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From: "M.A. Johnson" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <Recipient list suppressed>
Subject: Paris Reporters Say Bush Threatened War Last Summer
Date: Sunday, January 13, 2002 10:28 PM


   Good intentions will always be pleaded for every assumption
   of authority. It is hardly too strong to say that the
   Constitution was made to guard the people against the dangers
   of good intentions. There are men in all ages who  mean to
   govern well, but they mean to govern. They promise to be good
   masters, but they mean to be masters. -- Noah Webster

~~for educational purposes only~~
[Title 17 U.S.C. section 107]


Paris Reporters Say Bush Threatened War Last Summer
by James Ridgeway

Far from the American media machine, two French authors have
released a report outlining U.S. attempts to finesse the issue of
Osama bin Laden long before Al Qaeda struck on September 11.
Based on extensive firsthand reporting, Jean-Charles Brisard and
Guillaume Dasqui� write in their book, Bin Laden: The Forbidden
Truth, that the Bush administration went so far as to consider
waging war against Afghanistan's ruling Taliban last summer.
Brisard and Dasqui� argue the U.S. cared more about getting
access to the region's oil than about getting the head of Osama
bin Laden.

Now thousands of U.S. citizens are dead and Al Qaeda is on the
run. Dasqui� tells the Voice he doubts the group will last "more
than a few weeks." The journalist describes bin Laden's military
leaders as mostly former members of the Egyptian special forces
who joined with the Saudi exile in 1992 and 1993 during fighting
in Sudan. Al Qaeda commanders and troops are "the military
product of a religious deviance," he says, warning that ending the
network "won't solve anything because the Saudi charities and
other organizations tied to the clerics will go on pumping out the
money. The problem is their fundamentalism."

Brisard, who has run Vivendi International's economic intelligence
service, prepared the West's first report on Al Qaeda back in
1997, at the request of the French government. Along with
Dasqui�, he now argues the FBI's efforts to get to the bottom of
bin Laden's terror outfit�which bombed two American embassies
in Africa in 1998�were blocked by the Saudi royal family and the
big oil companies, which were hungry for the region's crude
reserves.

The FBI press office had no comment on the book, and the State
Department has steadily denied having any negotiations with the
Taliban, which had no diplomatic standing in the U.S. But the two
authors think highly of the FBI agents who were working on
counterterrorism, saying they often had excellent informants.

That's not to say progress was great. When an FBI agent would
turn up to do an interview, the Saudis would step in with their
own bizarre behavior. "We uncovered incredible things," Dasqui�
tells the Voice. "Investigators would arrive to find that key
witnesses they were about to interrogate had been beheaded the
day before." In the end, he says, the West "always considered
Saudi Arabia as a partner that we absolutely and systematically
had to protect."

The book also reveals a portrait of U.S. policy toward the Taliban
that differs sharply from the one usually held up for the American
public but coincides with that of the Taliban's unofficial emissary
in the U.S., Laili Helms, the niece of the former CIA head (see
"The Accidental Operative," Voice, June 19, 2001). Helms
described one incident after another in which, she claimed, the
Taliban agreed to give up bin Laden to the U.S., only to be
rebuffed by the State Department. On one occasion, she said, the
Taliban agreed to give the U.S. coordinates for his campsite,
leaving enough time so the Yanks could whack Al Qaeda's leader
with a missile before he moved. The proposal, she claims, was
nixed. The State Department denied receiving any such offer.

Helms also related an incident when Prince Turki, then the head
of Saudi intelligence, flew to Kabul to negotiate bin Laden's
arrest. Turki, according to Helms's account of the story, wanted
bin Laden murdered on Afghan soil. If he were killed there, then
the Saudi royal family needn't face the embarrassment of airing
their dirty linen in an open trial. The Taliban refused, and Turki
returned home empty-handed.

