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IBM FINANCIAL
Analysis of IBM Fourth Quarter 2001 Business Results
Big Blue Stock to Take a Dive?
Gerstner�s Worst Fourth Quarter; Sharp Drop in Revenue, Profit
PHOENIX, Jan. 17 - Hold on to your seats folks, and fasten your seat belts.
The Big Blue stock is about to take a dive. A fairly steep dive, we figure�
No surprises there. What goes up, must come down. Especially if it rose on
hot air (inflated expectations). As this writer said in a Jan. 10 Dallas
Morning News article:
�The recent (stock) upturn has been fueled, in part, by the absence of the
bad news that seemed to come every day last year. When most companies start
reporting their most recent quarterly earnings in a few weeks, the tide could
turn. Emotions always run ahead of reason. When the facts are in, that
tends to dampen some of the enthusiasm.�
Well, IBM�s fourth quarter facts are now in. And they are sure to dampen
investors� enthusiasm when Wall Street opens for business tomorrow morning.
In fact, the last three months of 2001 represent arguably the worst fourth
quarter ever reported during Lou Gerstner�s tenure as chairman (his first
full year at the helm was 1994). Consider the following 4Q01 highlights:
� Overall revenues were down 11%;
� Net income was down 13%;
� Americas region�s revenue (led by the U.S.) was down 9%;
� Asia/Pacific was down 10%;
� Europe (EMEA) was down 6%;
� OEM was down 34%
� Global Services (IGS), IBM�s only �knight in shining armor,� was
also down 1% - its first decline ever!
� Hardware was down 24%;
� Global financing was down 5%;
� Enterprise investments were down 20%;
� PC revenue was down 32%, plus the unit lost money ($17M pretax);
� Technology revenue was down 32%, plus the unit lost money ($293M
pretax);
� Software was the only IBM business segment to have shown some
growth, however modest (up 6%);
Now picture yourself as the IBM CFO having to deliver this truckload of bad
news to the marketplace. You�d probably feel like Al Gore on September 11 -
grateful to have lost the Florida chad contest. J
Well, with not much to rejoice about, the IBM CFO, John Joyce, bravely drove
the Big Blue truckload of trouble into the post-earnings analyst conference.
He painted it with BS, and called the quarter a success� relative to other
industry truckloads of bad news.
When Joyce pulled the same stunt two years ago, blaming the IBM woes on the
Y2K that time, we called it a �Slam-Dunk of Bunk,� (Jan 19, 2000). This
afternoon, Joyce has outdone himself. Make it a �Grand Slam-Dunk of Bunk!�
Yet the analysts bought it. At least that�s the impression one got by the
meek and mild tone of their questions. So don�t look for a huge stock slide
tomorrow, even though a free fall is what Armonk richly deserves. At least
based on the above facts (also see the chart and our special Appendix - On
Wall Street, Big Blue Sky Always Bluer - Next Year! (1987) - "The more things
change, the more they are the same" - French philosopher Alphonse Karr,
1809-1890).
A part of the reason for Wall Street�s permissiveness of poor business
performances is that there is about three trillion dollars being �parked� by
investors in short-term market instruments currently, according to our
sources in the banking community. All this money is seeking a sinkhole into
which to drop. Just like 15 years ago (see the Appendix).
Of course, Wall Street won�t put it that way. They will call it an
opportunity. The Big Blue is just one of many sinkholes� oops,
opportunities. And it is a big one at that, as you saw from the above
highlights.
Segment Analysis
Geographies. One good business these days is war business, seems to be the
message that emanates, both from IBM�s fourth quarter results, and from the
IBM CFO comments.
�Public sector was strong across all geographies,� Joyce said. But the
demand among the small and medium size company was weak, headded. He blamed
the softness of the PC market on the latter.
Add another coat of BS to the Big Blue truckload of trouble. For, a majority
of the PCs that IBM sells goes to large corporations. In the U.S., for
example, two-thirds of its fourth quarter PC revenues came from the �direct�
sales channel.
In fact, had IBM diversified more and sooner toward the small and medium
company markets, as we suggested back in 1996 (see �Louis XIX of Armonk,� Aug
26, 1996), the company would not be such a large sinkhole right now.
As it turned out, however, the Big Blue had the �foresight� to get out of the
federal government business back in 1994 (!?), when it sold its Federal
Systems Division to Loral Corp. (see Annex Bulletin 94-06, Jan 25, 1994).
