or in tolerating the adoption of
more fundamentalist Islamic practices or sympathizers, especially in the military
services. Cairo has banned political parties based on religion, conducted security
sweeps before elections, changed elective municipal off
ices to appointive ones, and uses military rather than civilian courts to try
suspects. Many Brotherhood politicians were arrested before last fall's election,
including Sayf al-Banna, son of the organization's founder an
d a prominent leader in the movement. This happened despite the Brotherhood's
acceptance of government restrictions on its political activities.
Morocco. Morocco's King Hassan relies on a unique factor to bolster his claims to
political legitimacy and contain Islamist critics: his status as a descendant of the
Prophet Muhammad and Com-mander of the Faithful. The K
ing is seen at home as a strong leader. Radical Islam does not yet pose a serious
threat to his rule, but poor economic growth, bleak job prospects, high unemployment,
and a high birth rate could provide a receptive clima
te for the growth of radical Islamist movements. Added to this volatile mix is the
King's apparent ill health and a son (and successor) perceived by many Moroccans as
weak. Morocco could become vulnerable to an Islamist c
hallenge from either its non-violent Islamist party-he Justice and Charity group-or
the more extremist Islamic Youth Movement.
Tunisia. Tunisia's economic growth, high levels of education, and improved living
standards coupled with coercive security measures against real and suspected Islamists
have kept Islamist politics quiescent. To the Tunisi
an leadership, the chronic unrest in Algeria only shows the folly of allowing
elections. Many Tunisians are reluctant to support a cause which seems to threaten
their well-being. The principal Islamist opposition movement
, An-Nahda, has been silenced at home and the activities of its exiled leader, Rashid
Ghannouchi, curtailed.
Recommendations
The United States and West European governments should encourage economic
liberalization and foreign investment. Corruption, overpopulation, unemployment, and
stagnant economiesCnot IslamCare creating the conditions which
threaten regional stability. Investments need to be visible and concentrated in local
communities where they will do the most good. Europeans have more economic and
political leverage to bring to bear than does the Unite
d States. The United States should develop political strategies in cooperation with
France, Spain, and Italy, and investment plans in concert with the International
Monetary Fund and the European Union.
Economic growth is the key but not the whole answer. Rather than emphasizing human
rights and insisting on democratic processes in countries not ready to adopt or
interested in adopting western political models, the Unite
d States should encourage governments to adhere to their own religious and
constitutional value systems. Encou-ragement should be given to political
liberalization and the inclusion of political groupings, including Islam
ists willing to work constructively within the system. Meaningful participation
similar to the controlled political roles allowed by Jordan's King Hussein could help
bolster regimes by providing a safety valve.
The United States and West European states should encourage regional economic and
security cooperation. The idea is not to strengthen the security services' ability to
hunt and kill dissidents but to create regional econo
mic infrastructures based on natural and people resources.
The hardest policy challenge for the United States is to find a balance in relations
with authoritarian regimes who support U.S. policy interests. The U.S. needs to
convince Algiers, Cairo, Rabat, and Tunis that violence
is self-perpetuating and could provide the breeding ground for more pernicious forms
of political radicalism.
Origins and Influence
of the Muslim Brotherhood
Founded in Cairo in 1928 by Hasan al-Banna, a cleric preaching non-violent radical
reform, the Brotherhood opted for violence but gained little. Its leaders were
alternately patronized and imprisoned by Gamal Abd al-Nasir
and Anwar Sadat as they sought to consolidate their power. The Brotherhood changed
its tactics in the 1960s, beginning a quest for legitimate political status as it
built up its popular and financial base. Today, the Bro
therhood is one of the wealthiest organizations in Egypt and has approximately 2-3
million members. It outperforms the government in delivering social services and
humanitarian aid to Cairo's poor and over the years has g
ained control of many of Egypt's powerful professional and trade syndicates. Its
members have spread the Brotherhood's ideology of Islamic reform, an end to corrupt
rulers, and the elimination of foreign influence through
out the Arab and Islamic world. Offshoots include the Algerian Hamas organization, the
National Islamic Front headed by Hasan al-Turabi in Sudan, Hamas in the West Bank and
Gaza, the Islamic Action Front in Jordan, and ch
apters in the Gulf states, Central Asia, and Afghanistan.
William H. Lewis and Judith S. Yaphe are Senior Fellows at the Institute for National
Strategic Studies. This paper is the result of of the second in a series of
roundtables on Radical Islam and U.S. interests in the Midd
le East and North Africa with members of the research, policy, and defense
communities. For more information contact Judith Yaphe at (202) 685-2224, fax (202)
685-3866, or on the Internet at [EMAIL PROTECTED]
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