-Caveat Lector- http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/tribune-review/regional/s_2771.html
Defense psychiatrist: Taylor delusional By Robert Baird TRIBUNE-REVIEW Wednesday, November 7, 2001 A University of Pittsburgh psychiatry professor testified Tuesday that Ronald Taylor was legally insane during a shooting spree in Wilkinsburg in March 2000 in which he killed three men and wounded two others. Dr. Horacio Fabrega, a psychiatrist from Mt. Lebanon who examined Taylor for the defense, said Taylor, who is black, was "acting out of a delusional system" in which he believed whites were racists, conspiring to demean and undermine blacks. Fabrega said Taylor, whom he diagnosed as suffering from chronic paranoid schizophrenia, knew from "a societal point of view" that what he was doing was wrong, but his pent-up rage went beyond a level he could control. Taylor, 41, who has worn a blank expression throughout the trial, seemed to brighten slightly yesterday morning when he saw his mother, Shirley, in the courtroom for the first time. Taylor mouthed the words, "Hi, Mom." His mother wasn't present for the afternoon session in the courtroom of Allegheny County Common Pleas Judge Lawrence O'Toole. On cross-examination by Chief Trial Deputy Edward Borkowski, Fabrega acknowledged that "most paranoid schizophrenics don't commit criminal acts." Fabrega said Taylor has "functional amnesia" about the events of March 1, 2000, but Borkowski contended that Taylor has "a selective memory." The prosecutor said psychiatrists at Mayview State Hospital in South Fayette Township wrote in his medical records on April 7, 2000, that Taylor knew what happened the day of the shootings, and later indicated he "conveniently remembers what he wants to remember." Defense attorney John Elash, who is seeking a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity, rested his case after calling Fabrega, his only witness. Taylor won't testify in his own behalf in the guilt phase. When the trial resumes today, Borkowski may call Dr. Michael Welner, a New York City psychiatrist hired by prosecutors to examine Taylor, in rebuttal of Fabrega's testimony. In Pennsylvania, a legal insanity defense must show that a mental disease prevented a defendant from understanding the quality and nature of the acts, or that they were wrong. Fabrega said Taylor understood that what he was doing was wrong and that he could be shot by pursuing police. But Taylor was in the "midst of a psychotic storm" that rendered him unable to recognize his actions as wrong, Fabrega said. Fabrega said Taylor became frustrated when he couldn't find John DeWitt, 64, a maintenance man with whom he argued at his Wilkinsburg apartment and accused of being a racist. The psychiatrist said Taylor was "living in a world he constructed that was unreasonable," and had views of religion, witchcraft and racism that therapists had been unable or unwilling to untangle. Fabrega testified Taylor launched into "a script" he had in his head for years, setting fire to his apartment and shooting and killing John Kroll, 55, of Cabot, Butler County, a carpenter who was fixing his door. Fabrega said Taylor "was becoming a bandit, an outlaw. He believed (whites) had it coming. They deserved a payback. (He) had to get even." During eight hours of interviews with Taylor at Mayview, Fabrega said the defendant said, "I just lost it," and committed the shootings at his apartment, and at the Burger King and McDonald's restaurants in Wilkinsburg. Borkowski has said anger, rage, social maladjustment, emotional instability and uncontrollable impulse cannot serve as the basis of an insanity defense. Taylor is charged with killing Joseph Healy, 71, of Wilkinsburg, a retired Roman Catholic priest; Emil Sanielevici, 20, of Greenfield, a third-year physics student at the University of Pittsburgh, and Kroll. He also is charged with aggravated assault for the wounding of Richard Clinger, 58, of North Huntingdon Township, Westmoreland County, and Steven Bostard, 26, of Swissvale, assistant manager at the Wilkinsburg McDonald's. Fabrega contended Taylor's "psychotic storm" was set off when the apartment management sent two white men, DeWitt and Kroll, to fix his door, when he expected a white man and a black man. Fabrega, who conceded Taylor was selective in picking his victims, said he was offended by Borkowski's claim that some white people weren't shot because Taylor "couldn't sneak up" on them as he had the others. But, as Borkowski went through the details of each shooting, Fabrega admitted that all the victims were defenseless. Taylor was treated at a clinic for 15 years and was hospitalized twice at St. Francis Medical Center in 1990 and 1998 for a total of 14 days. Borkowski said a 1995 note in his medical records reported Taylor "exaggerates his symptoms" to get Social Security disability payments. Robert Baird can be reached at (412) 391-8650. === http://www.law.cornell.edu/ny/ctap/085_0295.htm IN THE MATTER OF GEORGE L. (ANONYMOUS), APPELLANT. 