Which meant that IBM dug itself even deeper into a hole. Of course, it
thought it was cashing a post-Cold War �peace dividend.�
Meanwhile, back to the fourth quarter, IBM revenues in the Americas region,
which encompasses the U.S., Canada and Latin America, and accounts for about
44% of the worldwide total, slipped under $10 billion (to $9.8 billion), a 9%
decline from a year ago (down 8% in constant currency).
IBM�s business in Europe, Middle East and Africa, the second largest segment
at 28% of global revenues, fared somewhat better. But it also dropped by 6%,
both as reported and in constant currency.
Asia/Pacific declined by 10% (down 1% in constant currency), while the OEM
sector plummeted by 34% (down 33% in constant currency).
Overall, IBM�s fourth quarter revenues ($22.8 billion) were down 11% from the
year before totals (see the chart). Which puts them about one billion
dollars short of Wall Street�s expectations.
Services. Perhaps the biggest disappointment in IBM�s fourth quarter results
was that its �knight in shining armor;� its �one string violin� in the 1990s;
its only remaining �crown jewel� - IBM Global Services - is no longer any of
the above. For the first time ever (!), the IBM services revenue actually
declined (down 1%) from a year ago.
When first signs of trouble started to show up in the IGS results two years
ago, the Big Blue tried to sweep them under the rug by a sweeping statement.
It was due to customers� reticence to spend money because of the Y2K bug, we
were told. But it will all get better from there on.
Back then, we said in a subheading to our �Slam-Dunk of Bunk,� Jan 19, 2000)
report: �Biggest Surprise: A Sharp Drop in Services Revenue Growth - Up Only
2%!�
�A precipitous drop (down to only 2% in 4Q99) in the growth of IBM Global
Services revenues, IBM�s �crown jewel� and the only working string in its
violin, should give us cause for optimism. Why? Because �we�re pleased the
Y2K issue is behind us,� according to Joyce.�
Well, what was considered bad news (�a precipitous drop in growth�) two years
ago, is now even worse bad news - a plain vanilla decline in revenues.
This time, Joyce blamed it on the late timing of some fourth quarter contract
signings. As a result, he said, IBM could not book as much revenue as it
expected in the fourth quarter.
Of all the buckets that he IBM CFO used up painting coats of BS over Armonk�s
truckload of trouble, this was probably the biggest.
Everybody knows that service contracts are annuities; that revenues are
usually earned over a five to 10 year-contract period. Everybody also knows
that it usually takes six to nine months for a mega-contract to start to
produce revenues and profits for a vendor. So the fourth quarter contract
signings ($15 billion, according to IBM) could not have been reasonably
expected to contribute much to the company�s top and bottom lines until well
into 2002.
Unless, of course, the Big Blue is into something it is not supposed to be in
- such as �aggressive accounting� - booking revenue and earnings early (for
more on that, check out the �Enronizing IBM?� part of this report).
Meanwhile, IBM�s backlog of $102 billion was only up $5 billion over that at
the end of the third quarter, despite $15 billion in new business the company
is supposed to have added to it in the fourth period.
Which suggests that IBM�s sinkhole is also getting deeper because of the
customer contract cancellations/expirations are continuing to run at a high
rate. In fact, they appear to be accelerating.
In the last two years, IBM�s cancellations/expirations averaged about $8
billion per quarter. But in the fourth quarter of 2001, they shot up to $10
billion (see the chart).
Plus there is a possibility of �aggressive accounting� in this area, too.
One IBM insider told us in late November that the company had changed the
definition of its �backlog,� but has failed to communicate that to the
outside world:
�Traditionally we think of the definition of backlog as orders taken, goods
sold, services booked, a done deal. Now IBM is using as a reference market
opportunity, market segment, ability to sell to NOT BOOKED, NOT SOLD.�
In other words, IBM seems to be substituting what the rest of the IT services
industry calls a �pipeline� (of opportunities) for �backlog� (firm orders
taken), according to this insider.
Which implies that Wall Street�s and other outsiders� perception of IBM
services� success may be considerably greater than reality. IBM�s declining
revenues in the face of record sales hint in that direction.
Servers. IBM�s fourth quarter hardware sales were dismal, declining a
whopping 24% since a year ago quarter. Making matters worse for the bottom
line, the hardware gross profit dropped even more steeply. This resulted in
a gross margin of only 26%, down from 30% in the fourth quarter 2000 - less
than even the IT services margins! (28%, including maintenance).