Brisard and Dasqui� characterize the U.S. as playing a clumsy
footsie with the Taliban, with diplomacy unfolding in a series of
bizarre fits and starts. By the late 1990s, the writers claim,
diplomacy was run on different levels. One channel went from the
UN Security Council to Kabul. Meanwhile, the State Department
conducted its own  bilateral negotiations. From the start, the U.S.
favored a sort of covert support for the Taliban, in hopes that
sooner or later the one-eyed Supreme Leader Mullah
Mohammed Omar could be prevailed upon to break ties
with bin Laden so the West could get on with its pipeline and
other business interests.

However, this approach came to a screaming halt in September
1997, when European Union commissioner Emma Bonino paid
an official visit to Kabul, where the Taliban arrested her for
filming the conditions in a women's hospital. Their outrageous
actions made it difficult for the West to appear at all friendly
with the Taliban. In reality, since they had all the power in this
Stalinized regime, nobody ever stopped dealing with them. It's
just that the trail became more submerged. Bin Laden then
began his potent offensives, attacking the diplomatic posts
and the USS Cole.

In general, according to the authors, the U.S. line on the
Taliban had gone something like this: "OK, they are officially
a bit wild, but let's not go overboard. Eventually we can make
them acceptable." Under Clinton, few thought they could
ever deal with the Taliban, and some wanted to pile on
sanctions. But under Bush, talks started up once more. The
purpose was legitimate at the start, Brisard notes. "It was for
the U.S. to negotiate that bin Laden be given to them," he
says. "Then it shifted to the point where advisers thought
that the economic arguments would make the difference with
the Taliban and accelerate the negotiations. They started
to put the oil subsidies that would be given to the Taliban
on the table. At the end of July, the negotiations broke down,
because the U.S. threatened to go to war with the Taliban if
they didn't accept the deal."

Dasqui�, too, notes the role of the oil industry in this conflict.
"Most of the big names of the Bush administration have a
political culture developed in Big Oil�Cheney with Halliburton,
Rice at Chevron," he says. "Donald Evans also came from a
big oil company." This shift from the Clinton era took effect
quickly. In March 2001, a personal representative of Supreme
Leader Omar came to Washington. In his mission to the nation's
capital, he was accompanied by Helms.

It should be noted here that the Taliban, through a policy
of coercion, had stopped farmers from growing opium
poppies�a major goal of both the Clinton and Bush drug
wars. In certain quarters this was taken as a sign of their
coming around to deal with the U.S. What nobody seemed
to know, or at least appreciate at the time, was that bin Laden
had put so much money into Afghanistan that he virtually
owned the regime. "We must understand that Mullah Omar
was a peasant and illiterate," says Brisard, "so the person
giving substance to the religious message of the Taliban
regime is Osama bin Laden. He is the person who brings
life to and finances the Taliban economy."

The way the French writers see it, the most significant factor
in Central Asia is not a revived cold war between Russia and
the U.S. over influence in the former Soviet republics, but the
rise of Iran. Here the irony is that the U.S. embraced Saudi
Arabia as a counterbalance against the Shiites in Iran. Now
the tables are turned. FBI investigations showed the connection
between the Saudi clergy and the September terrorist attacks.
Gradually the U.S. has begun to distance itself from the Saudis.
And at the same time, it has begun to warm to Iran, whose help
the U.S. suddenly needs.

"During the dark years of Taliban power, their principal opponent
in western Afghanistan was Iran," Dasqui� says. "It played a very
important part in supporting the Afghan resistance." Indeed, it was
Shiite Iran that financed dissidents against the Taliban. When the
crisis started, the Swiss Embassy in Tehran organized meetings
between American State Department officials and Iranian president
Mohammed Khatami's government.

In the end, the authors say Al Qaeda was a special case in that
it was set up to be a nexus for other fundamentalist networks.
Through bin Laden, it provides the financing to attract such groups
as the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and the Ramata I Islamya. "There
are a lot of fundamentalist movements around the world, but no one
like Al Qaeda, because it was meant to be a kind of central point,
a crossroads, the focus of fundamentalist movements," says
Dasqui�. "But if tomorrow Al Qaeda disappears, many little
movements can replace it. All that is necessary is to get the
support and benediction of the Saudi clergy."



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