85 N.Y.2d 295, 648 N.E.2d 475, 624 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1995). March 23, 1995 2 No. 46 [1995 NY Int. 054] Decided March 23, 1995 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the New York Reports. Kim L. Darrow, for Appellant. Bridget Rahilly Steller, for Respondent. KAYE, CHIEF JUDGE: This case presents the difficult question whether a mentally ill individual--found to be not responsible, by reason of mental disease or defect, of committing a violent crime --"currently constitutes a physical danger to himself or others" (CPL 330.20[1][c]) so as to remain confined in a secure psychiatric hospital even though his symptoms have improved considerably. We agree with both the trial court and the Appellate Division that, in this case, the People sustained their statutory burden of showing current dangerousness. I. On June 28, 1990, appellant was released from the psychiatric unit at St. Francis Hospital in Dutchess County where he had been admitted two weeks earlier, after assaulting his father. Although the doctors at St. Francis apparently misdiagnosed appellant as suffering from bipolar disorder--a less serious illness than the acute paranoid schizophrenia from which he actually suffers--while at St. Francis, appellant received neuroleptic medication, a treatment also suitable for schizophrenics. The hospital records indicate that appellant was released from St. Francis based on the doctors' opinion that because he had become "medication compliant" and had gained greater insight into his illness, he would continue treatment at an outpatient clinic, continue taking his medication, and abstain from alcohol and marijuana (which exacerbated his violent and delusional behavior). On July 8, however, only ten days after his release from St. Francis, believing that he was the Messiah, that the world was about to end, and that he had a God-like mission to struggle against evil, appellant again attacked his father, this time with a hunting knife, seriously wounding him. In speaking about the incident some time later, appellant explained that because he believed at the time that he could break the law and get away with it, he had decided to destroy his former employer who represented evil, but unable to locate his employer he turned on his father instead. Appellant also later admitted that he had visited the outpatient clinic recommended by the doctors at St. Francis only once because he was unwilling to continue taking his medication. As a result of the assault on his father and reckless driving of his pick-up truck several hours afterwards, appellant was taken into custody and indicted in County Court on separate counts of attempted murder, assault and reckless endangerment. On August 15, 1990, after receiving the recommendation of two independent psychiatrists, the trial court found appellant unfit to proceed and ordered him temporarily committed to the custody of the Commissioner of Mental Hygiene (CPL article 730). Appellant was transferred to the Mid-Hudson Psychiatric Center. Four months later, after being discharged from Mid-Hudson because his delusional thinking had abated, appellant was again examined to determine his fitness to proceed. Though acknowledging that the symptoms seemed to have improved, the examining psychiatrist reported that appellant was still subject to delusions: His insight and judgment are questionable * * * * [T]he defendant's mental status has not been consistent, even recently, and that he was talking about auditory hallucinations, and God, telling him to do things to other people, specifically in regards to an incident with his father. * * * [Although] the defendant attempted to present himself from a good light, * * * his mental status is fragile and susceptible to rapid, acute, unpredictable decompensation. Appellant's psychiatrists later acknowledged that during this period he had suffered a relapse in jail, while on medication. As a result of the court's finding that he was still unable to assist his attorneys, appellant was returned to Mid-Hudson in January 1991.[n 1] After his subsequent discharge from Mid-Hudson to the custody of the Department of Corrections, three months later, in April, the trial court concluded that appellant was fit to proceed. On June 11, 1991, appellant offered a plea of not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect. Three psychiatrists then examined appellant and submitted reports to assist the trial court in the statutory determination whether he "currently" suffered from a mental illness and whether he constituted a physical danger to himself or others (CPL 330.20[1][c]). Although all three psychiatrists agreed that appellant was mentally ill, suffering from "schizophrenia, paranoid type, chronic with acute exacerbation," two of the three concluded that because the illness was in remission as a result of the therapy he had been receiving at Mid-Hudson (including treatment with the antipsychotic medications loxitane, cogentin and vistaril), appellant could safely be treated in a nonsecure facility. Even the psychiatrist who subsequently testified on appellant's behalf, however, acknowledged that "[t]his 24 year- old male has at least a two year history of delusional thinking resulting in dangerous behavior * * * " While not disagreeing with his colleagues that appellant's schizophrenia was in remission and that appellant was not dangerous as long as he continued taking medication, the prognosis of the People's witness, Dr. Bucove, was considerably less sanguine. As he concluded in his written report to the trial court: There is no evidence that schizophrenia can be cured. From a statistical point of view, [appellant] is more likely to relapse than not relapse over time * * * * If [appellant] lived in the community, there would be a danger to the community of his relapsing to an active state of schizophrenia with a recurrence of homicidal intentions * * * * [Appellant] was treated at the psychiatric unit of St. Francis hospital from June 14th through June 28th, 1990. He stabbed his father on July 8, 1990. * * * If [appellant] is transferred to a non- secure facility, his family * * * should be advised of the risks to them * * * * Given the unreliability of predicting dangerousness, the court has a difficult role in making a decision regarding his disposition * * * Similarly, at the evidentiary hearing on January 2, 1992, Dr. Bucove testified: As a physician, I can't speak of a course of specific persons, specific course of illness in the future. I could