Given that hardware still represents a very large (39%) share of IBM�s
business, trouble in this sector tends to wreak havoc throughout the Big Blue
financial statements. As a result, IBM�s Joyce had to dig deep and long
through his truckload of trouble to find something good to say about the IBM
hardware lines of business. And he found it in perhaps a most surprising
area.
It was IBM mainframes (now dubbed zSeries) that were the bright light of the
fourth quarter. For the first time since 1989, revenues went up, Joyce
rejoiced.
But the official IBM statement said they were �essentially flat,� thus
contradicting the CFO�s exuberance during the analyst teleconference. This
roughly squares with a meager (+12%) MIPS shipments increase that IBM also
reported for the fourth quarter.
Furthermore, the official IBM financial statements show that the Enterprise
Systems revenues, which include mainframe and storage, were down 13% in the
quarter. And that their related pretax profit dropped even more
precipitously (down 18%) during the same period.
So did Joyce misspeak? Not exactly. He did say that the 15% zSeries revenue
increase was for the full year. But he spoke about that in the context of
the fourth quarter, and while showing the slide reflecting the fourth quarter
results.
So guess one could call this �Big Blue BS with a twist.� For, after all the
hoopla, hat-tossing and cheering about the supposed IBM mainframe growth, the
cold fact remained that the fourth quarter of 2001 marked the period when a
temporary resurgence of mainframe demand - STOPPED!
Yet, no analyst challenged Joyce on his joyous mainframe proclamations during
the question period.
But one person did flatter the IBM CFO with a leading question. Did he
expect IBM to have gained share in the Unix market? Joyce replied in the
affirmative. He said that since other Unix vendors are having so much
trouble that their revenues are declining 40% or more, IBM�s Unix drop of
�only� 20% will mean just that - a market share gain! J
See how deep IBM spokesmen have to reach to scrape the bottom of the Big Blue
barrel these days to come up with a positive spin on negative financial
news? J
Furthermore, Joyce said that IBM was also doing great at the top of its Unix
product line, but for the late start of the �Regatta� server shipments (Dec.
14).
Oh, shucks� Poor Big Blue� being hit from all sides with all this �bad
luck!� First, it�s the economy (stupid!); then services customers don�t want
to sign until the year end; then Unix buyers want to buy the IBM servers, but
IBM is all out. Sorry.
And who, do you suppose, makes the planning decisions about when the IBM
products are to be ready to ship? Certainly not the customers, right?
So before we bring out the violins to serenade IBM�s bad luck, let us point
out who is benefiting from IBM�s Unix marketing. Yes, your guessed it� the
Big Blue archrivals, such as Sun Microsystems, for example. They are filling
the demand that IBM has generated but cannot meet.
While some analysts questioned whether competitors (IBM) were seeing stronger
growth than Sun, Ed Zander, Sun�s chief operating officer, highlighted the
company's strength in the high-end server market.
�I think if you take the server business and what we're doing in the high
end, we lead everybody in that class,� he said. �We're very pleased,
especially with all the money IBM is pouring into advertising� (see the New
York Times, Jan. 18).
So yes, there are good reasons for one to feel sorry for IBM. But bad luck
isn�t one of them. Pathetic marketing - ironically by a company once
regarded as the best of breed in that respect - seems like a better one.
Technology and PCs. The IBM CFO breezed through the company�s two most
troubled areas like a bullet train through a whistle stop. He finished his
�review� of the PC and Technology sectors in record time. And no wonder.
Both sectors� revenues were down 32% in the fourth quarter. Both lost money�
PCs lost $17 million pretax, while Technology dropped $293 million of red ink
to the same line.
We�ve said many times in the past that IBM should have gotten out of both of
those businesses (see �IBM Break-up,� Jan. 1996). But this would have
diminished �Louis XIX�s� Big Blue empire by some $24 billion or more in
revenues.
So proving that he is an amateur empire-builder rather than a savvy
entrepreneur, Gerstner has now ended up with a dwindling empire anyway. No
pain for the IBM chairman personally, though. He will ride off into the
Florida retirement sunset with tens of millions of dollars gained from
insider sales of his IBM shares and options (see �Greed Breeds Incest,� Nov.
1998).
Enronizing IBM?
Now, if the preceding reminds you of the $1.1 billion in insider sales from
which Enron executives benefited before the October collapse of that
erstwhile Wall Street darling and highflier, you won�t be alone.
