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Adm. William Owens, Mass Mind Control, Techno-Fascism
& the �Revolution in Military Affairs�
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Admiral Owens on the Purpose of Mass Mind Control (an echo of Noam
Chomsky, who observes that mass mind control is necessary in this fading
"democracy" where military force is used sparingly for practical reasons):
http://www.subcontinent.com/sapra/military/m_1999_02_27.html
�Writing jointly in the �Foreign Affairs� journal of the US
(March-April,1996), Joseph S.Nye, former Chairman of the US National
Intelligence Council and former Assistant Secretary of Defence for
International Affairs in the Clinton Administration, and Admiral William
A.Owens, former Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Clinton
Administration, said as follows: �... If a state can make its power
legitimate in the perception of others and establish international
institutions that encourage them to channel or limit their activities, it
may not need to expend as many of its costly traditional economic or
military resources...."
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[Admiral Owens is the foremost proponent of systematic conversion to
advanced technology at the Pentagon. Naturally, he just happens to be an
executive at a high-tech corporation with ties to several others and
extensive notorious military and intelligence ties. You do the math. � AC]
http://www.actconferences.com/Satv4/bios/bio_owens.htm
Admiral William Owens
Co-CEO & Vice Chairman
Teledesic
As part of Teledesic�s senior leadership team, Bill Owens works closely with
chairman and co-CEO Craig McCaw. Owens spearheads Teledesic�s business
development and government marketing activities. He also serves as chief
executive officer of affiliated Teledesic Holdings Ltd. Previously, Owens
was president, chief operating officer and vice chairman of Science
Applications International Corporation (SAIC), the nation�s largest
employee-owned high-technology company. Before that, he was vice chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He also served as the deputy chief of Naval
Operations for Resources, Warfare Requirements and Assessments, commander of
the U.S. Sixth Fleet, senior military assistant to Secretaries of Defense
Frank Carlucci and Dick Cheney, and director of the Office of Program
Appraisal for the Secretary of the Navy. He is a graduate of the U.S. Naval
Academy with a bachelor�s degree in mathematics. He has bachelor�s and
master�s degrees in politics, philosophy and economics from Oxford
University and a master�s in management from George Washington University.
He joined Teledesic in August 1998.
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Emergent Technology in the Revolution in Military Affairs
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/forum63.html
Strategic Forum
Number 63, February 1996
The Emerging U.S. System-of-Systems
by Admiral William A. Owens
Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Conclusions
The things which give military forces their fighting capability are
changing, and these changes point toward a qualitative jump in our ability
to use military force effectively.
Probably relating to the way we plan, program and budget for these things,
we are more adept at seeing the individual trees than that vast forest of
military capability (the system-of-systems) which the individual systems are
building for our fighting forces.
The system-of-systems depends ultimately on well orchestrated contributions
of all the military services. This assumes a common appreciation of and
adherence to what we are building. Most importantly, it requires joint
strategic and operational doctrine by which to organize, plan and carry out
military operations.
Revolutions Propel U.S. Military Toward Fundamental Change
Three simultaneous revolutions are propelling the U.S. military toward
fundamental change. The first is the implosion of the Soviet Union, the end
of the Cold War and emergence of the United States as the sole military
superpower. We are also experiencing a related revolution--the reallocation
of resources from defense to domestic programs, which began almost a decade
ago and accelerated with the demise of the Soviet Union. The third is what
some call the revolution in military affairs (RMA). In part because of
earlier investments, particularly in electronic and computational
technologies, the things which give military forces their fighting
capability are changing, and these changes point toward a qualitative jump
in our ability to use military force effectively. It is the RMA which
enables us to take full advantage of the opportunities posed by the first
two revolutions, without compromising our national security or position as a
world leader.
What kind of changes are emerging as a result of the American RMA? They fall
into three general categories, which, for convenience, we may call
intelligence, command and control, and precision force:
Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), involves sensor and
reporting technologies associated with intelligence collection,
surveillance, and reconnaissance, as well as the new means by which we are
able to keep track of what our own forces are doing.
Advanced C4I--command, control, communications, computer applications, and
intelligence processing--the realm in which we convert the sensor awareness
to dominant understanding of a battle space and convert that understanding
to missions and assignments designed to alter, control, and dominate that
battle space.
Precision force. A broad concept, in which the knowledge and orders
generated from the first two areas are translated into action and results.
It is easy to miss the powerful synergy which exists between ISR, advanced
C4I and precision force. Look at table 1, a cross section of some of the
weapons and systems in use or soon to be available to our fighting men and
women. We tend to plan, program and budget for these things as if they were
discrete capabilities. We are more adept at seeing the individual trees than
that vast forest of military capability which the individual systems,
because of their interactions, are building for our fighting forces.
Fortunately, when you go to sea or into the field where things are actually
happening, you can see early signs of how it all fits together. From this
you can envision how future systems in the hands of well-educated and
trained officers, soldiers, sailors, marines and airmen portend a
qualitatively and quantitatively different military force for the country.