only speak of in terms of what happens with these people with his illness. It is a fact with people with his illness frequently do decompensate * * * without forewarning * * * The problem with schizophrenia is that one is vulnerable to recurrence and the recurrence of schizophrenia usually takes the same pattern as previous relapses. * * * I would say there is a high probability of a relapse over time. Based on the evidence, the trial judge found that appellant did in fact pose a current danger and should remain confined to a secure facility: [T]he People have sustained their burden of demonstrating that the petitioner suffers from a dangerous mental disorder * * * Although there is medical testimony to the effect that at the time of examination petitioner was not specifically dangerous, * * * there is a danger of relapse at any time. In view of the short time between the commission of the acts which led to the indictment and this application, there is an insufficient basis upon which to make a determination as to petitioner's long-term stability for purposes of transfer to a non-secure facility. Thus, having been retained either in a psychiatric hospital or in prison for the seventeen months since attacking his father, appellant was ordered confined to a secure psychiatric facility as a "track 1" defendant suffering from a dangerous mental disorder thus subject to greater restrictions regarding his future transfer, furlough or release (People v Stone, 73 NY2d 296, 300; Matter of Jill ZZ., 83 NY2d 133, 137). After affirmance by the Appellate Division, this Court granted leave to appeal.[n 2] II. In determining whether appellant was correctly found to suffer from a "dangerous mental disorder," we begin with the governing statute: "Dangerous mental disorder" means (i) that a defendant currently suffers from a "mental illness" as that term is defined in * * * the mental hygiene law, and (ii) that because of such condition he currently constitutes a physical danger to himself or others. (CPL 330.20[1][c].) As appellant concedes, this case is not about whether he suffers from a mental illness: each psychiatrist to have examined him since his arrest agrees that he suffers from acute paranoid schizophrenia. Rather, the sole question presented is whether, on account of that condition, in January 1992 he "currently constitute[d] a physical danger to himself or others" and should therefore be committed to a secure psychiatric facility. We are thus presented with the question of defining the word "currently" as used in CPL 330.20(1)(c)(ii), an issue we have yet to address in any detail. Relying on Matter of Torres (78 NY2d 1085, affg for reasons stated in 166 AD2d 228), appellant makes essentially two arguments why the People's evidence was insufficient to establish his dangerousness as of January 1992. First, he contends that "currently" must be read in its strictest sense, and that in January 1992 (when he was taking antipsychotic medication in the controlled environment of a psychiatric hospital), his disease was in remission. Second, appellant points to the People's failure to offer evidence of violent acts in the seventeen months between the attack on his father and his commitment proceeding. Without such evidence, he reasons, the People's case improperly depended upon the nature of his criminal act combined with the statistical probability of relapse affecting paranoid schizophrenics generally, rather than a particularized showing that he would again degenerate into violent and delusional behavior. ===== http://www.jhu.edu/~newslett/02-14-97/News/DuPont__trial_resumes.html DuPont trial resumes : DuPont's state of mind at time of murder unknown, doctor concedes By MARIA PANARITIS Associated Press MEDIA, Pa. - It is impossible to know John E. du Pont's state of mind at the time he killed Olympic wrestler David Schultz, a prosecution psychiatrist conceded today under cross-examination. Forensic psychiatrist John O'Brien resumed testimony a day after du Pont's murder trial was recessed. On Monday, O'Brien testified that du Pont was sane when he killed Schultz on Jan. 26, 1996. He also testified that he then barricaded himself inside his mansion during a two-day standoff with police. Du Pont, 58, has pleaded innocent by reason of insanity. O'Brien, the first of two forensic psychiatrists to testify for prosecutors, also said then he thought the millionaire heir to the du Pont chemical fortune suffered from a cocaine-induced psychotic disorder with delusions. This theory is in contrast to the idea that duPont suffered from paranoid schizophrenia, as defense experts contend. O'Brien called his diagnosis a "grab-bag psychosis diagnosis". O'Brien said the diagnosis was based on many unknown factors. These unknown factors included duPont's refusal to talk about the crime and the extent of his cocaine use. Under cross-examination by lead defense attorney Thomas Bergstrom, O'Brien conceded today that he could not know du Pont's state of mind during the murder. He conceded this point despite his previous testimony concerning duPont's possible cocain-induced psychiatric disorder. Defense psychiatrists have testified that paranoid schizophrenia spawned years of psychotic delusions for duPont. Such delusions could have made du Pont believe Schultz was part of an international conspiracy to take his life, they argued. Prosecutors say duPont killed Schultz because he was jealous of the Schultz's close relationship with Bulgarian wrestler Valentin Jordanov. Both men lived and trained in wrestling on du Pont's Newtown Square estate. Prosecutors also say du Pont had grown to distrust Schultz, 36, because of his friendship with wrestler Dan Chaid. Du Pont had kicked Chaid off his estate for supposedly trying to discredit