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12 March 2002 Belgian Investigation of ECHELON An Echelon investigation in the Belgian parliament continues that of the European parliament. The report of parliament members Anne Marie Lizin and Chistian Van Parys states that Echelon offends Eurpoean Community law, that Echelon similarly monitors other countries [ UK, DE, FR exist ], and requests the EU to create its own monitor. ___________________ Thanks to Ilka Schroeder "Report on the possible existence of a network for interception of communications named Echelon," written by Belgian members of Parliament concludes that there are grounds for appeal making it possible to subject the existence and the activities of the Echelon system, or of any system of similar interception, with a legal control. Its authors go further than the European Parliament -- whose ad hoc committee had considered the question last year -- while affirming, with supporting legal arguments that the interception of the private telecommunications relayed by satellite within and bound for Belgium is contrary to European Community legislation. The rapporteurs recommend the creation of a European intelligence service and want to prohibit between the EU States any type of espionage or interception of economic information. This problem is felt with all the more acuity in Belgium, which, contrary to the majority of its European partners, does not have any interception system nor does it collaborate in a system developed by one or more allied countries. Belgium is thus incapable of protecting its scientific and economic interests. "It is time to open our eyes to this reality and to cease being naive. Our clean allied Europeans spy on us. Is there real European solidarity?" questioned Armand De Decker, chair of the Belgian Senate, February 26 in Brussels in presenting this report to the press. The report written by Senator Anne-Marie Lizin and House member Chistian Van Parys, very largely refers to work of the ad hoc Echelon committee which was set-up on July 5, 2000. Heritage of the cold war, the Echelon system allows the five Member States of the secret pact "UKUSA" (which probably goes back to 1948), namely the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand and Australia, to intercept the electronic, telephone communications and fax in the whole world, thanks to the geographical dispersion of its stations. The Belgian parliamentary report does not question either the fact that this espionage on a large scale is intended to collect information of an economic nature. The report also underlines the existence in several European countries (primarily the United Kingdom, France and Germany) of similar systems of global interceptions, even if they do not have all a capacity comparable with that of Echelon. In addition, American companies are currently developing an interception base in Denmark. In its conclusions, the report affirms without ambiguity that the existence of a system of interception which collects, starting from the foreigner, of the private telecommunications relayed by satellite within and bound for Belgium contravenes Community legislation, insofar as the system is used for economic espionage. This violation of the right is the fact of the countries which intercept the communications, but also of those which place their territory at the disposal of third country so that they can deliver to the interception communications (allusion hardly buckled to the United Kingdom, associated with Echelon). The legal arguments are based on: - article 3 of Directive 95/46/CE of October 24, 1995 on data protection of personal matters. This article excludes from the field of application of the directive only the processing of data concerned with public safety, defense, national security and the activities of the State relating to fields of the criminal law; - article 25 of Directive 95/46/CE; this article authorizes the transfer of personal data towards third countries only under the condition for which these countries ensure an adequate level of protection of personal data. This condition is not met, according to the report because the United States provides protection only for its own citizens; - article 1.3 of Directive 97/66/CE of December 15, 1997 on the personal data protection in the area of electronic communications: here also, are excluded only the activities concerning public safety, defense, the national security and criminal law. Lastly, the authors of the report think that the existence of a system of interception of private communications threatens the realization of the goals of Treaty EC: free movement of goods, people, services and capital. Lastly, it violates the sovereignty of Belgium (which never authorized these interceptions nor officially informed) as well as the European Convention of the human right. "All this makes it possible to consider an action in Community legislation," emphasized Anne-Marie Lizin. In this context, the commissioners of the Belgian Parliament want a European awakening on the need for setting up a democratic control of these practices. They suggest organizing a first meeting of the parliamentary bodies of control of intelligence services of the EU countries which have such control and sharing this with the countries of the EU which do not yet have it. They also recommend to the Belgian government that it require of its European partners the progressive development of European rules of exchange of information between the intelligence services and to abolish the current system who rests on the principle "giving for giving." (AF) |