What is happening, driven in part by broad system architectures and joint
operational concepts, in part by serendipity, is the creation of a new
system-of-systems. Merging increasing capacity to gather real-time,
all-weather information continuously with increasing capacity to process and
make sense of this voluminous data builds the realm of dominant battle space
knowledge (DBK). DBK involves everything from automated target recognition
to knowledge of an opponent's operational plans and the networks relied on
to pursue them.
The growing capacity to infuse DBK into all our forces will be coupled with
the real time awareness of their status and the understanding of what they
can do with their growing capacity to apply force with speed, accuracy, and
precision. This means we will increasingly match the right force to the most
promising course of action at both the tactical and operational levels of
warfare. Further, we will have an increasing capacity to apply tailored
forces faster, with more precise weapons and over greater distances. The
advances in ISR will allow us to know the effects of our actions--and
understand what those effects mean--with far more fidelity, far earlier than
anything we have experienced to date. This will give our forces a great
fighting advantage. This battle assessment, in turn, will make subsequent
actions more effective. As a result, we truly will be able to operate within
the opponent's decision cycle. This new system-of-systems capability,
combined with joint doctrine designed to take full advantage of these new
fighting capabilities, is at the heart of the RMA. It emphasizes a joint
perspective, because the system-of-systems depends ultimately on the
well-orchestrated contributions from all the military services. This
requires a common appreciation of what we are building and, most
importantly, requires common strategic and operational doctrine by which to
plan and carry out military operations.
The RMA is inevitable. But the speed at which it comes depends on our
willingness to embrace these changes in our policy, planning and programming
decisions. By accelerating the transition, we could actualize the RMA
perhaps decades before any other nation. This is important for many reasons;
one of the most significant is that it will ensure our ability to protect
ourselves while enhancing our ability to shape the international
environment, rather than simply react to it.
This, then, is the essence of the argument in favor of accelerating the RMA.
It is a bold vision and a controversial one. Visions count, they are what
move us forward and provide us the means to deal with an unknown future.
However, the professional military should not reify this vision unless it
holds up to honest critique. Let us examine the five most thoughtful
criticisms that have been raised.
Opponents Fight Back
The conflicts we face will remain competitions among thinking, learning, and
adaptive human beings. We need to recognize that any future opponent would
diligently and intelligently try to counter capabilities the
system-of-systems gives us.
History is replete with examples of how advances in military technology were
eventually countered or matched. Yet history also has intriguing examples of
real revolutions in military affairs--Guderian's blitzkrieg, Ellis's vision
of amphibious warfare, and the nuclear revolution come to mind. None of
these provided dominance in all areas of military operations, and the edge
they provided ultimately eroded. But it was good to have the edge, not only
because it paid off in conflict, but also because it gave leverage when
implementing foreign policy.
I believe the inherent character of the system-of-systems provides an edge
in the competition of conflict. The technology it rests upon emphasizes
flexibility and adaptability. It will enable the U.S. military to know more
about the flow of conflict than an opponent and to operate well within the
decision cycle of that opponent. It will arm American forces with the means
of learning faster on a battlefield (traditional or otherwise) and allow
them to be more adaptable and flexible than an opponent. In other words, the
coming RMA starts from the fundamental assumption shared by its critics: war
is a human contest that rewards innovation, learning, adaptability, and
flexibility.
Relying on Technology is An Achilles' Heel
Reliance on "information" technologies--the kind of sensors, data processing
and communications subsystems that appear in table 1--carries the inherent
vulnerability of such technologies to offensive information warfare, or
"hacking."
There is, to be sure, great danger in relying on military systems that have
exploitable flaws. Indeed, the characteristic that gives any system its
potency--that the parts of a system enhance the effectiveness of one
another--also makes them susceptible to catastrophic failure if one of their
central parts can be corrupted. Yet there are some aspects of the
system-of-systems that ought to alleviate, if not refute, these concerns.
First, the people implementing the vision are far from ignorant of the
danger of inherent flaws. A great deal of thought, planning, money, and
continual effort goes into reducing real or hypothetical vulnerability. We
won't wait until someone else finds a vulnerability; we will think and work
continually to find and eliminate it first.
Second, the computer and communications technologies on which the
system-of-systems are based are becoming less, not more, susceptible to the
various forms of corruption and interference. A race will always exist
between those who try to ensure the security of information-based systems
and those who seek to overcome their security measures. Yet, the trend
favors the defense. In part, this is because of the relative "hardness" of
the new generations of communications equipment. Fiber optic cable, for
example, has physical characteristics that make it inherently more difficult
to "tap" surreptitiously.
Third, there is a robust redundancy to the emerging American
system-of-systems. This redundancy works against the possibility of breaking
the whole system. It also means that if there are ways of successfully
attacking parts of the system, the overall system would not collapse but
rather generate "work arounds" or gracefully degrade. In one sense, this is
faint praise; we don't want the system-of-systems to degrade at all. In
another, it suggests that an opponent would be impotent before he could
defend against, counter, or defeat the capabilities we use against him.