him. === http://www.courier-journal.com/localnews/2001/09/20/ke092001s73709.htm Local/Regional� News Item Thursday, September 20, 2001 Judge delays murder trial National crisis could distract jury, she says -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- By Kim Wessel The Courier-Journal Fearing that jurors would be too distracted in the aftermath of last week's terrorist attacks, a Jefferson County judge yesterday postponed the murder trial of a man accused of killing a local deputy in 1993. Peter Bard, 36, was to stand trial Monday in Louisville for the death of Jefferson County Deputy Sheriff Floyd Cheeks before Judge Lisabeth Hughes Abramson made her unusual ruling yesterday. Bard is charged with one count of murder. If convicted, he could get the death penalty. At a hearing in Jefferson Circuit Court, Abramson agreed to delay the trial for fear that jurors wouldn't focus on it because of the attacks at the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Bard's case is the only trial in Jefferson County to be postponed because of the terrorist attacks. It was reset for Jan. 7. ''I have concerns about the ability of jurors to give this case the level of attention and consideration that it deserves,'' Abramson said. Bard's case, with its claims of insanity and the possibility of the death penalty, requires ''particular dedication'' from the jurors, Abramson said. ''Given the present circumstances in our country . . . this is not the appropriate time to try this case.'' Bard's attorneys, Don Meier and Ann Bailey Smith, had asked that Bard's trial be postponed, albeit reluctantly, Smith said. She said in court that she and Meier had been discussing a delay since Friday with Abramson and prosecutor Joe Gutmann. Defense lawyers worried about asking jurors to spend three to four weeks engrossed in a trial without being distracted by ''what's been happening in the country.'' Smith told Abramson that they had ''specific concerns'' about Bard's case in relation to the recent events, but she wouldn't elaborate. Neither would the other lawyers on the case. According to court records, Bard, who has been diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia, has claimed he is king of some other land and ''Palestinians would dress up as law enforcement officers and come to his home to threaten him.'' He has said ''these people posed a threat to his life.'' When he was evaluated by a psychologist, Bard said Cheeks was an ''imposter'' -- a Palestinian wearing a sheriff's uniform. Cheeks was not Palestinian. A hearing in the case is scheduled for Nov. 1. Cheeks, 37, was the first Jefferson County deputy sheriff killed in the line of duty since 1933. On Oct. 27, 1993, he and his partner, Sgt. Milburn Peers, went to 1109 S. 28th St. about 1:30 p.m. to serve an emergency protective order on Bard's brother, Ivan. Ivan Bard was not home. According to court records, after Cheeks knocked on a door, Peter Bard, carrying a pistol, opened it and fired two shots at Cheeks. The deputy ran but was hit once in the back. Louisville police officers who arrived at the home dragged Cheeks out of the line of fire. Once police surrounded the house, Bard surrendered, dropping his gun and falling to his knees, court records indicate. Until last year, Bard repeatedly had been found incompetent to stand trial. At least two psychologists have diagnosed him with paranoid schizophrenia. After undergoing treatment and taking medication, Bard now is able to understand the charges against him and participate in his defense, which means he's competent for trial. His attorneys have indicated that they plan to argue that their client was insane at the time Cheeks was killed. Bard has told Dr. Steven Simon, a psychologist who evaluated him at the Kentucky Correctional Psychiatric Center, that a lens implanted in his eye and wires implanted in his ears enabled powerful political figures to monitor his actions. ==== http://www.fayettevilleobserver.com/news/archives/1999/tx99jul/n23debr4.htm Friday, July 23, 1999 Sprangle enters not guilty plea Facing 2 murder charges, defendant pleads insanity By Michelle Washington Staff writer LILLINGTON -- Debra Sprangle pleaded not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity on Thursday to a charge of murdering her husband in August 1990. Sprangle has shifted between the state mental hospital at Dorothea Dix and the State Women�s Prison since she was charged with the murder. She also faces a charge of murdering her boyfriend, Milton Smith, in 1983. For years, Sprangle was ruled incompetent to stand trial. Doctors diagnosed her condition as bipolar and paranoid schizophrenia. She suffered delusions and hallucinations and told doctors that she was married to Jesus Christ. She also was prone to fits of violence, sometimes in court. Last August, a Superior Court judge ruled that Sprangle was capable of standing trial. Doctors said powerful anti-psychotic drugs had brought much of her mental disease under control. ==== http://www.polygamyinfo.com/past_media%20plyg%20105%20trib.htm Salt Lake Tribune COURT CAN'T JUDGE LAFFERTY'S BELIEFS, SAYS PETITION Byline: By Dave Jonsson A 10th Circuit Court ruling overturning the murder convictions of self-proclaimed prophet Ron W. Lafferty is ``fundamentally flawed'' because the judges presumed that Lafferty's religious beliefs are wrong, state prosecutors contend. In a petition for a rehearing to be filed today, the Utah attorney general's officeargues the Constitution forbids judges from making that kind of presumption. The federal judges based their decision on Lafferty's belief in his own ``Messianic'' role in the killings, according to the petition. In a 2-1 decision Dec. 9, the three-judge panel dismissed Lafferty's two first-degree murder convictions, ruling he