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I've moved to Washington. My new address is:
Paul Wolf
3801 Connecticut Ave NW #300
Washington, DC 20008
(202) 364-7225
No news on the Gaitan court case, which has been languishing in
the courts, as they say. We're expecting something to happen any
time now, but it's hard to guess at the timetable.
If we win the case, and the CIA is compelled to release its
files, this would be quite a dramatic victory, considering the
Bush administration's hostility to freedom of information. The
government even hired private contractors to re-classify files
that have already been released, and this has apparently caused
all kinds of chaos.
Attorney General John Ashcroft has said that the Department of
Justice will defend in court any agency witholding records for
reasons of national security. Actually, that's what they're
already doing in the Gaitan FOIA case - Assistant United States
Attorney Diane M. Sullivan is representing
the CIA and FBI.
In the meantime, I've found a whole series of memoranda and
telegrams on Colombia's emergency request for helicopters to
use against the "Independent Republics" in the battle of
Marquetalia. This battle is often cited as the beginning of
the current FARC insurgency. The documents below are linked
on my webpage:
http://www.derechos.net/paulwolf/colombia/drugwar.htm
I need to register a domain name for this page - I'd appreciate
any names people could suggest. Also, I'm looking for photos
relating to the bogotazo, la violencia, or the violence of the
1960s, or references to photos in books, to go along with these
documents and help illustrate "the secret history of Colombia".
- Paul
Helicopters for Colombia, May 14, 1964
http://www.derechos.net/paulwolf/colombia/lazoadams14may1964.htm
In Tolima State (rugged mountainous region mid-way between Bogot�
and Cali in the Cauca Valley) there have been two trouble spots
-- a bandit (criminal) area in the north, and a communist-bandit
"enclave" in the south (an area known as Marquetalia). The latter
is the most active and strongest communist "enclave" of 4 or 5
scattered through Colombia.
Because criminal bandits have been responsible for more deaths and
greater brutality in recent years than have been the communist-led
outlaw groups (which have killed largely for political reasons),
the GOC has been moving more energetically in trying to wipe out
the bandit groups than in fighting the communist bands.
Within the past 3 months the Colombian Army has killed the two
leading bandit chiefs in northern Tolima ("Desquite" and "Sangre
Negra"), and the GOC has announced the "pacification" of that
area. (Actually, the bandit groups, while seriously hurt, are
still moderately active, and army units, plus helicopters, must
remain in northern Tolima to finish the job.)
With the recent successes against the bandits in northern Tolima,
the army's enthusiasm and morale is high, and its plans to move
against the communist-led bandit "enclave" in southern Tolima
have been speeded up. The GOC has announced an immediate clean-up
operation against the "enclave" and its prestige, as well as that
of the army, is now committed to an early and effective campaign.
Moreover, the communist groups, made up in part by escaped
criminals and political prisoners, well-armed and firmly
entrenched in the area, has become more active in terrorizing the
region in an attempt to discourage the GOC from moving against it.
Our National Policy Paper on Colombia (presently in final draft)
sets forthone of our principal objectives as the elimination of
the potential for subversive insurgency inherent in the continued
existence of active bandit groups, guerrilla bands, and communist-
dominated "enclaves".
History of Colombian Request for Helicopters, circa May 14, 1964
http://www.derechos.net/paulwolf/colombia/lazoadams14may1964.htm
On 1 May 1964, the Embassy emphasized its previous position
stating that the campaign against the communist enclaves was
prompted by increased activity and fear that communists would be
successful in uniting the enclaves. The campaign was an integral
part of the Internal Defense Plan approved by the Special Group
(CI) and urged on the Colombian Government by the United States.
Telegram from Bogota Embassy to Secretary of State April 1, 1964
http://www.derechos.net/paulwolf/colombia/lazodearborn1apr1964.htm
In letter, Valencia stated above equipment would be used against
communist centers in southern Tolima (dominated by Marulanda or
"Tiro Fijo"); the central and eastern cordilleras of Huila; and
Rio Chiquito, Cauca. Valencia emphasized in letter that communists
these areas are genuine and not crypto-communists. Also claimed
they oriented toward Cuba whence they receive direction and
financing.