Pravin Banker, a financial advisor at small investment bank the Financial
Network, says the accounting profession, stung badly by Lucent, Enron and
other imploding corporations, �will want to peel the onion and look under the
covers,� according to a Jan. 17 CBS Market Watch.com report. Greater
accounting vigilance will lead to questions at Dow-traded companies,
including computer giant IBM, says Banker, who is based in Connecticut.
Here�s an excerpt from that CBS report:
�To be sure, skeptics have long questioned the accounting practices of IBM
andother technology companies. Banker says accountants will run a
fine-toothed comb over companies that:
"IBM will crack, and so will Microsoft," says Banker. "The gun-shy
accountants will make sure of that."
Last year was a record one for bankruptcies: 255 stock-market companies filed
for Chapter 11 compared with 176 in 2000, a 45 percent increase.�
Of course, you�ve been hearing us point out for over five years now that
�financial engineering� has been the only new line of business the Gerstner
administration has ushered into Armonk. We are no longer the lone voice in
the wilderness. In June 2000, the Fortune magazine also picked up that chant
(see �Fortune on IBM,� June 2000). And now, �aggressive accounting� knives
are getting unsheathed all across the media and financial institutions.
Finally, the governments are also getting into the act. Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), whose lax enforcement of accounting and other
trading rules helped make the Enron-size failures possible, is waking up to
the fact that it is supposed to protect the investor, not the company whose
shares are being traded.
Responding to a growing criticism of accounting practices stemming from the
collapse of the Enron Corporation, Harvey Pitt, a former Wall Street lawyer
and the new head of the SEC, proposed today (Jan. 17) that the accounting
industry should be policed by a group dominated by outside experts instead of
policing itself.
But Pitt did that only after coming under fire himself for his close ties to
Wall Street. And from the Wall Street Journal at that, of all media outlets!
(see �Pitt Peeves,� WSJ, Jan. 17).
Furthermore, speaking in Connecticut the same day, the state attorney general
asked the state's accountancy board today to consider whether to revoke the
licenses that let Arthur Andersen, Enron's auditor, work for corporations in
that state.
And last but not least, the Enron board fired today its beleaguered auditor,
Arthur Andersen, amid finger-pointing between two former cohorts in financial
scams.
Don�t you love it how �everybody� turns pristine and lily white when
governmental, legal and financial snoops start to poke at a corporate
carcass, especially one as large as Enron�s? Next to practicing greed in
good times, kicking someone when he is down seems to be a favorite boardroom
sport.
The same goes for the media. Suddenly, everyone is the wiser, even those who
once lauded Enron�s financial savvy, and who admired its chairman Ken Lay�s
Washington and Wall Street power.
�How Wall Street Greased Enron's Money Machine,� (WSJ, Jan. 14), and �A
Bubble No One Wanted to Pop� (NYT, Jan. 14) are two among many stories, one
from the Journal, the other from the Times, that exemplify the newfound
�slash and burn� style of reporting about Enron�s woes.
The Times�s piece is particularly significant, and not just because it was
published on the front page of the New York daily. To appreciate why, check
out the following, slightly edited, excerpt from it:
IBM Wasn�t as Mighty as Highflying Stock Made It Appear
By GRETCHEN MORGENSON
(That) the world is now awakening to is that the IBM Corporation (news/quote)
was not much of a company, but its executives made sure that it was one hell
of a stock.
In recent years, IBM came to exemplify the productivity miracle that new
technologies were thought to have bestowed on astute companies across
America. With the odor of scandal all around it, IBM, once an innovative
computer company, has instead become an indictment of the anything-goes
approach to business that characterized the late 1990's. The bull market
euphoria convinced analysts, investors, accountants and even regulators that
as long as stock prices stayed high, there was no need to question company
practices.
"IBM is the prime example of all the things that were allowed to go wrong
during the stock market mania," said William Fleckenstein, president of
Fleckenstein Capital, a money management firm in Seattle. "This wall got
built brick by brick in broad daylight in the 1990's by companies doing
whatever they had to do to make their numbers, being willing to sacrifice the
long-term well-being of the company so that the executives could get rich."
Sound familiar? If unsure, check out �IBM Smoke and Mirrors Game: Mortgaging
Its Future?� (Apr. 1997).
And the IBM insiders became rich indeed. Thanks largely to munificent stock
option grants, which they turned into shares, they sold hundreds of million
dollars� worth of stock from 1996 to mid-2001.