Clearly, none of this is cause for complacency; we need to continually bear
in mind potential vulnerabilities and work hard to find and end them.
Neither can a compelling case be made that the vision is flawed logically or
that moving to the system-of-systems carries more practical risk than
sticking with the status quo and traditional way of doing things.
It Applies Only to the Last War
Some argue that the system-of-systems may work only in a conflict similar to
Desert Storm, with relatively open terrain, an inept opponent, and enough
time to amass an overwhelming force. Future conflicts may take place in
terrain less open, against a motivated force astutely led. Urban areas,
jungles, and mountains are as likely to be future battlefields as open
deserts. Under these circumstances, it is argued, the system-of-systems is
less applicable, and relying on it in place of a more "traditional" force is
unnecessarily risky.
However, the system-of-systems applies across the full spectrum of conflict.
It promises a better, although different, way of doing things. Americans
will always seek to use military force with speed, precision, effectiveness
and minimal risk to our personnel. The dispositions, movements, and
capabilities of an opponent's forces may be easier to discern in open desert
than in downtown Mogadishu or triple-canopied jungles. But this is no reason
to refrain from trying to discern enemy characteristics. The fact is that
the system-of-systems will give us far better capacity to do this, and with
greater effectiveness and lower risk than we currently have. Furthermore, it
is obvious that it would be highly advantageous to the nation if we found
alternatives to the large manpower base and force structure which was the
hallmark of our military forces during the Cold War. The system-of-systems
and RMA holds out the promise that in the not too distant future the pointed
end of the spear may be smaller, far sharper and able to pierce the
opponents jugular vein on the first throw.
The System-of-Systems Reduces the Fog and Friction of War
Conflict is chaotic, confusing, and messy. We will never have perfect
understanding of a battlefield, our systems and weapons will never work
flawlessly all the time, and the forces we ask to wage war will never do
everything correctly every time.
The system-of-systems does not offer omniscience or omnipotence. It has
demonstrated the ability to reduce the fog and friction of war and promises
to do even more so in the future. What counts in war is the relative
influence on the opposing side of what some have called the fog and friction
of conflict. The side that can reduce the effect of that fog and friction
significantly, relative to its opponent, will win.
It's Not Broken; Don't Fix It
There is considerable agreement within the Department of Defense and the
services on the central issues: that we ought to continue to develop our
capacity to understand the battle spaces in which we may operate, to improve
joint operations, and continue to pursue new technologies. The real issue is
the rate at which we should move and which technologies and force structures
to favor.
The amount of money needed to accelerate the achievement of the vision is
not substantial; most of the programs that drive the RMA are already funded.
They will reach fruition relatively soon, and not all of them should
necessarily be accelerated. Their significance is, after all, a function of
their interaction. Accelerating some but not others may give only marginal
gains. Some simply cannot come any faster no matter how much money and
brainpower we devote to them.
At the center of the debate is whether we should shift resources from some
programs and the forces associated with them and give it to others. Making
tradeoffs is nothing new. What is new is the rationale used for making them.
In the past, we used the perception of the threat (e.g., we developed new
capabilities to keep ahead of our peer competitor, the Soviet Union) or the
realization that things inside the military were broken and need fixing. The
Department went through such a period of introspection after Vietnam.
Now, however, neither of these rationales is particularly relevant: there is
no peer competitor and we won the last war. So the Occam's razor has
changed. Today's rationales are: 1) maintaining an adequate defense today
while building superiority for the 21st century; 2) what the American people
will support and the economy can sustain over the long haul.
The system-of-systems is emerging as the result of these rationales. In an
increasingly ambiguous and dangerous world, where coalitions will parallel
and perhaps replace alliances, and nations will look for U.S. leadership,
the smart, flexible, mobile, effective forces the system-of-systems will
build makes sense.
Recommendations
The RMA is inevitable. But the speed at which we adapt to it depends on
recognition of what is emerging and a willingness to embrace these changes
in our policy, planning and programming decisions. By accelerating the
transition, we could actualize the RMA perhaps decades before any other
nation.
The amount of money needed to accelerate introduction of the
system-of-systems is not substantial; most of the programs that drive it are
already funded. The center of the debate is whether we should shift
resources from some programs and the forces associated with them and
increase others. Tradeoffs are nothing new. What is new is the rationale
used for making them. The Occam's razor for defense has changed. Today's
rationales are: 1) maintaining an adequate defense today while building
superiority for the 21st century; 2) what the American people will support
and the economy can sustain over the long haul.
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The Strategic Forum provides summaries of work by members and guests of the
Institute for National Strategic Studies and the National Defense University
faculty. These include reports of original research, synopses of seminars
and conferences,the results of unclassified war games, and digests of
remarks by distinguished speakers.
Editor in Chief - Hans Binnendijk
Editor - Jonathan W. PierceNOTE
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