This loan request did not come as surprise, since we given advance
information on GOC military plans move against Marulanda in Huila-
Tolima some time ago. ... Troops already being moved into position
southern Tolima, northern Huila and should be deployed on or about
April 20 for operations.
Telegram from Bogota Embassy to Secretary of State April 10, 1964
http://www.derechos.net/paulwolf/colombia/lazodearborn10apr1964.htm
We strongly believe we must provide all possible assistance
to foster success operations against communists. For political
reasons, do not see how we can fail give maximum support GOC in
project which so clearly in our mutual interest and which
represents voluntary GOC effort reduce communist danger this
country. Operations against communist areas represent logical
extension internal defense plan to support of which we committed.
Our judgement is we must accede President Valencia's request to
fullest measure possible. There no question but that requirement
exists and that objective deserves strongest US support.
Telegram from Bogota Embassy to Secretary of State April 25, 1964
http://www.derechos.net/paulwolf/colombia/lazodearborn25apr1964.htm
No doubt at all Marulanda and his followers genuine communists.
Are currently receiving propaganda support Bogota other parts
country from Communist Party, Fedepetrol Union, Communist Youth
and other extremists.
GOC and its military forces firmly committed to campaign against
Marulanda with troops and aircraft already deployed. They intend
carry plan to successful conclusion. We wish emphasize here that
prestige of government from President on down is at stake in anti-
commie campaign.
Possibility cannot be excluded, in view increasing commie
propaganda support Marquetalia, that other zones (El Pato,
Riochiquito, Sumapaz) may begin diversionary operations when
situation begins tighten on Marulanda. In such event, contingency
planning requires mobility provided by additional helicopters
which could be tactically diverted to provide temporary punitive
reaction of sort employed with success in northern Tolima anti-
bandit campaign.
In order provide best chance of GOC success we firmly convinced
additional helicopters needed now.
Telegram from State/DOD to Bogota Embassy May 1, 1964
http://www.derechos.net/paulwolf/colombia/lazorusk1may1964.htm
All Washington agencies share Embassy's desire provide continued
support Colombian anti-bandit campaign in most vigorous possible
way and agree that Colombian effort against small Communist
affiliated enclaves represents next logical stage this campaign.
Telegram from Bogota Embassy to Secretary of State May 8, 1964
http://www.derechos.net/paulwolf/colombia/lazodearborn8may1964.htm
Military units already in position Marquetalia and adjoining
regions and have begun civic action and psychological operations.
Communists and other extremists have campaign underway to "defend
Marquetalia". There even reports of as yet undetermined veracity
of Cuban arms shipment intended for Marquetalia. Colombian papers
also reporting Soviet endorsement "violent revolution" those
parts LA where such measures justified. Thus, we have situation
in which GOC prestige absolutely committed to reduction "Tiro
Fijo" influence Marquetalia and communists increasingly
committed prevent this. As Dept aware, GOC action against
communist areas was made integral part of Internal Defense Plan
approved by Special Group (CI) in 1962 and urged by US on
Colombian Government.
Asst. Sec. of State to Deputy Asst. Sec. of Defense, May 11, 1964
http://www.derechos.net/paulwolf/colombia/lazomann11may1964.htm
In the past year the Colombian armed forces and police have been
remarkably successful in reducing banditry in the northern Tolima
region. To a significant degree this success has resulted from the
provision of medium helicopters under the Military Assistance
Program.
The President of Colombia has now requested extraordinary assistance
to deal with a new phase of the Colombian counter-banditry campaign.
The Colombian Government has stepped up its timetable and is
preparing to expand its operations to include a campaign against
well-established communist-led bandit groups in a new area of
Colombia. ... It is of priority importance that the momentum of the
Colombian campaign not falter. I believe that we should continue to
provide them with every reasonable encouragement and assistance. In
view of the facts of this case and the Presidential request, I feel
that the fulfillment of our political objectives in Colombia
requires the provision of these helicopters.
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