was not competent when he decided against using an insanity defense at his trial. The state's petition asks all 10 Denver federal judges to ``correct the apparent determination that if a person holds religious beliefs which are not in the mainstream, he must be delusional.'' Lafferty, 48, and his brother Dan, 42, were convicted of the 1984 killings of Ron's sister-in-law, Brenda Wright Lafferty, 24, and her 15-month-old daughter, Erica, in American Fork. The baby's throat was cut and Brenda Lafferty was beaten and stabbed. The men claimed the killings were ordered by God. Dan Lafferty was sentenced to life in prison for the killings after jury deadlocked 11-1 on the death penalty. Assistant Attorney General Charlene Barlow contends in the state's 14-page petition that the Denver court ``appears to accept without question the psychological examiners' assumptions that Lafferty was `paranoid delusional' because of his religious beliefs.'' ``To accept that Lafferty was delusional, the majority had to assume that Lafferty's beliefs were wrong,'' she wrote. ``The only way to say that Lafferty was delusional [and consequently, that his delusions made him unable to make rational choices] is to say that his religious belief in divine intervention was wrong. ``This the court is unable to do,'' Ms. Barlow argues. Ms. Barlow's petition also suggests the 10th Circuit judges overstepped legal bounds by linking Lafferty's competency to choices he made at trial. ``The majority implicitly determines that no rational person would have rejected the insanity defense or the request for a lesser included offense because those choices were `where Lafferty's best interests lie,' '' the state appeal argues. ``Since Lafferty rejected those choices,'' the argument says, ``he must have been irrational and incompetent. ``It is not for the [Denver court] to determine where Lafferty's `best interests' lie. The right to direct his defense lies with Lafferty himself. ``By tying a determination of Lafferty's competency to his defense decisions, the majority is implying that he made choices which were not in his best interests and were therefore bad choices. Because they were bad choices, they must have been a product of Lafferty's incompetence.'' Mike Esplin, Lafferty's appeals attorney, contended Lafferty may have understood the trial proceedings, but his mental illness prevented him from making rational decisions about his defense. ==== http://www.state.sd.us/state/judicial/opinions/Cases/2000/2000_083.htm South Dakota Supreme Court Steinkruger v. Miller, 2000 SD 83 Opinion Filed June 21, 2000 Corrected Aug 18, 2000 Formatting provided courtesy of State Bar of South Dakota and South Dakota Continuing Legal Education, Inc. 222 East Capitol Ave. Pierre, SD 57501-2596 HTML Code � State Bar of South Dakota, 1999 ROGER STEINKRUGER, Chief Executive Officer, South Dakota Human Services Center, Appellee, v. DEWAYNE MILLER, Appellant. [2000 SD 83] South Dakota Supreme Court Appeal from the First Judicial Circuit, Yankton County, SD Hon. Arthur L. Rusch, Judge #21105--Affirmed Mark Barnett, Attorney General Lynne A. Valenti, Special Assistant Attorney General Department of Human Services, Pierre, SD Attorneys for Appellee. David M. Hosmer, Yankton, SD Kari L. Nordstrom, South Dakota Advocacy Services, Pierre, SD Attorneys for Appellant. Considered on Briefs Feb 14, 2000; Opinion Filed Jun 21, 2000 KONENKAMP, Justice. [�1] Are South Dakota's forced medication statutes unconstitutional because they fail to require that mental patients be given the least restrictive treatment alternative? The circuit court found that there was no less intrusive alternative available in this case. We conclude that our statutes comport with constitutional constraints by incorporating the least restrictive alternative requirement for incompetent, involuntarily committed patients and affirm the circuit court's order for forced medication. A. [�2] DeWayne Miller, age fifty-seven, currently resides at the South Dakota Human Services Center as an involuntary patient. He first arrived there in 1979 and returned involuntarily several times. His mental illness has been variously diagnosed as severe schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type, and schizophrenia, paranoid type, continuous, with prominent negative symptoms. Both are classified as psychotic disorders under the DSM-IV, published by the American Psychiatric Association. Miller holds delusions at times that he can read minds, that he is pregnant, that all medicines are poisons. Occasionally, he admits to auditory hallucinations, and his behavior tends to confirm these. He also suffers from chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, diabetes, high blood pressure, renal stenosis, and severe sleep apnea. [�3] Dr. Kahn, Miller's treating physician and the medical director at Human Services Center, classifies Miller's chronic and severe mental illness as a danger to himself because while in a delusional state he cannot meet his basic needs for food, clothing, and shelter on his own. Miller's mental health treatment plan includes psychotropic medication, psychotherapy, and participation in life skills and recreation therapy groups. Psychotropics are "[d]rugs with an effect on psychic function, behavior, or experience... ." Robert Jean Campbell, M.D., Psychiatric Dictionary 523 (5th ed 1981). Because Miller's mental disorder impairs his judgment and decision-making ability, he denies his illness and refuses both his medicinal and therapeutic regimen. Without psychotropic medication, Dr. Kahn believes, Miller's prognosis remains extremely poor and his current functioning level will decline. Miller's prescribed medication may cause undesirable side effects, such as tiredness and dry mouth, but the