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from - http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A12095-2002Jan20.html

Army Lost Track of Anthrax Bacteria
Specimens at Md.'s Fort Detrick May Have Been Misplaced or Stolen

By Rick Weiss and Joby Warrick
Washington Post Staff Writers
Monday, January 21, 2002; Page A01

The Army's premier biowarfare research facility at Fort Detrick, Md., lost track
of more than two dozen potentially dangerous biological specimens around 1991,
including some containing the microbe that causes anthrax, according to
scientists who worked there at the time and documents from a 1992 internal Army
investigation that looked into the loss.

Moreover, Army investigators were told in 1992 that a Fort Detrick biological
warfare research laboratory apparently had been the site of unauthorized anthrax
research during weekends and evenings earlier that year, according to the
documents, filed as part of a pending lawsuit.

And in contrast to recent assurances by Army officials that Detrick has not
dealt with the dangerous, powdered form of anthrax spores in recent decades,
such powders were, in fact, inadvertently produced in the lab during the 1990s,
according to a scientist who worked there at the time and who has since filed a
lawsuit, alleging discrimination, against the Army. The powders were produced
while research on less dangerous, "wet" anthrax spores was being conducted, the
scientist said.

The spore-laden letters that were sent to members of Congress and media outlets
last fall contained a form of dry anthrax spores similar to the Fort Detrick
byproduct. Five people were killed and 13 others are known to have been sickened
in the attacks.

The unauthorized weekend work, which is not known to have involved the dry form
of the bacteria, was accidentally uncovered when a worker noticed that someone
had tampered with a device that would have revealed that the equipment had been
used after hours, according to the Army investigation.

The apparent improprieties occurred at a difficult time in the Army lab's
history -- when there were hard feelings over personnel issues and even a degree
of internecine warfare among some workers -- a fact that makes it difficult
today to weigh conflicting explanations for the inventory disparities and the
apparent tampering with equipment.

It is possible that specimens may simply have been misplaced, according to one
source who worked in the Fort Detrick lab and who spoke to The Washington Post
yesterday on condition of anonymity.

On the other hand, that source and others said, the emerging details are
consistent with the increasingly popular hypothesis that last fall's
bioterrorist attacks were the work of a current or former Fort Detrick
scientist.

At a minimum, according to several sources who worked there at the time, the
personal rivalries and less than fully vigilant security practices offered
adequate incentive and opportunity for an employee to make off with at least a
few potentially deadly microbial samples.

Officials with the Army and the FBI declined to comment on the revelations
yesterday.

Congress did not impose today's strict security measures for research on
dangerous microbes until 1996. And at the time of the apparent breaches, several
high-ranking people associated with the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of
Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), which oversaw the work at Fort Detrick, were
facing allegations ofracial discrimination.

Details of the situation at Fort Detrick in the early 1990s, many of them first
published yesterday by the Hartford Courant, are contained in papers filed as
part of a 1998 discrimination lawsuit against the Army by an Egyptian American
scientist, Ayaad Assaad, a veterinary physiologist who worked at Fort Detrick
for nearly a decade before being let go in 1997, during a round of staff cuts.

The United States is a signatory to a 1972 international convention that
prohibits research on offensive biological weapons, and the Fort Detrick lab has
been officially devoted to defensive research since 1969. The 1992 Army
investigation grew out of an internal audit conducted in February of that year
that found 27 specimens missing from the lab -- including some containing the
bacteria that cause anthrax. It is unclear whether any of the missing specimens
belong to the Ames strain, the strain used in last fall's attacks. But Fort
Detrick officials have acknowledged that the Ames strain was under study at the
lab. The whereabouts of at least some of the 27 specimens remain a mystery.

It also remains unclear whether those specimens -- mostly tissues from animals
that had been intentionally infected with the agents that cause anthrax, ebola
and other diseases -- contained any viable microbes. The process of preparing
them for study under a microscope typically requires subjecting them to toxic
chemicals.

But even if those specimens pose no danger, their disappearance suggests that
other, dangerous samples may have been subject to removal without authorization,
former Fort Detrick workers said.

A woman who worked in the laboratory told Army investigators in February 1992
that she had seen evidence of unauthorized activities in the lab. An
odometer-like device that records the use of a high-powered microscope had
apparently been tampered with in a way that had concealed its use during
evenings or weekends, according to court papers.

One Monday in early 1992, the worker found that the machine had apparently been
used over the weekend and that the previous user had failed to close a computer
file used to label microscope slides. The label name she saw on the computer
screen was "Antrax [sic] 005," according to court papers.

Two former USAMRIID employees contacted by The Post yesterday described becoming
aware of the missing bacteria either personally or through court records. Eric
Oldenburg, a former Fort Detrick lab technician who now works as a detective in
Phoenix, recalled being detailed to help track down the specimens.

"Some anthrax was missing, and there may have been other" types of microbes,
Oldenburg said.

Assaad learned of the search through USAMRIID documents turned over to him as
part of his lawsuit, which alleges that the Army discriminated against him
because of his Arab heritage.

Assaad, who now works for the Environmental Protection Agency, described
security at Fort Detrick in the early 1990s as "very lax," compromised by weak
policies and what he described as improper relationships between some managers
and their subordinates. He said it would have been relatively easy for someone
working at USAMRIID's labs to walk out with deadly pathogens.

Assaad also asserted that a dry, powdered form of anthrax was present at Fort
Detrick, contradicting repeated recent statements by Army officials that only a
liquid form of anthrax was used at the Frederick, Md., facility. Assaad said
that during the process of creating a wet aerosol of anthrax for lab
experiments, small amounts of anthrax spores would precipitate and cling to the
sides of lab equipment. "It dried to a powder as fine as any you could make,"
Assaad said. "You could collect some of it using a Kleenex or your finger."

The anthrax spores in the letters sent to Sens. Thomas A. Daschle (D-S.D.) and
Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vt.) were in the form of a fine powder -- particularly
dangerous because the powdered form spreads more easily and penetrates the
lung's deepest passages. Fort Detrick workers were not at risk of infection
because they were vaccinated.

Assaad was interviewed by FBI agents on Oct. 3, shortly before news of the first
anthrax attacks broke, after an anonymous note accused him of being a
bioterrorist. The FBI concluded the letter was a hoax, but the timing of the
incident makes Assaad suspect that the writer had foreknowledge of the
anthrax-laced letters sent to New York and Washington and the letter believed to
have been sent to Florida.

"After the attacks, I called the FBI to offer my assistance, but I never heard
back from them," Assaad said.

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