Sound familiar? If unsure, check out see �Greed Breeds Incest,� (Nov. 1998).
Mostly on the strength of the stock buybacks and the highflying shares, IBM
executives were able to convince investors, bankers, analysts, accountants,
debt-rating agencies and even IBM's own employees that its promise was real,
its financial results genuine and its growth never-ending.
Sound familiar? If unsure, check out �Is Big Blue Back?� (Forbes column,
June 1997).
Now the spotlight in the IBM follies is trained on the nation's capital. But
the story of the company's rise and fall, and the retirement savings its
workers lost, inevitably leads back to Wall Street.
IBM's executives were surely smart enough to know that once they had
convinced bankers, brokers and accountants of the company's strength, all
parties could pretty much be counted on to keep the myth of solidity alive,
even after problems arose. When questions were first raised about
partnerships that should have been listed in financial statements, true
believers could be relied on to drown out naysayers.
Naturally, given the millions of dollars Wall Street firms generated selling
IBM's shares and bonds to investors, analysts were among the most vociferous
defenders of the company, even after its stock began to fall.
Of course, if a company wants to mislead its investors, analysts and
accountants, there is probably little that can be done to stop it. IBM's
auditor has said that it was misled. Because IBM operated in a largely
unregulated arena, the company recorded revenue and profits that made the
economic status of its business appear larger than it really was.
And so on, and so forth�
Summary
By now, we are sure you�ve figured it out. The preceding is a fictitious New
York Times story based on a real one about Enron. Our �slight editing�
mostly consisted of substituting IBM for Enron, and computer or IT services
industry terms for those used in the energy sector.
Could something like this ever happen to IBM? Well, a Chapter 11 bankruptcy
filing isn�t likely any time soon. Despite its recent woes and some
questionable financial and business practices, IBM still nets $7 to $8
billion a year at the bottom line. Even if hot air due to �aggressive
accounting� is taken out, chances are there will still be plenty left over at
the bottom line for the shareholders.
But a story like the above fictitious one could be written one day not only
about IBM, but also about other corporate giants. At least those who have
fallen for the allure of Wall Street-pleasing �financial engineering,� or
quick buck �aggressive accounting,� instead of making their money the
old-fashioned way - by outselling and outsmarting their competition on Main
Street.
So a good rule of thumb is this� if a company whose shares you own panders to
Wall Street, and engages in �financial engineering� - dump it! Even if it
hurts right now. Sooner or later, you�ll be glad you did.
Happy bargain hunting!
Bob Djurdjevic
P.S. In early morning trading on Jan. 18, IBM fell $6.42 to $113.48 while
Microsoft tumbled $3.16 to $66.70. The selling spread to other technology
issues, including Intel, whose shares fell 93 cents to $33.60.
Special Appendix
On Wall Street, Big Blue Sky Always Bluer - Next Year! (2002)
"The more things change, the more they are the same"
(French philosopher Alphonse Karr, 1809-1890).
Annex vs. Wall Street IBM Forecasts 2001/2002
as of June 2000
2001
2002
EPS
Revenue
EPS
Revenue
Annex
$4.19
$92,600
$4.31
$95,600
Wall Street
$4.84
$92,700
$5.48
$99,200
Actual
$4.35
$85,866
Annex vs. Wall Street IBM Forecasts 2002
Annex
$3.73
$85,100
Wall Street
$4.81
$91,300
Wall St-Annex Diff (Jan02)
$1.08
$6,200
Wall St-Wall St Diff (Jan02-Jun01)
($0.67)
($7,900)
On Wall Street, Big Blue Sky Always Bluer - Next Year! (1987)
"The more things change, the more they are the same"
(French philosopher Alphonse Karr, 1809-1890).
------------
Volume IV, No. 87-37 July 14, 1987
(c) Copyright 1987 by Annex Research. All rights reserved. (An excerpt).
WHY "IBM/INDUSTRY WATCHING" IS NOT A TEAM SPORT
PHOENIX, July 14, 1987 - Several years ago, I had the privilege of working at
Judge Edelstein's chambers for a few days (former Chief Judge of New York's
Second Circuit, who also presided over the 13-year antitrust battle between
the Justice Department and IBM). On one occasion, a messenger delivered a
package from a large Wall Street law firm. Unfortunately, the materials in
the package were late. "How many lawyers do they have, Jonathan?" the Judge
asked his law clerk, referring to this respected Wall Street firm. "I think
about 240, at the latest count," Jonathan replied. "Too bad they don't hire
one good one," the Judge snapped, as he dispatched the courier out the door
in a hurry.