drugs can be given in a way to minimize discomfort. Based on his psychiatric and medical opinion, Dr. Kahn concludes that psychotropic medication is the least restrictive treatment available for Miller's condition, and any side effects would be "substantially outweighed" by the expected benefits. [�4] Miller perceives no need for medication. One of his delusions is that smoking will cure his pulmonary disease. He denies having any ailments, physical or mental, and attributes his chronic problems to "stress." When his doctor reviews his proposed treatment with him, including the benefits and adverse effects of the psychotropic medication, Miller consistently refuses consent. According to his treating doctor, however, and as later found by the circuit court, "administration of psychotropic medication is essential and necessary in a meaningful and successful treatment plan [and] although other treatment possibilities exist such as electroconvulsive treatment, psychotropic medication is the treatment of choice considering Mr. Miller's mental and physical conditions." An independent mental status evaluation, requested by Miller's counsel, corroborates these findings and recommendations. ==== http://www.legis.state.ga.us/Courts/Supreme/ca990125.htm Webb v. State, No. S99A0020. Appeal from Chatham Superior Court. Michael Norman Webb was found guilty but mentally ill of murder and possession of a knife during the commission of a felony in the fatal stabbing of his father. According to evidence presented at trial, Webb had a history of paranoid schizophrenia and gouged out the dead victim's eyeballs under the belief that the victim was a ghoul or vampire with the power to regenerate unless the eyes were removed. The father, a Methodist minister, had gone to his son's home because he had been unable to contact him and was worried about him. After spending half a day together, Webb attacked his father, who was washing dishes and had his back turned to his son. Webb claimed he believed an attack by his father was imminent. The victim, who had a history of carrying a pistol for self-protection when he was around his son, had a pistol in his back pocket. Police found Webb in the waiting room of the Georgia Regional Hospital where he had sought, unsuccessfully, to be committed for psychiatric treatment. In this appeal, the defense argues that the verdict of guilty but mentally ill was contrary to the evidence because Webb carried his burden of proving insanity and the defense of delusional compulsion. === http://www.supreme.state.az.us/courtserv/CRTPROJ/01sentguid/page24b.htm *State v. Jimenez, 165 Ariz. 444, 799 P.2d 785 (1990) The defendant was examined by several doctors during this case. Dr. Bencomo concluded that the defendant had a borderline level of intelligence and suffered from a mental illness. Dr. Enos found that the defendant acted under a compulsion that he could not control. With a direct relationship between the mental disease and the crime, the defendant suffered from a mental disease of a schizophrenic nature. Dr. Amezcua-Patino believed that the defendant was psychotic at the time of the crime, but that the defendant knew the difference between right and wrong and was not committable to a mental institution at that time. Dr. Beaver indicated a history of command hallucinations and schizophrenic symptoms and that the crime could not be separated from the disease. Dr. Beaver opined that the defendant was acutely schizophrenic at the time of the murder, and that while the defendant probably knew that what he was doing was wrong, he could not resist the hallucinations. Dr. Garcia-Bunuel found a major mental disorder. Dr. Kruchek noted that the defendant was suffering from a schizophrenic disorder, paranoid, and because of the compelling nature of the hallucination was not able to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. Dr. Kruchek testified that he had diagnosed the defendant with schizophrenia, a psychotic illness. Dr. Dean also diagnosed borderline intelligence and paranoid schizophrenia. Dr. Bencomo advised the trial court that the defendant is a seriously mentally ill individual who would not have had the ability to form any malicious intent. Dr. Bencomo opined that the defendant could not have planned a premeditated murder. The Court concluded this extensive review of the medical and psychological evidence in the record by indicating that the defendant had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that his mental capacity was so impaired that he was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct and was unable to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. This mental incapacity was a substantial mitigating factor and a major contributing cause of his conduct sufficiently substantial to outweigh the aggravating circumstances. The heinousness and depravity of the crime were directly related to the defendant's mental impairment, as was the unfortunate circumstance of the victim being a helpless child under the age of 15. Given the strong evidence of the severity of the defendant's mental illness, combined with the substantial and relevant factor of the defendant's young age and borderline intelligence affecting his maturity, leniency is required. *State v. Fierro, 166 Ariz. 539, 804 P.2d 72 (1990) Even if the trial court does not find sufficient evidence to establish a mitigating circumstance under (H)(1), the trial court must consider any evidence of mental impairment to mitigate capital punishment. The trial court cannot conclude its inquiry once it determines that the evidence does not meet (H)(1). In order to remain faithful to Lockett and Watson, the court must then consider whether the proffered evidence in some other way suggests leniency. The trial court concluded, based on the testimony of witnesses, that the defendant's intoxication on the night of the murder was insufficient to establish that his capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform it to the requirements of the law was significantly impaired. The inquiry should have continued however. The record reveals that from the age of 11, the defendant suffered from a psychological illness for which his family could not afford psychiatric care. The defendant spent most of the first six months of his incarceration in the psychiatric ward where he exhibited psychotic behavior. He attempted suicide, suffered from headaches, insomnia, and hallucinations, complained of hearing voices, repeatedly smeared feces on himself and needed medication to alleviate his condition. The evidence indicates a history of alcohol abuse. These factors, taken together, have an independent mitigating effect despite the failure to establish impaired capacity at the time of the crime. See also drugs/alcohol section. State v. Lavers, 168 Ariz. 376, 814 P.2d 333 (1991) The Court agreed with the defendant that it is not incongruous that a mental disorder that causes a murder can also require leniency, but found no evidence that by making this statement the trial court discounted the mitigating circumstance of mental impairment. The trial court was unable to determine the extent to which the defendant's ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct was impaired, but nonetheless found "it was impaired to some extent and this is a mitigating circumstance." The trial court was not compelled to accept the opinion of a defense expert. In light of the conflicting evidence regarding the defendant's mental impairment at the time of the murder, the trial court would have been justified in finding that mental impairment was not a mitigating circumstance at all. The defense psychologist diagnosed the defendant as having a "delusional paranoid disorder, jealous type," which exists within the context of an "obsessive-compulsive personality disorder." He also testified that the defendant appeared to have an alcohol dependence, was extremely intoxicated at the time of the murders, and was experiencing "delusions" that the victims, his wife and her daughter, were having sexual relations with his wife's ex-husband. He concluded that the defendant's ability to perceive the wrongfulness of his acts or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was "grossly impaired." In reaching his conclusions, the defense psychologist relied upon the truthfulness of what the defendant told him even though the defendant told the trial court he had lied to the psychologist. He also acknowledged that he did not attempt to confirm the history the defendant provided, that he did not listen to the tape recording of the murder, and that the defendant had no indications of organic brain disorders. The state rebutted the defense psychologist's testimony with testimony from a psychiatrist who found insufficient psychiatric symptomology to support the diagnosis of "delusional paranoid disorder, jealous type" and "obsessive-compulsive personality disorder" and "alcoholic dependence, binge type." Based on this record, the Court found that the trial court did not improperly discount the defendant's mental impairment as a mitigating circumstance. ==== Tuesday, December 7, 1999 Media Advisory: David Martin Long Scheduled to be Executed AUSTIN - Texas Attorney General John Cornyn offers the following information on David Martin Long, who is scheduled to be executed after 6 p.m., Wednesday, December 8th. FACTS OF THE CRIME On September 27, 1986, the bodies of Dalpha Jester, her daughter Donna Jester, and Laura Lee Owens were discovered at their home in Lancaster, Texas, by Donna's boss. Laura's body was found in the front yard, while Donna and Dalpha were found laying on the bed in the back bedroom of the house. All three died as a result of numerous chopping wounds to their heads and faces which had been inflicted with a hatchet. The murder weapon was found rinsed off and wrapped in a towel in a bathroom sink in the victims' home. Through entries in a diary kept by Donna, police were able to focus on David Martin Long as their prime suspect. According to the diary and Long's subsequent confession, Donna met Long when she picked him up as he was hitchhiking on September 19, 1986. Since Long "had no place to go" Donna allowed him to stay in her home in exchange for house repairs. Donna also agreed to supply Long with cigarettes and wine, specifically MD 20/20, while he worked on her home. According to testimony from Long and police officers, the women's home was filthy and smelled of dog hair and feces from several dogs who roamed freely through the home. Although he initially slept outside in Donna's car, Long developed an apparently loving and sexual relationship with Laura. During that time, Long also began to fear that Donna had dead bodies, possibly of other hitchhikers, buried in her backyard. Long testified that on the day of the murders, September 27, 1986, he experienced these fears and many unexplained emotions. Long claimed that he was also adversely affected by the filth and smell in the house. According to a forensic psychologist who later examined Long, Long related foul odors to his mother's death, which occurred when Long was ten years old, and certain odors caused him to become "out of control" or agitated. Nevertheless, on the day of the murders, Long completed several repairs on the house and did not consume any alcohol until Donna and Laura arrived home from their jobs. When Donna and Laura went to the back bedroom to talk with Dalpha, Long thought they were conspiring against him. Long then retrieved a hatchet. When Laura returned to the