On another occasion a few months ago in Sydney, Australia, Dr. Gene Amdahl,
told me that designing systems was a job for only one or two people. One
sometimes needs "a cast of thousands" to do the coding, but only one person
setting the direction. Otherwise, all those people may end up pulling
together splendidly, but alas, the wrong way. Dr. Amdahl said that he
thought that IBM watching was also the kind of work where "one good one" can
pull more weight than many others.
What happened today on Wall Street illustrated once again why, like being a
good lawyer or a systems architect, the IBM/industry watching is not a team
sport. IBM's second quarter earnings were down 10%, just as many Wall Street
analysts had boosted their earnings estimates. Even though the Wall Street
indeed has hundreds of people going through the soothsaying motions, every
once in awhile it ends up at the short end of the stick.
Wall Street/Annex -- On The Opposite Sides Of Fence
For several days preceding IBM's release of its second quarter results, the
business press was buzzing with rumors of upbeat news about IBM. The
optimism was fueled by the fact that at least six of the major Wall Street
firms' analysts either increased their estimates for IBM, or made statements
to the press which suggested that they should (see the WALL STREET
JOURNAL-7/08/87 and the DOW JONES wire-7/13/87). It is not surprising,
therefore, that on July 13, the day before IBM was to release its latest
results, its stock jumped 2 1/4 points in anticipation of a good report card
from the company.
Meanwhile, at the same time as some of our respected Wall Street colleagues
were telling their followers to expect an upbeat IBM report today (at about
$2.15 per share, they were implying net earnings of about $1.3 billion), our
IBM Revenue/Earnings Model clients were being told of our LOWERING of the
second quarter IBM earnings estimates from $1.3 billion to $1.14 billion.
What were IBM's actual earnings? $1.18 billion! Predictably, IBM's stock
plunged 2 3/8 points today, despite a 28.38-point surge in the Dow Jones
Industrials Index.
By the way, we weren't alone in suggesting a cautious stance vis-a-vis IBM.
It was refreshing to see a relatively young analyst, Stephen Milunovich, of
First Boston, sticking to his guns, i.e. his earlier estimate of $1.90 per
share for the second quarter. As it turned out, he was right while Merrill
Lynch, E.F. Hutton, Drexel Burnham, Gartner Group, Thomson McKinnon, Weil &
Associates -- the six firms quoted by THE WALL STREET JOURNAL and the DOW
JONES wire - were wrong, and by a considerable margin, too.
Lower Prices In 1987, Lower-than-expected 3090 Volumes
Evidently, some of our Wall Street colleagues paid more attention to the
local gossip than to the FACTS which determine IBM's and other vendors'
destinies. For, were they paying attention to the latter, some might have
realized that the factors to which IBM's Akers attributed his own optimism --
the earlier than expected shipments of the PS/2, the 9370, and the 3090-600E
-- would only have a minimal impact on the company's 1987 net earnings.
That's because in the case of the first two product lines, we are dealing
with relatively low margins (see CMS BULLETIN 87-36, 7/06/87). As for the
3090-600E, this CPU's contribution to 1987 profits is likely to be offset by
the lower shipment volumes of the 3090-300E and 400E, as well as the
aggressive price cuts exacted by the PCMs. In other words, we said that IBM
will surpass its 1986 shipment and revenue levels, but its profit margins
would nevertheless still form a trough (see the charts and CMS BULLETIN
87-35, 6/29/87). An IBM spokesperson today essentially confirmed such a
view. Commenting about the outlook for 1987, he said that IBM was very happy
with the second quarter results, and that the company expects "a modest
increase in shipments and revenues for the year." Notice -- he did not
mention PROFIT increases.
---
Sound familiar? (Annex Ed. - Jan. 18, 2002) J ("The more things change, the
more they are the same" - French philosopher Alphonse Karr, 1809-1890).
Volume XVIII, No. 2002-02
January 18, 2002
Editor: Bob Djurdjevic
Published by Annex Research
e-mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
P.O. Box 97100, Phoenix, Arizona 85060-7100
TEL/FAX: (602) 532-7789
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Om, Shalom, Salaam.
Em Hotep, Peace Be,
All My Relations.
Omnia Bona Bonis,
Adieu, Adios, Aloha.
Amen.
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