living area to watch television, Long told her to go outside because he needed to talk to her. However, Long attacked her, from behind, with the hatchet. Long proceeded into the back bedroom of the house where he killed Donna and Dalpha. Long then returned to the front yard and repeatedly struck Laura with the hatchet. All three victims sustained defensive wounds to their hands and arms. Dalpha was particularly defenseless against Long as she was 65 years old, partially blind, and needed a walker for mobility. Long claimed that he was having some sort of a "spiritual experience" that was related to "satanics" during the attacks. After cleaning off the ax, Long fled in Donna's car drinking MD 20/20 all the while. He was arrested that night in Buffalo for driving while intoxicated, but was later released. Long was eventually arrested on a felony warrant (from Dallas County) on October 24, 1986, in Austin where he had also been arrested for public intoxication. Long gave the Austin police of fictitious name but his true identity was revealed through a fingerprint analysis. Lancaster authorities took Long back to Dallas County, where he confessed to the murders. In his confession, Long stated, "I'm a cold hearted son of a bitch and I killed them because they threatened my relationship with Laura Lee. I killed Dalpha Jester because she knew my name and I felt like she was living dead anyway." Long's presented an insanity defense at trial. Long testified regarding a lengthy substance abuse history which began with regularly consuming alcoholic beverages by the age of twelve and later included marijuana, heroin, cocaine, LSD, methamphetamine, and barbiturates. Long stated that he had suffered head injuries from a bat, a beer bottle, and being hit by a car. Long claimed he sought help for his alcoholism and drug abuse and was committed both voluntarily and involuntarily to several hospitals and institutions. Two or three days before he met Donna Jester, he was released from a voluntary alcohol treatment program at Serenity House in Little Rock. According to Long's religious beliefs, unless a condition is organic, insane people are actually demon possessed. Long stated that he was engaged in a game between God and Satan that he did not want to be a part of anymore. Medical records indicated that Long had been previously diagnosed with "toxic psychosis superimposed residual schizophrenia," which can result from drug or alcohol ingestion, "catatonic schizophrenia," which is a severe condition manifested by almost total withdrawal from reality, borderline delusional thinking, and paranoid ideation. A defense psychologist, Dr. William Hester, testified that Long had an unstable childhood, accompanied by over-discipline or physical abuse, as well as sexual abuse by a family member. Hester diagnosed Long with an extreme antisocial personality disorder, which came under the former label of "psychopath." Hester opined that Long may have been operating under an alcoholic hallucination due to alcohol withdrawal at the time of the murders and there was a reasonable probability that Long committed the murders in a psychotic episode and did not know that his conduct was wrong. However, Hester stated that Long was "malingering" on one of the tests he had administered. In addition, Long stated in a second interview that perhaps he was possessed by demons. When Hester confronted with the fact that he had not mentioned demons during the first interview, Long dropped the subject. Hester admitted that he had previously concluded in one of his reports that, "there was no evidence to support insanity obtained in any of my interactions or testing of the defendant." Ultimately, Hester acknowledged that he could not render an opinion whether Long was legally insane when he committed the murders. Long's brother Gary, who is four years older than Long, and sister Linda Dornhoff, who is seven years older than Long, testified that Long changed after their mother's death when Long was ten years old. Gary and Linda related that their father's subsequent alcohol abuse and neglect of Long and their other brother Daniel resulted in the two boys being placed in various institutions and foster homes. By age twelve, Long was in reform school. Both believed that Long had serious mental problems and a long history of substance abuse. Linda also described that when their mother became sick, their father would go out drinking and leave the children alone. Following one such episode, their father brought a woman home from the bar and had sex with her in front of his children. Dr. James Grigson, a psychiatrist called by the State, testified that he had met Long, reviewed medical records of Long's previous hospitalizations, and met with the defense expert. Grigson's attempt to examine Long was not unsuccessful. Based on a hypothetical question encompassing the facts in evidence, Grigson testified that he would diagnose Long with a severe sociopathic personality disorder. He noted that such a diagnosis coincided with Dr. Hester's diagnosis as well as test results from Long's previous hospitalizations. An antisocial personality disorder is not a disease or defect, and there was no evidence of organic damage in Long's medical records. According to Grigson, Long was not insane or suffering from a disease or defect and understood the difference between right and wrong. Grigson also testified that it is not unusual for an individual to exhibit behaviors fitting a wide range of diagnoses and that a sociopath sometimes does this to manipulate his doctors. He believed Long may have done this because the later medical records reveal no evidence of schizophrenia and "schizophrenia doesn't come and go." ++++++ M. F. 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